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EDITORS' NOTE
On January 30, 2009, The Denver University Law Review joined
forces with the University of Colorado's Byron R. White Center for the
Study of American Constitutional Law to host a Symposium, simply
titled "Home Rule." Held in the Old Supreme Court Chambers at the
Colorado State Capitol in Denver, the event brought together the nation's
top home rule scholars for a spirited discussion. Fittingly, a large part of
the discussion focused on Colorado and the recent Colorado Supreme
Court decision, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp, 185 P.3d
161 (Colo. 2008).
The Telluride court issued a ruling that appears to strongly protect
the home rule power for municipalities; consequently, the majority of
articles in this Symposium Issue address Telluride and its nationwide
implications. In the pages that follow are thoughts from some of the
brightest minds commenting on constitutional law today. The format for
this Symposium Issue includes five Articles, each of which are followed
by an invited Comment.
First, Professor Clayton P. Gillette from the New York University
School of Law addresses the impact of home rule on a municipality's
revenue raising powers in Fiscal Home Rule, and Professor Paul Diller
from the Willamette University College of Law comments on Professor
Gillette's article.
Second, Professor Laurie Reynolds of the University of Illinois Col-
lege of Law takes an in-depth look at the relevance of extraterritorial
impact to home rule powers, followed by University of California at
Berkeley School of Law Professor Michelle Wilde Anderson's comment
on Professor Reynolds' piece.
Third is Columbia University Law School Professor Richard Brif-
fault's analysis of the relationship between extraterritoriality and its im-
pact on local governments and interlocal relations. Professor Christopher
Serkin of the Brooklyn Law School then provides his views on Professor
Briffault's Article.
Fourth, Professors Lynn A. Baker and Daniel B. Rodriguez of the
University of Texas School of Law discuss how state courts examine
state/local conflicts, followed by a Comment from Professor Nestor M.
Davidson of the University of Colorado Law School.
Finally, Professor Richard Collins, Director of the Byron R. White
Center and professor of law at the University of Colorado Law School,
details the saga of Telluride and its implications. Hofstra Law School
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Professor Ashira Pelman Ostrow concludes the Issue with a Comment on
Professor Collins' analysis.
In addition to this Issue's contributors, we would like to recognize
the other speakers who helped enhance the dialogue at the Symposium.
First, a special thank you to Leslie A. Fields, partner in the Denver office
of Faegre & Benson LLP, for discussing her efforts as counsel for the
prevailing town of Telluride in this Issue's dominant case. David W.
Broadwell, Chief Legal Adviser to the Denver City Council, provided a
strong voice for the impact Telluride will have in Colorado going for-
ward, and he also provided comments on Professor Briffault's presenta-
tion. Richard A. Westfall, partner in the Denver law firm of Hale Friesen
LLP, also presented his arguments for why Telluride was wrongly de-
cided, a much-needed minority opinion in the debate over Telluride.
Finally, a special thank you to Professor Richard Collins and the
Byron R. White Center for presenting this opportunity and helping us
make this Symposium Issue possible. Professor Collins and the Center's
conference coordinator, Danielle Hayward, have been a true pleasure to
work with and we hope this is the beginning of a unique partnership be-







In times of national fiscal distress, cities suffer multiple wounds.
States tend to compensate for reduced tax revenues by decreasing aid to
their political subdivisions. In recent months, for example, New York's
Governor has proposed closing an anticipated $15.4 billion deficit in part
by reducing school aid to localities by $698 million and cutting an addi-
tional $240 million in aid to New York City.' California has considered
proposals to address its budget crisis by withholding appropriated funds
from counties.2 These proposals have materialized just as cities expe-
rience declines in their own revenues. New York City's Independent
Budget Office has estimated that city tax revenues will fall by $2.8 bil-
lion in fiscal year 2009 to $34.7 billion and by an additional $380 million
in 2010.3 New York City may be an extreme example in the current en-
vironment, given the demise of the financial sector that has recently gen-
erated a significant percentage of New York City's revenues. But the
phenomenon, if not the degree, is common to other municipalities as
faltering property values and job losses reduce tax and business receipts
on which cities depend.
In theory, these reductions could be offset, at least in part, by local
revenue-raising initiatives. Wholly apart from the limited fiscal capacity
that localities enjoy to increase revenues without inducing firms and in-
dividuals to exit the jurisdiction, however, the legal capacity of home
rule cities to raise revenue is a prime example of the diverse meanings of
local autonomy. In some jurisdictions, the constitutional grant of home
rule entails the power to impose taxes. In others, however, authority to
impose taxes is explicitly exempted from the constitutional grant. In still
others, home rule cities are allowed to impose some taxes, but not others.
Judicial interpretation of home rule has imposed further restrictions. For
example, the Colorado Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the scope
t Max E. Greenberg Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. Thanks are
due to Lynn Baker, Richard Briffault, Richard Collins, Nestor Davidson, Laurie Reynolds, Dan
Rodriguez, and other participants in the January 30, 2009 Conference on Home Rule. I am particu-
larly grateful to Ben Holzer, NYU School of Law Class of 2009, for excellent research assistance.
1. See Conor Dougherty & Amy Merrick, States Squeeze Cities, Spreading the Economic
Pain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2008, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.comlarticle/SB 122955325187
415831.html.
2. See Loretta Kalb & Robert Lewis, Revolt Brews in Counties, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 5,
2009, at IA, available at http://www.sacbee.com/capitolandcalifornia/story/1600656.html.
3. N.Y. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, FISCAL OUTLOOK: As ECONOMY WEAKENS, CrIy'S
BUDGET GAPS SWELL 1 (2009), http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/FiscalOutlookJan2009.pdf.
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of fiscal home rule to deny cities the capacity to enact a local income
tax.4 Finally, even where the home rule grant is silent with respect to
revenue raising, general provisions of state constitutional law-such as
debt limitations, tax limitations, balanced budget requirements, and limi-
tations on fees and charges-may restrict municipal fiscal powers.
In a sense, the very notion of restricting revenue raising by home
rule municipalities seems oxymoronic. Chief Justice Marshall's equation
of the power of states to tax a federal entity as the power to destroy it5
has an unspoken corollary: the power to deny taxing authority has the
same effect. Shorn of the capacity to raise revenue, the ability of home
rule municipalities to realize the objectives of decentralized governments
would be vulnerable to the very interference by the state that home rule
presumably displaced. For a state to embrace home rule as a doctrinal
matter, but then to maintain a monopoly over the means of financing the
projects that localities wish to pursue undermines much of the purpose of
local autonomy. Any justification for legal restrictions on revenue rais-
ing, such as to constrain inefficient expenditures by public officials, must
still be compared to potential alternatives for achieving the same objec-
tive, such as the market for residence and mobile capital, that might have
different impacts on the objectives of decentralization.
To see why this is the case, consider the various rationales that are
proffered for decentralization. The primary economic justification for
decentralization is reflected in the enormous body of literature that fol-
lowed Charles Tiebout's pure theory of a market for residence. In this
account, the variety of local governments allows prospective residents
and firms (at least those who have mobility and information about differ-
ent jurisdictions) to migrate to areas that offer a preferred bundle of
goods and services at a particular tax price. In this idealized competition
for mobile capital, localities are induced to provide local public goods at
prices that reflect the same marginal cost principles that would prevail in
a market for private goods under perfect competition. Failure to deliver
desired services, or to finance services that are provided through a me-
chanism consistent with residents' preferences, means losing residents
and tax base to competitors. In the happy version of the Tieboutian sto-
ry, interlocal competition creates a race to the top: localities strive to
offer preferred goods and services in as efficient a manner as possible in
order to avoid exit by mobile capital to more hospitable jurisdictions, and
individuals and firms locate in those jurisdictions where they can be most
socially productive. The variety of local governments that efficiently
offer different bundles of local public goods increases welfare, as more
individuals are able to realize their preferences than would be possible in
a more heterogeneous centralized jurisdiction. In a jurisdiction of 1,000
4. City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441,447 (Colo. 1958).
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819).
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residents, 600 of whom desire municipal funding of a new stadium and
400 of whom do not, the majority can impose its will on the minority. If
the dissidents live in a jurisdiction of their own, the majority can fund the
stadium it desires, while the minority can forgo that project altogether.
The assumptions that one must make in order to realize the Tiebout
result-concerning perfect mobility, absence of externalities, and infor-
mation about a large number of jurisdictions-are obviously too heroic
to reflect real world conditions. Nevertheless, with some caveats that I
will discuss, there does exist significant empirical evidence to support
this happy story of race-to-the-top fiscal competition.6 To the extent that
the assumptions of the Tiebout model can be realized, local governments
can provide the goods and services that residents prefer or define the
functions of the community that presumably favor decentralized gov-
ernment over regional or statewide alternatives.
Pursuit of decentralized conceptions of local autonomy, however,
typically entails a funding mechanism. Constraints on the fiscal tools
that municipalities are allowed to utilize necessarily interfere with the
Tiebout sorting that recommends the use of decentralized governments to
attract residents who desire certain goods and services and therefore pro-
vide local public goods efficiently. That is, the restrictions interfere with
interlocal competition for residence and mobile capital by privileging
some forms of revenue raising and disfavoring or prohibiting others,
notwithstanding that local decisions about these matters would better
serve municipal purposes. As Wallace Oates notes, models of local gov-
ernment competition that lead to efficient results rely on assumptions that
the localities have access to the full range of fiscal and regulatory policy
instruments.7
One does not have to accept the Tiebout hypothesis as either a de-
scriptive or normative matter to understand that constraints on the fiscal
tools available to a locality interfere with the ability of local governments
to realize the benefits of decentralization. The recent investigation by
Professors Gerald Frug and David Barron, who reject many of the impli-
cations of the competitive model of local government, into the scope of
autonomy enjoyed by different municipalities decries the constraints on
revenue raising that the city of Boston suffers compared to other cities
such as Chicago and Denver.8  Frug and Barron contend that arguments
about local autonomy are misconceived insofar as they focus on
longstanding debates about whether cities should pursue developmental
6. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 40-42 (2001); Wallace E.
Oates, The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Spending on Property Values: An Empirical Study of
Tax Capitalization and the Tiebout Hypothesis, 77 J. POL. ECON. 957, 960-70 (1969); John Douglas
Wilson, Theories of Tax Competition, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 269, 289 (1999).
7. Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal and Regulatory Competition: Theory and Evidence, 3
PERSPECKTrWEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOKLrr 377, 379-80 (2002).
8. GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CnrY BouND 75-92 (2008).
12432009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
or redistributive policies, growth or no-growth policies, or use-value or
exchange-value policies. 9 Urban institutional structures, they argue,
should permit cities to consider a more robust set of opportunities that
transcend the dichotomous choices that conventional theory has imposed
on them. Even if cities desire to explore novel options for their environ-
ments, the authors recognize, the success of the venture will largely de-
pend on the legal authority of cities to implement their visions. Among
the primary mechanisms that Frug and Barron identify as prerequisites to
local imagination is fiscal autonomy. As they conclude, the set of reve-
nue tools that a city employs necessarily affects the policies it is able to
implement. Property taxes, sales taxes, and income taxes impose differ-
ent burdens on different constituents and thus affect the decisions a local-
ity makes about what resources to attract and what resources to abandon.
According to Frug and Barron, the constraints that Massachusetts places
on its home rule jurisdictions are all the more troublesome because Bos-
ton procures a larger percentage of its revenues from the primary tax
used by cities-the property tax-than do cities with broader taxing
power. Perhaps Boston would, if granted greater leeway, prefer a differ-
ent mix of financial instruments, some of which are currently beyond its
authority, to pay for city services, and thus create a different set of incen-
tives for private activity that are affected by different revenue devices.
To the extent that the state controls revenue raising, it necessarily con-
stricts the set of policy choices available to the city. While Frug and
Barron do not advocate "local autonomy on tax issues," because the state
may have an interest in the level of taxes any of its cities imposes, they
do endorse a rethinking of the allocation of revenue-raising power among
state and local jurisdictions.'
°
Withholding taxing power from home rule cities, moreover, does
not simply threaten to forestall particular projects that the locality has
identified as worth pursuing. It has a more subtle and potentially more
notorious consequence of instantiating a particularly limited view of the
proper role of cities. The power to tax is typically defined in a manner
that pertains only to those exactions that meet two conditions: the
proceeds of the exaction flow into the general fund of the local treasury,
and the amount payable is not based on the provision of specified goods
or services to the payer. Exactions that do not satisfy these criteria, such
as tolls, service charges, assessments, and user fees that are benefit-
based, typically fall outside restrictions on taxes. The inherently ambi-
guous distinction between a fee and a tax gives rise to a wealth of litiga-
tion, as municipalities seek to circumvent limitations on taxing authority
9. Id. at 23-30.
10. Id. at 87.
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by denominating as valid fees exactions that payers then challenge as
invalid taxes."
My primary concern here is not the proper resolution of those cases.
Rather, my concern is what the distinction itself says about the proper
scope of local autonomy. Part of my argument in this Article is that the
disparate treatment of taxes and fees implies a distrustful view of redi-
stributive municipal expenditures that are necessarily funded through
taxes rather than through benefit-based fees. A legal regime that privi-
leges the use of benefit-based exactions over taxes implicitly affirms that
distrust. It may be that skepticism about municipal redistribution is justi-
fied.12 For current purposes, I am agnostic on that issue. My claim here
is only that we must recognize that the differential treatment of local
legal capacity to impose taxes and non-tax revenue obligations assumes
that the two categories have different degrees of legitimacy.
I. THE SCOPE OF FISCAL HOME RULE
Home rule, which too frequently is used as a generic term to charac-
terize the capacity of local governments to initiate legislation without the
prior approval of the state legislature, means very different things in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Home rule cities in some jurisdictions have the au-
thority to trump state legislation in matters of mixed local and state con-
cern, while in other jurisdictions home rule provides no such supremacy.
In some jurisdictions, home rule status confers the ability to legislate
extraterritorially or with respect to civil relationships; in other jurisdic-
tions, not. And in some jurisdictions, home rule means that localities can
decide how to pay for publicly provided goods and services without leg-
islative constraint, while in other jurisdictions home rule implies far less
fiscal authority.
A few examples illustrate the variety of provisions that govern fis-
cal home rule. The Massachusetts Home Rule Amendment withholds
taxing power from home rule cities, in apparent disregard of the principle
that "home rule without money is meaningless."' 13 Iowa and Tennessee
permit home rule cities to impose only those taxes that the legislature
preapproves.14 Illinois requires legislative approval for home rule cities
to license for revenue, or to impose taxes measured by income.' 5 As I
indicated above, ambiguous constitutional provisions are vulnerable to
11. Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the "Get What You Pay For"
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 425-30 (2004); see also Emerson Coll. v. City of
Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1100-02 (Mass. 1984).
12. See Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordinances, and Judicial
Intervention, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1057, 1085-88 (2007).
13. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 8, at 77.
14. IOWA CONsT. art. I § 38A; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9.
15. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(e).
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narrow judicial interpretation of home rule, which may deny cities the
capacity to enact taxes that local officials prefer.
6
Even those home rule jurisdictions that do have the capacity to tax
are subject to state constitutional provisions that restrict the set of fiscal
policy choices and the set of fiscal tools that they are able to employ. In
their excellent compendium of the scope of home rule, Krane, Rigos, and
Hill report a variety of constraints on the discretion of home rule munici-
palities to structure fiscal arrangements.17 Constitutional limitations on
property tax rates, balanced budget requirements, debt limitations, and
the like all remove from the locality the ability to rely on market me-
chanisms alone to decide basic fiscal issues; that is, what services to pro-
vide and how to pay for them. Even states, such as Colorado, that pro-
vide a strong form of home rule-that is, a form that allows local ordin-
ances to trump conflicting state statutes with respect to municipal af-
fairs-have adopted state constitutional provisions to constrain local
revenue-raising power.
18
For the most part, restrictions apply to taxing authority, but not to
non-tax revenue raising. That is, even if a home rule municipality is not
entitled to impose an income tax or an ad valorem property tax in excess
of state constitutional restrictions, it may still impose user fees or service
charges for services it provides. This distinction instantiates a particular,
contestable view of what cities should do. Fees and charges are typically
required to be benefit based. That is, fees and charges can be imposed in
amounts that reflect the cost of the service conferred on the payer or the
benefit received by the payer, but no more.19 This is a perfectly rational
mechanism for defraying the cost of publicly provided services. Locali-
ties provide local public goods such as garbage collection or road paving
in order to solve collective action problems that would cause these goods
to be undersupplied, relative to demand, if their provision were left to the
marketplace. Once the locality decides to provide a local public good,
however, it may be perfectly appropriate for the locality to charge for
that service using the same principles of marginal cost pricing that a pri-
vate provider would charge under ideal competitive circumstances. 20
Any other pricing mechanism would cause residents who would be will-
ing to pay the cost of providing the service to avoid it (if the governmen-
tally imposed charge is too high), or would cause residents who don't
value the service as much as it costs to utilize it anyway (if the charge is
too low). If the good is being publicly provided to compensate for a pri-
16. City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441,447 (Colo. 1958).
17. DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RiGos & MELVIN B. HELL JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA 4-6
(2001).
18. HCA-Healthone, LLC v. City of Lone Tree, 197 P.3d 236, 241-42 (Colo. App. 2008).
19. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REv. 795, 800 (1987).
20. See Jerome W. Milliman, Beneficiary Charges: Toward a Unified Theory, in PUBLIC
PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS 27, 33-35 (Selma J. Mushkin ed., 1972).
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vate market failure, either of these results would cause a misallocation.
In addition, benefit-based charges with marginal cost pricing provide
signals to local officials concerning the preferences of residents for par-
ticular services, as evidenced by their willingness to pay for them. 21
Because these signals are based on charges for individual services, they
may provide more accurate signals about resident preferences than elec-
tions, which are infrequent and require binary votes on an entire bundle
of services. In short, fee-based services are likely to improve the effi-
ciency of government provision by mimicking competitive pricing mod-
els and delivering only those services that residents value in amounts at
least as great as their cost. This is not to say that government should
never vary from competitive pricing in order to redistribute wealth. It is
only to say that when localities act to correct a market failure rather than
for redistributive purposes, marginal cost-based fees are a reasonable
means of exacting payment.
Perhaps these advantages of benefit-based exactions explain the de-
creasing importance of property taxes, and the narrow use even in home
rule localities of local sales or income taxes. According to Krane, Rigos,
and Hill, property taxes account for more than 75 percent of municipal
revenues in only three states, and for less than 40 percent in eight
22states. Charges and user fees account for between 30 and 50 percent of
municipal revenues in twelve states.23 One might initially believe that
these exactions dilute any claim about municipal impotence for home
rule municipalities that lack taxing authority, since taxes comprise a sub-
stantial, but incomplete, share of municipal revenues. But the distinction
between taxes and fees informs the point that I am making about the
conception of cities implicit in the denial of home rule authority to tax.
To conclude that home rule local governments properly utilize benefit-
based exactions where they desire to match benefits and burdens seems a
far cry from saying that they should be constrained from using alterna-
tive revenue-raising devices, such as taxes that are predicated on ability
to pay, should local officials believe that the alternatives will advance
other policy objectives. The greater constraints that many jurisdictions
suffer in utilizing taxes induces localities to employ alternatives, even
where doing so is less consistent with municipal policy objectives con-
cerning the incidence of payment for municipal services. While local
governments have a crucial role to play in the allocation of local public
goods, the effect of privileging fees over taxes is to deny home rule mu-
nicipalities the same discretion to engage in redistribution or to encour-
age or discourage favored or disfavored local activities.
21. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 19, at 800-01.
22. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 17, at 490 tbi.A15 (results not reported for six states).
23. Id.
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From the perspective of the market for residence and mobile capital,
these restrictions seem particularly anomalous. I have suggested above
that localities can thicken the market for residence by selecting fiscal
tools that they believe will attract desired firms and individuals. State
constraints on the set of fiscal tools that localities can select perversely
restrict that market. For example, localities may seek to attract popula-
tions that require redistributive services in order to provide support ser-
vices for high-income earners, where doing so increases a population that
increases net local revenues. Those of us who experience the joys of
New York understand that the predicate for the diversity of culture, res-
taurants, and intellectual stimulation that the City offers depends heavily
on attracting both national and international immigrants, many of whom
will require redistributive services in the short run. 24 To the extent that
restrictions on fiscal home rule imply that localities should do nothing
other than address market failures, they artificially confine the ability of
cities to experiment with distributive programs that are explicitly related
to attracting mobile capital and that can serve as models for more centra-
lized levels of government.
Moreover, those constraints have what, at least initially, appear to
be perverse consequences. A common critique of market-for-residence
analyses of local governments is that they encourage localities to concen-
trate on goods and services that disproportionately benefit the relatively
wealthy.25 On this understanding, a city would prefer to enact benefit-
based fiscal policies that attract development and the wealthy rather than
redistributive policies that underwrite programs that disproportionately
benefit the relatively poor. Indeed, the orthodox theory of urban finance
suggests that local governments should not engage in redistribution be-
cause those who pay redistributive taxes can too easily exit the jurisdic-
tion for benefit-based suburbs, while still exploiting the central city for
employment, entertainment, and shopping.26 But if localities and local
officials already have significant incentives to avoid redistributive taxes,
then there might be less need for legal restrictions that have the same
effect. In light of the disincentives to use local redistributive taxes, one
might conclude that a locality that chooses to do so is presumptively in-
volved in advancing the kind of unique program or local preference that
home rule is intended to encourage. Of course, local officials may be
using redistributive taxation for less desirable purposes, such as to divert
public funds to favored groups, notwithstanding that the expenditures
24. See John M. Quigley, Urban Diversity and Economic Growth, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 127,
136(1998).
25. See Reynolds, supra note 11, at 374-75.
26. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 131-40 (1972); see also JOHN CULLIS &
PHILIP JONES, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 303-05 (2d ed. 1998); PAUL E. PETERSON,
CITY LIMITS 182-83 (1981); PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 27-28 (1995); Richard
A. Musgrave, Fiscal Federalism, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING
VISIONS OF THE STATE 155, 160-61 (James M. Buchanan & Richard A. Musgrave eds., 1999).
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will deviate from residents' preferences.27 But recognizing the possibili-
ty that local officials may misbehave does not entail the kind of presump-
tion of misconduct that is implicit in the constitutional constraint on local
taxation.
Indeed, constraints on local taxation may have a more nefarious ef-
fect. Since most state constitutional constraints do not prohibit local
taxation, but only make it subject to state legislative preapproval, there is
a risk that state legislators will use their plenary power over taxing au-
thority in ways that serve the objectives of their constituents while dis-
serving the interests of the state as a whole. It is plausible, for instance,
that state legislators could refuse to authorize a commuter tax for a cen-
tral city, notwithstanding that the tax would properly reimburse the city
for the net costs of providing services to commuters. Legislators who are
responsive to their suburban constituents will have tendencies to vote
against additional taxes of which the central city is the primary benefi-
ciary. Unless one believes that state legislators will systematically be
more publicly interested in deciding the proper scope of local taxation
than are local officials themselves, there is a risk that making local taxing
power hostage to state discretion will disserve the interests of both juris-
dictions.
II. THE ARGUMENT FOR LIMITED FISCAL HOME RULE
To say that restraints on home rule are problematic is not necessari-
ly to say that unlimited fiscal home rule is desirable. A variety of argu-
ments support the proposition that fiscal home rule poses its own dan-
gers, and that those dangers will be minimized by allowing the state
some discretion over the scope of local revenue raising. One argument
could rely on the standard justification for restricting home rule authori-
ty-the generation of negative external effects of local action. Home
rule localities typically have authority to act only within the sphere of
local or municipal affairs. Thus, if local financial decisions have suffi-
cient implications for neighboring municipalities or for the state, then
some centralized constraint might be appropriate.
I have thus far told a happy race-to-the-top story about interlocal
fiscal competition. But some theories suggest that interlocal competition
will generate a race to the bottom that imposes adverse external effects.
There are two separate stories along these lines. In the first, the decision
of one locality to decrease its tax rate and thus to attract mobile capital
will adversely affect the jurisdiction from which mobile capital departs,
and that loss will not necessarily be offset by production gains in the new
locality. As a result, localities will compete with low tax rates and low
27. See infra text accompanying notes 31-34. See generally Gillette, supra note 12 (discuss-
ing the distinction between beneficial and more malign uses of local redistribution).
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service levels in order to discourage mobile capital from exiting.28 Al-
ternatively, a locality may generate spillovers by failing to provide ser-
vices that have positive effects in other jurisdictions. But those extra-
mural effects will not be taken into account by any locality in deciding
its own levels, because the nonresident beneficiaries cannot easily be
taxed for the services they receive. As a result, a locality will set a tax
rate and public service level that, from a social perspective, is too low.
29
These effects, however, do not support constrained fiscal home rule.
The first problem, failure to tax mobile capital sufficiently, suggests that
the locality is not taxing enough. But restrictions on fiscal home rule
emanate from just the opposite problem: a concern that the locality will
tax too much. The concern for underprovision from a regional perspec-
tive is similarly unrelated to fiscal constraints on localities. If localities
create spillover benefits, then it is not at all clear why they, rather than
the nonresident beneficiaries, should pay for them. The state may wish
to subsidize local activity in order to solve the problem of underprovi-
sion. Alternatively, the state could explicitly authorize taxing of nonre-
sidents to obtain reimbursement to the locality that provides the services.
But that strategy as well entails enhancing the revenue-raising authority
of localities, not restricting it.
An additional externality argument that may support tax constraints
involves the possibility that local taxes will adversely affect state taxes.
An increase in local taxes that encourages exit by mobile capital can re-
duce the tax base that is available to the state, and thus force a reduction
of state services or require further increases at the state level.30 Alterna-
tively, increased local taxes will likely reduce tolerance for increased
state taxes. Vertical tax competition, that is, may be less desirable than
horizontal tax competition. But this argument assumes that taxing at the
state level is more efficient and will be used for better purposes than tax-
ing at the local level. As I have suggested above, it is not necessarily the
case that state lawmakers are more prone to spend wisely than local
lawmakers. One might believe that state legislators are better positioned
to determine the optimal level of taxation for local governments because
the state internalizes both the costs and benefits of local taxation, while
the local governments will consider only intramunicipal effects. I have
suggested above that localities are typically viewed as taxing mobile
capital too little, not too much, so that the fears of encouraging exit seem
misplaced. But more to the point, there is little reason that the assumed
myopia of local legislators has no state analogue. State legislators who
wish to maximize state budgets in order to obtain credit for funding
28. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 379-80 (1996).
29. David Wildasin, Interjurisdictional Capital Mobility: Fiscal Externality and a Corrective
Subsidy, 25 J. URB. ECON. 193, 194-96 (1989).
30. See Wilson, supra note 6, at 289.
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projects may constrain local spending below the optimal level if they
perceive local taxes as competitive with state taxes. The fact that state
legislators have the authority to limit local taxes, in short, may be a func-
tion of the allocation of authority between state and local governments
generally, but it does not suggest that either set of actors is more likely to
spend in the interests of its constituents.
Thus, the argument for constrained fiscal home rule must ultimately
come from a belief that greater local fiscal autonomy will generate ad-
verse internal effects that legal restrictions can avoid. The underlying
assumption is that unbridled fiscal authority will cause local government
officials to impose taxes that are too high, in the sense of providing
goods and services that have a value to residents less than their tax price.
One strain of this argument derives from the claim that cities should
avoid redistributive functions. I suggested above that, in light of the in-
centives that cities already face to avoid local redistribution in order to
forestall exit, one should presume that any local redistributive taxation
conforms to resident preferences. But one could draw the opposite con-
clusion. That is, consistent with theories that local government officials
seek to maximize either public budgets, or their personal chances of re-
election, or post-public service employment, one could infer that any
instance of local redistributive taxes is presumptively an effort to subsid-
ize projects favored by dominant interest groups within the city or to
maximize budgetary discretion for local officials. 31 The implicit claim
on this theory is that local officials will systematically direct redistribu-
tive spending to projects that do not enjoy popular support. While this
threatens to induce mobile residents and capital to emigrate, exit is al-
ways constrained by assets invested in the current locality as well as ties
to jobs, friends, and family, and the agglomeration effects of being lo-
cated where other competitor finrs and support industries (lawyers,
bankers, accountants) are located.32 Thus, officials can exploit residents
at least up to a point without fearing that inefficient taxation will cause
exit. This more pessimistic public economy story suggests that local
revenue raising should be severely limited, or at least subjected to state
supervision. The implication is that in the absence of state fiscal re-
straints, local governments would overtax their constituents in order to
fund goods and services that their constituents did not want to pay for.
One might initially conclude that electoral constraints on public of-
ficials preclude them from overtaxing residents, or from using forms of
revenue raising that residents disfavor, or from expending funds in ways
31. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Curley Effect: The Economics of Shaping
the Electorate, 21 J.L ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2005).
32. See EDWARD L GLAESER, CIms, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUIMRIUM 116
(2008); David Schleicher, Why Are There Cities? Agglomeration and Sorting in Local Government
Law (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
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inconsistent with residents' preferences. But electoral constraints are
notoriously porous. First, as I suggested above, local officials face only
occasional and binary elections. If residents believe that officials are
doing a good job overall, no single policy is likely to lead to electoral
defeat for the official. A voter who believes that the schools are well run
and the garbage is collected on time may forgive the mayor for furnish-
ing her office with a solid mahogany desk or funding a new golf course
used only by wealthy residents.
Second, electoral checks arise only in the presence of political com-
petition, and there is significant evidence that local politics are less com-
petitive and less partisan than politics at more centralized levels of gov-
ernment. Local officials who enjoy a monopoly obviously have broader
discretion to impose taxes for projects that serve their own purposes,
even though they would not survive a direct vote by residents. Jessica
Trounstine demonstrates that monopolistic local officials target spending
towards their supporters more than non-monopolists. 33 The possibility
that expenditures can be distorted to assist non-representative subgroups
of residents is similarly reflected in models that suggest local officials
can influence the budget for favored projects by controlling the expendi-
ture agenda. For instance, Romer and Rosenthal indicate that agenda
setting by local officials can increase spending beyond what is optimally
preferred by residents. 34 Assume, for instance, that a city council that
has a monopoly over proposing expenditures advocates an expenditure of
$100,000 for a project. Assume further that most voters prefer the
project, but would prefer to fund it for no more than $80,000. If the
$80,000 expenditure is not on the table, the choice is now between a
$20,000 overexpenditure or abandonment of the project, which would
cause an $80,000 underexpenditure. Romer and Rosenthal suggest that
most voters will prefer the excessive expenditure. Thus, the ability of
government to propose a single alternative to the status quo permits, and
perhaps induces, excessive spending.
It is plausible, therefore, that electoral politics alone will insuffi-
ciently discipline local officials against .the use of fiscal tools that their
constituents disfavor. In theory, limitations on the taxing power can
serve as a corrective. Because local officials are likely to make expendi-
tures on basic services, restricting access to taxes will not harm recipients
of those services. Instead, the constraints will limit the pool of available
expenditures, and thus preclude those disfavored by a majority of resi-
dents.
Unfortunately, even if it is appropriate to impose some corrective on
officials' incentives to diverge from residents' fiscal preferences, broad
33. See JESSICA TROUNSTINE, POLmCAL MONOPOLIES IN AMERICAN CITIES 148-61 (2008).
34. See generally Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the
Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q.J. ECON. 563 (1979).
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legal restrictions on fiscal authority provide a rather blunt instrument that
can have perverse effects. Consider the constitutional restrictions on
property tax rates that several states have instituted. The literature that
has analyzed the effects of these limitations suggests that they have led to
significant unintended consequences. For example, David Figlio and
Arthur O'Sullivan find some evidence to support the proposition that
local governments manipulate service cuts in order to persuade voters of
the need to vote in favor of tax limit overrides by allowing observable
services to deteriorate, while continuing to fund less observable expendi-
tures that are likely to diverge from resident preferences.3 5 Other studies
raise questions about whether tax limitations effectively limit the size of
government or officials' access to revenues, rather than inducing officials
to substitute unconstrained sources for constrained sources. As Richard
Briffault has noted,3 6 some studies purport to demonstrate that tax caps
shift burdens to other fiscal tools, such as user fees. This shift is not nec-
essarily invidious, since, as I suggested above, user fees can provide
beneficial means of gauging preferences and increasing efficiency. But
user fees may also be regressive in ways that property taxes are not, and
the shift to benefit-based finance surely reduces flexibility to engage in
redistributive spending. Other studies, moreover, purport to demonstrate
that tax caps have had a selective restraining effect on the growth of gov-
ernment. For instance, one study suggests that the tax limitation in Illi-
nois had a restraining effect on school district operating expenditures, but
no effect on school district instructional spending.37 Still other studies
indicate that limitations on property taxes significantly constrain spend-
ing, but that those reductions are accompanied by increases in property
values only if the locality is able to find non-tax mechanisms to avoid
reductions in school spending.38 Limitations imposed during times of
fiscal surplus, when the state may be able to compensate for reductions
in local revenues that tax limitations cause, may be less available during
times of fiscal distress. Constitutional limitations, however, are unwiel-
dy to adjust or reverse. Any regret that residents come to feel in leaner
times likely comes too late.
The literature on unintended consequences may actually understate
the problem of tax limitations. The implicit claim of that literature is that
those who impose tax limits are myopic about the long-term conse-
35. David N. Figlio & Arthur O'Sullivan, The Local Response to Tax Limitation Measures:
Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 233, 233-34
(2001).
36. Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitu-
tional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 932 (2003); see also Richard F. Dye & Therese J. McGuire, The
Effect of Property Tax Limitation Measures on Local Government Fiscal Behavior, 66 J. PUB. ECON.
469 (1997).
37. Dye & McGuire, supra note 36, at 487.
38. Katharine L. Bradbury, Christopher J. Mayer & Karl E. Case, Property Tax Limits, Local
Fiscal Behavior, and Property Values: Evidence from Massachusetts Under Proposition 2 , 80 J.
PUB. ECON. 287, 309 (2001).
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quences of their current choice to limit the discretion of their local offi-
cials. But there is a plausible argument that, even in the short term, the
electorate affected by tax limits is insufficiently represented in the deci-
sion making process. It is one thing to permit residents of a locality to
constrain the taxing authority of their officials; it is quite another to con-
tend that local autonomy is served by permitting nonresidents to impose
the same limits. The referenda that have compelled state constitutional
tax limitations have been held at the state level. The limits themselves,
however, tend to apply to municipalities that impose property taxes, ra-
ther than to the state itself. This creates opportunities for strategic beha-
vior, as nonresidents have opportunities to constrain the taxing capacity
of localities in which they have investments that could be positively af-
fected by limits. Jacob Vigdor's analysis of Proposition 2 1/2 in Massa-
chusetts reveals the likelihood of just that voting pattern. Vigdor finds
that referenda on statewide property tax limits are used by voters to in-
fluence tax and spending decisions in neighboring jurisdictions where
they would otherwise have no voting power. Nonresident voters tend to
vote to limit taxes in neighboring jurisdictions in order to maximize the
value of nonresident employment and nonresident land ownership, and to
alter the characteristics of the target jurisdictions. 39 Any such result is
not easily reconciled with a claim that tax limitations make local officials
more accountable to their constituents.
Would greater fiscal home rule reduce these difficulties without in-
creasing the risk that local officials would deviate from residents' prefe-
rences? The literature on interlocal competition for residence and mobile
capital suggests a tentative answer in the affirmative. First, increasing
taxes for goods and services that residents disfavor raises incentives for
migration and deters investment by mobile capital that otherwise could
ultimately increase the locality's tax base. The literature on "revenue
hills" indicates that cities that increase taxes past a tipping point will
generate net decreases in tax collections as residents exit for more finan-
cially hospitable jurisdictions, leaving city officials with fewer funds to
allocate to city services or to redistribute to favored groups. 4° This sug-
gests that residents are sensitive to taxes and services in a manner that
limits the ability to local officials to use unpopular fiscal tools. Because
these effects are constant and dynamic, they serve as more effective con-
straints than occasional, binary elections. Local officials who have a full
array of financial tools can experiment with them all, and seek to balance
different allocations of burdens to react to the successes and failures of
other fiscal plans. Even political monopolies cannot resist these effects:
if political monopolists want either to maximize budgets or to maximize
39. Jacob L. Vigdor, Other People's Taxes: Nonresident Voters and Statewide Limitation of
Local Government, 47 J.L. & ECON. 453,472 (2004).
40. Andrew Haughwout, Robert Inman, Steven Craig & Thomas Luce, Local Revenue Hills:
Evidence from Four U.S. Cities, 86 REv. EON. & STAT. 570,582-83 (2004).
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their reputations, they will want to avoid the financial deterioration that
attends misuse of revenue raising.
Finally, any defects in the local political process should not lead us
into a Nirvana fallacy concerning state regulation of municipal fiscal
autonomy. There is little reason to believe that state legislators are suffi-
ciently pure of motive that they will necessarily correct the overreaching
of local officials without introducing distortions of their own. Instead,
the same interests that might lead local officials to deviate from the inter-
ests of their constituents could equally affect state officials. State impo-
sition of unfunded mandates that appear to impose fiscal obligations on
localities largely to avoid state responsibility for the concomitant ex-
penditures demonstrates that state officials can suffer from the same stra-
tegic behavior that distorts local budgetary decisions.41 The willingness
to allow localities to exercise a particular revenue-raising authority will
not necessarily be granted freely. Rather, it may become a valuable ob-
ject of logrolling or an opportunity by representatives of suburban dis-
tricts to exercise influence over decisions in the central city.
I am not suggesting that interlocal competition is a perfect con-
straint on local officials. Local officials who place a priority on econom-
ic development may favor exchange value over use value and thus ignore
residents' preferences in the hope of attracting a tax base that serves
more personal purposes. 42 The question, however, is not whether mar-
kets for residence are perfect, but whether they better constrain local
officials than constitutional restrictions on fiscal home rule. My claim is
that reliance on market mechanisms that signal both officials and resi-
dents of the propriety of different fiscal tools may be more responsive to
local conditions than less narrowly tailored legal restrictions that are
lumpy and sticky, or state control that is responsive to its own set of in-
terests that may interfere with the local market for residence without
producing any offsetting benefit.43
Ill. FISCAL HOME RULE AND DEBT
Virtually every state constitution imposes limits on the amount of
debt that its political subdivisions can issue in order to fund capital
projects, whether those subdivisions are granted home rule authority or
not. Typically, municipalities are restricted to an amount that is linked to
41. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Me. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 207 v. State Bd. of Educ., 487 N.E.2d
1053, 1055-57 (1l. App. Ct. 1985).
42. For analysis and critique of the differences between use value and exchange value, see
JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES 41-42, 103-11 (1987).
43. Note, however, that my argument about the disutility of tax limitations applies to localities
more than to the state. Because I rely on the market for residence, and that market is thicker among
localities than it is among states, I venture no view about whether tax limitations on states should
similarly be relaxed.
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the assessed property value in the jurisdiction." These limitations are
outgrowths of nineteenth century debacles in which local governments
borrowed heavily for capital improvements that were supposed to gener-
ate sufficient revenues to defray the costs of debt service, but that ulti-
mately defaulted. When those capital improvements, primarily railroads,
failed to materialize, local taxpayers were left holding the proverbial bag.
The result was an array of constitutional provisions such as public pur-
pose requirements, prohibitions on lending of credit, and debt limitations,
that restricted relationships between public and private entities.4 5
In theory, there is a justification for constitutional debt limitations
that makes them more acceptable than tax limitations, even for home rule
municipalities. Current residents do not necessarily internalize both the
full costs and full benefits of debt. Projects constructed with bond
proceeds will return immediate benefits, but the costs will be borne
largely by future residents who must pay debt service at a time when the
project may or may not be desirable. As a consequence, unless one be-
lieves that future debt service is fully capitalized into the current tax
structure and property values of the locality, current residents have an
incentive to utilize too much debt and to impose a temporal externality
on future residents. Legal constraints may be appropriate to prevent lo-
calities from becoming overextended for projects of dubious future value
if future residents who must pay the debt cannot protect themselves.
The relevant question, then, is not whether there is a need for a con-
straint on officials who might wish to issue debt, but whether constitu-
tional debt limits best fulfill that role. There are multiple reasons to be-
lieve that they do not. First, legal debt limitations do not preclude locali-
ties from issuing all debt. Rather, they preclude issuance of debt that
falls within the meaning of that term as it is used in interpretation of the
constitutional clauses. A century and a half of judicial construction of
these clauses has dramatically reduced the significance of debt limita-
tions. The early exclusion of obligations secured solely by revenues
generated by operation of the project financed with bond proceeds made
sense, insofar as payment of those debts was not secured by the munici-
pal treasury and thus did not expose residents to the risks of financial
distress that the limitations were intended to preclude.46 But subsequent
judicial contraction of the scope of constitutional "debt" has exposed the
municipal treasury to risk by validating evasive forms of financing that
testify to the imagination of intelligent bond lawyers and investment
bankers, rather than to the suitability of debt limitations. Machinations
for circumventing debt limits include "moral obligation" bonds or bonds
44. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GBiEzrE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW
171-74 (1992).
45. See ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CrnEs, U.S. FEDERALISM,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 44-59, 80-85 (1996).
46. See, e.g., Robertson v. Zimmerman, 196 N.E. 740,744-45 (N.Y. 1935).
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the payment of which is "subject to appropriation" by the local legisla-
ture. These schemes technically allow the issuing locality to cease mak-
ing payments should the project prove inappropriate, although the subse-
quent loss of creditworthiness means that payment is likely compelled as
a practical matter. Nevertheless, courts have distinguished between that
practical effect and the absence of a legal obligation in order to exclude
the related bonds from the constitutional limitation.47 Tax increment
bonds permit an issuer to dedicate property taxes in excess of a baseline
amount to payment of debt service without violating the constitutional
limit. The justification is that the funded project increases property val-
ues, so that tax receipts above the baseline are directly related to the ex-
penditure. But typically there is no requirement that the relationship
between the funded project and the increase in property values be proven
in order to remove the obligations from constitutional limits. 48 The crea-
tion of special authorities to issue debt separate from that of the general
municipality creates overlapping jurisdictions with concomitant increases
in the size of government.4 One might contend that these devices reveal
that debt limits are ineffective and thus do no harm. But circumventing
debt limitations by devising alternative financing mechanisms imposes
additional costs on municipalities that issue debt, both because discover-
ing and testing the legality of alternatives requires additional expenses,
and the interest rates payable on debt that purports to be payable from
more limited sources is likely to be higher than interest rates on general
obligations of the same issuer. Should a debt avoidance mechanism be
declared improper, the results may cause financial distress to the issuer.50
Moreover, circumvention of debt limitations obfuscates the locality's
true debt position by making it more difficult to discover the total obliga-
tions of the issuer.51
47. See Lonegan v. State, 819 A.2d 395, 397 (N.J. 2003); Colleton County Taxpayers Ass'n
v. Sch. Dist. of Colleton County, 638 S.E.2d 685, 689-90 (S.C. 2006); AMDURSKY & GILLErrE,
supra note 44, at 214-19; Briffault, supra note 36, at 920-25.
48. See, e.g., Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618 P.2d 1374, 1382 (Colo. 1980). But
see Okla. City Urban Renewal Auth. v. Med. Tech. & Research Auth. of Okla., 4 P.3d 677, 679-80
(Okla. 2000).
49. See, e.g., Gould v. Barton, 181 S.E.2d 662, 669-70 (S.C. 1971). For findings that over-
lapping jurisdictions increase the size of the local public sector, see Christopher Berry, Piling on:
Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common-Pool, 52 AM. J. POL. Sci. 802, 802 (2008).
50. See Chem. Bank v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 666 P.2d 329, 331, 342-43 (Wash.
1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1075 (1985). The invalidation of the contracts in Chemical Bank
caused default on bonds of the Washington Public Power Supply System. Id. at 331.
51. For example, an initial inquiry into New York City's fiscal state reveals that the city has
in excess of $35 billion in long-term indebtedness. See BOND OFFICIAL STATEMENT ARCHIVE, CrrY
OF NEW YORK, $308,000,000 GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, FISCAL 2009 SERIES G, at 54 (2008),
httpJ/nycbonds.orgNYC/pdf/2009/NYC_2009-G.pdf. Only further examination reveals that the
figure does not include a significant amount of debt for which the City is not nominally responsible,
but which is payable from revenues that otherwise would have been available to the City. For in-
stance, the figure does not include the debt of the Transitional Finance Authority. That authority has
issued $13.5 billion of debt secured by New York City personal income tax and sales tax revenues.
Id. at 56. The City also has entered into agreements to pay the indebtedness of other governmental
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These restrictions might be more acceptable if we believed that mu-
nicipal debt limitations reflected some sophisticated analysis of the op-
timal level of debt that a locality should incur. But the variety of limita-
tions placed on municipalities belies that proposition. State constitution-
al limitations on municipal debt are typically tied to assessed property
values within the municipality, and one might imagine that, over time,
experience and financial theory have caused convergence around an ideal
percentage that reveals debt affordability. One would be disappointed.
South Dakota localities can issue debt up to 5% of assessed property
value, although school districts (which may overlap with localities) can
issue debt in amounts up to 10% of assessed property value.52 Localities
in Georgia 53 and counties in Arkansas54 can issue debt up to 10% of as-
sessed property value, while non-county municipalities in Arkansas55 and
localities in Alabama56 can incur debt up to 20% of assessed property
value. These restrictions are often accompanied by, or can be exceeded
by, a vote of municipal residents. There, too, variety defies any conclu-
sion that the requirements serve to impose scientifically derived optimal
constraints on local debt. Where elections are required, some states per-
mit bonds to be issued with a simple majority vote, but Washington 57 and
West Virginia58 require a 3/5 supermajority, and Idaho
59 and Texas60
require a 2/3 supermajority.
My point is not that debt limitations are irrational, although they
lack the cohesion and consistency that one might expect if they really
provided appropriate constraints on localities. Rather, my point is that
municipal debt limitations, like restrictions on taxes, reflect a view of
local governance that is unnecessarily in tension with the autonomy-
enhancing objectives of home rule. The application of debt limitations to
general obligation bonds but not to revenue bonds may make economic
sense, insofar as revenue bonds do not expose the issuing locality to the
same risks of project failure that gave rise to the demand for constitu-
tional limitations in the first instance. But, like restrictions that apply to
taxes and not to fees, the separate treatment of general obligation debt
and revenue debt favors allocative functions of local governments over
redistributive functions, notwithstanding that the locality itself may pre-
fer redistribution. Indeed, the payment mechanisms for these revenue
issuers, the proceeds of which benefit the City. Those agreements fall outside the debt limit of the
City because they are "subject to appropriation." Id. at 53.
52. S.D. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
53. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 5, l(a).
54. ARK. CONST. amend. 62, § 1 (b).
55. Id.
56. ALA. CONST. art. XII, §§ 222, 225.
57. WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
58. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
59. IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (regarding water, sewer, or electrical system bonds).




bonds typically consist of fees and taxes the amounts of which are tied to
debt service. Thus, the restrictions apply only when a locality is engaged
in a project that entails a degree of innovation and entrepreneurial risk
that may require a commitment of the municipal treasury in order to at-
tract bondholders and that underlies the preference for home rule. But
the fact that such projects must compete with more traditional capital
expenditures for a limited amount of permissible debt discourages or
increases the costs of municipal innovation.
Second, the need for debt limitations to constrain local overexten-
sion is more dubious than was the case when these limitations were
promulgated. Debt can be a dangerous tool in the hands of local officials
who have incentives to spend money in the short term, especially money
that has to be repaid only when they have left office. As a result, one can
make an argument for external checks on debt, even those that vary
widely among jurisdictions, in order to counter the incentives of offi-
cials-and of voters who do not fully internalize future costs into their
calculations of whether a project is beneficial-to impose costs on future
generations.
But it is a more open question just what that external check should
be. If legal restrictions tend to be artificial and more costly than effec-
tive, then contemporary market mechanisms may provide sufficient (or
more accurate) constraints on the incentives of local officials to overex-
tend their local treasuries. Debt restrictions arose in an era prior to the
advent of sophisticated bond markets, accounting standards for govern-
ment issuers,61 federal disclosure requirements, the development of bond
counsel as a legal specialty to pass on the legality and validity of bonds,
the birth of rating agencies to track the financial stability of issuers, and
the creation of a thick secondary market for bonds that provides bond-
holders with additional incentives to monitor performance of issuers.
The recent performance of financial markets and rating agencies do little
to recommend them as perfect monitors of local decisions about debt.
But, again, the presence of perfection is not the proper question. Rather,
the relevant inquiry is whether debt limitations that seem haphazard and
that are systematically, but expensively, evaded add anything to admit-
tedly imperfect market based constraints, or whether they simply further
distort local financing decisions. My tentative conclusion here, as in the
area of taxation, is that even flawed market constraints on local officials
may be better suited than legal constraints to balance the objectives of
home rule against the risks of local fiscal impropriety. If potential bond-
holders, informed by disclosure and accounting requirements, have in-
centives to monitor issuers, and if the market for debt, augmented by
61. The Government Finance Officers Association promulgates generally accepted accounting
practices and standards for governmental accounting, auditing, and financial reporting. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN J. GAUTHIER, GoV'T FIN. OFFICERS ASS'N, 2005 GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING,
AUDITING, AND FINANCIAL REPORTING (8th ed. 2005).
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disclosure and accounting requirements, is sufficiently thick, then one
would anticipate that interest rates for any municipal issuer of debt will
reflect creditworthiness and the risk of overextension. Thus, market and
regulatory constraints that provide information and allow potential inves-
tors to evaluate a locality's fiscal position may substitute for state consti-
tutional constraints that purport to preserve the safety of the municipal
treasury by limiting the amount of debt. Moreover, interest rates that
reflect capacity to pay are more nuanced and responsive to the current
circumstances of the issuer than blunt legal limitations. Unlike interest
rates, debt limitations cannot be adjusted to take into account municipal
resources that are not reflected in assessed property value. In short, in-
terest rates based on significant amounts of information are likely to send
a strong signal about the affordability of debt, a measure for which debt
limitations presumably do no more than serve as a rough proxy. Interest
rates provide a secondary benefit to the extent that they indicate the rela-
tive health of a municipality. Since interest rates for municipal debt are
readily observable and can be compared to interest rates paid by other
localities, reliance on interest rates also provides a mechanism by which
residents can monitor the fiscal performance of their officials relative to
officials in other jurisdictions.
Explicit reliance on market mechanisms rather than debt limitations
to achieve optimal debt levels may also reflect current reality. After re-
viewing the ease with which state debt limitations can be avoided and
their lack of connection with governmental needs, D. Roderick Kiewiet
and Kristin Szakaly conclude that "it is the discipline of the credit market
that is the real constraint on issuing debt, not the state constitution.',
62
There seems little reason to believe that the analysis would be different
for local rather than state debt. Their result seems consistent with the
findings of Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom. 63 They tested a market
discipline hypothesis for sovereign debt and concluded that yields on
state debt within the United States rise at an increasing rate with the level
of borrowing, and that at some level of borrowing, the market stops sup-
porting a sovereign's debt issuance. They infer that borrowers have
market incentives to avoid issuing excessive debt.64 This does not neces-
sarily mean that public officials properly respond to market incentives.
65
Moreover, the market constraints may suggest only that borrowers re-
view per capita debt burden of the issuer, which may be a very rough
surrogate for quality of debt. These studies do, however, suggest that
62. D. Roderick Kiewiet & Kristin Szakaly, Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An
Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 62, 66 (1996).
63. See Tamim Bayoumi, Morris Goldstein & Geoffrey Woglom, Do Credit Markets Discip-






potential creditors somewhat utilize information obtainable from the
market about sovereign borrowers.
Finally, creditors of municipalities are able to negotiate bond cove-
nants that restrict local officials from engaging in conduct that might
jeopardize the public treasury in a more direct way than the imposition of
a debt limit, which assumes that constrained public officials will sur-
render inefficient projects, not those that they may favor for more per-
sonal purposes. 66 The interests of creditors, of course, will not always
perfectly coincide with those of residents. But bond covenants are possi-
ble whenever municipalities issue debt, so the presence of debt limita-
tions does not prevent the possible inconsistency. The relevant point is
that creditors' and residents' interests in the health of the public treasury
are often consistent; to the extent that is true, contractual arrangements
between bondholders and issuers may provide better protection for resi-
dents than flat prohibitions on debt issuance. Indeed, I have suggested
elsewhere that under plausible conditions, bondholders will not only
serve as useful monitors of local debt, but will also be able to compen-
sate for some of the slack in monitoring by the electorate of local offi-
cials' performance. 67 Relaxing legal constraints on debt, of course, in-
creases the incentives for bondholders to engage in that monitoring role,
since they cannot rely on even artificial limits to deter fiscal overexten-
sion. In addition, to the extent that legal limits require circumvention
through obfuscating funding devices, elimination of those limits could
render the amount of indebtedness more transparent.
CONCLUSION
If home rule is desirable, and if its exercise requires fiscal discre-
tion, then legal constraints must be justified by some countervailing ob-
jective. There certainly exist reasons to be wary of unfettered fiscal dis-
cretion, since local officials may make budgetary decisions that adverse-
ly affect either their own residents or nonresidents. But even in an era
where markets have revealed their imperfections, one should not neces-
sarily resort to legal doctrines to provide optimal solutions to questions
of institutional design. The bluntness and inflexibility of legal doctrine
may prove to impose relatively high impediments on the exercise of
home rule for relatively little benefit. Reliance on market checks may
allow local governments more fiscal flexibility, while simultaneously
encouraging more transparency and less political divergence from resi-
dent preferences than legal constraints. If I am correct, a greater degree
of fiscal home rule promises greater realization of the objectives that lead
us to favor decentralized government in the first instance.
66. See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 9 (1977).
67. Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
937, 942 (2008); see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever
of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L REV. 1209, 1213 (2006).
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Do MARKETS WORK BETTER THAN LEGAL RESTRAINTS?
A RESPONSE TO CLAYTON GILLETTE'S "FISCAL HOME
RULE"
PAUL DILLERt
Professor Clayton Gillette takes a dim view of state-imposed limita-
tions on municipal taxing and borrowing authority. While recognizing
their poor performance of late,1 Gillette concludes that "markets," how-
ever imperfect, are likely to work better than "artificial" legal restraints
at ensuring the fiscal health of local governments. Gillette's preference
for markets over legal restrictions may strike the reader as a curious one
given recent economic events. With the bust of the housing bubble, the
subprime mortgage meltdown, and the collapse of once-venerable Wall
Street firms, the American public and its elected leaders have increasing-
ly embraced government intervention in the marketplace. Why, then,
does Professor Gillette maintain his faith in markets as the best tool for
preventing the abuse of municipal fiscal authority?
Part of the reason Professor Gillette prefers "markets" is because he
uses that term broadly to include the Tieboutian market for residents and
business owners. Gillette believes that this market, which bears little
resemblance to the financial markets that have foundered in recent
months, more effectively prevents local officials from imposing exces-
sive taxes than constitutional limitations on municipal taxation.4  Gil-
lette's reliance on the Tiebout theory in criticizing hard limits on munici-
pal taxation authority seems reasonable, although as Gillette recognizes,
the theory's value as a descriptor of urban dynamics is significantly li-
mited by its heroic assumptions. 5
t Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. I thank Rich Birke
and Jennifer Evert for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1259 (2009). See also
Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the
Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009); Jon Meacham & Evan Thomas, We Are All Socialists
Now, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, at 23.
2. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1248, 1259.
3. See Meacham & Thomas supra note 1, at 23; David E. Sanger, Selling a New Deal, but
Promising it Will be Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, available at http:llwww.nytimes.comV2009/
02/25/us/politics/24web-sanger.html.
4. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1255.
5. Id. at 1243; see also Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 26 n.8 (1998)
(citing Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956);
Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Momdel, 71 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROc.
93, 93 (1981); Lyke Thompson, Citizen Attitudes About Service Delivery Models, 19 J. URB. AFF.
291 (1997)).
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Not all cities are restrained by taxation limits that are as "blunt and
inflexible" as those on which Gillette focuses his criticism.6 In some
states, limits on revenue-raising authority may be circumvented by popu-
lar vote while in other states, the state constitution limits only certain
types of taxation. By allowing voters and municipal officials some flex-
ibility in determining revenue, these softer restraints may offer an alter-
native to the hard limits that Gillette dislikes and the crudely functioning
Tieboutian "market" that he prefers. Rather than leaving elected officials
to guess what level of taxation is likely to be so excessive as to spur an
exodus of residents and business owners, soft restrictions allow voters to
register their preferences for taxation levels through democratic means.
As I will explain, however, these evadable revenue-raising restrictions
have proved surprisingly sticky. This stickiness suggests that even limi-
tations less rigid than those criticized by Gillette may have an apprecia-
ble impact on voters' preferences for taxation and, therefore, the ability
of local governments to raise revenue.
In arguing against municipal debt limitations, Professor Gillette re-
lies more on conventional market mechanisms like the financial institu-
tions-including banks and rating agencies-that have performed so
poorly of late. Gillette believes that these institutions will better restrain
municipalities from excessive risk-taking than legal debt restrictions.
Although there are salient differences between the market for municipal
debt and the markets for mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that
have recently imploded, one hesitates to share Gillette's faith in the very
ratings agencies and bond trading houses that have contributed to the
nation's economic pain of late.7 On the other hand, Gillette rightly iden-
tifies these actors as potential providers of information useful to voters
seeking to monitor elected officials' behavior. To that end, in the context
of debt limitations, particularly when they-like tax limitations--can be
circumvented by public vote, market forces can work in conjunction with
the plebiscite to restrain excessive borrowing by public officials.
I. LIMITATIONS ON TAXATION
Gillette assesses the constitutional restrictions many states have im-
posed on property tax rates as "blunt" instruments, and in some states
they are, severely constraining local governments' ability to raise reve-
nue.8 In other states, however, constitutional provisions impose softer
limitations on local taxing authority. In California, for instance, Proposi-
tion 13 has severely constrained cities' ability to raise revenue through
6. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1261.
7. Gretchen Morgenson, Debt Watchdogs: Tamed or Caught Napping?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2008, at Al.
8. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1253.
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taxes on real property. 9 California cities, however, are free, with voter
approval, to raise the sales tax beyond the state level and keep the incre-
mental amount collected to fund local services.10 In Oregon, a series of
state constitutional amendments adopted by popular vote in the 1990s
limited the ability of local governments to raise revenue through property
taxes." The voters in Oregon cities and counties can approve the cir-
cumvention of these limits, however, by passing a "local option levy" to
raise additional funds for local services. 2 Moreover, Oregon cities re-main free to impose income and sales taxes within their jurisdictions.13
Softer state constitutional restraints like Oregon's and California's
represent something of a hybrid between the hard limits imposed by state
constitutions, which Gillette dislikes, and a system that relies solely on
market-based constraints, which Gillette prefers. In contrast to market-
based restrictions, soft limitations rely to some degree on residents ex-
pressing their preference for taxes and services by voting with their bal-
lots rather than only with their feet. Because "consumer-voters," particu-
larly residents, are not as mobile as the Tiebout theory assumes, softer
limitations may better elicit voter preferences than the functioning of the
Tieboutian market envisioned by Gillette. 14  Soft limitations also may
reflect a judgment that the expression of residents' preferences through
"voice" rather than "exit" has its own value.15
But just how soft are soft limitations on local revenue-raising au-
thority? In states like California, allowing cities to adopt incremental
sales taxes clearly does not fully compensate for cities' constricted abili-
ty to tax real property in a post-Proposition 13 regime. Voters in Cali-
fornia cities can opt for a higher municipal revenue stream, but only in a
manner they might consider less favorable than increased property taxes.
Moreover, voters who might otherwise prefer a higher-tax, more-services
mix may nonetheless vote against a sales tax increase because they fear,
with some good reason, that the increase will drive away businesses
9. CAL. CONST. art. XIII.A; see generally ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES
AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13 (1995).
10. Coleman v. County of Santa Clara, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Neecke v.
City of Mill Valley, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). In those cities or counties that do not
adopt a higher sales tax, state law already allocates a one-percent increment out of the state-imposed
sales tax of approximately seven or eight percent to local governments. See PAUL GEORGE LEWIS &
ELISA BARBOUR, CALIFORNIA CITIES AND THE LOCAL SALES TAX 5 (1999).
11. In particular, Ballot Measures 5, 47, and 50, passed in 1990, 1996, and 1997, respectively,
limited the ability of local governments to raise revenue through the property tax. See Paul DiUller,
The Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L. REv. 939, 970-71 (2009); David H.
Angeli, The Oregon Legislature's Constitutional Obligation to Provide an Adequate System of
Public Education: Moving from Bold Rhetoric to Effective Action, 42 WILLAMETrE. L. REv. 489,
493 (2006).
12. OR. REV. STAT. § 280.060 (2007).
13. Diller, supra note 11, at 971.
14. E.g., Frug, supra note 5, at 26.
15. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
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(who are more likely to vote with their feet than residents). 16 Voters who
prefer higher taxes and more services might also vote against a sales tax
increase because they fear, with some justification, that it will distort the
city's approach to land use: the more reliant the city becomes on sales
taxes, the more likely it will adopt a zoning code that favors retail sales,
accelerating strip mall development and suburban sprawl. 17 California's
soft limitation, therefore, has hard consequences on the menu of choices
available to voters.
In states like Oregon that have property tax limitations that can be
circumvented to some degree by popular vote,18 the soft limitations im-
posed by state law have proved surprisingly sticky. On the surface, the
availability of the "local option levy" to communities preferring a higher-
tax, more-services mix allows residents a democratic vehicle through
which to express their preferences. In practice, however, cities and coun-
ties have found it difficult to pass local option levies, with the success
rate of those placed on the ballot only about thirty-three percent. 19
Moreover, this thirty-three percent "success" rate relies on a denominator
that excludes many revenue-raising proposals floated publicly by local
officials but ultimately not placed on the ballot because public opinion
polls indicated that they were likely to fail. 20 The reluctance of Oregon
voters to adopt local option levies may accurately represent local voter
preferences. On the other hand, the requirement of voter approval for a
local option levy and the establishment of a state-imposed default taxa-
tion baseline likely have an effect on resident preferences for taxes and
services. In other words, voters' preferences for tax-service packages are
not necessarily stable and are not determined independent of the manner
in which the preferences are expressed.
In Oregon, for instance, prior to the state's soft constitutional limita-
tions, local officials could increase the property tax rate without voter
approval. 21 The subsequent statewide adoption of a constitutional limita-
16. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l1-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLuM. L. REV.
346,421 (1990).
17. See generally LEWIS & BARBOUR, supra note 10; Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of
Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Deci-
sions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1997).
18. Oregon voters may not circumvent the constitution's limitations on the valuation of real
property for taxation, OREGON CONST. art. XI § 11(2), but they may vote to increase the tax rate on
assessed property in the taxing district for up to five years or ten years for capital projects. ld. §
1 (4)(a)(A).
19. See Oregon State Univ. Media Release, OSU Study: County Budget Crisis to Have Im-
pact on Roads, Law Enforcement, July 9, 2008, http://oregonstate.edu/dept/ncs/
newsarch/2008/JuI08/Roads.html.
20. E.g., Mark Larabee, Portland Voters Won't See Road-Repair Fee Hike on Ballot,
OREGONIAN, July 25, 2008, at B2 (explaining how Portland council member decided not to refer
gas-tax hike to voters because polling indicated the increase would not pass).
21. E.g., Fran Gardner, School Board Approves $310 Million Budget, OREGONIAN, Apr. 27,
1989, at C2 (discussing Portland School Board vote increasing "tax rate for the district [from
$16.08] to $16.71 per $1,000 assessed valuation").
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tion on property taxes, even if soft, however, may have framed voters'
views as to what is the appropriate level of taxation by establishing aS• 22
baseline that voters privilege. When city officials seek to raise revenue
beyond the baseline, an "endowment effect" may cause voters to see this
increased taxation as a loss they would not feel had state law not estab-
lished a baseline.2 3 Moreover, subjecting property tax increases to a lo-
cal plebiscite may cause voters to focus on the loss of the extra property
tax more than if it were simply enacted by a majority vote of the city
council or board of education. By making property tax increases the
subject of an up-or-down plebiscite, a local option levy increases the
justificatory burden on local officials who support the measure. As a
result, in states like Oregon, local officials must engage in extensive
campaigns to "sell" voters on why the increased property tax is merito-
rious.24 In sum, although they might seem like a way in which communi-
ty preferences for taxation can be elicited, even soft revenue-raising limi-
tations prove somewhat hard by changing those preferences themselves.
II.DEBT LIMITATIONS
In the context of debt limitations, Professor Gillette's reliance on fi-
nancial markets and institutions as a restraining force is somewhat ques-
tionable in light of their recent performance. On the other hand, Profes-
sor Gillette acknowledges that he does not expect these markets to be the
only force restraining excessive borrowing by municipal officials even in
the absence of hard constitutional limitations. Rather, Gillette sees the
financial markets as providing information for voters to use in monitor-
ing the actions of their local officials. Nonetheless, Gillette argues that
financial markets and the interest rates they produce will likely provide
the main check on excessive borrowing by local authorities.
Gillette acknowledges that constitutional municipal debt restrictions
are not always "hard." Rather, many of the limits can be evaded if debt
can legally be classified as a certain type. Gillette frowns on some of the
more recent "[m]achinations for circumventing debt limits," such as
"moral obligation" bonds,25 the combined use of which can make it hard-
22. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL PUB.
POL'Y & L. 106, 108 (2006) [hereinafter McCaffery & Barron, PSYCHOL.] (citing I.P. Levin et al.,
All Frames Are Not Created Equal, A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149 (1998); A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, The Framing of
Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 185 SCiENCE 453, 453-58 (1981); A. Tversky & D.
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. 151, 151-78 (1986)); see also
Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L
REV. 1745, 1774 (2005) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, UCLA].
23. See McCaffery & Baron, PSYCHOL, supra note 22, at 108-09; see generally Rossell
Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
24. E.g., Jennifer Anderson, Portland Public Schools Parents Mobilize Levy Campaign,
PORTLAND TRiB., Sept. 15, 2006 (describing campaign to convince voters to approve local option
levy for Portland schools), available at http://www.portlandtribune.com/news/story.php?story_id=l
15828679645386300.
25. Gillette, supra note 1, at 1256.
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er for voters to know the locality's "true debt position."2 6 Gillette briefly
acknowledges another major way in which debt limitations are soft: in
many states, they may be overridden by a majority-or sometimes su-
permajority-vote of residents. 27
As in the case of tax limitations, soft debt limitations may affect
voters' preferences rather than simply provide a vehicle through which
those preferences can be expressed. By setting a particular level of in-
debtedness as a ceiling beyond which the city needs a majority vote to
exceed, these systems may cause voters to privilege the preset ceiling
more than they would if the city's debt level were being established
anew, or if the city's level of indebtedness were determined by an elected
council. 28 Because the costs of increased indebtedness are not imme-
diately felt by voting residents in the same way that tax increases are,
however, any "endowment effect" created by the state-imposed soft lim-
its may be smaller than in the tax context. 29 Regardless, similar to soft
tax limitations, soft debt limitations likely increase the justificatory bur-
den on local officials seeking to increase municipal debt.30
Soft debt limits also present an ostensible alternative to the Tiebou-
tian model by allowing voters to express their preferences through the
ballot box rather than only via exit. Given that voters are likely to have
very little conception of what a good level of indebtedness is for the city,
they are likely to approve or not approve circumvention of a soft debt
limit more on the basis of the perceived merits of the particular projects
for which the extra debt will pay, rather than on some detached assess-
ment of the city's credit position. In this sense, soft debt limitations can
serve as a vehicle through which voters express their opinion of city lea-
dership and its preferred projects, a signal which may be useful to local
officials concerned about voter preferences.31
CONCLUSION
Overall, Gillette is right to doubt the utility of constitutional taxa-
tion and debt limitations. While in their softer forms these restraints
seemingly allow more democratic input from voters, in doing so, as I
have attempted to illustrate here, the limitations may affect the prefe-
rences of the voters. Exactly what the voters' "true" preferences for tax-
ation and debt levels are is an issue that cannot be determined indepen-
dent of the manner in which those preferences are elicited. Hence, while
26. Id. at 1257.
27. Id. at 1258.
28. McCaffery & Baron, UCLA, supra note 22, at 1774.
29. Id. at 1774-75 (observing that people are likely to discount the future costs of current
deficits).
30. E.g., Kimberly Melton, Maintenance To-do List Requires Bonds-Mt. Hood Community
College Bond Issue, OREGONIAN, Oct. 19, 2006, at Metro East Neighbors 1.
31. Cf McCaffery & Baron, PSYCHOL, supra note 22, at 118.
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Gillette is right that state-imposed hard limitations on local revenue-
raising and debt-incurring authority "artificially" constrain voters' ability
to select the level of taxation and debt that they consider optimal, even
softer limits likely affect voters' preferences. Whether this phenomenon
is salutary depends on considerations beyond the scope of this paper,
such as the importance of the programs a city may not be able to afford
once its residents' taxation preferences have been framed by soft limits,
and, on the other hand, the value of allowing residents to participate di-
rectly in municipal fiscal decisions.





In its recent decision in Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley
Corp.,' the Colorado Supreme Court surprised many when it held that
home rule units were immune from the state legislature's explicit statuto-
ry prohibition2 of extraterritorial eminent domain for parks and open
space by all Colorado municipalities. 3 Newspaper editorials decried the
holding as improperly insulating home rule units from legitimate state
legislative efforts to restrict their powers and called the opinion a "sleazy
power play[]. ' 4  They predicted that the court's protection of extraterri-
torial eminent domain would lead to endless attempts by other Colorado
cities "to ride roughshod over [non]residents who can't even fight back
by trying to vote them out of office. ' '
This somewhat hyperbolic criticism has ignored two important
facts. First, the court's opinion is limited to protecting the state constitu-
tional right of home rule municipalities to exercise extraterritorial emi-
nent domain in the pursuit of legitimate police power objectives. It has
both an explicit textual basis in the state constitution and a clear pedigree
of precedent in its support. 6 Thus, the court's opinion has no effect at all
t Prentice H. Marshall Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. This paper was
presented at a conference on home rule co-sponsored by the Byron R. White Center on Constitution-
al Law at the University of Colorado and the Denver University Law Review on January 30, 2009.
Many thanks to Michelle Anderson and Clayton Gillette for their comments, and to all conference
participants for their helpful observations and critiques.
1. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
2. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-l-101(4)(b)(I) (West 2009) ("[N]o home rule or statutory
municipality shall... acquire by condemnation property located outside of its territorial boundaries
for the purpose of parks, recreation, open space, conservation, preservation of views or scenic vistas,
or for similar purposes ....").
3. The court did not rule on the statute's effect on non-home rule municipalities, that is,
those acting pursuant to explicit statutory authorization. See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 164 n.1.
4. Vincent Carroll, Editorial, Unleashing Mischief, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 6, 2008, at 39.
The Denver Post, though also extremely critical, was more restrained. See Editorial, Wrong Course
on Eminent Domain, DENVER POST, June 4, 2008, at B12.
5. Carroll, supra note 4, at 39.
6. The Colorado Constitution establishes that a home rule unit has "the power, within or
without its territorial limits, to construct, condemn and purchase... and operate water works, light
plants, power plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any other public utilities or works or
ways local in use and extent, in whole or in part ...." COLO. CONST. art. 20, § 1. Although that
language does not explicitly confer home rule powers of extraterritorial eminent domain for parks
and open space, the Colorado court has long construed the constitutional text as conferring on home
rule units the "full power to exercise the right of eminent domain in the effectuation of any lawful,
public, local and municipal purpose." Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 108 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo.
1940). As the Colorado court repeated in its recent opinion, "the purposes specified in section 1 are
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on the legislature's preemptive powers in the more usual context, in
which the constitution is silent about the particular home rule power be-
ing exercised. Second, and perhaps more importantly, those who fear
that the state's highest court is opening the door for lots of [extraterritori-
al] "high handed [municipal] bullying ' 7 should pause to consider the
totality of the Colorado courts' decisions interpreting home rule powers.
In Colorado, as in many states, concerns about extraterritoriality can lead
to judicial invalidation of a wide range of home rule enactments. In this
paper, I consider extraterritoriality in that broader context and argue that
the judicially imposed extraterritorial impact limit is an improper and
unnecessary restriction of home rule powers. I come at this topic from
the perspective of regionalism, of the way in which our legal rules are
informed (or not) by the fact that more than 80% of our population now
lives in what can be defined as metropolitan areas,8 with their multiplici-
ty of local government units and the corresponding overlapping and in-
tersecting boundary lines.
In the regionalism debate,9 home rule surfaces regularly as the vil-
lain, criticized for having legitimized (or even, perhaps, championed) a
parochial, selfish approach to regional problems.10 In this view, exclu-
sionary zoning, lack of affordable housing in the region, and metropoli-
tan inequality generally are seen as the product of the strong local auton-
omy or independence provided by home rule, as affluent suburban en-
claves retreat behind their borders and ignore the plight of their less for-
tunate local government neighbors. 1 Yet, as David Barron has so in-
merely examples of a broader grant of power, namely the power to condemn property for any lawful,
public, local, and municipal purpose." Telluride, 185 P.3d at 165. Thus, the sole legal question
before the court was whether the exercise of extraterritorial eminent domain powers for open space
and parks constituted a lawful purpose. The court easily found that it did. See id. at 167-69. The
court did not break new ground by holding that all constitutionally protected home rule powers are
immune from state legislative interference. See City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation
Co., 575 P.2d 382, 389 (Colo. 1978).
7. See Carroll, supra note 4, at 39.
8. See Keith Aoki, All the King's Horses and All the King's Men: Hurdles to Putting the
Fragmented Metropolis Back Together Again? Statewide Land Use Planning, Portland Metro and
Oregon's Measure 37, 21 J.L. & POL. 397, 403 (2005). The U.S. Census Bureau defines a metropol-
itan area as "at least one urbanized area that has a population of at least 50,000 [people]." Standards
for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,228, 82,238 (Dec. 27,
2000).
9. See Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAw. 483,
489-95 (2007), for a summary of the various strands of academic commentary that debate the wis-
dom of regional approaches to service and social problems confronting all metropolitan regions in
the country.
10. See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2255, 2331-34 (2003).
For elaboration of the arguments, see generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the
Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985
(2000); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Romancing the Town: Why We (Still) Need a Democratic Defense of
City Power, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2009 (2000) (book review); Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Bor-
ders: A Partial Response to Richard Briffault, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1173 (1996).
11. The socio-economic stratification among local governments in metropolitan regions is
increasing, resulting in growing numbers of "rich" and "poor" suburbs, with fewer towns and cities
fitting within the category of "middle class." See TODD SWANSTROM ET AL., BROOKINGS INST.,
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sightfully pointed out, those criticisms may be wide of the mark, because
they blame home rule communities for not solving problems that in fact
are currently beyond their legal competence.1 2  For example, Barron
points out, courts frequently invalidate home rule attempts to provide
antidotes to the lack of affordable housing, 3 or to expand civil rights
protection for discrete segments of the metropolitan region,14 thus pre-
venting home rule governments from adopting initiatives that would
counteract the negative impacts of localism that others have so strongly
condemned.1 5 And unlike other critics of "parochial localism,"1 6 Barron
looks to the home rule system itself and the reshaping of home rule pow-
ers as the way to encourage a more equitable and sensibly planned re-
gional landscape.' 7
Professor Barron's critique informs this analysis of the extraterri-
torial impact factor in the judicial analysis of home rule powers. I argue
here that not only is the factor improperly used by the courts to limit the
scope of home rule powers, but that it is also unnecessarily anti-regional
in its impact, because it helps to keep home rule units on the sidelines in
the search for regional solutions to pressing social problems and service
needs. After describing the breadth of meaning encompassed by the
courts' understanding of extraterritorial impact, I offer several reasons
why it should not form a part of the judicial analysis. I then suggest how
removing the cloud of the extraterritorial impact factor from the home
rule analysis might affect the role of home rule units as primary actors in
formulating regional policy. Though I understand that home rule powers
(or metropolitan regions themselves) would not be magically trans-
formed by the courts' abandonment of one judicially created limitation, I
conclude that the extraterritorial impact factor should be discarded be-
cause it reinforces a misguided perception about the proper reach of
home rule initiatives and involvement in problems common to all gov-
ernment units in metropolitan regions.
1 8
PULLING APART: ECONOMIC SEGREGATION AMONG SUBURBS AND CENTRAL CIES IN MAJOR
METROPOLITAN AREAS 1 (2004), http://tinyurI.com/dff7oy.
12. See Barron, supra note 10, at 2345-61.
13. See, e.g., Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
14. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
15. See Barron, supra note 10, at 2347-62.
16. Id. at 2334. The term describes Rick Hill's critique and his claim that while local gov-
ernment may be the level of government at which direct political participation is maximized, it also
seems to be the level that more easily promotes "social inequality and parochialism." See Hills,
supra note 10, at 2011-12.
17. As additional reasons for not giving up on home rule, Barron stresses the strength of the
localist tradition in our legal and political structures, the positive opinion most Americans have of
their local governments, and the normative defenses of localism (subsidiarity, efficiency, and protec-
tion of community character, to name a few). See Barron, supra note 10, at 2337-45.
18. Although Barron prefers legislative rather than judicial reforms to create the reconfigured
home rule powers he endorses, noting that the latter raises "the familiar conundrums of judicial
legitimacy," id. at 2364, the extraterritorial impact factor is purely a creature of judicial analysis and
its fate lies squarely with the courts themselves.
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I. HoME RULE AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
According to most standard accounts, home rule powers do not in-
clude the power to act outside the local government's borders.' 9 As a
result, the vast majority of courts requires explicit constitutional or statu-
tory enabling authority for any extraterritorial home rule government
action. Extraterritorial eminent domain, 20 annexation and disconnec-
tion, 1 and extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction 22 are the most common
examples of extraterritorial powers for which courts refuse to find inhe-
rent home rule authority.2 3 From this strong and nearly universal limita-
tion, it has been perhaps a small step for the courts to entertain arguments
that a particular home rule initiative, though it applies only within the
borders of the home rule unit, has an impermissible extraterritorial im-
19. In Seigles, Inc. v. City of St. Charles, the Illinois court called that assertion "axiomatic."
849 N.E.2d 456, 458 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); see also 1 CHESTER JAMES ANTiEAU, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW § 3.08 (Supp. 1967); 2 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 7:2 (3d ed. 2006). Professor Terrance Sandalow's important critique of home rule
powers agreed with that territorial limit. He pointed out, though, that the more modern legislative
home rule system endorsed by the National Municipal League, should be interpreted as having given
(improperly, in his view) extraterritorial powers to home rule units. See Terrance Sandalow, The
Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 692
n.193 (1964). That view of has never taken hold in the courts, which routinely require explicit
legislative authorization for home rule units to exercise extraterritorial powers. The statement of the
Illinois Supreme Court is typical: "[W]hatever extraterritorial governmental powers home-rule units
may exercise were to be granted by the legislature." City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 338 N.E.2d
19, 21 (Ill. 1975).
20. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Hamish, 150 P.3d 245,250-51 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); City of
Mesa v. Smith Co. of Ariz., Inc., 816 P.2d 939, 943 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); City of Peoria v. Keehn-
er, 449 N.E.2d 1376, 1379-80 (111. App. Ct. 1983); Britt v. City of Columbus, 309 N.E.2d 412, 415,
416 (Ohio 1974). In all of these cases, the court explicitly concluded that home rule units do not
have the inherent power of extraterritorial eminent domain. Note that the Colorado court's opinion
in Telluride is not inconsistent with those cases, because the court found independent explicit textual
authorization of extraterritorial eminent domain in the state's constitution. Town of Telluride v. San
Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 169 (Colo. 2008).
21. See, e.g., La Salle Nat'l Trust v. Vill. of Mettawa, 616 N.E.2d 1297, 1302-03 (ll. App. Ct.
1993); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 700 v. City of Duluth, 170 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Minn. 1969); State ex inf.
Hannah ex rel. Christ v. City of St. Charles, 676 S.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Mo. 1984) ; City of New York
v. State, 557 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Vill. of Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of
Cuyahoga County, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ohio 1958); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. City of Beaverton,
161 P.3d 926, 931 (Or. 2007); Mid-County Future Alternatives Comm. v. City of Portland, 795 P.2d
541, 546 (Or. 1990). In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court in City ofAsbury v. Iowa City Develop-
ment Board upheld a home rule city's ability to offer more in the way of inducements for annexation
than state law authorized for non home rule units, thus seemingly concluding that annexation powers
fall within the scope of home rule and thus need no statutory authorization. 723 N.W.2d 188, 198
(Iowa 2006).
22. See, e.g., City of Carbondale v. Van Natta, 338 N.E.2d 19, 23 (ii. 1975) (invalidating
home rule unit's attempt to enjoin violation of local zoning ordinance by owners of land located
outside city borders); Harris Bank of Roselle v. Vill. of Mettawa, 611 N.E.2d 550, 559 (I1. App. Ct.
1993) (invalidating home rule attempt to prohibit private treatment of wastewater on property out-
side its borders); City of Riverview v. Sibley Limestone, 716 N.W.2d 615, 619-20 (Mich. Ct. App.
2006) (invalidating a home rule ordinance purporting to require city permit for sandblasting outside
the city limits); Sanders v. Snyder, 178 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Oh. Ct. App. 1960).
23. In some states, the explicit authorization of extraterritorial powers comes from state con-
stitutional, rather than statutory, sources, thus rendering the powers immune from legislative
preemptive powers. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XX, §1.
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pact.24 This more free floating use of the extraterritoriality limit is
grounded not in specific statutory enactments or constitutional limits, but
rather in a reviewing court's assessment of the context in which a chal-
lenged home rule ordinance will operate. Though courts may disagree
about the circumstances in which they will conclude that home rule regu-
lation impermissibly crosses over into extraterritorial, many use a finding
of extraterritoriality as the basis for the conclusion that the home rule
ordinance either has exceeded the permissible scope of home rule initia-
tive powers, or has been preempted by the state legislature.
The use of the extraterritorial impact factor in the judicial analysis
will depend on, or at least be shaped by, the type of home rule system
adopted by the state in which the court sits. Thus, before examining the
factor's role in the judicial analysis, some basic background information
about the two major types of home rule, and how the systems differ in
both their attitudes about the scope of home rule powers and the role of
preemption in the judicial analysis, may be helpful.
A. The Differences Between Imperio and Legislative Home Rule
Notwithstanding the substantial interstate variety in constitutional
schemes, statutory authorization, and judicial attitudes, home rule sys-
tems can be categorized as pertaining either to the "imperio" or "legisla-
tive" variety. The former derives its name from the United States Su-
preme Court's description of the home rule city of St. Louis as an "impe-
riun in imperio" 25 and denotes the original form of home rule, which
envisioned two distinct spheres of local and statewide concerns and pow-
ers.26 Articulation of the two exclusive spheres was left in the hands of
the courts.27 The system of so-called legislative home rule,28 introduced
24. Professor Sandalow's critique expressed as much disapproval, indeed condemnation, of
what he called the "Extraterritorial Impact of Intramural Legislation," see Sandalow, supra note 19,
at 700, as he did of claims that home rule units had the inherent authority to exercise extraterritorial
powers such as annexation, eminent domain, and extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction. See id at
692-700. Underlying Sandalow's critique was a distrust of the fairness and quality of the municipal
legislative process as well as the more prevalent view that local governments tend toward "municipal
parochialism." Id. at 702. The Supreme Court has noted and accepted as inevitable the conundrum
that the "indirect extraterritorial effects of many purely internal municipal actions could conceivably
have a heavier impact on surrounding environs than the direct regulation contemplated by [state laws
conferring extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction]." Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S.
60, 69 (1978). For purposes of federal law, at least, it is clear that the extraterritorial impacts of
local action provide no legal basis for challenge by affected nonresidents.
25. St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893).
26. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124-25 (2007).
27. Typical imperio language enables home rule units to legislate with respect to "municipal
affairs," CAL. CONST. art. XL, § 5; or grants "all powers of local self-government," OHIO CONsT. art.
XVIII, § 3; or grants powers over "local affairs and government," WIS. CONST. art. XI, § 3. The
scope of those terms is determined by judicial analysis. Dier, supra note 26, at 1125.
28. That term is used to highlight that the theory underlying the new approach is to shift the
determination whether a matter is within the scope of home rule powers from the courts to the state
legislature. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 333-34 (7th ed. 2009). Although some understand "legislative home
rule" as referring to home rule systems created pursuant to statutory, rather than constitutional,
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in the 1950s and 60s by the National Municipal League, 29 offers an anti-
dote to what its supporters viewed as the unnecessary judicial meddling
characteristic of the imperio model. Based on the view that home rule
should provide local governments with the full range of government
powers that the state is capable of transferring to its political subdivi-
sion,30 legislative home rule contemplates a much reduced judicial role,
with the determination of the scope of home rule power left almost en-
tirely in the hands of the legislature.
Although they have distinctly different origins and starting premis-
es, in both systems, judicial evaluation of a home rule ordinance for con-
sistency with state constitutional and statutory mandates involves two
distinct steps. 3' First, the ordinance is evaluated to determine whether it
is within the scope of home rule powers. In imperio states, this may in-
volve consideration of the meaning of "pertaining to its affairs" or "lo-
cal," while in legislative states, the primary question before the court is
whether the power exercised by the home rule body is one of those pow-
ers that the legislature was capable of transferring to its political subdivi-
sion. At this point the imperio analysis adds one more twist-if the court
deems a home rule enactment to be exclusively local, it will have im-
munity32 from the impact of conflicting state laws, even if legislative
intent to preempt home rule regulation is explicit.
Once the home rule enactment has been found to fit within the
scope of transferred power, the second question is whether the local law
has nevertheless been preempted by state law. In imperio states, the
provisions, see, for example, Sarah Burgundy, Comment, Charming the Eight-Hundred-Pound
Gorilla: How Reconsideration of Home Rule in Oregon Can Help Metro Tame Measure 37, 85 OR.
L. REv. 815, 820-21 (2007), our review of judicial opinions in preparation of the casebook did not
find that the source of home rule power was important to the legal analysis. And in fact, many
legislative home rule systems are explicitly created in state constitutions. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST.
art. 10, § 11 ("A home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by law
or by charter."); N.M. CONST. art. 10, § 6(D) ("A municipality which adopts a charter may exercise
all legislative powers and perform all functions not expressly denied by general law or charter.").
29. Actually, the system was first introduced in the 1950s by the American Municipal Associ-
ation, and revised in the 1960s by the National Municipal League to make clear that a "city may
exercise any legislative power.. . not denied ... by general law." NAT'L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL
STATE CONSTITUTION 16 (6th ed. 1963). The Louisiana Supreme Court provided a helpful recount-
ing of the development in City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Commr's of the Orleans Levee Dist., 640
So. 2d 237, 243 (La. 1994).
30. That basic premise of legislative home rule was described by the Louisiana Supreme
Court when it noted that the newer form of home rule envisioned that "all delegable legislative
powers would be granted to the local government, subject to the legislature's power to deny local
government's exercise of authority by state statute." New Orleans, 640 So. 2d at 243.
31. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 447-49.
32. The scope of this immunity varies among the imperio states. In Colorado, for instance,
home rule immunity from conflicting state legislation extends to all matters deemed exclusively
local, see, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990--while in Oregon
the immunity is much narrower. See City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204,
1215 (Or. 1978). If state legislation addresses "a concern of the state with the modes of local gov-
ernment," local immunity is typically forthcoming, but any state law that focuses instead on a "subs-
tantive social, economic, or other regulatory objective," will preempt a conflicting local law. Id. at
1211.
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analysis is wide-ranging and relies on both express and implied preemp-
tion, typically involving an "occupation of the field" or an "inconsistency
with state law" analysis.33 In legislative home rule systems, in contrast,
courts turn to state law to see only whether the legislature has clearly,
some say explicitly, 34 articulated its intent to supersede local law, either
by prohibiting the exercise of a particular power at the local level or by
declaring that state law is to be exclusive.3 Though some courts clearly
distinguish the two steps, 36 others blend their analysis of the scope of
home rule powers with their assessment whether state law should be
deemed preemptive.37
A review of the cases shows that the extraterritorial impact factor is
important in both imperio and legislative states, although its use and
scope are different. I argue here that the factor is inappropriate in both
systems, because it muddies the judicial analysis, usurps the legislative
function, and unnecessarily limits the scope of home rule initiatives and
the role of home rule units in the region.
B. Extraterritorial Impact in the Courts
Although the extraterritorial impact factor has formed part of the
judicial analysis of home rule for many years,38 and is, at least in one
state, a step in a required three part inquiry in all challenges to home rule
33. For a thorough analysis of implied preemption in state courts see Diller, supra note 26, at
1140-57.
34. For example, the Montana courts have interpreted their constitution as requiring explicit
legislative preemption. See, e.g., Town Pump, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Red Lodge, 971 P.2d
349, 357 (Mont. 1998) (refusing to invalidate local alcohol regulation because the legislature had not
"specifically denied" the challenged power). Other courts in legislative home rule states have been
unwilling to give up the judicial power to find preemption in the absence of an explicit preemptive
statement. See, e.g., Casuse v. City of Gallup, 746 P.2d 1103, 1105 (N.M. 1987) (concluding that a
finding of clear legislative intent to preempt, though not explicitly stated, is sufficient basis on which
to find preemption of a home rule ordinance).
35. Thus, for a home rule enactment to be immune from state preemption in a legislative
home rule state, specific constitutional protection is required. The Illinois Constitution, for instance,
explicitly authorizes home rule units to license, tax, and to incur debt. ILL. CONST. art. VIL § 6(a).
36. For an example of clear judicial separation of the two legal questions, see Goodell v.
Humboldt County, 575 N.W.2d 486,492 (Iowa 1998).
37. The Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in City ofNorthglenn v. lbarra illustrates judicial
blending of the two issues. 62 P.3d 151, 155 (Colo. 2003). In that case, the court simultaneously
concluded that the local ordinance pertained to a statewide concern (and was thus not within the
scope of home rule authority) and that the ordinance had been preempted. See id. (holding that the
ordinance "is a matter of statewide concern and is preempted"). Further obfuscating the judicial
analysis was the court's application of the extraterritorial impact factor. In barra, the term was used
as a measure of the ordinance's invalidity rather than, as is usually the case in Colorado judicial
analysis, to determine whether the issue being regulated falls within a category of "shared state and
local" concern, in which case, the ordinance is a candidate for preemption. See id. at 163-67 (Coats,
J., dissenting).
38. Although the Colorado Supreme Court did not use the terminology of extraterritorial
impact, its invalidation of Denver's regulation of local telephone rates more than 55 years ago was
based on its concern about "the impact and effect which it may or may not have upon the areas
outside the municipality." People ex rel. Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
243 P.2d 397, 399 (Colo. 1952).
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initiatives, 39 its meaning remains vague. In one unusually straightfor-
ward and objective interpretation of the extraterritorial impact factor
issued during the state's first decade of home rule, the Illinois Supreme
Court concluded that a home rule landlord tenant ordinance-had no extra-
territorial impact because it was limited to the regulation of "leases for
property within its own borders .... [and made] no attempt to control
rental property outside its own boundaries." ° That language suggests a
simple tracking of the territory in which a regulation applies and would
limit extraterritoriality to those instances in which the home rule unit
attempted to apply its police powers to activity occurring beyond its bor-
ders, asserting, for example, that it has inherent home rule power to an-
nex, regulate, or condemn outside its territory.41 Most courts, however,
have not adopted such a limited and objective definition.
A survey of the many faceted judicial applications of the extraterri-
torial impact factor reveals little in the way of categorizing or generaliz-
ing principles. Rather, use of the term has extended in all encompassing
ways and can be used to catch virtually any home rule initiative within
its reach. To determine whether a particular home rule initiative imper-
missibly imposed an extraterritorial impact, courts have considered ar-
guments about where and upon whom the impact has been felt, about
how the impact is to be measured, and about the directness of the con-
nection between home rule initiative and the extraterritorial impact.
Notwithstanding judicial assurances that the criterion will not apply to
invalidate home rule ordinances with impacts that are "incidental 4 2 or
"de minimis,' '43 the test's application belies this limit and, in fact, the
extraterritorial impact factor can be all things to all people.
1. Focusing on the ordinance's cumulative impact
In some cases, the court's conclusion of extraterritoriality reflects
concerns about potential cumulative impact. If the court concludes that it
is likely that most home rule units would or have adopted regulations
similar to the one being challenged, the impermissible extraterritorial
impact lies in the cumulative "squeeze" that the regulated entity will feel.
In a challenge to a Colorado municipality's regulation that prohibited
39. In Colorado, the courts apply three factors to determine whether a home rule initiative
should be categorized as local (and immune from conflicting state regulation), shared state and local
(and thus pre-emptible), or statewide (and beyond the scope of home rule powers). Those factors, as
first made explicit in City & County of Denver v. State, consist of the need for statewide uniformity,
the impact of the ordinance on persons outside the municipality, and whether the matter has been
traditionally governed by state or local government. 788 P.2d 764, 768 (Colo. 1990).
40. City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 421 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. 1981). Unfortunately, the
Illinois courts have not always adhered to this narrow definition. See Bernardi and Des Plaines for
examples of a judicial ripple effect analysis similar to the ones developed in other states. People ex
rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d 316, 321-22 (Ill. 1988); Metro. Sanitary Dist. of
Greater Chi. v. City of Des Plaines, 347 N.E.2d 716, 718-19 (III. 1976).
41. See text accompanying notes 19-23.
42. City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161 (Colo. 2003).
43. Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 769.
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convicted sex offenders from living in the same residence, the court
noted its concern that other municipalities would follow suit. In fact, in
the immediate area of the targeted ordinance, many communities had
adopted a similar exclusion, thus giving the plaintiff foster family, which
cared for adjudicated juveniles pursuant to a state license, few if any
choices of a home.44
If, in contrast, the court's concern is not that all neighboring com-
munities will adopt the same regulation, but rather that widespread local
regulation will produce a maze of varying and potentially inconsistent
regulations by other similarly situated home rule municipalities, the
extraterritorial impact lies in the "patchwork ' 45 or the "confusion" 46 re-
sulting from "a significant variety of conflicting local legislation." 47  If
home rule is based on the assumption that local governments need flex-
ibility to meet their communities' needs, the patchwork created by a
multiplicity of different home rule approaches to the same problem
should be evidence that home rule is accomplishing its intended result,
not that it has exceeded its limits.48
44. See Ibarra, 62 P.3d at 162, in which the court noted that "at least sixteen counties and
municipalities in Colorado" had adopted ordinances regulating the living arrangements of adjudi-
cated sex offenders. See also id. at 162 n.17. In contrast, in Denver v. State, the court noted the
absence of evidence about the "aggregate economic impact" of municipal residency requirements
such as the one before it and refused to invalidate Denver's. Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 769 n.7;
see also Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 673 P.2d 354, 358 (Colo.
1983) (speculating that if all home rule municipalities were to impose the same costs upon the rail-
road as Denver sought to in this case, "the possible result is that the affected railroads may well
decide to reduce service, or even, in some cases, to terminate service"); Commercial Nat'l Bank of
Chi. v. City of Chicago, 432 N.E.2d 227, 243 (I1. 1982) ("[U]nrestrained extraterritorial exercise of
[home rule] powers in zoning, taxation and other areas could create serious problems .... [E]ach
home rule unit in the State of Illinois could pass a similar ordinance.").
45. Its concern that "patchwork electrical-transmission legislation" would "handicap com-
pliance with safety regulations and inhibit the efficient distribution of electrical power" led the
Rhode Island Supreme Court to invalidate a home rule unit's three year moratorium on the construc-
tion of high voltage electric power transmission lines. Town of East Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d
104, 111-12 (R.I. 1992). An Ohio appellate court used the same concern in its analysis invalidating
a residency requirement for municipal employment. See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Em-
ployees Local # 74 v. City of Warren, 895 N.E.2d 238, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
46. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1281 (Colo. 2002). In some cases though,
the court finds a patchwork of potentially conflicting legislation to be legally unremarkable. See,
e.g., Winslow Constr. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 960 P.2d 685, 694 (Colo. 1998).
47. Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1281. On that basis, the Commerce City court found that
home rule traffic regulations that used automated vehicle identification systems had an extraterritori-
al impact, nothing that "a driver-simply by commuting to work on a typical day--could be sub-
jected to a patchwork of rules and procedures by individual cities." Id at 1282; see also People ex
rel. Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 243 P.2d 397, 401 (Colo. 1952)
(speculating about the difficulties the company would face if subjected to a multiplicity of home rule
regulations); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441, 447 (Colo. 1958) (speculating that
state preemption of local income taxes could reflect a "fear of permitting a veritable tax jungle of
separate city income taxes .... ").
48. As a court more protective of home rule initiative has noted: "Home rule ... is predicated
on the assumption that problems in which local governments have a legitimate and substantial inter-
est should be open to local solution and reasonable experimentation to meet local needs." Kalodi-
mos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 274 (Ill. 1984).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In essence, the courts' concerns about the cumulative effect of home
rule regulation operates as a double edged sword. It means that whenev-
er home rule units in the same area are all affected by, and respond to,
the same issue, the resulting landscape is ripe for challenges of extraterri-
torial impact. If the court believes that many municipalities will take the
same approach to a problem, the extraterritorial impact lies in the way in
which the ordinances would combine to impose a broad blanket of exclu-
sion or similar restrictions. If, however, the court believes that neighbor-
ing municipalities' regulatory efforts are likely to take different forms,
the impermissible impact comes from the regulatory inconsistency of
legal obligations found from one local government unit to the next. Tak-
en to an extreme, perhaps, this inquiry could potentially leave standing
only those home rule initiatives dealing with issues unattended to in the
surrounding home rule units. This creates the particularly unrealistic and
unjustified result that home rule initiatives will be found to be free of
impermissible extraterritorial impact only when they deal with a problem
not common to their similarly situated neighbors.
2. Restricting the analysis to the impact of the individual ordinance
In contrast to some courts' projection or extrapolation of cumulative
effects, others have restricted their analysis to the possible extraterritorial
impact of the challenged ordinance operating alone. In those cases, the
judicial inquiry focuses more narrowly on the conduct or individuals
affected by the ordinance to evaluate whether the local government's
border is effective to contain the cause and effect of its regulation. In
this context, local inability to prevent permeation, seepage, or cross bor-
der movement can be fatal to the home rule ordinance's validity.
In City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 49
the home rule city adopted a noise control ordinance to moderate the
disturbances caused by diesel locomotives as they prepared for their
morning commuter trips into Chicago. The court invalidated the ordin-
ance because of its extraterritorial impact. Movement in and out of the
home rule city was crucial: because the unwanted sound could not be
contained within Des Plaines' borders, and also because the ordinance
purported to regulate sounds that originated outside of the city but whose
effects were felt inside, the ordinance had a double extraterritorial im-
pact.
The constant movement of people through the home rule unit may
also form the basis of impermissible extraterritoriality. In Holiday Uni-
versal, Inc. v. Montgomery County,50 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
invalidated a home rule county's attempt to prohibit certain unfair prac-
49. 357 N.E.2d 433 (I1. 1976).
50. 833 A.2d 518 (Md. 2003).
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tices in the performance of service contracts. 51 The ordinance purported
to apply both to contracts signed in the county, as well as those that were
to be primarily performed within its limits. For the court, both aspects of
the law's coverage were problematic, and both fell under the extraterri-
torial impact umbrella. After all, it reasoned, contracts signed in Mont-
gomery County could be performed outside the county, outside the state,
and even outside the country.52 And the extraterritoriality extended fur-
ther: even if some of the contract were performed within the county, the
ordinance would apply to service contracts "where as much as forty-nine
percent of the performance of the contract takes place outside of Mont-
gomery County. 53 By failing to find a way to seal the county's borders
from the constant movement of people, the ordinance's inevitable appli-
cation to people outside its borders rendered it impermissibly extraterri-
54torial in its scope.
Given the courts' concerns about the impact of the ordinance ex-
tending to some conduct or activity that is not totally contained within
the unit's territory, it might be expected that the extraterritorial impact
label would not apply when the conduct being regulated occurs com-
pletely within the home rule unit's borders. In City of Commerce City v.
State,55 however, the city adopted an automated photograph system for
purposes of imposing fines for traffic violations. Although the offending
conduct took place entirely within the city's borders, the extraterritorial
impact came from the fact that the city was in essence in a "commuter
corridor[] ,' 56 with numerous non-residents passing through on a daily
basis. According to this line of reasoning, then, impermissible extraterri-
torial impacts can be created by the inevitable porousness of local bor-
ders and the movement of people, commerce, and pollution from one
home rule unit to another, even though all behavior targeted by the
home rule ordinance occurs exclusively within the unit's territory. Al-
though this version of extraterritoriality does not involve judicial specu-
lation about the cumulative effect of similar ordinances throughout the
51. The ordinance imposed a number of consumer protections on service contracts, the most
important one being the right to cancel the contract without penalty within three days after signing.
See id. at 520-21 (citing section 1I-4A of the Consumer Protection Chapter of the Montgomery
County Code).
52. See id. at 525
53. Id.
54. This approach to extraterritoriality stands in stark contrast to the Illinois courts' approach
in some local tax cases, which rejects out of hand the claim that a local tax on out of town sellers
doing business within the home rule unit is impermissibly extraterritorial. See, e.g., Mulligan v.
Dunne 338 N.E.2d 6 (111. 1975); M. Wine & Spirits Co. v. County of Cook, 548 N.E.2d 416 (111.
App. Ct. 1989).
55. 40 P.3d 1273 (Colo. 2002).
56. Id. at 1282.
57. See Baggett v. Gates, 649 P.2d 874, 880 (Cal. 1982). In that case, the court found an
impermissible extraterritorial impact in the fact the law applied to numerous nonresidents who
visited the city daily, and to property within the city owned by nonresidents. Because those nonresi-
dents would feel the effect of the challenged local law, the court held that the city was powerless to
adopt a regulation governing dispute resolution procedures for municipal employees.
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region, it imposes another substantial restriction on the home rule unit's
potential scope of initiative powers.58
3. The ripple effect
Of the different approaches applied by the courts, it is undoubtedly
the ripple effect that provides the broadest sweep for the extraterritorial
impact factor. Under this line of argumentation, the court is willing to
consider impacts allegedly felt by other municipalities as government
units,59 by the individuals residing in those municipalities, 6° or by the
marketplace generally.61 Even with the stated caveat that these effects
must be more than de minimis, 62 the potential breadth of the ripple effect
analysis is enormous. Though the Colorado Supreme Court is undoub-
tedly the term's staunchest proponent, it has been rather vague in speci-
fying its intended reach. As applied in a number of cases, it seems that
the ripple effect of the extraterritorial impact will rise to the level of im-
permissible when the court throws the home rule pebble into the waters
within the home ruleunit's territory and then devises a theory as to how
the resulting ripples will extend beyond its borders.
The ripple effect has been found in a wide variety of situations. For
one thing, if a local regulation reduces the statewide supply of some enti-
ty, business, or program, it may have an impermissible extraterritorial
58. The court in Commerce City concluded that because the home rule ordinance may apply
to nonresidents in ways that interfere with their expectations as state residents, its impact becomes
impermissibly extraterritorial. Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1284. This use of extraterritorial impact
is circular, of course, because the expectations of state residents are shaped in no small part by the
judicially accepted contours of home rule. One of home rule's essential premises is that local condi-
tions demand particularly tailored local responses; citizens' expectations of uniformity in local
regulation, then, is fundamentally inconsistent with the basic premise of home rule itself. Compare
the same court's analysis in Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge # 27 v. City & County of
Denver, in which the court refused to conclude that the numerous daily contacts between nonresi-
dents coming into Denver and the city's deputy sheriffs were sufficient to create an impermissible
extraterritorial impact. 926 P.2d 582, 590 (Colo. 1996).
59. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees Local # 74 v. City of Warren,
895 N.E.2d 238, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating local residency requirement for municipal
employment because of extraterritorial impact) ("The requirement impairs competition among the
municipalities for residents; it affects the tax revenue, housing market, and school systems of all
surrounding communities."); see also People ex rel. Bernardi v. City of Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d
316, 321-22 (I. 1988) (invalidating local attempt to exempt city contracts from the Prevailing Wage
Act because of impact on wages in other parts of the region); Metro. Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chi. v.
City of Des Plaines, 347 N.E.2d 716, 718-19 (111. 1976) (invalidating local home rule regulation of
regional special district because the regional special district's territory included numerous other local
governments, and thus the home rule regulation would indirectly affect those municipalities).
60. See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 152 (Colo. 2003).
61. See, e.g., Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 32-33 (Colo.
2000).
62. The lbarra case stressed this aspect of the extraterritorial impact when it said: "To find a
ripple effect... the extraterritorial impact must have serious consequences to residents outside the
municipality, and be more than incidental ...." 62 P.3d at 161. Three years earlier, the court had
found that the ripple effect of an inclusionary zoning ordinance "may well be minimal," but con-
demned it anyway. Lot Thirty-Four, 3 P.3d at 39.
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impact.63  For another, if the regulation imposes a cost on a business
within the home rule unit, which the business may in turn pass on to its
customers outside the home rule unit, it may also have an impermissible
extraterritorial impact.64 In addition, if the regulation imposes a cost on
business that may encourage the business to relocate to another commu-
nity, an impermissible extraterritorial impact may be found.65 This line
of reasoning is extremely potent, since the purpose of most home rule
initiatives is to regulate conduct or recuperate costs imposed by actors
within the unit, and exit to avoid unwelcome government regulation is a
typical response to all sorts of home rule regulatory initiatives. 66 Nearly
any restriction or regulation of a business entity's flexibility and ability
to participate in the market can be translated into a monetary cost, either
in terms of opportunities lost or reduced profitability resulting from the
imposition of regulations.
In some cases, courts have found invalid rippling in a regulation's
effect on other municipalities, either on their competition for money or
people67 or on their legal obligations. An Ohio appellate court recently
illustrated this line of reasoning when it invalidated a municipal residen-
cy requirement for municipal employees, noting that the local regulation
"impairs competition among the municipalities for residents; it affects
the tax revenue, housing market, and school systems of all surrounding
communities." 69  Though the Colorado Supreme Court has expressly
held that Denver's similar residency ordinance did not have an imper-
missible extraterritorial impact,70 the Ohio court's articulation of the rip-
ples seems to come straight out of the Colorado playbook of the ripple
effect's intended application.
63. See, e.g., Ibarra, 62 P.3d at 161-62 (extraterritorial impact of local residency restriction
comes from reduction of total number of foster homes statewide).
64. See Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 673 P.2d 354, 358-59
(Colo. 1983) (imposing cost of rebuilding viaduct in Denver on railroad may cause railroad to reduce
or terminate service to people outside Denver). But see U.S.W. Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of Long-
mont, 924 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Colo. App. 1995) (finding company's argument that home rule imposi-
tion of cost will require it to raise rates statewide is outweighed by local government's interest in
regulating).
65. Lot Thirty-Four, 3 P.3d at 38. Compare id, with JAM Rest., Inc. v. City of Longmont,
140 P.3d 192, 196 (Colo. App. 2006) (no impermissible extraterritorial impact from local amortiza-
tion of sexually oriented businesses).
66. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part 11-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 CoLu~m. L.
REv. 346, 399-403 (1990).
67. See Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees Local # 74 v. City of Warren, 895
N.E.2d 238, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
68. See, e.g., People ex rel. Bemardi v. City of Highland Park, 520 N.E.2d 316, 317 (Ill.
1988).
69. Am. Fed'n, 895 N.E.2d at 249.
70. In City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990), the Colorado Supreme
Court refused to find an impermissible extraterritorial impact in a challenge to Denver's residency
requirement for municipal employees. Because local government employees in Denver constituted
merely 1/7 of 1% of the total Colorado work force, the impact, in the court's view, could not be
substantial. kId at 769.
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And finally, if the judicial application of the ripple effect assumes
that all extraterritorial impacts are beyond the scope of home rule pow-
ers, then even beneficial impacts should be within the term's reach. The
Colorado Supreme Court has suggested as much in its evaluation of Tel-
luride's inclusionary zoning ordinance. Though it found plenty of nega-
tive extraterritorial impacts, the court also turned the tables on Telluride,
using the ordinance's stated goals as evidence of its hoped-for extraterri-
torial impact. Because the ordinance articulated the goals of alleviating
the area's shortage of affordable housing and of improving regional qual-
ity of life by reducing traffic congestion and reducing the distance be-
tween home and work for those employed in Telluride or other commun-
ities, 71 it had apparently acted beyond its limited mandate to think only of
itself.
In summary, judicial application of the extraterritorial impact factor,
whether in the form of the cumulative, individual, or ripple effect ap-
proach, essentially provides untethered freedom to choose the measuring
stick of the alleged extraterritorial impact. More than a balanced evalua-
tion of in-unit interests and out-of-unit impacts, the extraterritorial im-
pact factor has created an opportunity for judicial insertion of its own
notions of good government on the home rule landscape. Taken to its
logical ending point, application of the ripple effect would mean that
only ordinances without an impact of any kind can pass scrutiny under
the extraterritorial impact analysis. An Ohio appellate court suggested as
much when it upheld a home rule unit's domestic partner registry against
challenges of extraterritorial impact, by noting that the ordinance could
not have an extraterritorial impact because it essentially accomplished
nothing at all.72
II. REMOVING THE EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT FACTOR FROM THE
JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
As a doctrinal tool, the extraterritorial impact factor skews the judi-
cial analysis and upsets the balance between legislature and judiciary in
the definition of home rule powers. The term's inherent vagueness and
imprecision mean that it can apply in numerous, and often self-
contradictory, ways. Thus, for instance, courts have found impermissible
extraterritorial impacts in an ordinance because of the likelihood that the
community's neighbors would follow suit by adopting similar ordin-
71. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LL.C., 3 P.3d 30,38 (Colo. 2000).
72. City of Cleveland Heights ex reL Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights, 832 N.E.2d 1275,
1278 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) ("The registry confers no right or obligation upon registrants, is adminis-
tered exclusively within the city of Cleveland Heights, and has no effect outside the territory of the
city."). Actually, the court may have been too quick to conclude that the ordinance in this case
would have no effect on the behavior of people outside the home rule unit. The domestic partner
registry may in fact send the message that the community is gay friendly. That message could affect
the choice of residence made by individuals for whom tolerance of sexual preferences is important.
See Diller, supra note 26, at 1131.
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ances,73 while in other cases the extraterritorial impact has come from the
likelihood that neighboring jurisdictions would adopt different ordin-
ances and create the much maligned "crazy patchwork., 74 An extraterri-
torial impact can come from the way a law imposes costs on a business
that might be recouped in that business's out of town activities,75 or it
may come from the likelihood that a regulation will encourage a business
to leave the home rule unit's territory and take its business elsewhere.76
If the impact measurement is limited to the effect of the individual ordin-
ance on the larger region or state, it will likely be trivial and unassaila-
ble,77 but if the court decides to speculate on the aggregate effect of
many similar ordinances, the composite extraterritorial impact effect will
cross the line into impermissible. 78 All in all, the inconsistency of mean-
ing and measurement essentially gives courts a cover for imposing their
own political assessment of the local laws at issue. Not only does that
create a powerful tool that is beyond the reach of legislative directives,
but it also leaves home rule units themselves without guidance as they try
to predict the best way to adopt a legally sustainable ordinance.
A. Elevating Judicial Intent Over Legislative Intent
If the majority of judicial decisions applying the extraterritorial im-
pact factor involved cases with no indication of legislative intent, its ap-
plication could be defended, perhaps, as a necessary substitute for the
unavailable best evidence. Yet in many of the cases in which it has been
an important factor, the legislature's intent was unequivocal. In imperio
courts, because the absence of the extraterritorial impact is an important
contributor to a judicial conclusion that the law is exclusively local, and
thus immune from state preemption, its application has meant the differ-
ence between the court's decision to defer to the legislature's clear intent
to preempt and its decision to disregard that statutory intent by awarding
immunity to the home rule ordinance. And because of the extraterritorial
impact's enormous breadth and imprecision, it is impossible to identify a
consistent analysis or judicial metric.
In one case, the Colorado court immunized a municipal residency
requirement from explicit preemptive intent because of its conclusion
that the extraterritorial impact was trivial.79 Yet in another case, the
73. See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161-62 (Colo. 2003).
74. See, e.g., An Fed'n, 895 N.E.2d at 248-49; Town of E. Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d
104, 111-12 (R.I. 1992).
75. See, e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 673 P.2d 354,
358-59 (Colo. 1983).
76. See, e.g., Lot Thirty-Four, 3 P.3d at 39.
77. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 769 (Colo. 1990).
78. See, e.g., barra, 62 P.3d at 161-62.
79. Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 769. In contrast, an Ohio appellate court recently applied the
analysis to a similar Cleveland ordinance and concluded that its extraterritorial impact meant that the
home rule initiative was subject to state statutory prohibition of municipal residency requirements.
See Ant. Fed'n, 895 N.E.2d at 248-49.
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court's recognition that the extraterritorial impact was likely to be "mi-
nimal"80 did not result in home rule immunity. In one opinion, the home
rule ordinance's application to large numbers of nonresidents within the
home rule unit's borders was key to a finding of extraterritoriality;
8s
while in another, that same fact was irrelevant to the judicial analysis,
and immunity from conflicting state regulation was forthcoming.82 In all
of these cases, the state legislature had explicitly articulated its intent that
local regulation should yield to uniform statewide standards.83 The
court's resolution of the extraterritorial impact factor determined whether
that state legislative intent would be honored or disregarded.
The extraterritorial impact factor has also been applied to frustrate
explicit legislative intent to allow concurrent regulation. In Holiday
Universal, Inc. v. Montgomery County,84 the Maryland Court of Appeals
concluded that a home rule county's unfair practices law had an imper-
missible extraterritorial impact because its application to all contracts
"primarily" performed within the county meant that some out-of-county
conduct came within its sweep. Concluding that the impact of the regu-
lation was impermissibly extraterritorial, the court held that the county
law was beyond the scope of its home rule powers.8 5 Although the Mar-
yland legislature had explicitly, and strongly, encouraged local govern-
ments to adopt consumer regulations to supplement the state law,86 that
80. Lot Thirty-Four, 3 P.3d at 39-40.
81. City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1282 (Colo. 2002). The Colorado Su-
preme Court's own holding nearly 25 years earlier in People v. Hizhniak, 579 P.2d 1131 (Colo.
1978), in which it had upheld a home rule municipality's ability to "regulate speed limits on its
streets and prescribe its own penalties for violations thereof," id. at 1132, seemed persuasively on
point and suggestive of a judicial conclusion of immunity. See Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1285-
1287 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting) (citing Hizhniak, 579 P.2d at 1132).
82. Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge # 27 v. City & County of Denver, 926 P.2d 582,
592 (Colo. 1996) (granting immunity to home rule unit from statewide training requirements for
deputy sheriffs).
83. State law relevant to Denver v. State declared that "no residency requirement may be
imposed on any employee by any local government." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-120(4)(a)
(West 2009), quoted in 788 P.2d at 765 n.4. State law found applicable in Lot Thirty-Four prohi-
bited the adoption of any municipal law "which would control rents on private residential property,"
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-301 (West 2009), quoted in 3 P.3d at 34, and explicitly intended to
apply to "any city, town, or city and county which has chosen to adopt a home rule charter." COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-302 (West 2009), quoted in 3 P.3d at 37. In the statute at issue in the
Commerce City dispute, the legislature had declared that "the enforcement of traffic laws through the
use of automated vehicle identification systems under this section is a matter of statewide concern
and is an area in which uniform state standards are necessary." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-4-
110.5 (West 2009), quoted in 40 P.3d at 1280. And finally, state law in the Fraternal Order case
mandated a particular type of training for all deputy sheriffs "employed by the state or any city, city
and county, town, or county within this state." COLO. REV. STAT.. § 18-1-901(3)(1)(1) (2002) (re-
pealed 2003), quoted in 926 P.2d at 585 n.3.
84. 833 A.2d 518 (Md. 2003).
85. Id. at 526-27.
86. In its statement of purpose, the state's Consumer Protection Act noted its intention "to set
certain minimum statewide standards for the protection of consumers across the State, and the Gen-
eral Assembly strongly urges that local subdivisions which have created consumer protection agen-
cies at the local level encourage the function of these agencies at least to the minimum level set forth
in the standards of this title." MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 13-102(b)(1) (West 2008).
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clear evidence of state intent was irrelevant, trumped by the court's con-
clusion on extraterritorial impact.
While the extraterritorial impact factor seems to surface most fre-
quently in cases in which the legislature has clearly spoken, it can also be
an important part of an imperio court's preemption analysis in cases with
no legislative statement of preemptive intent. In that situation, the extra-
territorial impact factor has become a proxy for legislative intent. The
Colorado Supreme Court's analysis in City of Northglenn v. Ibarra
87
most clearly illustrates this point for the imperio home rule system.
In Ibarra, a home rule city's ordinance prohibited registered sex of-
fenders from living together in a single family residence. Juliana and
Eusebio Ibarra, who were certified by a child placement agency (which
in turn was licensed by the state of Colorado), offered foster care to
children placed in their home by the state agency. When Northglenn's
ordinance became effective, three of the four children living in the bar-
ras' home were adjudicated juvenile sex offenders. The Ibarras were
convicted of violating Northglenn's residency restriction, and their legal
challenge alleged that the local law was beyond the scope of home rule
powers.88 The state's highest court agreed with the Ibarras, concluding
that the local ordinance was inapplicable to the Ibarras as foster care pro-
viders for adjudicated juvenile offenders. Although that conclusion may
seem intuitively correct, the court's analysis unnecessarily muddied the
waters with its insertion of extraterritorial impact into the preemption
analysis.
Clear state precedent, developed first in the supreme court's holding
in City & County of Denver v. State,89 instructs Colorado courts to eva-
luate challenges to home rule ordinances to determine, first, the nature of
the ordinance as local, statewide, or shared; and second, if necessary, to
consider whether the local law has nevertheless been preempted by the
state legislature. The extraterritorial impact factor (along with a consid-
eration of the state's need for uniformity and the tradition of state and
local regulation with regard to the issue at hand)9° forms a part of the
analysis of that first question. If the court applies the factors and con-
cludes that the ordinance is best described as dealing with a shared state
and local concern, application of its well-established preemption test is
87. 62 P.3d 151 (Colo. 2003).
88. The Ibarras' other allegations consisted of claims that the local law discriminated on the
basis of family status in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, that it violated their
associational rights under the U.S. Constitution, and that it violated the Ibarras' right to make impor-
tant personal choices in their family life. See Ibarra, 62 P.3d at 154.
89. 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990). This opinion is recognized as the origin of the three factor
inquiry. See also Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge # 27 v. City & County of Denver, 926 P.2d
582, 588-89 (Colo. 1996).
90. Consideration of these additional factors is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth
noting that the other two factors established by the court more obviously relate to judicial explora-
tion about likely legislative intent and thus are arguably legitimate parts of the inquiry.
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the second step. Only if the local law conflicts with state statutes will the
local law be preempted.
In barra, and unlike most other Colorado cases applying the extra-
territorial impact factor, the state legislature had not explicitly preempted
the challenged local regulation. Application of the Denver v. State fac-
tors should have occurred at the first step in the analysis, that is, to de-
termine whether the local regulation dealt with an exclusively local, ex-
clusively statewide, or shared concern. Based on case precedent, it
seems likely that the matter fit within the category of shared state and
local concern, which would then have triggered the preemption analysis.
The Ibarra court, however, failed to separate the two steps, conflating
the categorization question with the preemption question, and thus con-
verting the extraterritorial impact factor into an argument about the state
law's preemptive effect. 91 The subtle yet important consequence of that
blending of the issues is that the court favored application of a vague
judicial metric and failed to analyze the relevant local interests and the
existence or extent of conflict between state law and the home rule initia-
tive.
92
While the extraterritorial impact factor surfaces most frequently in
imperio states, it has been used by courts in legislative home rule states
as well. In a slightly different scenario than the one presented in imperio
states, where the extraterritorial impact factor has emerged as a way for
courts to disregard legislative intent, the legislative home rule court's use
of the extraterritorial impact will invalidate local regulation in an area in
which the state legislature has remained silent, and thus, non-preemptive.
In legislative home rule courts, then, the extraterritorial impact factor
functions more as a tool of implied preemption. Even though the Illinois
Supreme Court has frequently stressed that implied preemption is incon-
91. Pursuant to the analysis developed in Denver v. State, home rule ordinances dealing with
exclusively local concerns are immune from conflicting state law, even if the legislature has explicit-
ly indicated its desire to preempt local law. Thus, when the state has explicitly articulated its intent
to preempt, the resolution of the immunity question also answers the question whether the local law
has been preempted, not because extraterritorial impact is a relevant factor to preemption, but be-
cause the state's intended preemption can take effect only if the court concludes that the law is not
exclusively local, and thus, preemptible. In most of the cases applying the Denver v. State factors-
see, for example, City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1280 (Colo. 2003); City & County
of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 755 (Colo. 2001); Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four
Venture, LLC., 3 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo. 2000); Fraternal Order, 926 P.2d at 589-the facts were
similar, involving a local law that conflicted with an explicit state preemptive declaration. It is only
when the state has not provided clear evidence of legislative intent to preempt that the two questions
are necessarily separate. lbarra was one such case, yet the court failed to distinguish them. See
generally lbarra, 62 P.3d 151.
92. The preemption analysis would have forced the court to grapple with difficult questions
about whether state law articulated a reasonable need for unfettered discretion in its agents' place-
ment of adjudicated juvenile offenders in foster care. Although the court did identify a number of
state concerns and interests, it neither identified the relevant local interests nor identified the extent
of the conflict between state and local law. The dissent, for instance, raised the possibility that the
majority's holding could be broad enough to authorize placement of a foster child in a building that
violated a city's health or building codes. See lbarra, 62 P.3d at 165-66 (Coats, J., dissenting).
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sistent with Illinois' clear adoption of legislative home rule, 93 on occa-
sion it has applied the extraterritorial impact concept to do just that.
For example, in City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western
Railway Co.,94 the court invalidated a home rule noise ordinance for its
impermissibly extraterritorial intent to regulate something whose origin
was not always within the home rule unit, and which could not be con-
tained within the home rule unit. Similarly, in People ex rel. Bernardi v.
City of Highland Park,95 the court invalidated a home rule unit's attempt
to exempt itself from the application of the state's Prevailing Wage Law,
identifying an impermissible extraterritorial impact on the computation
of the prevailing wage in the area, which could decrease for other muni-
cipalities because of Highland Park's actions. In essence, judicial appli-
cation of the extraterritorial impact factor in the legislative home rule
system means that the legislature has not taken steps to preempt the law,
but the court believes it should have.96 This approach improperly ignores
the court's duty to uphold local regulation "in the face of less stringent or
conflicting State regulation, following a determination that the State's
expression of interest in the subject as evidenced by its statutory scheme
did not amount to an express attempt to declare the subject one requiring
exclusive State control." 97
In the contexts described above, application of the extraterritorial
impact factor elevates judicial over legislative intent. In some cases, it
makes questions of legislative attitudes about the local law irrelevant to
the analysis, even when the state has clearly and explicitly articulated
that intent pursuant to statutory enactment. In others, when legislative
intent is not explicit, it substitutes judicial application of a vague metric
for evaluation of whether, and if so to what extent, local laws based on
legitimate home rule concerns conflict with state law. Application of
indeterminate terms may be necessary and even appropriate when it
comes to protection of constitutional norms98 but when a clear constitu-
tional green light shines on a home rule enactment, 99 and when other
parts of the judicial analysis would involve well established inquiries to
determine the relationship between state and local law, the extraterritorial
impact factor serves only to trump what would otherwise be a state legis-
lature's political decision about the proper allocation of power between
state and local governments. In both cases, the court cuts off the oppor-
93. See Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 274 (11. 1984) (rejecting appli-
cation of a "free-wheeling preemption rule to the exercise of home rule power").
94. 357 N.E.2d 433 (IUI. 1976).
95. 520 N.E.2d 316 (111. 1988).
96. Both cases had vigorous dissents, making the argument described in the text. See Bernar-
di, 520 N.E.2d at 323 (Miller, J., dissenting); Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 357 N.E.2d at 436 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting).
97. Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 275.
98. See Sandalow, supra note 19, at 707-2 1.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
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tunity to find the best evidence about legislative intent and arrogates to
itself the final say in an essentially political dispute.'
00
The extraterritorial impact inquiry appears to have originated in
courts in imperio states and may derive from that system's original focus
on carving out two self-contained spheres of regulation, one local and
one statewide)10' In this inquiry, the absence of extraterritorial impact
supported the argument that the local ordinance fell within the sphere of
exclusively local regulation and was thus immune from all conflicting
state laws. Instances of concurrent regulation or overlap between state
and local laws were few, thus minimizing the need for judicial analysis
to resolve conflict. 0 2 Yet as the courts in the more recent cases recog-
nize, the increasing interconnection brought about by new technology,
faster modes of transportation, new methods of communication, and in-
creasing urban density, make the definitions of an exclusively statewide
concern and an exclusively local concern extremely difficult to identi-
fy.103 In fact, the Kansas Supreme Court has suggested that the line itself
may be ephemeral: "Few, if any, ordinances and resolutions deal with an
exclusively local matter and no statute regulates a matter which can be
exclusively of statewide concern."' 4  If the majority of home rule dis-
putes involve overlapping regulations and potentially conflicting asser-
tions about valid state and local interests, the extraterritorial impact fac-
100. In his very thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of state court preemption of local law,
Professor Paul DiUller urged that the judiciary assume the role of "partners [with the state legislature]
in the process of interpreting state laws and developing the vertical distribution of power in a home
rule system," Diller, supra note 26, at 1159, thus rejecting arguments that state courts are better
suited to act as "'agents' merely searching for a specific instruction from the legislature." Id. Diller
offers three main arguments in support of this position-that courts are more impartial in a geo-
graphic sense, id. at 1160-64, enjoy a "tempered political insulation," id. at 1164-66, and are likely
to resolve disputes more quickly than the legislature, id. at 1166-68. For the contrary view that
courts should require explicit legislative articulation of intent to preempt, see Richard Briffault,
Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 265 (2004). At least in legislative
home rule states, Professor Diller's proposal seems to violate the system's essential feature, that is,
the absolute legislative supremacy and flexibility in determining the scope of home rule.
101. See Diller, supra note 26, at 1124-25.
102. See id. According to the standard history of home rule, opposition to the narrow judicial
construction of the exclusively local sphere in the imperio system prompted the introduction of
legislative home rule, with its focus on total legislative flexibility to delineate the scope of home rule
powers. See BREFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 28, at 303; Diller, supra note 26, at 1124-27.
Professor Terrance Sandalow led the opposition to the legislative home rule system, arguing that
judicial decisions in imperio states had been protective of home rule. See Sandalow, supra note 19,
at 652, 661-63. He agreed that home rule initiative powers should be broad, see id. at 652-58, but
defended the preservation of a vigorous judicial role "to curb abuse of municipal authority." Id. at
691.
103. See City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1281 (Colo. 2002) (noting that increas-
ing metropolitan area integration may change "local" concerns into "statewide" issues); City &
County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748, 755 (Colo. 2001) (concluding that globalization
increases the need for uniformity of regulation).
104. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Bd. of County Conm'rs of Greeley, 643 P.2d 188, 194 (Kan. 1982).
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tor, and its search for exclusivity of regulation, seems to have lost its
original justification and has become ill-suited for the judicial analysis.' 0 5
Nor can the extraterritorial impact factor be defended with the ar-
gument that it marks the line beyond which home rule regulation cannot
extend. 1°6 As a matter of state constitutional law, even imperio courts
have adjusted their attitudes to accept that home rule is more properly
viewed as a transfer of all transferable powers from the state to its politi-
cal subdivisions.'t 7 In that regime, home rule enactments should be
upheld so long as they meet state constitutional standards, meaning that
the extraterritorial impact of local actions should be the basis for judicial
condemnation only when it results in a violation of constitutional guaran-
tees. The New Jersey,108 New Hampshire,"°9 and California11° Supreme
Courts are among the very few that have concluded that the extraterri-
torial impact of local action may rise to the level of a state constitutional
violation. 11
B. Judicial Analysis Without the Extraterritorial Impact Factor
Judicial abandonment of the extraterritorial impact factor would cla-
rify and strengthen the judicial analysis. In legislative home rule states,
application of the factor is one of the few situations in which the courts
105. Justice Hans Linde's opinion in City of La Grande v. Pub. Employes Ret. Bd, 576 P.2d
1204 (Or. 1978), implicitly accepted this argument, when it established a narrow sphere of immune
local regulation. See id. at 1215. Though his opinion, which subjected home rule units to statewide
retirement laws for city police and firefighters, has been criticized as improperly restrictive of home
rule powers, it really takes no position on that issue. Justice Linde's basic point, rather, is that it is
up to the legislature, and not the court, to determine the scope of home rule initiative. See Burgundy,
supra note 28, at 830-33 (discussing La Grande and the opinion's strenuous dissents).
106. As a matter of federal constitutional law, municipal government extraterritoriality would
raise concerns only if the government extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction reached the level of
"annex[ation] ... in all but name." Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 70 n.8
(1978). In Holt, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges based on the one person, one
vote doctrine to an Alabama statute that granted municipalities extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction
over nearby unincorporated territory. Id. at 62-63.
107. In Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 108 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1940), the state supreme court
asserted: "[T]he Legislature, prior to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment, constitutionally
could have conferred upon a municipality the power here questioned and ... it must be considered
that such authority now is vested in the city by virtue of the [Home Rule] amendment." Id. at 241.
More recently, the Colorado court declared that "(t]he effect of the [home rule] amendment was to
grant to home rule municipalities 'every power theretofore possessed by the legislature to authorize
municipalities to function in local and municipal affairs." City & County of Denver v. State, 788
P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990) (quoting Four-County Metro. Capital Improvement Dist. v. Bd. of Coun-
ty Comm'rs of Adams, 369 P.2d 67, 72 (Colo. 1962)); accord City & County of Denver v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Arapahoe County, 156 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo. 1945)).
108. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,415 (N.J. 1983).
109. See Britton v. Town of Chester, 595 A.2d 492, 496 (N.H. 1991) (refraining from reversing
the lower court's holding that a zoning ordinance with extraterritorial impact was unconstitutional);
Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc. v. City of Manchester, 949 A.2d 681, 685 (N.H. 2008).
110. See Assoc. Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 483 (Cal. 1976).
111. As a proxy for legislative intent to limit home rule, the extraterritorial impact limit is on
equally weak ground. Most obviously, this justification is belied by the fact that the factor's most
frequent use has been to enable the courts to flaunt, rather than follow, their state legislature's expli-
cit intent. See supra text accompanying notes 81-95.
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have not been consistent with their home rule system's clear mandate for
legislative, rather than judicial, preemption. Giving up the extraterritori-
al impact factor would mean the relinquishment of what is essentially a
tool of implied preemption, or, more exactly, a factor with which the
court expresses its desires about what it believes the legislature should
have done.
In imperio states, the loss of the extraterritorial impact factor would
not strip the courts of the higher level of active involvement they current-
ly enjoy. The judiciary would still have a broad mandate to decipher
legislative intent through application of its preemption analyses. In addi-
tion, it would retain its ability to limit state preemptive authority to those
instances in which the preemptive law falls within the state court's defi-
nition of a "general law"' 112 or to those instances in which the state legis-
lature has a legitimate interest, rather than merely a stated intent, to
preempt. 
1 3
The courts in at least two imperio states have decided to follow that
course. The Supreme Court of Kansas jettisoned the extraterritorial im-
pact inquiry from its analysis, concluding that "[e]ven if a local act has
extraterritorial effect which makes its impact other than 'purely local,'
the local act should stand if not in conflict with a state statute and not in
an area clearly pre-empted by the state."' 1 4  The Iowa Supreme Court
adopted a similar view, concluding that "almost anything qualifies as a
local affair."' 115 By shifting the focus of judicial analysis to one of ascer-
taining legislative intent, the courts relinquished the opportunity to apply
their own policy preferences and left the resolution of the legal dispute to
a determination of the local law's consistency or conflict with state law.
In these imperio states, then, the judiciary has voluntarily assumed a
backseat in the analysis of the relationship between state and local law,
eschewing the opportunity to delineate the line between the permissibly
local and impermissibly extraterritorial, and focusing instead on the iden-
112. In its interpretation of the state constitutional provision that home rule authorizes "all
powers of local self-government . . as are not in conflict with general laws[]", OHIO CONST. arL
XVIII, § 3, the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test to evaluate whether an explicit state
intent to preempt qualifies as a "general law." See, e.g., City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963,
968 (Ohio 2005) (holding that for a state enactment to qualify as a preempting "general law," it must
"(1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state
alike.. . , (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or
limit legislative power of a municipal corporation .... and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon
citizens generally"), quoted in Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776, 783
(Ohio 2006).
113. See Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 768 & n.6 (stressing that legislature's declaration of
statewide concern is not conclusive nor automatically binding on the court); accord City & County
of Denver v. Qwest Corp. 18 P.3d 748, 755 (Colo. 2001); Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four
Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo. 2000).
114. Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Greeley, 643 P.2d 188, 194 (Kan. 1982).
The court invalidated the local ordinance based on its direct conflict with several provisions of state
law. Id. at 196; see also Blevins v. Hiebert, 770 P.2d 486,489 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
115. Worth County Friends of Agric. v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 257, 261 (Iowa 2004).
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tification of legislative intent. Though judicial control over home rule
through application of the extraterritorial impact factor may have made
sense at a time when home rule units were regarded as self-contained
empires, the reality of today's metropolitan landscape means that the
term applies in a way that is not responsive to home rule units' needs nor
to the state's decisions about how to allocate power to its political subdi-
visions.
I[. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT
FACTOR FOR HOME RULE UNITS
A. Reducing Home Rule Initiative
In my estimation, the negative implications of the extraterritorial
impact analysis extend beyond its effects on the judicial inquiry and are
felt by the home rule unit itself. Most importantly, the factor restricts the
scope of home rule initiative in significant ways. It can invalidate policy
initiatives that might otherwise, in the words of Paul Diller, "percolat[e]
'out' to other cities and 'up' to the state level."'" 6 If, as Professor Diller
has persuasively argued," the most valuable feature of home rule is its
ability to facilitate local policy experimentation and innovation, the
extraterritorial impact factor impedes the full realization of that benefit.
By targeting those home rule initiatives whose causes and effects cannot
be contained within the home rule unit's territory, the extraterritorial
impact limit is likely to catch within its sweep many cutting edge initia-
tives trying to grapple with the region's most pressing problems. "
8
Recent scholarship on immigration regulation is a good illustration
of how the extraterritorial impact factor can reduce the breadth of home
rule initiative power dramatically. Over the past few years, several legal
scholars have suggested a rethinking of the longstanding and long un-
questioned common wisdom that immigration regulation is exclusively
116. See Diller, supra note 26, at 1119.
117. See id. at 1117-33.
118. On occasion, application of the extraterritorial impact factor in Colorado has protected a
greater, rather than lesser, scope of home rule initiative powers. That is because the absence of
extraterritorial impact can produce a finding that the local law is immune from conflicting state
regulation, even when that legislation explicitly articulates a preemptive intent. See, e.g., Fraternal
Order of Police, Colo. Lodge # 27 v. City & County of Denver, 926 P.2d 582, 589 (Colo. 1996);
City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990). Without the extraterritorial
impact factor, then, the local laws challenged in these cases would have been preempted. In most
states, however, the extraterritorial impact factor applies only to restrict home rule regulation. See,
e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 357 N.E.2d 433, 435 (1l. 1976); Metro. Sanitary
Dist. of Greater Chi. v. City of Des Plaines, 347 N.E.2d 716, 719 (111. 1976); Holiday Universal, Inc.
v. Montgomery County, 833 A.2d 518, 524 (Md. 2003); Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Em-
ployees Local # 74 v. City of Warren, 895 N.E.2d 238, 249 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Town of E.
Greenwich v. O'Neil, 617 A.2d 104, 111 (R.L 1992). More fundamentally, though, defending the
courts' application of the extraterritorial impact factor because of its strategic potential to thwart
explicit legislative intent to restrict home rule would mean giving the judiciary the power to ignore
state legislative intent in what is clearly a political debate about the allocation of government power
between state government and its political subdivisions.
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within the province of the federal government.119 They argue that, in
fact, state and local immigration regulation may properly allow an inter-
jurisdictional approach to an issue that has a multi-faceted impact on
communities and states, as well as on our nation. 120 As Rick Su has ob-
served, many local ordinances that appear to be examples of immigration
regulation are better understood as reflections of longstanding local at-
tention to regulatory initiatives defining community character and quality
of life; he urges that their legitimacy be evaluated through a localist
lens. 121 Yet, surely the extraterritorial impact factor would apply to keep
local regulation out of the mix altogether, for after all, it is hard to im-
agine an area of the law more susceptible to claims about extraterritorial
impact. If the recent scholarship is correct that the breadth of interests,
actions, and impacts of what can be loosely defined as "immigration reg-
ulation" is too complicated and nuanced to be summarily pushed beyond
the permissible scope of home rule, the application of a vague judicially
created term that would do just that has no place in the analysis.
122
B. Misunderstanding the Region
With its underlying premise that the impacts of home rule regula-
tion should be contained within the governmental unit's borders, the
extraterritoriality limit ignores the essential fact that regions are by defi-
nition interconnected, interdependent, and affected by one another's ac-
tions. In the words of Neal Peirce, a region is "a fully integrated organ-
ism .... the closely interrelated, geographic, economic, environmental
119. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61
VAND. L. REv. 787, 830 (2008); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigra-
tion Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REv. 567,641 (2008); Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigra-
tion Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1619, 1636 (2008).
120. Professors Rodriguez and Huntington focus more specifically on the state-federal relation-
ship, although Prof. Rodriguez notes that her proposal of an "antipreemption norm," must ultimately
deal with the states' power to preempt local regulation and the fact that "state preemption of local
law is even more effective in flattening out diverse preferences than the immigration preemption
sometimes employed by courts, because state preemption is not constrained by functional parallels to
the constitutional doctrines that protect states' interests." Rodriguez, supra note 119, at 637. Pro-
fessor Su, as a state and local government law scholar, focuses explicitly and exclusively on the
realm of local regulation and the way in which our country's longstanding acceptance of localism
and localist values must inform the legal analysis of municipal regulation that implicates immigra-
tion and regulates immigrants.
121. Professor Su challenges the implicit assumption in the recent immigration federalism
scholarship that local immigration regulation is a reflection and embodiment of the same political
forces and debates over immigration as those that are evident at the state and national levels. He
argues that much local immigration regulation has its own source, one that has little if anything to do
with the larger picture of immigration policy. Rather, he argues, it is better understood as a conse-
quence of localism, in which local governments have long sought to protect their residents' quality
of life. See Su, supra note 119, at 1649-54. Professor Su does not dispute that the regulations target
immigrants but makes the important observation that understanding the total picture requires sensi-
tivity to the localism context. His specific analysis of North Carolina's state and local government
law structure illustrates this point nicely. See id. at 1654-76.
122. The argument here is not a strategic one about which level of regulation is more likely to
implement a favored political agenda in immigration regulation but rather whether home rule units
should be automatically disqualified from participation. See Rodriguez, supra note 119, at 594-95.
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entity that chiefly defines ... [our] civilization. ' 23 Just as the fate of
each particular local government in the region depends on the fate of the
entire region, 24 the actions of one inevitably have an impact on the other.
In fact, it is that very interrelatedness and interconnection that undergirds
the law and economics explanation of why the ability of "consumer vot-
ers"'125 to choose among diverse local governments in the region en-
hances overall welfare. After all, the competition among municipalities
to attract residents and revenues presupposes meaningful interjurisdic-
tional regulatory differences.
Applying a factor that seeks to cordon off a local government so
that it becomes an isolated unit whose actions have no impact on any
other part of the region misunderstands the essence of a region and the
inevitability of interlocal contacts and impacts. Although a court may try
to insist that local governments operate in a way that affects nothing
beyond their own borders, it is a futile attempt to change the reality of
the regions in which most home rule units exist. The very nature of met-
ropolitan regions insures that transactions, people, services, and goods
cross many local government borders on a regular and routine basis.'
26
A judicial term that views those inevitable cross-border connections as
evidence of a home rule ordinance's invalidity reduces the scope of
home rule initiative to the trivial. For the growing interconnectedness
among municipalities to serve as the basis for invalidation of local regu-
123. NEAL R. PEIRCE WiTH CURTIS W. JOHNSON & JOHN STUART HAL, CITISTATES: How
URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETrrIvE WORLD 291(1993). He further describes metro-
politan regions, which he refers to as "citistates", as "a concentration of human development, of
roads and rivers and bridges and masses of buildings, all arrayed together, people and vehicles, air,
water, and energy, information and commerce, interacting in seemingly infinite ways." Id
124. See LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNES, NAT'L LEAGUE OF CITIES, "ALL IN IT
TOGETHER": CrIES, SUBURBS AND LOCAL ECONOMIC REGIONS 1, 3-7 (1993). In that study, the
authors found that in the 25 metropolitan areas with the most rapid income growth, central city
incomes also increased. Conversely, in the 18 metropolitan areas that recently experienced income
decline, central city income declined in all but four instances. The report implies that metropolitan
area suburbs have a stake in the economic well-being of their central cities. Other analysts reached
similar conclusions about the interdependence of suburb and city. See, e.g., Joseph Persky & Wim
Wiewel, The Distribution of Costs and Benefits Due to Employment Deconcentration, in URBAN-
SUBURBAN INTERDEPENDENCIES 49, 50 (Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel eds., 2000); H.V.
Savitch et al., Ties that Bind: Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan Region, 7 ECON.
DEV. Q. 341, 341 (1993); Richard Voith, Central City Decline: Regional or Neighborhood Solu-
tions?, BUS. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 3; Richard Voith, City and Suburban Growth: Substitutes or
Complements?, BUS. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 21, 22 (concluding that an economically vital central
city is essential to the health of the metropolitan area).
125. Published in 1956, Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956), first articulated the economic defense of localism in urban government. Accord-
ing to his model, local governments compete with each other to provide a desired mix of services to
retain their constituents, the individual citizens whom he described as "consumer-voters." Id. at 419.
Competition between and among government units should produce greater efficiency in the provi-
sion of public services as well as more variety in the range and level of services offered by different
government units.
126. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1116 (1996).
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latory initiatives127 means that the sphere of permissible home rule activi-
ty becomes smaller, while the problems become more urgent.1
28
In fact, if the inescapable interconnectedness in a metropolitan re-
gion forms the basis of impermissible extraterritorial impacts in home
rule ordinances, the incongruous result is that home rule initiatives will
be on stronger legal footing when they are adopted in rural areas, be-
cause rural communities lack the multiple intergovernmental connections
that come from the density and sprawl of metropolitan regions. A home
rule traffic regulation 129 or a regulation of local service contracts
130
adopted in a part of the state with few incorporated municipalities, dense
urban areas, or regional employment or transportation centers, is unlikely
to have the same impermissible extraterritorial effect on nonresident
movement as the courts have found in urban areas. Yet home rule was
envisioned precisely to allow local governments located in denser areas
to deal with the problems caused by increasing urbanization. In fact, the
drafters of the 1970 Illinois Constitution favored the state's adoption of
home rule precisely because of the pressing need for local government
flexibility and initiative in metropolitan regions:
[H]ome rule powers are most urgently needed by larger municipali-
ties in the more highly urbanized areas of the state. Although the
problems of urban society affect many small localities, they are felt
most intensely in larger cities and villages. Dense concentrations of
population and industry call for the creative use of flexible govern-
mental powers to achieve and maintain order, social justice and a sa-
tisfactory quality of life. The renewal of old and deteriorating neigh-
127. For the court in City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273 (Colo. 2002), for instance,
the increasing interlocal integration results in decreasing home rule ability to deal with local prob-
lems. In the court's words, "[a]s motor vehicle traffic in the state and between home-rule municipal-
ities becomes more and more integrated it gradually ceases to be a 'local' matter." Id. at 1281.
Similarly, the court in City & County of Denver v. Qwest Corp., 18 P.3d 748 (Colo. 2001), opined
that "advances in technology and the phenomenon of globalization have greatly increased the need
for uniformity of regulation." Id. at 755. In this view, then, the trend is towards a decreasing sphere
for home rule regulation.
128. Several state supreme court decisions illustrate how the extraterritorial impact factor
fundamentally ignores the basic nature of metropolitan regions. In Holiday Universal Inc. v. Mont-
gomery County, 833 A.2d 518 (Md. 2003), for instance, the Maryland Court of Appeals invalidated a
home rule ordinance because its application was not limited to behavior occurring exclusively within
the territory of the home rule unit, but rather extended to regulate contracts whose implementation
occurred "primarily" within the home rule unit. For the court, the fact that up to 49% of the contract
could be performed beyond the borders of the home rule unit meant that "the impact ... is too great
for the ordinance to be a local law .... " Id. at 526. The Colorado Supreme Court in Commerce
City, applying that concern in a different direction, found an impermissible extraterritorial impact in
local regulations' application to numerous non-residents who entered the home rule unit on a daily
basis on their way to work. In this case, between 40 and 90% of the tickets issued under the home
rule units' photo radar system went to non-residents driving through on their way to work or other
activities. See Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1282. Thus, the extraterritorial impact in this case came
not from the way in which the law pulled out-of-unit conduct within its reach but rather in the way it
applied to numerous people coming into the unit on a daily basis. In both instances, the extraterri-
torial impacts identified by the courts merely reflect our metropolitan reality.
129. Commerce City, 40 P.3d at 1285.
130. Holiday Universal, 833 A.2d at 520.
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borhoods and business districts which characterize larger municipali-
ties requires extra revenue, better planning and more efficient admin-
istration.131
Thus, in many instances, the extraterritorial impact factor puts the
law in the counter-intuitive position of limiting home rule units in metro-
politan areas more than their rural counterparts, when in reality, govern-
ments in denser urban areas are more likely to need broader legislative
and initiative powers and were the primary intended beneficiaries of
home rule in the first place.'
32
Moreover, when local actions are invalidated because of their im-
permissible extraterritorial impact, a regulatory vacuum may result, for
there is no government unit whose boundaries are coterminous with the
impact found by the court. Regional governments are virtually nonexis-
tent in U.S. metropolitan areas, 133 yet regional problems abound. When
home rule initiatives dealing with these issues are found to have imper-
missible extraterritorial impacts, they are invalidated simply because
they affect an issue that is also of pressing concern to other home rule
units in the area.134 Although the courts' condemnation of extraterritorial
impacts may come with the add-on that a regional solution is needed,
regional solutions have not been forthcoming. 135 As a result, pressing
131. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTrruIONAL CONVENTION, at 1628-29
(1972), quoted in City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 421 N.E.2d 196, 201 (I1. 1981).
132. Admittedly, it is possible to imagine a situation in which an ordinance adopted in a rural
setting is likely to have a greater extraterritorial impact than if the same ordinance were applied in a
denser urban area. Regulation of confined animal feeding operations (CAFO) is one obvious exam-
ple. See Worth County Friends of Agric. v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Iowa 2004).
Presumably, a rural county's CAFO ban would have far greater extraterritorial effect than a ban
adopted in a densely populated suburb, where hog factories are unlikely to be a pressing local issue.
133. For discussion of the few exceptions to this rule, see BR1FFAuLT & REYNOLDS, supra note
28, at 588-99. See also Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505,
510 (2005); Todd Swanstrom, What We Argue About When We Argue About Regionalism, 23 J.
URB. AFF. 479, 479 (2001) (describing Portland as the only metropolitan region with elected offi-
cials serving on a regional governmental body).
134. Given that home rule initiatives with the most pernicious and pervasive extraterritorial
impact, exclusionary zoning and suburban municipal incorporation are typically upheld as well
within the powers of home rule authority, this one-sided gap-creation seems unfairly lopsided
against regional initiatives that might counter the anti-regional tendencies of many home rule ac-
tions.
135. In City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 357 N.E.2d 433 (11.
1976), for instance, the court invalidated a home rule unit's noise ordinance because of the city's
inability to limit its regulation to noise that originated in and could be contained within its borders.
Id. at 435. Similarly, in Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, LLC., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo.
2000), the court pointed to an affordable housing ordinance's many potential impacts outside its
borders as evidence that the matter was not a local concern. Id. at 38. In both cases, the courts'
condemnation of the extraterritorial impact came with the add-on that what was needed was a re-
gional solution to the problem. According to the Chicago & North Western Railway court, "noise
pollution is a matter requiring regional, if not statewide, standards and controls." 357 N.E.2d at 435.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Lot Thirty-Four Venture expressed a similar concern: "[Tihe
growth of the one community is tied to the growth of the next, thereby buttressing the need for a
regional or even statewide approach." 3 P.3d at 39.
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local problems have been relegated to the status of an untouchable re-
gional problem. 1
36
C. Disadvantaging Home Rule Units Vis-&-Vis Other Units of Local
Government
In terms of the relationship between home rule units and other local
governments located nearby, the extraterritorial impact factor is unwisely
restrictive, and selectively so. In fact, it may shortchange general pur-
pose municipal governments vis-h-vis the other predominant types of
local governments in the region, specifically the counties in which the
municipalities sit137 and the specialized, limited purpose government
units that intersect, surround, and overlap with the borders of home rule
units.
Regional special districts are a pervasive phenomenon in all metro-
politan areas, and their impact is quite pronounced. 38  Their territory
inevitably includes numerous home rule units, and their objectives are
typically narrowly drawn and limited to service provision, with explicitly
authorized revenue raising powers. They are usually governed by an
appointed board, have no real constituent base, and not charged with any
general health, safety, and welfare responsibility toward the territory they
serve. 1
39
When regional special districts act, they affect the interests of gen-
eral purpose home rule units. Their actions are thus always extraterri-
torial, in the sense that they intrude into home rule units' spheres of in-
136. Proposals for consolidation and merger of existing local governments in metropolitan
regions have long fallen on deaf ears. Anthony Downs believes that the political opposition to
consolidated regional government comes from existing local government officials, who want to
retain power; residents, who are afraid of a more remote, less responsive government; and general
opposition to wealth redistribution. In his view, "almost no one favors metropolitan area govern-
ment except a few political scientists and intellectuals. Proposals to replace suburban governments
completely are therefore doomed." ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA
170 (1994). For a survey of the repeated rejection of metropolitan consolidation movements, see
JOHN J. HARRIGAN & RONALD K. VOGEL, POLmCAL CHANGE IN THE METROPOLIS 350-62 (6th ed.
2000). Although some commentators continue to favor consolidation, see, for example, DAVID
RUSK, CITIES WrrHOur SUBURBS 91-95 (1993), most scholars currently focusing on regionalism
have turned their attention to other solutions. In the current literature, the most common proposals
are based either on the use of regional special districts as limited purpose regional responses or on
the potential for reconfiguring home rule units so that they can better deal with the regional realities
in which they must exist. For explanation and critique of the regional special district "governance"
solution, see Reynolds, supra note 9; for elaboration of the latter proposal, see Barron, supra note
10.
137. In City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Grand County, 782 P.2d 753
(Colo. 1989), for instance, the court rejected arguments that county regulation of the city's extraterri-
torial actions improperly interfered with the city's home rule powers. Id. at 759. Although this case
illustrates the point I make in the text, I have focused my discussion on regional special districts
because of their prevalence and greater importance to the interests of home rule units.
138. Since 1952, the number of special district governments has nearly tripled, increasing from
12,340 to 35,356 in 2002. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GOVERNMENT UNITS IN 2002 tbl.5 (2002),
available at http://ftp2.census.govlgovslcog/2002COGprelimreport.pdf.
139. For an analysis of the role of regional special districts in metropolitan regions, see Rey-
nolds, supra note 9, at 501-23.
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terest and authority. But courts and legislatures routinely dismiss the
home rule units' interests in this situation,1'4 concluding that the regional
special district's specifically authorized powers trump the home rule
unit's more pervasive, yet less specific, interests. Thus, for instance,
regional special districts are frequently found to be immune from the
zoning and regulatory frameworks of the general purpose local govern-
ments within whose borders they operate.141 Not only are general regula-
tory schemes inapplicable to regional special districts; if an ordinance is
specifically intended to regulate the effects of regional special district
action within the home rule unit's borders, that law is likely to fall within
the scope of impermissibly extraterritorial action. 142  The home rule
units' inability to affect the actions of regional special districts further
unbalances the relationship between home rule municipalities and the
region's special districts. This approach, as I have argued elsewhere,
fundamentally misunderstands the basic premise that home rule units
derive their strength, not from specific statutory authorization but rather
from a wholesale transfer of broad initiative power from the state that
does not depend on further state action. 143 It improperly gives more au-
thority and autonomy to regional special districts than to the general pur-
pose home rule units in whose territory they operate.
Removing the extraterritorial impact factor from the judicial analy-
sis would not magically make home rule units an equal partner in a re-
gion with many political subdivisions. It might, however, help to make
home rule units more of a presence to be reckoned with, because in the
words of David Barron, they would now have a "credible threat"'144 that
they can in fact exercise their own home rule powers with regard to re-
gional issues. Far from establishing a new municipal "bully,"'145 remov-
140. See, e.g., Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist. v. City of Beaverton, 888 P.2d 74, 78 (Or. Ct.
App. 1995) (home rule city had no basis on which to object to, or to demand input into, a regional
special district's decision on siting a local transit stop).
141. See, e.g., City of Barling v. Fort Chaffee Redevelopment Auth., 60 S.W.3d 443, 448
(Ark. 2001); Zack v. Marin Emergency Radio Auth., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004);
City of Des Plaines v. Metro. Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chi., 268 N.E.2d 428,430 (. 1971); City of
Evanston v. Reg'l Transp. Auth., 559 N.E.2d 899, 905 (111. App. Ct. 1990); Laketran Bd. of Trs. v.
City of Mentor, No. 2001-L-027, 2002 WL 1446958, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. July 3, 2002).
142. In Metro. Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chi. v. City of Des Plaines, 347 N.E.2d 716 (Ill.
1976), for example, a home rule city sought to require a regional special district to obtain a city
permit for construction of a sewage treatment plant and to comply with the city's health ordinance.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that both actions had impermissible extraterritorial impacts and
were beyond the scope of the home rule powers. Key to the finding of extraterritoriality was the
court's observation that the regional special district included a number of other local government
units within its borders. Id. at 718-19. Thus, application of the Des Plaines ordinance to a govern-
mental unit with such territorial breadth, in the court's view, would improperly extend the power of
the home rule unit beyond its borders. Id. at 719.
143. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 513-14.
144. See Barron, supra note 10, at 2371-72 (discussing how state authorization of unilateral
municipal annexation powers-meaning that the wishes of the residents in the outlying areas to be
annexed are irrelevant to the legitimacy of the annexation-gives the city a bargaining tool in dis-
putes over regional revenue sharing and other region wide issues).
145. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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ing the extraterritorial impact factor responds to the sense that in most
metropolitan regions, home rule units are more bullied than the bully.
The prevalence of regional special districts, with their powers to act
within the borders of many home rule units, frequently prevents the
home rule unit from defending its own interests.
Judicial application of the extraterritorial impact factor to home rule
ordinances in metropolitan areas is also unnecessarily anti-regional in the
way in which it can stymie intergovernmental cooperative action in a
region. If no one unit acting alone is empowered to deal with, say, its
affordable housing problem,' 46 or the low wages currently paid to many
of its workers,147 the problem sits unattended to, waiting perhaps for state
action that may never come. And so long as an individual home rule unit
cannot act alone to regulate or initiate with regard to a particular prob-
lem, a joint approach will also be unavailable. That is because pervasive
state law limits on intergovernmental cooperation require that one or all
of the participating governmental units be empowered to act with respect
to the target of the proposed joint action. 148 The extraterritorial impact
factor, then, may remove many of the most likely topics for joint regional
action from the list of possible cooperative ventures.
When it comes to the search for regional solutions to any one of a
number of problems, the home rule municipality currently finds itself out
of the equation in many instances, as the state creates yet another region-
al special district with a narrowly targeted mandate to deal with one par-
ticular regional issue, broad immunity from home rule regulation, and a
regional territory that encompasses a number of home rule jurisdictions.
With that structure comes the frequently stated or unstated premise that
home rule units are part of the problem, rather than part of the solu-
146. See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 40 (Colo. 2000).
147. A Michigan trial court judge invalidated Detroit's living wage as beyond the scope of its
home rule powers. See Rudolph v. Guardian Protective Servs., Inc., No. 279433 (Mich. Ct. App.
filed July 23, 2007). The case is currently awaiting decision from the Michigan Court of Appeals.
See Michigan Court of Appeals, http://coa.courts.mi.gov/resourceslasp/viewdocket.asp?casenumber
=279433&fparties=&inqtype+public&yr=O (last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
148. Laws authorizing joint municipal action tend to fall out into one of two types. The more
restrictive "mutuality of powers" acts limit the scope of intergovernmental cooperation to issues that
each cooperating unit is independently authorized to undertake. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-
13-212 (2008) (allowing interlocal agreements "to perform any service, activity, or undertaking
which each public agency ... is authorized by law to perform"). The broader "power of one unit"
approach to intergovernmental cooperation allows joint action between and among units of local
government when only one of the participating entities has the power to undertake the action that is
the topic of the cooperation. Illinois appears to take that approach. See, e.g., 5 ILL COMP. STAT.
ANN. 220/3 (West 2009). In County of Wabash v. Partee, 608 N.E.2d 674 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the
court described the purpose of the intergovernmental cooperation acts as "to allow a local govern-
ment to do indirectly that which it cannot do directly." If the extraterritorial impact factor invali-
dates the individual home rule units' powers to regulate in a particular area, however under either
approach that topic will be removed from the scope of potential cooperative action. Id. at 679.
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tion. 1 49 If they are part of the problem, it may be because home rule units
are hopelessly and essentially parochial, but it may also be that, as David
Barron has argued, home rule units are currently operating within a legal
framework that prevents them from doing much with respect to these
region-wide problems. If the home rule unit's interest is as essentially
intertwined with the fate of the region as scholars of many ideological
stripes seem to agree, 50 it is reasonable to expect that removal of legal
impediments to joint regional action would further promote those self-
interests.
CONCLUSION
To those who agree with the Rocky Mountain News that allowing
Telluride to exercise extraterritorial eminent domain will result in a lot of
high-handed bullying, my proposal undoubtedly seems unacceptable. No
municipality in a region should be a bully, but I have no reason to sus-
pect that my proposal would produce any. Fears of municipal abuse are
frequently raised by opponents to broad home rule powers, and courts
with a solid tradition of support of home rule are familiar with similar
"parade of horribles" arguments. In a 2004 opinion upholding the ability
of a home rule unit to exempt itself from state prohibitions on the sale of
liquor on Sunday, 5' the Kansas Supreme Court rejected the state's typi-
cal floodgates argument, noting that the same argument had been made
in an earlier case in which the court upheld home rule powers to regulate
weapons.152 And, the court noted, that opinion was issued in 1975, "and
the sky has not fallen."'' 53 Removing the extraterritorial impact factor, I
believe, will similarly leave the sky firmly in place.
Much more than the implementation of some perfect plan, it seems
to me that regionalism refers to a state of affairs in which the existing
units of local government come together to act, jointly and individually,
on behalf of the regional welfare generally. There is no single way a
region should look. Currently, however, the limits placed on home rule
powers guarantee that the region will continue to develop along the exist-
ing path, in which numerous regional special districts are created, home
rule units are relegated to the margin, and joint regional action does not
occur. 54  Opening up the range of options to encompass the "anti-
149. See, e.g., Frank S. Alexander, Inherent Tensions Between Home Rule and Regional Plan-
ning, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 539, 557 (2000) ("The presence of home rule powers is a contribut-
ing factor in the problems faced on regional levels by multiple municipalities.").
150. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REv. 93, 114-15, 149-53 (2003), for a review of some of the evidence of
municipal interdependence in metropolitan regions.
151. State ex rel. Kline v. Unified Bd. of Conm'rs. of Unified Gov't of Wyandotte Coun-
ty/Kansas City, 85 P.3d 1237, 1250 (Kan. 2004).
152. Id. at 1245 (citing City of Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1975)).
153. Id.
154. See Reynolds, supra note 9, at 495-501.
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sprawl," 155 new urbanist,1 56 or new regionalist15 7 agenda will require en-
hanced home rule powers exercised jointly with other members of the
region.
The extraterritorial impact factor has two principle negative conse-
quences. For one thing, it unbalances the judicial analysis by tipping the
scale in favor of the judiciary, frequently in cases in which the legislature
has clearly articulated its intent about the legality of the disputed home
rule powers. As used by the courts, it has become a method for flaun-
ting, rather than following, legislative intent. Even in imperio home rule
states, where judicial involvement in mediating disputes over home rule
is intended to be more pronounced, the extraterritorial impact factor has
unwisely extended the judicial role into a domain better left for the legis-
lature. And second, the use of the extraterritorial impact factor as a
court-imposed limit on home rule powers unnecessarily limits the ability
of home rule units to deal with pressing local problems. It is improperly
premised on a vision of home rule municipalities as isolated and self-
contained entities whose actions and residents can easily be kept within
their borders. This ignores the realities of metropolitan areas, where the
actions of one political subdivision of that region inevitably has impacts
felt by many others. Removing the factor from the analysis would give
home rule units more freedom to experiment with new regulatory initia-
tives. It would contribute to a restoration of the balance between region-
al special districts and home rule units, and it might also have a subtle,
yet positive, effect on the region's prospects for joint action to tackle its
most pressing problems. While the elimination of one factor from the
judicial evaluation of home rule powers would not transform the regional
landscape, it would remove one impediment currently standing in the
way of home rule units assuming a leadership role in regional policy.
Though the region should certainly not be forged by a bully, it is equally
important that it not be forged by a vacuum or by the unilateral actions of
single-purpose service providers, which are the alternatives most fre-
quently left open after judicial application of the extraterritorial impact
factor.
155. See Barron, supra note 10, at 2266-77.
156. See ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SMART GROWTH MANUAL: NEW URBANISM IN AMERICAN
COMMUNITmES (2009); ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE
DELJNE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (2000).
157. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 133, at 521-23.
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Do concepts like "local" versus "statewide" problems have salience
today? Can city borders demarcate a meaningful realm of public policy
that permits cities to confront the challenges of urban complexity and
metropolitan fragmentation? Can we address problems of regional ineq-
uity and inefficiency using city-led solutions? In her article on the little-
noticed but powerful extraterritorial impact limit on home rule powers,'
Professor Reynolds has triggered these and other important theoretical
questions and drawn our attention to local borders in a new way.
As she describes, the judicially crafted doctrine of an extraterritorial
impact limit blocks local legislation that technically applies only within
the borders of a home rule city, 2 but in fact imposes an extraterritorial
impact on areas or people outside city lines. The doctrine is derived
from the "axiomatic ' 3 principle that home rule cities do not have the
power to act beyond their borders in the absence of express statutory
authorization to the contrary.4
As currently applied, the extraterritorial impact limit constrains ci-
ties' ability to enact laws that have indirect spillover consequences on
people or places outside their borders or are targeted to address problems
that originate outside those borders. This interpretation, Professor Rey-
nolds argues, squelches local efforts to address regional problems. For
instance, the limit has been invoked to strike down an inclusionary zon-
ing ordinance passed by a major regional employment center as well as a
i Assistant Professor of Law, UC Berkeley Law School. I am grateful for the insightful
comments of Nestor Davidson and Laurie Reynolds and the editors of the Denver University law
Review.
1. See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENY. U. L.
REv. 1271 (2009).
2. Though this discussion refers primarily to home rule cities, its core arguments and doc-
trinal foundations apply equally to home rule counties.
3. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at n.19 (quoting Seigles v. City of St. Charles, 849 N.E.2d
456 (Ml. App. CL 2006)).
4. Most notably, such authorization includes, in some states, regulatory powers (like zoning
authority), condemnation powers, or both. See Richard Briffault, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp: Extraterritoriality and LocalAutonomy, 86 DENV. U. L REv. 1311 (2009).
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traffic control measure passed by a city within a regional commuter cor-
ridor.5
Professor Reynolds makes a strong case that, in addition to con-
straining regionalism, courts' interpretations of the extraterritorial impact
limit have been undisciplined and unduly expansive. She forcefully ar-
gues that some strands of interpretation have undermined the very expe-
rimentation and local legal diversity that home rule authority was de-
signed to foster. For instance, the extraterritorial impact limit has immo-
bilized home rule cities between contradictory rules; it blocks some leg-
islation that may cause a cumulative impact (because adjacent units may
adopt similar laws), while also blocking legislation that may create a
confusing and inefficient "patchwork" of laws (because adjacent units
may adopt different laws).6 Further, the doctrine has subjected home rule
cities to amorphous, unpredictable standards like the prohibition on
extraterritorial "ripple effects," which can include any effect on the costs
or conduct of persons or businesses outside the home rule city.
Despite these problems, the extraterritorial impact limit is rooted in
some important rationales that warrant our continued observance. With
my brief comments here, I will make the case for a few of these ratio-
nales, then provide a more modest alternative proposal for fixing, rather
than eliminating, the doctrine. Before embarking on either goal, howev-
er, I'll follow Professor Reynolds's lead to cast one more stone at the
extraterritorial impact limit, as it is currently interpreted.
I. ONE MORE RISK OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT LIMIT
Picture the following two scenarios. In one, a home rule county es-
tablishes new rules governing the performance of service contracts with-
in the county, such as the right to cancel the contract without penalty
within three days after signing.7 In the other, a home rule county brings
an affirmative lawsuit challenging extortionate fees by so-called "payday
lenders."8 Both scenarios fall within the general rubric of consumer pro-
tection. Both are intended to protect persons within the jurisdiction. But
both will also exert inevitable spillover protections (or impositions) on
persons outside.9 Under the extraterritorial impact limit as currently un-
5. See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 38 (Colo. 2000);
City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1281-82 (Colo. 2003); Reynolds, supra note 1, at
1294-98.
6. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1279.
7. See Holiday Universal, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 833 A.2d 518, 520-21 (Md. 2003);
see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1280-81 (discussing Holiday Universal).
8. See First Amended Complaint at 1, 24, California v. Check 'n Go of Cal. Inc., No. 462-
779 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. County, Jan. 5, 2009); see also Kathleen Morris, San Francisco and the
Rising Culture of Engagement in Local Public Law Offices (forthcoming 2009 in Why the Local Still
Matters monograph of papers from the 11 th Annual Liman Colloquium at Yale Law School 2008).
9. In the first case, such spillover effects are arguably twofold: the law would reach persons
entering into such contracts outside the jurisdiction but intending to perform the specified service
inside the jurisdiction, and the law would reach persons entering contracts within the jurisdiction, but
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derstood, the first approach of addressing the problem through legislation
exceeds the county's powers. Yet the second approach, to address the
problem through affirmative litigation, is subject to no such constraints.
Does such a differentiation make sense? It advantages litigation as
a means of solving urban problems, where legislation might achieve a
more efficient and tailored result. If cities are limited to the second sce-
nario, they may only take action against a problem affecting their consti-
tuents where state or federal law already prohibits the conduct. They
cannot enact new laws to address a problem that affects only a small
portion of the public and thus has not warranted the attention of state or
federal lawmakers or is otherwise not reachable by existing laws. The
current regime curtails home rule cities' ability to address problems
proactively-including problems that are present only in certain com-
munities, for instance, or shared within one region but not common
across a state-that fall between the cracks of local and statewide con-
cern.
U. HAVING SAID THAT, A FEw GOOD THINGS ABOUT AN
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT LIMIT
As problematic as the application of the extraterritorial impact limit
may have become, we should pause before discarding it entirely. Under-
lying the principle are some important attributes worth preserving.
First of all, a law that truly causes an extraterritorial impact is not
democratically accountable to some or all persons affected by that law.
While it is important to distinguish acts causing an extraterritorial impact
from acts of coercive extraterritorial authority like extraterritorial regula-
tion and eminent domain, these are matters of degree more than differ-
ence. In either scenario, law should check a city's power to affect out-
siders who have no participation or protest rights in that city's politics.
My own research on high-poverty neighborhoods just outside of city
lines illustrates this argument-local borders may not encompass all
neighborhoods most affected by local lawmaking, and outsiders' lack of
local voting rights compounds and perpetuates these spillover effects. 10
Because extraterritoriality tracks the boundaries of representative gov-
ernment, it is an obvious, logical metric for courts to demarcate local
intending to perform the specified service outside the jurisdiction. In the second case, the spillover
effects arise because once the defendant has been deemed in violation of specific consumer protec-
tion laws it will be prohibited from undertaking those activities anywhere under the jurisdiction of
those same laws.
10. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty and Exclusion at the
Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2009); Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local
Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2010).
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authority and to determine the balance of power between cities and the
state. 1
Second, the concept of what is "local" versus what is "extraterritori-
al" is not merely a sword against local legislation. It can also be a shield
from state intervention in so-called imperio states (which carve out ex-
clusive realms of "local" versus "statewide" control), where home rule
jurisdictions enjoy a field of complete autonomy over "municipal" or
"local" affairs.12 That means they are immune from state meddling and
intervention in these domains, even where a state explicitly tries to
preempt local legislation.
Professor Reynolds seems to accept the loss of this shield were we
to eliminate the extraterritorial impact limit, arguing that we should in
fact transfer the decisional baton from judges to state legislatures, be-
cause extraterritoriality (and any demarcation of exclusive domains of
local versus state regulation) has proven elusive and outmoded. This
change would not be wholly unreasonable on its face, but it would be
quite dramatic, even radical. It would undermine local autonomy by
granting state legislatures the final word in defining their authority com-
pared to that of local governments, something that imperio states ex-
pressly chose not to do in designing their home rule systems. As a result,
it would elide the differences between imperio and legislative versions of
home rule power and strengthen state authority over local governments.
It is also clear that courts are struggling in these cases to maintain
the free flow of people, goods, and services across municipalities, which
requires some level of legal harmonization and coordination. Such a
motive helps to explain extraterritorial impact cases striking down local
rules governing service contracts or regulating utility companies. 13 In
this sense, extraterritorial impact constraints are challenging and contro-
versial for judges in ways similar to federal commerce clause questions.
Few would argue that in light of these interpretive challenges, we should
let Congress resolve conflicts with states over the breadth of Congress's
interstate commerce authority. We should be cautious of reaching an
analogous conclusion here. When it comes to balancing power between
two governments, the courts are better suited to the task than the larger
governmental unit, if we care, as Professor Reynolds and I both do, about
the autonomy of the smaller unit.
11. The Supreme Court has reasoned similarly. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1978) (finding that cities always exert spillover effects, so borders are the only
finite line by which to corral and demarcate participatory rights).
12. For a more complete description of the imperio versus legislative home rule systems see
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1275-77.
13. See Holiday Universal, 833 A.2d at 520-21; People ex rel. Pub. Utilities Comm'n v. Mt.
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 243 P.2d 397, 401 (Colo. 1952); see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1280-81
& n.38 (discussing these cases).
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Lastly, I agree with Professor Reynolds that local governments are
capable of alleviating regional harms through innovative leadership. Yet
we should not lose sight of the fact, as Professor Reynolds has argued in
other contexts, that many forms of regional inequity are the result of lo-
cal parochialism and self-interest at the expense of other jurisdictions.
14
Whether they mandate the exclusion of affordable housing, landfills, or
residence by convicted sex offenders, exclusionary zoning laws lead to
the siting of such land uses in ways that have concentrated poverty and
polarized the material conditions within metropolitan areas. 15 Local leg-
islatures may, or may not, have regional interests at heart when setting
policy. The extraterritorial impact limit represents freedom from region-
al impacts of self-interested local lawmaking as well as a constraint on
regionally benevolent lawmaking. Consequently, we need consistently
applied rules that define local and state power without presuming who
will be the more regionalist lawmaker.
III. COMING INTO BALANCE-FIXING, WITHOUT DISCARDING, THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT LIMIT
An extraterritorial impact limit on home rule authority thus has im-
portant rationales that should caution care before discarding the doctrine
entirely,' 6 even given Professor Reynolds's strong arguments that the
extraterritorial impact limit has led to unpredictable and speculative re-
sults, concentrated excessive power with the courts, and undermined
regionalism. To reconcile these concerns, I would favor the more mod-
erate goal of disciplining rather than abandoning this doctrine, with the
goal of continuing to control extraterritorial impacts in a society where
borders are less likely to contain regulatory influence.
To achieve this, I would advocate that instead of placing the focus
on "extraterritoriality," we focus on giving meaning to the concept of
"impact." Currently, as Professor Reynolds discusses, the only threshold
for cognizable "impact" under the doctrine is that it must be greater than
"de minimis" or "incidental." 17 This is an unnecessarily weak and vague
standard. Federal statutory laws governing fair housing and environmen-
tal protection, by contrast, require that a cognizable "impact" or "effect"
14. See Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New
Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003).
15. For a discussion of exclusionary zoning and its consequences see, for example, David
Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and the Legal Chal-
lenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 427, 434-54 (2000); Jerry
Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1083-89 (1996); JONATHAN LEVINE,
ZONED OUT: REGULATION, MARKETS, AND CHOICES IN TRANSPORTATION AND METROPOLITAN
LAND-USE (2006).
16. This reform would simply mean taking the concept of "territory" within "extraterritorial"
seriously, focusing on the location of the regulated activity with no concern for "impact" outside city
borders. It would continue to prohibit a home rule unit from applying its police powers to activity
occurring beyond its borders.
17. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 1278 (quoting City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 161
(Colo. 2003), and City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 769 (Colo. 1990)).
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must mean something significant (provably so), with a causal link to the
state action. They provide models for setting a higher minimum standard
for the extraterritorial impact reachable by an extraterritorial impact lim-
it.
For instance, a plaintiff alleging a racially disparate impact in viola-
tion of the Fair Housing Act 8 must show that a challenged practice by
the defendant "'actually or predictably results in racial discrimina-
tion."" 9 Further, that effect must be "significant," 20 and "an inference"
of such an impact is not sufficient-a plaintiff "must show a causal con-
nection between the facially neutral policy and the alleged discriminatory
effect.",21 Case law applying these standards is strict, ordinarily requiring
plaintiffs to document statistically the effects caused by the legislation.22
The National Environmental Policy Act provides a second model.
That statute requires federal agencies to prepare an environmental impact
statement for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment., 23  The statute distinguishes "direct effects"
from "indirect effects," 24 with direct effects defined as "caused by the
action and occur[ing] at the same time and place," while "indirect" ef-
fects are "caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in
distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. 25 Land use changes that
are "induced" by the federal action, for instance, are classified as indirect
effects.26  Both classifications require causation. Effects that warrant
consideration in an environmental impact statement must be "proba-
ble"-not "remote" or "highly speculative. 27
Applying that rubric to the present setting, courts could impose
much greater discipline on the extraterritorial impact limit by, for in-
stance, invalidating local laws only where they "directly" cause a "signif-
icant" outcome outside city borders. A plaintiff challenging an inclusio-
nary zoning ordinance would thus have the burden to prove both the fact
and extent of impacts predicted outside city lines.
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a) (West 2009).
19. N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir. 1988) affd per curiam,
488 U.S. 15 (1988) (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974)).
20. Reinhart v. Lincoln County, 482 F.3d 1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see
also Huntington, 844 F.2d at 938 (finding "a substantial adverse impact on minorities").
21. Tsombanidis v. West Haven Fire Dept., 352 F.3d 565,575 (2d Cir. 2003).
22. Id. at 575. For instance, the Second Circuit rejected a Fair Housing Act claim that new
housing regulations would create a disparate impact by increasing land prices in a community where
members of the protected class were priced out of purchasing homes above a certain cost. Instead,
the court found that the required proof would have shown the specific cost of dwellings before and
after the regulation took effect and the percentages of protected and nonprotected persons who
would be priced out of the post-regulation market. See Reinhart, 482 F.3d at 1230-31.
23. 42 U.S.C.A § 4332(C) (West 2009); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.9(a), 1508.13.
24. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a)-(b).
25. Id. § 1508.8(a)-(b).
26. Id. § 1508.8(b).
27. Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276, 1283 (9th Cir. 1974).
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In combination with shifting our focus from extraterritoriality to
impact, the private law exception to home rule authority-which is pre-
mised in part on the inherent extraterritorial impacts of certain kinds of
lawmaking-can assist courts in implementing their concern for legal
predictability.28 This rule constrains local governments from altering
common law property, tort or contract rules; imposing substantial extra-
territorial effects; or causing "undue burdens and extreme inefficiency"
on parties in multiple localities.29 Without excessive reliance on extrater-
ritorial impact, courts can nonetheless pursue interlocal uniformity.
Such an approach would continue to vest judges with interpretive
authority, but it would better protect a realm of genuine autonomy for
home rule governments that is not subject to state preemption, while also
limiting those governments to democratically accountable decisions.
CONCLUSION
Whatever our solution might be, Professor Reynolds has drawn our
attention to a doctrinal mechanism that currently confines home rule ci-
ties' ability to apply legislative innovation and experimentation to urban
problems. In an era when local governments are increasingly flexing
their wings to address social, economic, and environmental problems, we
should be particularly concerned about such a mechanism. Yet, in my
view, our response should be tempered to preserve the core notion of an
exterritorial impact limit while imposing greater discipline on its applica-
tion. Like home rule authority in general, the limit can function as both
sword and shield-it can suppress desirable local legislation, but so too
can it protect cities from neighbors' undesirable spillover effects and a
state legislature's divergent interests. To remove such a limit entirely
would not eliminate the eroding categories of "local" versus "statewide"
interests; rather, it would permit legislatures rather than judges to estab-
lish the boundaries of those categories. Such a change would fundamen-
tally undermine the autonomy of home rule cities while granting little
assurance of the kind of interlocal responsibility that both Professor Rey-
nolds and I prize.
28. Indeed, both of the consumer protection scenarios described in Part II are captured by the
underlying logic of leaving private law matters, including contract law, outside the scope of home
rule powers. See Gary Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and the Private Law Exception, 20 UCLA
L. REv. 671 (1973).
29. See id. at 728-39, 750.
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TOWN OF TELLURIDE V. SAN MIGUEL VALLEY CORP.:
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
RICHARD BRIFFAULT
INTRODUCTION
At first blush, the decision of the Colorado Supreme Court in Town
of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.1 seems like an extraordinary
endorsement of home rule and a significant milestone in the evolution of
local power. The Colorado Supreme Court adopted a very broad con-
struction of the power of a home rule municipality under the state consti-
tution2 and invalidated a state statute that expressly sought to limit that
power.3 The power in question---extraterritorial eminent domain-seems
to go well beyond even the most generous assumptions about local gov-
ernment authority. As the uproar following the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London4 reminds us, a growing
concern about local governments trenching on property rights has made
eminent domain increasingly controversial. More importantly, extrater-
ritorial eminent domain would appear to be precisely the subject that is
beyond the ordinary scope of local autonomy. As by definition it has
extra-local effects, extraterritorial eminent domain seems to be a matter
that ought to be subject to state control. Putting to one side the question
of whether the Colorado Supreme Court correctly interpreted its state
constitution, Telluride looks like one of the greatest judicial vindications
that home rule-and the goal of strong local self-government that under-
lies home rule-has ever received.
In this Article, I challenge the assumption that Telluride is a striking
advance for either home rule in particular or local autonomy more gener-
ally. Extraterritorial authority in general, and extraterritorial eminent
domain in particular, is neither novel nor particularly linked to home
rule. Although extraterritorial eminent domain surely strengthens the
municipality authorized to use it, such a municipal action potentially
challenges the autonomy of other local governments. Indeed, it can un-
dermine the model of local self-determination usually associated with
strong home rule. Extraterritorial eminent domain ultimately relies on
the older (and continuing) notion of local government as an agent or arm
t Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
1. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
2. Id. at 164.
3. Id. at 169.
4. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
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of the state for its legitimacy. 5 As I shall indicate, early and mid-
twentieth century commentators looked to state delegation as the source
of local power to act extraterritorially, and the more the value of local
self-government becomes the foundation for home rule, the more prob-
lematic municipal extraterritorial action becomes.6
More generally, extraterritoriality reveals the problematic nature of
local autonomy in the contemporary United States. With most urban
areas composed of dozens, if not hundreds, of local governments-and
few, if any, local governments fully encompassing their economic and
social regions-local governments inevitably have needs which cannot
be satisfied entirely within their borders and inevitably undertake actions
which affect people outside their boundaries.7 External effects cannot be
avoided, yet the fact that nonresidents who do not participate in local
elections and are not part of the local community are directly affected by
local government actions challenges the local self-government ideal that
drives the quest for local autonomy. The autonomy of one locality can
be fully legitimate only when it takes into account the interests of its
neighbors or is coordinated with the other local governments that
represent those neighbors' interests. Yet, the mechanisms for interlocal
coordination-and for increasing local accountability to the extralocal
residents affected by local actions-also necessarily constrain local au-
tonomy.
8
This article consists of three parts. The first draws on older cases
and academic commentary to examine the surprisingly well-established
recognition of municipal extraterritorial action in American local gov-
ernment law. The next part then considers the interplay between extra-
territoriality and the two dominant theories of local government-local
government as agent or delegate of the state, and local government as
representative of local people. As I have already suggested, even when
extraterritorial power grows out of a home rule grant, extraterritorial
action-particularly coercive forms of municipal action like eminent
domain-is more closely tied to the state delegate than the home rule
ideal of strong local self-government. The final part concludes by as-
sessing the relationship between extraterritoriality and interlocal rela-
tions. Extraterritorial power is important because the land and resources
within municipal boundaries are frequently inadequate to meet municipal
residents' needs, and territorial expansion may be legally (or politically)
unavailable or unlikely to meet those needs. Yet extraterritorial actions
5. Cf Costco Wholesale Corp. v. City of Beaverton, 161 P.3d 926, 931 (Or. 2007) ("[1]t is
legislative, and not home rule, authority that a city exercises when it acts extraterritorially.").
6. See, e.g., David E. Hunt, Comment, The Constitutionality of the Exercise of Extraterri-
torial Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 151, 151-57 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1130-34 (1996).
8. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BuFF. L. REv. 1 (2000).
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have direct implications for the self-governance of the locality's neigh-
bors. Some supralocal mechanism is necessary to reconcile the extrater-
ritoriality that may be necessary for effective local self-government with
the political accountability that provides the democratic legitimacy that is
also necessary for local self-government. Although that mechanism need
not involve the state directly, it will have to impose some limitations on
the autonomy of some local governments in order to protect the autono-
my of others and the democratic nature of the local government system
as a whole.
I. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL TRADITION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Local government power is closely associated with local bounda-
ries. Local governments are elected by voters who reside within local
boundaries; they are financed primarily by taxes collected on land, in-
come, or activities within local boundaries; they provide services to
people, firms, and landowners primarily within local boundaries; and
their regulatory activities are primarily focused on people, businesses,
and land within local boundaries. 9 The significance of local boundaries
for basic aspects of local governance drives the often intense conflicts
over the rules and procedures for municipal incorporation, annexation,
consolidation, and other forms of boundary change.
Yet, American local governments have long engaged in extraterri-
torial activities and have long wielded extraterritorial power. Under the
Dongan Charter of 1686, New York was authorized to acquire "a burial
place 'without the Gate of the Citty [sic],"" 0 and the Baltimore Charter
of 1796 gave that city quarantine jurisdiction three miles beyond the city
limits and authority over navigation four miles outside the city." In
1853, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the authority of the city of
Philadelphia to acquire land for a railroad outside the city, 12 and in 1885,
the New York Court of Appeals upheld the authority of New York City
to condemn land for a public park outside the city limits in nearby West-
chester County. 13 Nor was extraterritorial authority limited to big cities
or metropolitan centers. In 1869, Kentucky's highest court upheld the
authority of the town of Falmouth to regulate liquor sales and taverns,
and to charge a licensing fee within a one mile extraterritorial zone sur-
rounding the town.1
4
9. See generally RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNmENT LAW 174-93 (7th ed. 2009).
10. RUSSELL WEBBER MADDOX, EXTRATERRrrORIAL POwERs OF MUNICWPALrmES IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1955).
11. Id.
12. See Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 174-75 (1853).
13. In re Mayor of New York, 2 N.E. 642, 652-53 (N.Y. 1885).
14. Bd. of Trs. of Falmouth v. Watson, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 660, 661-62 (1869).
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These early exercises of extraterritorial authority, and their multiple
contemporary equivalents, can be grouped into several categories. First,
and most common, cities were long able to go beyond their borders to
purchase goods and services needed for municipal operations and to ac-
quire, operate, and maintain physical infrastructure necessary for the
health, safety, and well-being of their residents. As a 1928 Harvard Law
Review Note explained, "[elfficiency in the performance of municipal
functions often requires the acquisition and administration of property
outside the corporate limits .... ,1 For well over a century, many muni-
cipalities have obtained and controlled extraterritorial water supplies and
water systems; sewage disposal and drainage facilities; electric, gas, and
other power plants and transmission systems; parks and recreational fa-
cilities; and transportation systems, such as roads, bridges, and, in the
twentieth century, airports.
1 6
Sometimes this was because the necessary resource-the water
supply-was simply located beyond municipal borders. As one early
twentieth century political scientist noted, "[w]ithin the restricted limits
of their ordinary boundaries, cities are frequently unable to find certain
materials and substances which are essential to the provision of the ordi-
nary municipal services. Of these, perhaps the first in importance is an
adequate and satisfactory water supply. 1 7 Similarly, a city which begins
a bridge or road or drainage ditch within its borders may have no choice
but to continue the structure extraterritorially if it is to fulfill its transpor-
tation or waste removal function.18 More commonly, however, extrater-
ritorial acquisition and operation was less a matter of municipal necessity
and more a matter of convenience: from the municipal perspective, the
best place for certain undesirable forms of infrastructure needed to serve
the municipality-such as sewers, drains, cemeteries, and quarantine
stationsl9-might be outside the city limits.
Second, municipalities frequently sell goods and services-water,
gas, and electric power, sewage and waste removal-to residents, busi-
nesses, or other local governments located outside the city limits.
2
0
Courts and commentators have justified this as a means for the munici-
pality to profit from its excess capacity; as a form of protection of the
health of the residents of the municipality from sanitary problems on the
urban fringe; and as a means of developing areas that are potential targets
15. Note, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities, 41 HARV. L. REv. 894, 895 (1928).
16. See, e.g., MADDOX, supra note 10, at 10-21 (water and sewage), 22-32 (utilities and
transportation facilities), 51-57 (airports and parks); William Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers
of Cities, 10 MiNN. L. REv. 475,482-95 (1926).
17. Anderson, supra note 16, at 482.
18. Id. at 487-92.
19. Id. at 486, 495.
20. See MADDOX, supra note 10, at 15-18 (extraterritorial sale of water), 27-29 (sale of pow-
er); FRANK S. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRrrORIAL POWERS IN THE METROPOLrrAN AREA 16-25 (1962)
(sale of utility services).
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for future annexation efforts.21 Certainly, when extraterritorial service
delivery could be shown to benefit the local government's residents,
22courts generally have had little difficulty upholding such local action.
Owning, operating, and selling the products of physical infrastruc-
ture are not inherently governmental. Virtually all of these facilities have
private sector counterparts, so that municipal waterworks or power plants
may be seen as falling on the "proprietary" side of the proprie-
tary/governmental divide and, thus, may pose less of a challenge to the
notion that local governments' governmental or coercive powers are ter-
ritorially limited.23
However, the third major form of extraterritorial action-police
power regulation of people, land, or designated activities-involves
clearly governmental activity and is in tension with the idea that "the
principal purpose of setting municipal boundaries is to set a territorial
limit to the city's governmental powers." 24  Although not the norm,
extraterritorial local police power is surprisingly widespread. Sometimes
the extraterritorial police power is connected to the extraterritorial facili-
ties already mentioned. For example, local governments may have been
able to prohibit the contamination of the extraterritorial water supply,
25
or to regulate land uses in the immediate vicinity of the extraterritorial
airport in order to enhance aviation safety.26 More commonly, munici-
palities engage in extraterritorial regulation to protect their residents
from harms originating just across the city's borders, such as the stench
from slaughterhouses or tanneries, the danger of blasts from stored ex-
plosives, air pollution from smokestacks, and the moral pollution from
dram shops and liquor sales. These powers may also be seen as part of
the future orderly development of the community, or as a means of pro-
viding basic police services to residents of the extraterritorial area.
Extraterritorial regulatory authority is typically limited to certain le-
gal categories of municipalities, or targeted on specific activities, or tied
to specific territorially-defined zones, or restricted to specific powers,
such as the power to prevent nuisances, impose quarantines, or regulate
the subdivision of land.27 Certain powers, like taxation, are very rarely
21. SENGSTOCK, supra note 20, at 21-22; see also City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg'l
Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 2005).
22. See, e.g., Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utils. Co. of Ill., 807 N.E.2d 590 (111. App. Ct.
2004); GTE Nw. Inc. v. Or. Pub. Utils. Conm'n, 39 P.3d 201 (Or. CL App. 2002).
23. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 482 (referring to water, sewage, and other utilities
as "business powers"); cf. DeFazio v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. 679 P.2d 1316, 1338 (Or.
1984) (explaining that the fact that city engages in extraterritorial contracts or "other consensual
transactions in goods or services" has little relevance to the question of whether the city can exert
"coercive authority over people or property beyond its boundaries").
24. Anderson, supra note 16, at 572.
25. MADDOx, supra note 10, at 10, 13.
26. Id. at51.
27. See, e.g., Louis F. Bartelt, Jr., Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on its Validity, 32
NOTRE DAME LAW. 367, 386 (1957).
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wielded extraterritorially. Some courts have found broad grants of extra-
territorial authority troublesome,28 and extraterritorial regulatory authori-
ty typically has to be express, and not implied. But, notwithstanding the
tension with the idea of local government as territorially limited govern-
ment, some extraterritorial police power has long existed and continues
to be found in most states.29
Finally, extraterritorial authority has long included eminent domain.
Although eminent domain seems like the most coercive and therefore the
most governmental power of all, early commentators thought about it
primarily in terms of its connection to the proprietary power of operating
physical infrastructure to provide necessary goods and services, rather
than as a form of police power. According to William Anderson, the
author of the leading 1925 study of municipal extraterritoriality,
The eminent domain cases give us least trouble of all. If it be once
conceded that water supplies, parks, and similar facilities are for pub-
lic purposes, and even for municipal purposes although located out-
side of city limits, then there can be little legal objection to the use of
condemnation proceedings in the furtherance of the public purpose.
30
Similarly, a study undertaken by a scholar at Oregon State College
thirty years after Anderson's work found that extraterritorial eminent
domain was frequently used to obtain land for water supply facilities,
sewage and garbage disposal plants, and other utilities.31 Although typi-
cally the authority for extraterritorial eminent domain was explicitly pro-
vided by constitutional provision or statute, courts on occasion were will-
ing to imply it by combining the authority to acquire land externally with
the power to condemn land internally.32 Even today, when most courts
require that extraterritorial condemnation authority be expressly granted,
at least some find it implicit in the power to acquire land to construct or
maintain key infrastructure facilities.33
Although in the discussions of extraterritorial police and condemna-
tion authority I have distinguished between express and implied powers,
I have so far not said much about the source of this local government
power. As with all local powers, extraterritorial authority has to be
traced back to some grant from the state, whether in the state constitu-
tion, a general enabling statute, a home rule provision (constitutional or
statutory), a specific statutory grant, or a state-issued charter. There is no
inherent right of local self-government in American local government
28. See Malone v. Williams, 103 S.W. 798, 804-06 (Tenn. 1907).
29. See Hunt, supra note 6, at 151-57.
30. Anderson, supra note 16, at 564.
31. MADDOX, supra note 10, at 2, 11, 24.
32. Id. at 11, 24, 83; Anderson, supra note 16, at 564-65.
33. See, e.g., Kelley v. City of Griffin, 359 S.E.2d 644, 645-46 (Ga. 1987).
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law,34 and all local powers-even home rule powers--derive from the
state. In Telluride, for example, the Colorado Supreme Court's vindica-
tion of the power of extraterritorial eminent domain emerged out of an
interpretation of the home rule article of the state constitution,35 not a
claim of any inherent power of extraterritorial eminent domain. The
state source of this local power tells us that key state decision-makers-
constitution writers and ratifiers, legislatures, and courts-have long
concluded that due to the lack of fit between local boundaries and local
needs effective local government requires extraterritorial action on some
occasions and for some purposes. Local authority need not be inherent
in order to be powerful. As the next section suggests, however, different
views of the nature of local government can affect the type and scope of
the extraterritorial powers granted.
II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE LEGAL THEORY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
American local government law has evolved as a dialectic between
two competing theories of local government: local government as dele-
gate of the state, and local government as a democratically accountable
36representative of its local constituency. In effect, a local government is
an agent of two principals-the state that creates it, defines its bounda-
ries, and vests it with public powers, and the local people who elect (and
can vote out) local officials and whose health, safety and welfare are the
touchstone of local action. Local government as arm-of-the-state has
long been the dominant legal model reflected in constitutional doctrine,3 7
a host of state cases, and academic criticism. 38 Local government as
"American polis"39 has also had a long, if subordinate, tradition, as indi-
cated by the expanded, even if still limited, scope of local home rule,4°
occasional controls on state legislation targeting localities,41 and federal
constitutional protection for the rights of local residents to vote in local
elections. 42 Local government as arm-of-the-state continues to be the
blackletter law in virtually all states, and state governments generally
prevail in state-local conflicts. But the growing state constitutional, leg-
islative, and judicial respect for the local democratic roots of local self-
34. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 278-81.
35. Town of Telluride v. San Miguiel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164-69 (Colo. 2008).
36. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 70-144. A third model of local govern-
ment-local government as quasi-proprietary firm-applies primarily to special districts and special
purpose governments, and not to general purpose governments like counties or municipalities. See
id. at 147-73.
37. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907).
38. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1059, 1062
(1980).
39. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 9, at 98-146.
40. Seeid. at 314-449.
41. See id. at 281-314.
42. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474,480 (1968).
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government has resulted in greater attention to the value of local auton-
omy in local government law.
This has had a somewhat paradoxical consequence for the legitima-
cy, if not the legality, of extraterritorial local government action. Al-
though state measures granting local governments extraterritorial au-
thority would seem to reflect a growing valuation of local power and of
the local role in providing services and meeting the needs of local resi-
dents, in fact the rise of the polis model has created difficulties for local
extraterritoriality, particularly coercive extraterritorial measures like po-
lice power regulation and eminent domain.
When local power is seen as state-delegated power, extraterritoriali-
ty presents few conceptual problems. Formally, the only question is
whether the extraterritorial power has been delegated. The lack of repre-
sentation of residents of the extraterritorial area in the government of the
local government acting territorially is not a problem since the acting
locality is merely an agent of the state and the extraterritorial residents
are deemed to "have given their consent though their representatives in
the [state] legislature.
' 'A3
As the 1928 Harvard Law Review Note explained,
[T]he delegation of such [extraterritorial] powers would seem unim-
peachable, for the municipal corporation would exist solely for the
purpose of carrying on locally the government of the state. When,
therefore, it is deemed convenient to carry out that purpose by grant-
ing extraterritorial powers to a particular municipality, individuals
without its boundaries cannot complain; in theory they are being con-
trolled, not by their neighbors' representatives, but by the state
through its functionaries.
44
Similarly, in early-twentieth-century political scientist William An-
derson's view the rejection of the doctrine of an inherent right of local
self-government undermined the conceptual basis for any challenge to
even very broad grants of extraterritorial police power. With the state as
the font of all local power, extraterritorial regulation was not on any
weaker legal footing than internal municipal action:
If we bear in mind.., that the city acts in governmental matters only
as the agent of the state, and that it has no power to act governmen-
tally either within or without its ordinary boundaries without state
legislative authorization, we can properly argue that the act is, how-
ever indirectly, the act of the state legislature, in which all residents
of the state have representation. If the consent of the governed is a
43. Otis J. Bouwsma, The Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning, 8 VAND. L. REv.
806, 814 (1955).
44. Note, supra note 15, at 897-98.
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prerequisite to a valid act of legislation, that consent has been given
by the voters' representatives in the legislature.45
To be sure, some early court decisions found broad extraterritorial
police power troubling; the notion of local government accountability for
its actions to local people had some purchase on legal thinking even
when it was rejected as doctrine.46 Broad extraterritorial regulatory au-
thority was (and remains) relatively unusual. But, until at least the mid-
dle of the twentieth century, most local government law scholars had
little difficulty with local extraterritorial regulation as a matter of legal
theory. Indeed, the arm-of-the-state model was repeatedly invoked to
justify the application of extraterritorial regulation to land use planning,
zoning, and subdivision controls to enable cities to deal with the boom-
ing suburbanization beyond their corporate borders. 47
That easy acceptance of local extraterritorial action began to change
as the conceptual basis for local power began to evolve and more weight
was given to local government as representative of, and accountable to,
local residents. Frank Sengstock's 1962 study of extraterritorial powers
for the University of Michigan Law School had little difficulty with the
extraterritorial purchase of land for utility purposes or the sale of utility
services to nonresidents, but was quite troubled by extraterritorial police
power regulations as these had the effect of imposing government with-
out representation. The idea that nonresidents on the urban fringe had a
voice in extraterritorial municipal action through their representatives at
the state level began to seem less persuasive to some commentators, who
concluded that "[t]he condition that extraterritorial power constitute[s]
government without the consent of the governed is the chief and fatal
weakness in using such powers. ''4  Limited extraterritorial regulation
might be expedient as a temporary solution to the governance needs of
growing fringe areas, but a broad grant of police power was seen as
"treading on dangerous grounds ' '49 and an "unwarrantable interference
with local government in fringe communities.,
50
The Supreme Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to apportionment systems and to limits on
the right to vote in local elections bolstered the view of local government
as agent of its people. As the Court explained in 1968 in Avery v. Mid-
land County51 when it applied the "one person, one vote" doctrine to
local elections, "in providing for the governments of their cities, coun-
45. Anderson, supra note 16, at 581.
46. See, e.g., Malone v. Williams, 103 S.W. 798 (Tenn. 1907).
47. See, e.g., MADDOX, supra note 10, at 80-82; Bartelt, supra note 27; Bouwsma, supra note
43.
48. SENGSTOCK, supra note 20, at 72.
49. Id. at 50-51.
50. Id. at 72.
51. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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ties, towns, and districts, the States characteristically provided for repre-
sentative government-for decision making at the local level by repre-
sentatives elected by the people., 52 Even a properly apportioned state
legislature cannot authorize a local governance structure that violates the
one person, one vote requirement.53 Nor can a state legislature chosen by
an electorate properly composed of adult resident citizens authorize local
government elections (at least the elections of general purpose local gov-
ernments like cities or counties) in which the electorate is limited to, or
skewed in favor of, taxpayers or property owners. 54 The Court has re-
jected the notion that the locally underrepresented or disenfranchised
have consented to these rules through their participation in the election of
the state legislature that adopted these voting arrangements and that has
the power to change them. "Government-National, State, and local-
must grant to each citizen the equal protection of its laws, which includes
",55an equal opportunity to influence the election of its lawmakers ....
Accordingly, as commentators in the 1970s recognized, Avery and its
progeny threatened the viability of municipal extraterritorial regulation.
Relying on "[m]odern equal protection developments," the author of a
University of Chicago Law Review Note concluded in 1977 that "all but
de minimis forms of extraterritorial control are in danger of invalida-
1,56tion.
In fact, in the year after that Note was published, municipal extrater-
ritorial regulation received its most significant constitutional challenge.
Extraterritorial action was upheld, however, but only because the Su-
preme Court re-emphasized the state-delegate roots of local authority. In
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,5 7 a divided Supreme Court re-
jected the claim that an Alabama law entrusting municipalities with a
population of 6,000 or more with "police jurisdiction" over a three-mile
extraterritorial zone around those cities violated the Equal Protection
Clause.
In particular, the Court noted, the extraterritorial power did not in-
clude "the vital and traditional authorities of cities and towns to levy ad
valorem taxes, invoke the power of eminent domain, and zone property
for various types of uses."5  As a result, the extraterritorial residents did
not bear the same relationship to the Tuscaloosa government as the city
52. Id. at 481.
53. See id at 491.
54. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 300-01 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204, 213 (1970). Limiting the electorate to special constituencies like taxpayers or land owners may
be permissible in elections for the governments of special limited purpose districts. See, e.g., Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355, 370-71 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410
U.S. 719,728 (1973).
55. Avery, 390 U.S. at 481 n.6.
56. Hunt, supra note 6, at 178-79.
57. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
58. Id. at 72 n.8.
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residents, so denying the municipal vote to the former while extending it
to the latter did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Holt Civic Club then went on to affirm and acknowledge the legiti-
macy of some extraterritorial governance and, in so doing, embraced the
vision of local governments as agents of the states that created them.
59
The Court emphasized the wide extent of extraterritorial arrangements,
how many of these involved the granting of "more extensive or intrusive
powers over bordering areas" than conferred by Alabama, including zon-
ing,60 and how reluctant it was to intrude into an area traditionally left to
the states. Most importantly, the Court implicitly invoked the older ar-
gument that surrounding area residents consented to extraterritorial regu-
lation through their representatives at the state level. In response to ar-
guments that there are arrangements other than extraterritorial municipal
action for providing basic police regulation on the urban fringe that
would be more representative or accountable to the residents of the extra-
territorial zone, Justice Rehnquist emphasized that "[a]uthority to make
those judgments resides in the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are
free to urge their proposals to that body."6' Justice Stevens, in his con-
curring opinion, underscored that the Alabama legislature "is elected by
all of the citizens of the State including the individual appellants. 62
In Holt Civic Club, extraterritoriality was seen as a mechanism
created by the state to enable Tuscaloosa and other cities to deal with
health and safety issues just beyond their borders and to provide some
basic governance for those fringe areas. The democratic legitimacy of
this action was satisfied by the state legislature's representation of the
residents of the extraterritorial zone, although the legitimacy need was
also seen as mitigated by the relatively limited scope of municipal extra-
territorial power.
Contemporary extraterritorial cases reflect the mixed consequences
of Avery and Holt and, more generally, the efforts of state courts and
legislatures to hold together the arm-of-the-state and local self-
government ideas. Extraterritorial regulation, including both police
power health and safety measures and eminent domain, have been autho-
rized by legislatures and upheld by courts. Often, courts refer to either
the municipal need for extra-local action to meet important municipal
concerns like water supply, waste removal, and parks, or to the municipal
interest in regulating conditions, such as the form of land development,
in fringe and potential growth areas. Many contemporary decisions seem
ambivalent about extraterritoriality. Looking to the state-delegation
59. See id at 71 (citing Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178(1907)).
60. Id. at 72; see also id. at 72 n.8.
61. Id. at 74.
62. Id. at 76 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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roots of municipal extraterritorial action,63 courts have little difficulty
with the ultimate question of whether states may authorize municipalities
to act extraterritorially. Nonetheless, courts often appear troubled by
extraterritorial action.
Courts frequently require that the grant of extraterritorial authority
be express,64 and they are likely to resolve cases of uncertainty or ambi-
guity against the locality claiming extraterritorial power.65 Extraterritori-
al actions may draw closer judicial scrutiny. In California, for example,
courts are required to defer to the judgment of the local legislature with
respect to the necessity of a taking within local boundaries, but are, in
contrast, required to review the need for an extraterritorial condemna-
tion.66
A central theme in these cases is the challenge that coercive extra-
territorial action poses for the local self-government principle in the
extraterritorial area. Courts have emphasized that consensual or contrac-
tual extraterritorial measures-the sale of services, for example-pose
little difficulty because they do not involve any coercion of those not
represented in local elections.67 But more coercive measures are seen as
troublesome from a local democracy perspective.
Coercive extraterritorial actions threaten both the extralocal indi-
viduals subject to the locality's regulation and the collective interest of
the people of the extraterritorial area in governing themselves. A Cali-
fornia court looked to the first interest in explaining the different legisla-
tively-prescribed standards of review for internal and external eminent
domain actions. When engaged in an internal taking, a local government
will be politically "accountable to ... property owners and ... taxpay-
ers" affected, but such accountability is missing for an extraterritorial
taking.68 As a result, under California law a reviewing court ought to be
less deferential to a municipality's claim that a condemnation is neces-
sary to achieve its goals when it is taking land beyond its borders, as
opposed to land within the city limits.
Similarly, courts have expressed concern about the interlocal conse-
quences of extralocal action. As an Ohio court explained in denying a
municipality the right to apply its zoning ordinance extraterritorially in
the absence of express state authorization, "[aillowing one city to pass
63. See, e.g., Costco Wholesale Corp. v. City of Beaverton, 161 P.3d 926, 931 (Or. 2007)
("[It is legislative, and not home rule, authority that a city exercises when it acts extraterritorially.");
Philip v. Daley, 790 N.E.2d 961, 969 (111. App. Ct. 2003); St. Andrews Pub. Serv. Dist. Comm'n v.
Comm'rs of Pub. Works of Charleston, 344 S.E.2d 857,858-59 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
64. See, e.g., Seigles, Inc. v. City of St. Charles, 849 N.E.2d 456, 458 (11. App. Ct. 2006).
65. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Harnish, 150 P.3d 245, 249-50 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006); Ken-
neth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
66. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Keck, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
67. See, e.g., GTE Nw. Inc. v. Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 39 P.3d 201,208 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
68. Keck, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 602.
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laws which affect residents of another jurisdiction would cause signifi-
cant animosity and unnecessary litigation .... Obviously, harmony of
standards in adjoining areas is desirable, and cities should co-operate to
achieve the best results for all.... [But] one jurisdiction cannot impose
its will on another."69 Other courts have noted the difficulties of coordi-
nating extraterritorial eminent domain with the land use regulations of
the communities in which the extraterritorial action occurs, a problem
which is exacerbated when the home rule vision requires that both locali-
ties be treated as "co-ordinate sovereign[s]."70 The Telluride decision is
less striking for its affirmation of municipal extraterritorial eminent do-
main-such action is authorized in many states and upheld by many
courts-than for its apparent lack of concern about the democratic legi-
timacy question posed by municipal extraterritorial action.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE INTERLOCAL SETrING
Extraterritorial municipal action, particularly regulation of residents
in the extraterritorial area who are not authorized to vote in municipal
elections, is not only an extension of the theory of local self-government
but is also a problem for it. The need for extraterritorial action grows out
of the lack of fit between ordinary local authority and the scope of local
needs and concerns. Many localities are simply too small to address all
their requirements within their boundaries, yet they may be unable or
unwilling to expand the size of their cities. Moreover, the authority for
extraterritorial action is not inherent in local power but comes as a dele-
gation from the state. Indeed, the lack of consent of the "extraterritorial
governed" and the need to coordinate the actions of overlapping local
governments would be serious problems for a theory of extraterritoriality
rooted in local self-government. But these concerns diminish somewhat
when local powers are seen as deriving from the state government, which
is both accountable to a statewide electorate (including those in extrater-
ritorial zones) and has the power to coordinate the actions and policies of
adjacent local governments.
Given the contemporary power of the local autonomy model in
shaping both popular and legal thinking about local government-even if
the state-delegation model remains formally dominant doctrinally-
extraterritorial action, particularly coercive measures like eminent do-
main, necessarily seems problematic. As I suggested, extraterritoriality
raises two distinct, albeit related, difficulties. First, there is the political
accountability problem; that is, the question of regulation without equal
69. Tatco Dev., Ltd. v. Montgomery County, No. 18387, 2001 WL 28674, at *6 (Ohio CL
App. Jan. 12, 2001).
70. City of Scottsdale v. Mun. Court, 368 P.2d 637, 643 (Ariz. 1962); see also Valley Twp. v.
City of Coatesville, 894 A.2d 885, 889-90 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (discussing interaction of extra-
territorial eminent domain and subdivision controls of community in which eminent domain power
was exercised).
1323
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
representation of those regulated in the political process of the govern-
ment doing the regulating. Although this has probably received more
attention from academics troubled about extraterritorial municipal ac-
tion,71 I think the more serious issue, particularly when eminent domain
is at stake, is the second problem-the potential for interlocal conflict.
Most instances of municipal regulatory authority, apart from eminent
domain, involve municipal action in unincorporated areas, rather than in
other formally organized localities. There is unlikely to be much of a
clash between governmental policies when a municipality acts extraterri-
torially in an unincorporated area. Moreover, extraterritorial regulation
may actually benefit the extraterritorial area by providing basic police,
fire, and health protections to fringe area residents at relatively low cost
to them.72 In addition, Holt Civic Club indicates there is an outer bound
on how far a municipality can regulate beyond its borders without trig-
gering constitutional protection, particularly the right to vote in munici-
pal elections, for residents of the extraterritorial area.
But extraterritorial eminent domain authority can, and often is, ex-
ercised within incorporated municipalities. This means that one munici-
pality may be taking from another the decision concerning how a specific
parcel of land is to be used. This can be a direct challenge to the zoning,
planning, or land use policies of the host locality. Indeed, given that
counties or townships in some states enjoy planning or zoning powers
over unincorporated areas, the interlocal conflict over land use policy
provoked by eminent domain can occur even with respect to the con-
demnation of land in an unincorporated area. Extraterritorial regulation
of individuals may raise questions about the democratic basis of local
action, but extraterritorial eminent domain can generate a conflict be-
tween local governments, each of which has formal legal authority over
the same parcel of land and each of which is pursuing a different vision
of the proper use of that parcel as part its quest for local self-
determination. This makes the potential for conflict between extraterrito-
riality and local self-government in the eminent domain setting especial-
ly pointed.
States have not been unaware of this clash of local powers and local
governments when one is acting extraterritorially within the borders of
the other. Some states expressly provide by law which actor prevails
when a conflict occurs.73 Courts have sometimes sought to deal with
these problems by interpreting the powers in question to avoid a direct
71. For a recent and particularly fevered example, see Ryan A. Kriegshauser, Note, E.T. Take
Home: The Out-of-This-World Rationale for Extraterritorial Takings and Ignoring Their Inherent
Conflict with the Fifth Amendnent, 73 UMKC L REv. 925, 935 (2007).
72. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 74 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Ware v. Henry County Water & Sewerage Auth., 575 S.E.2d 654, 780 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2002).
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conflict.74 But, however the matter is addressed, some rule or procedure
is necessary to accommodate the competing goals of the affected local
governments. That resolution is going to require some determination at
the state level, whether by general rule or on a case-by-case basis, and
whether by an administrative agency (which could be a regional body), a
court, the legislature, or the state constitution.
The Telluride decision seems to recognize the need for some state
action to deal with interlocal conflict. The majority opinion notes that
although the legislature may not prohibit extraterritorial eminent domain,
"it may regulate the exercise of those powers."75 The point was made
more explicitly by Justice Coats who, in his concurring opinion, empha-
sized that "the state has a cognizable interest in regulating the acquisition
of property, beyond their own boundaries, by so many home rule ci-
ties. While neither the majority nor the concurrence stated what the
statewide interest would be, surely the state has an interest in protecting
the land use regulatory authority and, more broadly, the policy-making
autonomy of the local governments in which extraterritorially con-
demned land is located.
Where the Telluride Court may have erred is in summarily treating
the Colorado law in question as a prohibition and not a regulation. Colo-
rado Revised Statute § 38-1-101(4)(b) conditions extraterritorial eminent
domain for parks and open space on the "consent of both the owner of
the property to be acquired by condemnation and the governing body of
the local government in which territorial boundaries the property is lo-
cated." Although requiring the consent of the landowner is tantamount
to a prohibition-the whole point of eminent domain is to permit the
government to take property without the owner's consent-the require-
ment of the consent of the host local government should have been
treated as a regulation and not a prohibition. It is not antithetical to the
idea of eminent domain in the way that a requirement of landowner con-
sent would be, and it provides a means of harmonizing the policies of the
taking and host communities. The requirement of host community con-
sent is a feature of the laws of some states that permit extraterritorial
action.77 Indeed, Pennsylvania recently adopted such a requirement in
the aftermath of a court decision that allowed an extraterritorial condem-
nation in apparent violation of the subdivision controls of the host locali-
ty.
78
74. See, e.g., Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 570 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992); City of N. Vernon v. Jennings Nw. Reg'l Utils., 829 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 2005); Valley
Twp., 894 A.2d at 890; Provo City v. Ivie, 94 P.3d 206, 209 (Utah 2004).
75. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 170 n.8 (Colo. 2008).
76. Id. at 172.
77. See, e.g., Provo, 94 P.3d at 211.
78. See Brian P. Gregg, Comment, Valley Township v. City of Coatesville: The Future of
Extraterritorial Takings, 17 WIDENER L.J. 629, 636-37 (2008).
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The Telluride Court may have failed to adequately consider the le-
gitimate interest of the host community in the case before it because the
only objection to the taking came from the property owner. Indeed, the
host community, San Miguel County, endorsed Telluride's action and
filed an amicus brief that supported the condemnation. The land in ques-
tion was literally at Telluride's doorstep, and the park and open space
planned by Telluride would have benefitted San Miguel County, too. As
a result, the issue of whether state legislation could seek to harmonize the
interests of the host locality with those of the municipality engaged in
extraterritorial eminent domain was not squarely presented. Neverthe-
less, Telluride struck down all of subsection (4)(b), not just the landown-
er rights component. Given San Miguel County's support for Telluride,
the court's action was unnecessary to resolve the question presented by
the case. More importantly, it may constrain the state's ability to coordi-
nate interlocal relations in future extraterritorial eminent domain situa-
tions.
To be sure, the court may not have erred after all. It could be ar-
gued that the requirement of host community consent is tantamount to a
prohibition. Although many academic advocates of local autonomy have
expressed doubts about greater state oversight of local actions as a means
of addressing the external effects of local decisions, and have instead
suggested that interlocal contracts, interlocal agreements, and, more gen-
erally, interlocal collaboration is the way to go,79 the requirement of host
locality consent could indeed prove to be an absolute barrier to extraterri-
torial action. Neighboring communities do not always get along, and
consent may be denied because of "local pride and envy," the bad blood
accumulated from past conflicts, disagreement over how to divide the
benefits from a project, or a myriad of other bargaining difficulties.8 0 If
the host locality actually exercises its power to veto, then the requirement
of consent would operate as a prohibition.
Perhaps the prohibition/regulation distinction could be addressed by
revising state law so that the host locality's veto would be subject to
judicial or administrative review on some sort of reasonableness or best-
interests-of-the-entire-area standard. Or perhaps the taking locality could
be required to obtain the consent of a regional land use body which
would include representatives of the taking locality, the host locality, and
other affected adjacent localities. Alternatively, the state might not give
the host locality a veto but, instead, make it more difficult for the taking
locality to act if the host locality objects. A bill currently pending in the
Colorado legislature, for example, provides that if the host locality ob-
jects to the proposed condemnation the taking community can act only if
79. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv.
190, 191 (2001).
80. Minor Myers III, Obstacles to Bargaining Between Local Governments: The Case of West
Haven and Orange, Connecticut, 37 URB. LAW. 853, 854 (2005).
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a supermajority of its governing body votes for the action and that in any
judicial review of the taking, the condemning government must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the proposed public use of the
property outweighs the benefits of other planned or potential uses of the
property by the host locality or the landowner. Of course, if the state
supreme court concludes that the possibility that an entity-whether the
host locality, a reviewing court, or a regional agency--could deny per-
mission for the extraterritorial condemnation constitutes a prohibition
rather than a regulation, then the only way to assure that extraterritorial
eminent domain accommodates the interests of host localities would be a
state constitutional amendment.
But without some way of taking into account the interests of the
host locality, the Colorado Supreme Court's Telluride analysis would
have the effect of preferring the extraterritorial power of some local gov-
ernments over the internal regulatory authority of others in the name of
home rule. That does not seem to make sense from either the perspective
of local government as delegate of the state or from the perspective of
local government as grass-roots democracy.
CONCLUSION
Reconciling extraterritorial eminent domain with the land use regu-
lations and other policies of host localities is simply one facet of a broad-
er question-indeed, perhaps the central question facing American local
government law today-which is how to make sense of local autonomy
in a world in which large numbers of small localities divide up shared
economic, social, or topographical areas. Local government needs can-
not be satisfied entirely within local borders. Local government regula-
tory actions, as well as tax and service delivery decisions, inevitably
have extralocal effects. Local governments are agents of their people,
but they affect the lives of people beyond their borders who do not par-
ticipate in local governance. The more autonomy local governments
enjoy the more difficult the problem is likely to become, as the more
actions local governments are able to take the more impacts they will
have on other localities and on nonresidents.
To some extent these issues can be addressed by voluntary interloc-
al agreements, joint ventures, and councils of government. But the more
we speak of the rights and powers of local governments-including the
right not to cooperate with neighbors-the more difficult it will likely be
to resolve these issues at the local level. Ultimately, state action will be
necessary to accommodate different local interests, to harmonize inter-
local conflicts, and to provide rules and procedures for resolving inter-
local disputes. This could involve regional rather than statewide bodies,
as well as courts and administrative agencies, in addition to, or instead
of, the state legislature. But whichever of these many alternative forms it
takes, state regulation will be necessary to make local autonomy effec-
1327
1328 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:4
tive and legitimate. That is especially likely when local autonomy entails
the formal projection of local government beyond local borders onto land
subject to the jurisdiction of other localities.
As a result, the Telluride decision and extraterritorial eminent do-
main more generally suggest that a great paradox is at the heart of local
government law: At least some reliance on the model of local govern-
ment as delegate of the state will be necessary to legitimate the actions of
local government as a locally elected representative of local people. Or
perhaps this is not a paradox at all, but instead a resolution of the great
ann-of-the-state/local autonomy divide that has been central to contem-
porary legal academic debates about local government law.
INTER-LOCAL EXTERNALITIES: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON
RICHARD BRIFFAULT'S "EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND
LOCAL AUTONOMY"
CHRISTOPHER SERKIN t
It is hard to imagine a more provocative example of extraterritorial
power than the extraterritorial eminent domain documented by Professor
Richard Briffault in his contribution to this Symposium.1 At first blush,
it looks less like the natural exercise of state delegated authority than like
a cross-border invasion. In Professor Briffault's fascinating treatment, it
is more than that, too. It represents a point of uncomfortable intersection
between the dual sources of local government power: top-down delega-
tion from the state, and bottom-up representation of local voters.2
Extraterritorial eminent domain appears, at first glance, to be uni-
quely problematic. It seems to invite a direct clash between co-equal
governments. Moreover, the condemnee's political recourse is to a gov-
ernment in which he or she has no formal voice. In the face of these
concerns, why is extraterritorial eminent domain ever permitted? The
reason, as Professor Briffault argues, and as expanded modestly here, is
that extraterritorial eminent domain is, in fact, hardly unique in the prob-
lems it presents. Indeed, Professor Briffault shines a light on this prac-
tice at least in part because it is "simply one facet of a broader question.
• .which is how to make sense of local autonomy in a world in which
large numbers of small localities divide up shared economic, social, or
topographic areas."3 Instead of exceptional, it is but another example of
familiar problems of inter-local externalities and political accountability.
Identifying directly what feels exceptional about extraterritorial eminent
domain, but relating it to these more familiar phenomena, provides a
useful opportunity to elaborate on complicated interactions between local
governments.
There are two different aspects of extraterritorial domain that look
remarkable. First is the inter-local relationship between the condemning
jurisdiction (the "condemnor") and the jurisdiction in which the con-
demned property is located (the "host"). Second is the political economy
t Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School, Visiting Associate Professor N.Y.U. School
of Law. Thanks to David Golove and Michael Cahill for stimulating conversations about the topic,
and to Clay Gillette for helpful comments.
1. Richard Briffault, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.: Extraterritoriality and
Local Autonomy, 86 DENY. U. L. REv. 1311 (2009).
2. Id. at 1312.
3. Id. at 1323.
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of condemnation when the condemnee cannot vote in the condemnor's
elections.4
Professor Briffault appears most interested in, and troubled by, the
first: the effect of extraterritorial eminent domain on inter-local interac-
tions.5 In Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.,6 Telluride, Colorado,
sought to condemn property in the neighboring San Miguel County.
Interestingly, San Miguel County consented, at least implicitly, to Tellu-
ride's action. It is easy to see why. The purpose of the condemnation
was to provide "open space, parks, and recreation. ' '8 The host communi-
ty was, in essence, getting a park and open space for free. Its wealthy
neighbor was paying to assemble the property into a use that would gen-
erate positive externalities for the host community and, indeed, the entire
region.
As Professor Briffault recognizes, however, the fact of the positive
externalities in this case may have allowed the Colorado Supreme Court
to ignore important interests that other host communities might have in
the future. If, instead of a park, Telluride had been condemning property
in a neighboring municipality in order to site a landfill, or other NIMBY,
the interests between the two communities would have quickly diverged.
The condemnor in such a case would internalize only the acquisition
costs of the property, and not the ongoing costs of the use, which would
then be externalized to another locality. What's more, Professor Brif-
fault suggests that the condemned property may not even be subject to
the host community's land use regulations. 9 Even if it were, the host
community could still find itself home to some undesirable use that
would not have existed but for its neighbor's acquisition of local proper-
ty.
The externalities resulting from extraterritorial eminent domain
could also be more subtle. By acquiring land in a neighboring jurisdic-
tion, whether for a park, recreational use, or some other use preserving
open space, the condemnor is at least marginally decreasing the supply of
4. For sustained treatments of the political economy of eminent domain, see generally Tho-
mas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 61 (1986), and Nicole Stelle Gar-
nett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101 (2006).
5. Briffault, supra note 1, at 1324 ("I think the more serious issue, particularly when eminent
domain is at stake, is the... potential for interlocal conflict.").
6. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
7. Briffault, supra note 1, at 1326.
8. Town of Telluride, 185 P.3d at 163.
9. Briffault, supra note 1, at 1323. Professor Briffault cites the fascinating case of Valley
Twp. v. City of Coatesville, 894 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2006), in which a host community challenged the
condemnation action by a neighboring town. The condemnor sought to condemn a portion of a
parcel of privately owned property within the host jurisdiction. The host jurisdiction objected that
the action amounted to a subdivision without first obtaining a subdivision permit. The Pennsylvania
Court of Appeals disagreed, suggesting that the condemnor is not bound by land use regulations in
the host community, at least relating to acquisition of the property. Whether the condemnor would




developable land. Whether the effect of such preservation will be posi-
tive or negative depends entirely on local context. All else being equal,
limiting supply will tend to increase prices of the remaining developable
or already developed property. Given a fixed level of demand, preserva-
tion of open space effectuates a wealth transfer from future residents to
existing owners.1° But preserving open space also imposes opportunity
costs on the host jurisdiction. Development can increase property tax
revenue, or lower it depending on the attendant burdens on local infra-
structure." The bottom line: the effect of preservation on local property
values can be significant, but is hard to predict without taking a close
look at local conditions. Cross-border condemnation threatens to take
away the ability of the host jurisdiction to weigh for itself the competing
costs and benefits of preservation and development.
Extraterritorial eminent domain therefore has the obvious potential
to affect the balance of benefits and burdens between localities. A con-
demnor can generate benefits for the host community, as in Telluride, or
costs, as Professor Briffault rightly anticipates. Ultimately, however,
these boil down to familiar problems of inter-local externalities. Even in
intra-territorial exercises of municipal power, the actions of a local gov-
ernment can have dramatic effects on neighboring jurisdictions.
Local governments regularly impose negative externalities on each
other, a fact well documented both theoretically and empirically. 12 For
example, siting a landfill or other noxious use on the edge of town push-
es some of the costs on to neighboring jurisdictions. 13 Land use controls
with their impact on growth patterns can generate congestion on neigh-
boring roads and degrade environmental and scenic resources. Perhaps
most profoundly, highly restrictive growth controls, or outright exclusio-
nary zoning, can steer disproportionate numbers of poor residents into
neighboring jurisdictions.n
There is, of course, a flip-side to each of these costs. Local gov-
ernments can also generate positive externalities that are not territorially
bound. The benefits of various forms of preservation are not confined to
the enacting municipality. And creating the conditions for economic
growth, whether through direct subsidies or through any combination of
pro-growth policies, can also generate substantial benefits to neighboring
10. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L.J. 385, 402 (1977).
11. Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Protection, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 883, 941-42 (2007).
12. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624, 1674-79 (2006).
13. Id. at 1677 & n. 208 (citing sources).
14. Id. at 1678.
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municipalities in the form of employment for residents, increases in
property values, and the like.'
5
In the context of this rich panoply of inter-local effects, extraterri-
torial eminent domain is hardly a standout. The costs and benefits it is
capable of creating fall within the broad categories of externalities that
local governments regularly generate. 16  Moreover, the compensation
requirement is a good reason to be less concerned about the externalities
from eminent domain than from more run-of-the-mill land use regula-
tions. Of all the ways that local governments impose costs on each other,
condemnation may be literally the most expensive and therefore the least
common. 
17
Of course, condemnation may not be expensive for local govern-
ments in the currency that matters, and this introduces the second con-
cern: the political economy of extraterritorial eminent domain. Public
choice theorists have argued that governments do not internalize costs
the way private actors do, and that it is political costs, not budgetary
costs, that matter most to decision-makers. 8  Indeed, the political costs
of eminent domain may be much more important than financial costs as a
check on government condemnation.' 9 If that is true, the extraterritorial
application of eminent domain reemerges as a particular problem be-
cause the condemnee has no vote in the condemnor's elections.
It is not at all clear, however, that the availability of the vote tracks
a property owner's ability to exert political pressure in any meaningful
way. Public choice theory's insights go beyond rejecting assumptions
that government actors are motivated by wealth maximization and point
to the power that special interest groups exert on the political process.2°
It may not be the vote that matters so much as the ability to mobilize
others, an ability that is more likely to be affected by information and
organizational costs than anything else.2'
15. Id. at 1676-77.
16. For a general discussion of inter-local externalities see id at 1674-79.
17. See Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Condemning Religion: The Political Economy of
RLUIPA 29 (Brooklyn Law Sch. Research, Working Paper No. 127, 2009) (on file with author)
(finding condemnation less likely source of religious discrimination than zoning because of compen-
sation). To the extent extraterritorial eminent domain requires some kind of state authorization,
whether explicit or implicit, the interests of host jurisdictions have at least theoretically been
represented in the state political process. Briffault, supra note 1, at 1323 (discussing sources of
authority for extraterritorial eminent domain).
18. This claim is undoubtedly too broad. Many governments, and in particular small local
governments, are highly sensitive to budget pressures. When local property taxes fund compensa-
tion for eminent domain, and property taxes are capitalized into local property values, local govern-
ments will be very sensitive to the fiscal costs and benefits of condemnation. Serkin, supra note 12,
at 1665-73.
19. Professor Merrill has described the "Due Process costs of eminent domain" as among the
most important costs affecting government decision-makers. Merrill, supra note 4, at 77-78.





Here, one might be tempted to argue that the ability to generate po-
litical pressure does, in fact, depend on being a voter in the local jurisdic-
tion. It is not the vote itself that is meaningful, but instead the social
networks that develop within a community, and being a local voter is a
proxy for those kinds of broader social networks. Local property owners
may have a unique ability to develop the social networks within a com-
munity that translate directly into political power.
There is little reason, however, to expect actual political power to
track the ability to vote. In fact, as a proxy for political influence, it is
both expansively over- and under-inclusive. Communities have many
members with little or no ability to generate political power, despite hav-
ing the franchise in local elections. Moreover, non-residents in a com-
munity may well generate political power despite the absence of a vote,
as with second-home owners, or well-connected business leaders who do
not live in the town in which they do business. More generally, too, so-
cial networks are not confined by municipal borders. Political influence
often extends fluidly into neighboring localities through social, business,
and political connections that are rarely jurisdictionally constrained. It is
at least an open question whether, say, renters within a municipality will
fare better in the local political process than property owners outside.22
Short of an Equal Protection problem, the power to condemn is not li-
mited because the condemnee lacks clout.
None of this is to deny the theoretical problems presented by extra-
territorial eminent domain. It takes only a little imagination to envision a
town resisting eminent domain within its borders by condemning the
property right back. Or what of the potential for retaliatory condemna-
tions, where towns condemn property back and forth from each other?
Or the wholesale expropriation of an entire town, where a small munici-
pality is swallowed up by its larger, wealthier neighbor? Would the Pub-
lic Use Clause be permitted to stretch so far?23 Were these problems to
arise, state intervention would almost certainly be required to resolve the
competing interests. But the fact that these concerns remain merely hy-
pothetical suggests that local governments do not, by-and-large, over-
reach. Indeed, the ability of local governments to impose costs on each
other in so many ways serves as an implicit check on abusive power, as
does the ability of neighbors to generate political pressure that is not ju-
risdictionally bound.
Notice that this account may apply differently to local governments
than to state governments. Governments, after all, are not fractals; their
22. Considerable empirical evidence suggests that renters have considerably less influence in
local decision-making than homeowners. WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How
HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE
POLICIES 80 (2001).
23. U.S. Const. amend. V. For consideration of the meaning of Public Use see James E. Krier
& Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859 (2004).
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political and structural topography are not replicated at every level of
magnification. Indeed, Colorado cannot condemn property from New
Mexico, at least not without the latter's consent.24 The formal doctrinal
distinction is obvious: State police powers are not delegated by some
higher level of government, and are circumscribed by more inherent
geographical limits on sovereignty. Moreover, local governments, exist-
ing as they do at or near the bottom rung of sovereign power, operate in a
far more circumscribed legal space than states. Even in home rule juris-
dictions, local governments' powers are limited by layers of both state
and federal statutory and constitutional constraints. Recourse to the state
government in instances of real conflict can provide significant protec-
tion against overreaching. In fact, the Telluride example is telling on this
score. Failing to convince Telluride not to take his land, the condemnee
successfully petitioned the state legislature to limit Telluride's extraterri-
torial power, an act that required the Colorado Supreme Court to over-
turn.
25
This distinction between state and local governments is amenable to
a functional justification, too--one that suggests some natural limits to
inter-local extraterritorial domain. States are likely to be less intertwined
with each other than are local governments. While neighboring states
create external costs and benefits on each other too, inter-state externali-
ties are relatively smaller than inter-local ones as measured per capita,
geographically, or by some other jurisdictionally scaled denominator.
State jurisdictional boundaries may also be less porous than local ones, at
least when it comes to social and political networks. As organizational
costs go up, political power goes down. 26
These functional differences have implications for inter-local emi-
nent domain as well. Condemning property in a neighboring jurisdiction
is one thing. Doing so three towns over, or on the other side of the state,
may be something else entirely, because the political and structural me-
chanisms for accountability disappear. Extraterritorial power should be
at least roughly co-extensive with the political and structural checks on
that power, and so should decrease with distance from the condemning
locality. But that is at least not at issue (or is less of an issue) when
neighboring towns are involved.
Ultimately, then, extraterritorial eminent domain is not as excep-
tional as it may initially appear because the relationships between the
condemnor and the host community, and between the condemnor and the
non-resident condemnee, are not fundamentally different than in terri-
24. Inter-state condemnation is not completely unheard of. A Nebraska statute, for example,
expressly authorizes other states to condemn property within Nebraska for purposes of developing or
maintaining an airport, so long as Nebraska consents. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-242.
25. Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163-64 (Colo. 2008).
26. KOMESAR, supra note 20, at 61.
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torial application of the power. Professor Briffault takes from the exam-
ple of extraterritorial eminent domain a more general need for some me-
chanism for mediating between the interests of competing localities. He
suggests that, at some level, the State must be involved.27 I, too, have
previously endorsed a state-level mechanism for evening out the costs
and benefits local governments impose on each other.28 Such an ac-
counting is likely to increase the efficiency of local decision-making, at
least by small local governments. But the reality, of course, is that local
governments have been generating externalities for a long time. Extra-
territorial eminent domain is just one more line item to add to the inter-
local balance sheet in what is by now a long-running tally. Short of the
kinds of direct conflicts suggested above, state intervention may not ac-
tually be required to mediate between competing inter-local interests,
even though it would help.
Extraterritorial eminent domain is, at the very least, a provocative
example of local power. Professor Briffault is absolutely right, however,
that it is interesting mostly for what it reveals about more commonplace
local actions. It surely has the power to impose significant costs on
neighboring jurisdictions, or to secure substantial benefits, as was the
case in Telluride. But this is the nature of many inter-local interactions.
What is ultimately most remarkable, then, may not be the existence of
extraterritorial eminent domain, but how seldom it is actually used. At
least in this particular context, structural and political checks on local
power may be enough to prevent egregious overreaching, and that is a
surprisingly optimistic story about what, at first blush, appears to be a
source of direct conflict in territorial power.
27. Briffault, supra note 1, at 1327 ("Ultimately, state action will be necessary to accommo-
date different local interests, to harmonize interlocal conflicts, and to provide rules and procedures
for resolving interlocal disputes.").
28. Serkin, supra note 12, at 1689-97.
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It may, in fact, be the case that cities, in effect, already have expan-
sive powers. But it would be more accurate to say that, because of
the ongoing judicial interpretation, no one really knows.
- Stephen L. Elkin
1
Without the benefit of guidance from history, constitutional tradition,
or sharply delineated principle, courts have been required to grapple
with the questions of what 'affairs' are 'municipal' and when 'police,





The distribution of powers between levels of government in the
state system presents a puzzle for constitutional theory; likewise, it
presents a puzzle-actually, more of a ubiquitous governance dilemma-
for modern policymaking. The specter of Hunter v. Pittsburgh and its
injunction that municipalities are best understood as creatures of state
government and, therefore, as fundamentally subordinate entities, 3 haunts
modern local government law. At the same time, constitutional home
rule conceivably upends the standard view by according a sphere of au-
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1. STEPHEN L. ELKIN, Crry AND REGIME IN THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 176 (1987).
2. Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the
Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643,661 (1964).
3. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see also WILLIAM BENNETr
MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CrrEs 80 (3d ed. 1920) ("[The] municipal corporation,
is the creature of the state. Like all other corporations, it owes its existence to a statute, and it has no
powers save those which may be conveyed to it thereby."); Howard Lee McBain, The Doctrine of an
Inherent Right of Local Self-Government (pt. 1), 16 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 214 (1916).
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thority-indeed, a sovereignty of sorts-to municipalities in the state's
structure of governance and its constitutional theory. How constitutional
home rule can be reconciled with the Hunter principle is an enduring
puzzle in American local government law.4 Through scholarship, com-
mentary, and caselaw, informed observers struggle to make sense of this
seeming contradiction between the idea of local governments as suppli-
cants and the idea of these governments as governance partners.5
Underlying this enduring theoretical tension is a practical fact on
the ground: Defining the scope of this local sovereignty, and thereby
shaping the constitutional relationship between state and local govern-
ments, is a task that has largely fallen to the state courts.6 While home
rule is the creation of legislatures acting within constitutional conven-
tions or through other mechanisms,7 the contours and content of home
rule have been developed by the courts through adjudication. Home rule
doctrine reflects a far-flung effort over more than a century's time to find
meaning in the ambiguous phrases "local affairs" and "matters of state-
wide concern."8 The result of these efforts has been a highly developed,
and still developing, case law, one that involves drawing lines between
what is properly the domain of state government and those powers which
may be exercised by municipalities free of state preemption.
To be sure, the "disabling" or "immunity" function of home rule,
which aims to insulate certain local action from state control, was and is
controversial. 9 Indeed, most states disavow this function, either by hav-
ing no home rule at all ° or, more commonly, by having "legislative
home rule," which authorizes municipalities to exercise only those pow-
4. See e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85-86 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism]; Richard Briffault,
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp: Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, 86 DEN".
U. L. REV. 1311, 1317 (2009) [hereinafter Briffault, Extraterrioriality and Local Autonomy].
5. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2260 (2003);
Gerald E. Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 256 (1993); Gerald E. Frg,
The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062-63 (1980) [hereinafter Frug, Legal
Concept].
6. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at 660; Sho Sato, "Municipal Affairs" in California, 60 CAL.
L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1972). In nine of the imperio home rule states, the home rule provision of the
state constitution lists matters that are deemed to be of local concern, though the list is not exclusive.
See infra Appendix (listing Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, New York, North
Dakota, South Carolina, and Utah as those nine states). Even in those states, however, it is ultimate-
ly the job of the courts to determine whether a particular exercise of municipal power falls within
one of the categories listed in the constitution.
7. See DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RiGOs & MELVIN B. HILL, JR., HOME RULE IN AMERICA 11
(2001); HOWARD LEE McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACrICE OF MUNIcIPAL HOME RULE 112-13
(1916).
8. See infra p. 1349.
9. See Frug, Legal Concept, supra note 5, at 1078; Sato, supra note 6, at 1059-60.
10. Five states have no municipal home rule at all: Alabama, Hawaii, Nevada, North Caroli-
na, and Vermont. See infra Appendix; see also KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 24-25 (Alabama),
269-70 (Nevada); 312-13 (North Carolina); 417-19 (Vermont). Hawaii has no municipal govern-
ments, but has home rule counties. Id. at 112-14; see infra Appendix. See generally KRANE Er AL.,
supra note 7, at 476-78.
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ers not prohibited by the state legislature." Still, there exists in many
other states-including the home state of this law reviewl 2-a deeply
imbedded recognition of the truly "imperium in imperio" 13 quality of
constitutional home rule and, with it, an acknowledgment that there are
circumstances in which, notwithstanding the Hunter principle, local go-
vernance is shielded from state intervention.
14
In this Article we ask: What are courts essentially doing when they
review state/local conflicts under the rubric of constitutional home rule?
And what insights into larger matters of judicial capability and doctrinal
efficacy are afforded by a close examination of this work of the state
courts? In Part I, we frame the home rule inquiry by describing in broad
outlines the constitutional structure of municipal home rule. In Part H,
we undertake some field archeology, involving a close look at how state
courts currently decide home rule cases. A better understanding of how
the courts approach the potentially difficult task of defining and drawing
lines between "local affairs" and "matters of statewide concern" will
usefully illuminate both the larger conundrum of imperium in imperio
home rule and the enterprise of line-drawing in structural constitutional
law cases more generally.'5 In Part II, we consider whether and to what
11. Twenty-three states currently have this form of home rule. The states include Alaska,
Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. See infra Appendix.
12. Twenty-three states currently have imperio home rule. In addition to the nine states listed
in note 6, supra, the states include Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See infra Appendix.
13. The phrase means "government within a government," and is thought to have been coined
in the local government context by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1893. In City of St. Louis v. Western
Union Tel. Co., the Court observed regarding the City of St. Louis:
It does not, like most cities, derive its powers by grant from the legislature, but it framed
its own charter under express authority from the people of the state, given in the constitu-
tion....
[AInd the powers granted by [the charter], so far as they are in harmony with the consti-
tution and laws of the state, and have not been set aside by any act of the general assem-
bly, are the powers vested in the city.... The city is in a very just sense an "imperium in
imperio." Its powers are self-appointed, and the reserved control existing in the general
assembly does not take away this peculiar feature of its character.
149 U.S. 465,467-68 (1893) (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 170-71 (Colo.
2008) (holding that the "legislature cannot prohibit the exercise of constitutional home rule powers,
regardless of the state interest which may be implicated by the exercise of those powers," and invali-
dating, as inconsistent with the constitution's home rule provision, a statute that would prohibit
extraterritorial condemnations of property by home rule municipalities); see also, e.g., LYNN A.
BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 298-311 (3d ed. 2004); RICHARD
BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAw 278-314 (7th ed. 2009); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 111-46 (3rd
ed. 2009).
15. For earlier efforts along similar lines, see generally GORDON L. CLARK, JUDGES AND THE
CITIES: INTERPRETING LOCAL AUTONOMY (1985); Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review in Local Gov-
ernment Law: A Reappraisal, 60 MINN. L. REv. 669 (1976); Frank J. Macchiarola, Local Govern-
ment Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48 J. URB. L 335 (1971); Sandalow, supra note 2. For the most
part, these important analyses emphasized normative considerations; that is, they considered whether
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extent the work of the state courts described in Part II can be deemed a
success. Such an assessment, we believe, has implications not only for
home rule and state constitutionalism, but also for the appropriate role of
the courts in demarcating and enforcing federal constitutional boundaries
of state regulatory immunity.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE
Home rule developed out of a Progressive era concern with the li-
mited scope and capacity of municipal governments in the state constitu-
tional system.' 6 Although prominent scholars and the occasional state
judge of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century sent up the trial
balloon of inherent local power, t7 the near consensus view in the consti-
tutional law of the times was that municipalities had only those powers
delegated to them by state legislatures. 8 Home rule promised a reconfi-
guration of this structural relationship.' 9 The early home rule amend-
ments to state constitutions empowered local governments by according
new legal significance to municipal charters and their delineation of local
powers and prerogatives.20 With that, home rule portended a new sche-
ma for local governance and, especially, a new relationship between state
and local governments.2 ' To be sure, these municipal charters existed in
the shadow of state constitutions, which had long included a variety of
limitations on both state and local power.22 Yet, the reconfiguration of
and to what extent judicial scrutiny of state/local conflicts was coherent and sensible (usually the
answer offered was "no"). While normative considerations are inescapable, the signal contribution
of this Article is to consider more carefully, and with the benefit of recent caselaw, how the courts
go about analyzing state/local disputes in constitutional home rule contexts. A fuller analysis of the
normative underpinnings of these analytical patterns is beyond the scope of this article.
16. See generally KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12; Barron, supra note 5, at 2277-322;
Frug, Legal Concept, supra note 5, at 1080-119; Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal
Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 392-431 (1985).
17. See, e.g., Hoagland v. City of Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142, 149 (1877); People v. Lynch, 51
Cal. 15, 34 (1875); People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 107-08 (1871) (Cooley, J., con-
curring); Eugene McQuillin, Constitutional Right of Local Self-Government of Municipalities, and
Principles Applicable to Central Control, 35 AM. L. REv. 510, 524 (1901). See generally David J.
Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487
(1999).
18. See BAKER & GILLETE, supra note 14, at 202-03; Frug, Legal Concept, supra note 5, at
1114-15. See generally HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870 (1983).
19. See, e.g., RODNEY L. MOTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIES 11 (1949) ("During a
large part of the nineteenth century, under the dominant theory of legislative supremacy, cities were
considered to be merely creatures of the state legislature.... Cities were completely subservient to
legislative vagaries and whims .... Legislative interference with cities tends to turn state legisla-
tures into spasmodic city councils. Home rule, as a device for returning local business to the city, is
the obvious remedy for these evils.").
20. See KRANE ET AL.., supra note 7, at 11; see also the state constitutional provisions cited
supra note 12.
21. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 10.
22. See BAKER & GILLElrE, supra note 14, at 201-243 (discussing state constitutional limita-
tions on state power besides home rule); BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 278-314
(same); Michael E. Libonati, Local Government, in 3 STATE CONSITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CoNsTTmONAL REFORM 109-27 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert
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state/local relations represented by the home rule movement of the Pro-
gressive era was a substantial one; it harnessed the (progressive) power
of local governments and, not incidentally, gave these governments a
legal bulwark against their skeptical masters.23
Especially controversial was the protection that the home rule
amendments gave localities against state preemption of local laws. The
establishment of constitutional home rule, beginning first in Missouri and
then spreading among the states most enraptured by Progressive-era
lawmaking reforms,24 reconstituted state/local relations by creating, in
essence, an imperium in imperio.25 By putting into a state constitution a
guarantee that qualified cities would hereinafter enjoy home rule authori-
ty in the area of "local" or "municipal" affairs, the home rule reformers
were creating for municipalities both a power of initiation-that is, a
power to act in the absence of an express state legislative grant-and a
power of immunity-that is, a power to act in the specified area notwith-
standing any conflicting state law.26 This second sort of power proved
controversial, given the substantial tension between imperium in imperio
and the idea of local governments as creatures of state government. It is
one thing to view local governments as spheres of Jeffersonian democra-
cy and as separate institutions of governance in a wider polity;27 it is
another thing to see local governments as sovereign and independent
from the states that created them.
Moreover, by establishing a new legal architecture of state/local re-
lations centered on the divide between local and statewide affairs, the
constitutional home rule movement was assigning a critical task to
F. Willams eds., 2006) (discussing historical development of home rule provisions in the larger
context of the evolution of state constitutions).
23. See KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12.
24. Id. at 241-42. See generally McBAN, supra note 7, at 119-99.
25. See supra note 17.
26. See BRtFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 331-32 (discussing the distinction be-
tween the "initiation" and "immunity" functions of home rule); see also BAKER & GILLEt FE, supra
note 14, at 307-11 (discussing distinction between "investing" and "divesting" functions of home
rule).
27. See Briffault, Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, supra note 4, at 1317. A particular-
ly florid statement of this ideal is found in an early decision of the California Supreme Court:
What did [the Constitution's framers] have in their minds when they spoke of cities and
villages? It needed but to recall their origin and history to impress the Constitutional
Convention with a conviction that municipalities are invaluable to a great and free
people. The enlightened genius of the Roman civilization was planted and fostered by
the establishment of colonies with urban privileges. In the Dark Ages the chartered
towns in Europe served to curb the turbulence of the more potent of the crown vassals,
and to erect barriers for the protection of personal rights against the rude force of the
feudal barons. It often happened that from such centres of self-government the spirit of
freedom was extended and expanded, and it may be safely be said of the English bo-
roughs-for example-that they were largely instrumental in developing the constitution
of government which made that people jealous of the liberty they possessed, and capable
of receiving still greater accessions of the same blessing. In our own country the exis-
tence of local political corporations began.. .
People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 29-30 (1875).
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courts, the task of constitutional interpretation. 28  Courts would now
make decisions regarding whether and to what extent a power was to be
assigned to localities and shielded from state intervention. In doing so,
they were creating a doctrine of constitutional localism 29 that would, in
suitable cases, enable and require the courts to invalidate acts of the leg-
islature that intruded on the locality's own preferences. This power re-
flected the critical but unstartling idea that state legislatures are subject to
the fundamental law as interpreted and implemented by courts through
judicial review. The power was extraordinary, however, in the further
sense that courts would be acting to protect the autonomy of local gov-
ernments that were historically understood to be mere creatures of the
state government. On these terms, imperium in imperio home rule was
even more remarkable than constitutional federalism. After all, the latter
was built upon the circumstances of the states existing as independent
sovereigns that joined together to form the nation, the United States.3°
Constitutional localism, in contrast, was built upon a notion that whatev-
er municipalities the state chose to create should, after creation, be ac-
corded a realm of autonomy from ex post control by their creator.31 As a
matter of theory, constitutional home rule represents an unusual and truly
radical reconstitution of the traditional model of state/local relations and
of the role of the courts in a constitutional system.
Our focus here, however, is constitutional home rule in practice.
While constitutional home rule on paper points to a delineated realm of
local sovereignty, the record of home rule in the state courts in this re-
gard is more mixed. Over the century of its existence, home rule doc-
trine has reflected in its structure the inherently difficult nature of the
core line-drawing project. In some states, constitutional home rule has
never been seriously contemplated; rather, home rule exists by virtue of
statutory grant.32 Indeed, the modern home rule movement, dating
roughly from the mid-1960s, is entirely the creature of state legislation.33
In a few states, home rule does not exist in either statutory or constitu-
tional form.34 Of the remaining states, in which constitutional home rule
exists, some have state courts that have largely declined to subject state
legislation to scrutiny under the rubric of home rule; in other words, they
28. See Sandalow, supra note 2, at 712.
29. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 98-99.
30. See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 14-15 (1995).
31. It should be noted, however, that not all municipalities within an imperio home rule state
are eligible for "home rule" status. In some imperio states, home rule status is afforded only cities
that meet certain minimum population requirements. See REYNOLDS, JR., supra note 14, at 108-10.
See also, e.g., infra Appendix.
32. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 10-11; Kenneth Vanlandingham, Con-
stitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NL) Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1 n.1
(1975). See also infra Appendix (Delaware, Indiana, Mississippi).
33. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 23; KRANE Er AL., supra note 7, at 12-13.
34. See supra note 10.
35. See supra note 12.
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have largely denied any immunity function to home rule.36 In these
states, local governments can act through their home rule powers; but
insofar as the state legislature attempts to preempt local action, the state
typically wins and local governments lose.37
Given the incentives for state courts to defer to statewide interests,38
to authorize encroachments on local sovereignty in the face of state legis-
lative preferences and demands, 39 it is remarkable that many state courts
over the years have accorded certain immunities to local governments
despite conflicting state legislation.4n In the face of considerable ob-
stacles, state courts have undertaken the tough task of sorting local from
statewide concerns, and of truly dividing powers between state and local
governments. It would surely be interesting to speculate about "why"
state courts do this. Our focus in this Article, however, is on "how" the
state courts do so and, moreover, on how that line-drawing project fits
into larger notions of court/state/local relations.
In considering how state courts deal with home rule controversies,
we leave for another day the larger questions of the constitutional status
of local governments. The structure of state/local relations involves
complex political considerations, as well as difficult constitutional ques-
tions. A full-bodied account of constitutional home rule in modern
36. See, e.g., Libonati, supra note 22, at 115 ("Courts in several jurisdictions where a consti-
tutional grant of home rule initiative is qualified by the adjective 'local' or 'municipal' have not been
shy in holding that the subject matter in question is susceptible to redefinition as a matter of state-
wide concern when the state legislature has so spoken."); James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule
in New York: "The Ghost of Home Rule," 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 713, 715 (1985) ("The balance
between state and local powers [in New York] has tipped away from the preservation of local au-
thority toward a presumption of state concern."); Eliot J. Kirshnitz, City of New York v. State of New
York: The New York State Court of Appeals, in Declaring the Repeal of the Commuter Tax Uncons-
titutional, Strikes another Blow against Constitutional Home Rule in New York, 74 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 935, 947-48 (2000) (contending that "under the 'state concern' doctrine [crafted by New York
courts], even if legislation relates to the property, affairs, or government of a city, if the legislation is
also a matter of state concern, home rule is not implicated and the legislature may act through ordi-
nary legislative process").
37. See, e.g., Kirshnitz, supra note 36, at 945-48 (citing and discussing New York cases);
KRANE Er AL., supra note 7, at 304 (noting that the highest court in New York "has consistently
rendered decisions 'protecting the Legislature's power to act by ordinary legislation if a "matter of
state concern" is involved,"' and that the "courts 'have found state concerns even in seemingly local
matters'); id. at 368 (noting regarding Rhode Island that "a series of decisions that struck down
municipal efforts to use charter language to secure substantive authority" has resulting in the consti-
tutional phrase "in all local matters" meaning "the structural aspects of local government and little
more").
38. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 639
(2001) ("state courts are most frequently made up of state judges who stand for election or re-
election; they are beholden to state voters, and not local governments, for their decisions").
39. Courts compromise local sovereignty either by narrowing the scope of local governments'
initiation power, or by limiting their immunity power, or both.
40. See, e.g., Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 15 ("Despite the standard contention
that a crabbed judicial interpretation of the 'municipal affairs' language in home rule provisions has
limited local power to initiate measures, the most comprehensive study of the first decades of home
rule found that the courts generally permitted 'a fairly wide latitude of action on the part of the city
in its so-called capacity as an organization for the satisfaction of local needs."') (quoting McBAiN,
supra note 7, at 671).
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America requires engagement with both constitutional and political crite-
ria; for now, we explore only the question of how courts manage doctrine
where state and local power is in conflict. As the quotation from Dean
Sandalow preceding the introduction indicates, the conventional wisdom
is that courts have lurched in several directions in considering home rule
matters. The reality, however, is more nuanced, as we will show in the
next Part.
II. WHAT ARE COURTS DOING WHEN THEY DO HOME RULE?
The structure of constitutional home rule doctrine rests upon an ob-
ligation of the court to draw lines between what is properly state and
properly local. This obligation emerges directly from the court's duty to
interpret the pertinent language in the state constitution.4' Where the
state constitution grants localities sovereign power in the area of local
affairs, the task falls to the court to discern just what is or is not a local
affair. The nature of the project is necessarily ad hoc: The courts are
asked to evaluate specific exercises of municipal power against the back-
ground of language, typically "local affairs" or "municipal affairs," that
is notoriously ambiguous.42 And even where home rule power is defined
in a state constitution by resort to categories of activities,43 holding that
the activity or regulation in dispute falls within the scope of a specified
category is not the end of the court's inquiry where assertions of local
immunity are made.44
What makes a potentially unwieldy judicial project manageable is
the state courts' development and use of certain criteria, of general stan-
dards, against which the prerogatives of state and local governments can
be measured. We examine those standards and the courts' doctrines-
how the courts do home rule-in Part 1I below. First, however, it is
important to understand what the courts are doing when they do home
rule. As we explain in this Part, we believe that courts are undertaking
and accomplishing three objectives when they resolve constitutional
home rule controversies: first, they are dividing the total sum of go-
vernmental power between two levels of government and thereby assign-
ing functions (and, indeed, responsibilities) to these separate govern-
ments. Second, in defining and delimiting the categories of local and
statewide affairs, the courts are making analytical judgments about which
institutions are, and traditionally have been, best suited to perform cer-
tain tasks and functions. And, lastly, the courts are unavoidably making
41. We use duty here in its weak sense, that is, the "duty" to undertake constitutional interpre-
tation, taking no position upon whether and to what extent the constitution's text is the sole source of
information about the meaning of one or another state's home rule doctrine.
42. See, e.g., Sandalow, supra note 2, at 651, 660-61; Sato, supra note 6, at 1060, 1075-76.
43. The imperio home rule provisions of some state constitutions include non-exclusive lists
of these categories. See supra note 6.
44. See, e.g., KRANE Er AL., supra note 7, at 304 (discussing New York Constitution and
cases); id. at 79 (discussing Connecticut Constitution and cases).
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substantive regulatory choices. Whether or not intentionally, judges are
choosing one regulatory result over another by the act of assigning the
regulatory prerogative to one level of government, or governmental insti-
tution, rather than another.
Home rule decisions involve conflicts between a locality insisting
that it has exclusive authority to act and the state government insisting
that this is incorrect. In resolving such conflicts, courts make what are
fundamentally distributive decisions involving the quantum of state and
local power. We offer two insights here: First, the courts conceive of
their role as separating spheres of authority between state and localities.
Thus viewed, power becomes a zero-sum game; either the state can
preempt local initiatives, thereby giving the state the last word, or else
localities can trump state interests and thereby become the final authori-
ty.45 The judgment in favor of one or another level of government there-
fore is a strong judgment about the nature of constitutional authority.
That is, the ultimate prerogative to act is within the province of one au-
thority or the other; governmental powers are exclusive, not shared.
Second, in allocating power between different levels of government,
the courts are also allocating authority among institutions of governance.
Where, for example, local governments proceed through administrative
agencies and special purpose governments, they claim immunity through
home rule just as if they had proceeded through the city council rather
than through unelected officials. By contrast, state decisionmaking is, in
the main, decisionmaking by and through the state legislature. The state
legislature is made up of a large number of representatives, each of
whom is directly elected in a single-member district.46 In addition, the
state legislature is configured to engage in compromise, conflict, logrol-
ling, and other institutionally salient activities characteristic of a general
purpose decisionmaking body.47 Local administrative agencies and spe-
cial purpose governments, in contrast, are centralized decisionmakers
that each act within a confined area of authority and competence pur-
45. One particularly significant question, to which we offer no answer in this Article, is
whether and to what extent the state legislature's express judgment that a matter is in fact one of
statewide concern is typically outcome determinative in imperio home rule states. Compare, e.g.,
Bishop v. City of San Jose, 460 P.2d 137, 141 (Cal. 1969) ("[Tlhe fact, standing alone, that the
Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not determinative
of the issue as between state and municipal affairs ... the Legislature is empowered neither to de-
termine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide
concern."), with Oelbermann Assoc. Ltd. P'ship v. Borov, 535 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318-19 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County 1988) (holding that a state statute exempting loft apartments from local zoning requirements
was valid as applied to properties within a home rule city, notwithstanding language in New York
Constitution reserving to home rule governments the power to regulate "its property, affairs or
government").
46. See Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 646-55.
47. Cf id. at 648-58 (describing structural differences between state and local institutions and
some implications of these differences); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out:
Intrastate Aspects of Interstate Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 149, 172-75
(1997).
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suant to ideals of transparency and rational rulemaking. The result is that
home rule decisions favoring local authority are, in certain cases, favor-
ing institutions that are neither directly accountable to the affected elec-
torate nor concerned with the simple aggregation of the electorate's pre-
ferences.
It is also important to recognize that as the courts separate spheres
of authority, local governments gain immunity powers-and, thereby,
discretion-at the expense of state authority. By contrast to the relation-
ship between the federal government and the states, in which state au-
thority is today subject to nearly ubiquitous federal control even when
the states seemingly prevail under the Tenth Amendment,48 the effect of
a state court decision upholding local prerogatives in the face of state
authority is to cordon off localities from state authority in a strong sense.
States may resort to more draconian mechanisms of control to be sure,
but localities can maintain a reasonable capacity for resistance notwith-
standing the state's various options. Consider, for example, the authority
of local governments to generate their own revenue to further local ob-
jectives. While local taxing authority is curtailed in extraordinary and
rare circumstances-most notably, California after Proposition 1349 -the
ordinary baseline is broad local autonomy to carry out local initiatives so
long as the capacity for local revenue-generation exists.50 When courts
put their imprimatur on local authority of this sort, the practical effects of
immunity are considerable indeed.
Further, court decisions that assign an entire category of powers to
local prerogative may distribute governmental power in a way that is
difficult for state legislatures to revisit. The California Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. Bradley5' is an example of this phenomenon. In
that case, the state court accorded to the City of Los Angeles the broad
authority to create its own regulations for municipal elections, including
limitations on campaign contributions, the provision of partial public
funding for city political campaigns, and spending limits on candidates
who accept public funds. 52 The bell cannot be easily unrung; where es-
48. Although the "anti-commandeering" doctrine set out by the Court in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997), has chipped
away at the seemingly plenary powers of Congress under the Tenth Amendment, see infra notes
177-79 and accompanying text, the spending power remains an easy end run around any restrictions
that the Constitution might be interpreted to impose on Congress's ability to regulate the states. See
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1911, 1914 (1995);
Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 195, 195
(2001) [hereinafter Baker, Spending Power]; Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting offthe
Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress
Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 460 (2003).
49. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (imposing various limitations on the real property assessment
and taxing powers of state and local governments).
50. See Kirk Stark & Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause
Proposition 13?, 50 UCLA L. REv. 801, 814 (2003).
51. 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992).
52. Id. at 991-92.
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sential attributes of municipal government are configured around judicial
decisions upholding local power in light of home rule, state decisionmak-
ing in those areas must be adjusted to take account of this new reality.
53
Unavoidably, division of powers through judicial decree frames go-
vernmental choices going forward. It is hard to imagine state govern-
mental actors easily acquiescing to court decisions shielding local gover-
nance from state control and limiting state flexibility. Yet, while the
process is a predictably dynamic one, with state government tacking and
adjusting in response to judicial decisions, those decisions importantly
alter the terrain on which subsequent adjustments are made. Local gov-
ernments are rightly viewed not only, or even especially, as creatures of
state governments; they are also competitors with the states. In both
their regulatory and proprietary roles, local government frequently have
economic and political interests that may collide in discernible ways with
the interests of their state government. In distributing powers, courts are
regulating the rules of this competition. A truly comprehensive effort
(which this Article is not) to evaluate the efficacy of home rule in the
courts needs to tackle squarely the question of how the courts' choices in
the allocation of power between state and local governments impact the
governance strategies of state and local officials.
In addition to allocating powers between different levels and institu-
tions of government, the courts' home rule decisions reflect and imple-
ment substantive regulatory choices. When, for example, a Colorado
court struck down the town of Telluride's attempt to impose residential
rent control on new development within the town, the scope of local reg-
ulatory choice was curtailed.54 In ruling that the Colorado law prohibit-
ing municipalities from imposing residential rent control trumped Tellu-
ride's ordinance imposing such a regime, 55 the court was not only affirm-
ing the state's power to regulate in this area. It was also ultimately rein-
forcing the legislature's substantive regulatory preference that residential
rental properties within the state not be subject to rent control.
Consider a different example, involving an ordinance of the Illinois
village of Morton Grove that banned the possession by civilians of all
operable handguns. 6 Those challenging the ordinance contended that it
violated the Illinois Constitution, which provided that "Subject only to
the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed., 57 When the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
ordinance, it reaffirmed the power of localities to choose whether and
53. Or the state constitution must be amended to redefine the affected areas as "matters of
state concern."
54. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
55. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 40.
56. Kalodimos v. Vin. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269 (111. 1984).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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how to regulate in this area. But in doing so, the court also reinforced
the village's regulatory preference for more stringent firearms control.
At some level, this is a banal insight-of course home rule decisions
involve substantive regulatory choices by the courts. But our point here
is a deeper one: How we evaluate and assess the resulting home rule
doctrine is bound up with our views about the substantive regulations
involved.
Consider the underlying regulatory choice in the 2008 case of Town
of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.58 The town of Telluride made
the bold decision to use eminent domain to expand its extraterritorial
regulatory terrain. While the locality's underlying motivation was not
entirely transparent, it appeared that the citizens of Telluride had a strong
pre-existing commitment to maintaining a protective barrier of open
space land at the boundaries of their community. 59 Local government
control over the land, including control over the location and extent of
any proposed private development, was a sensible way for the strongly
pro-environmental citizens of Telluride to realize and enforce their poli-
cy preferences. The four private corporations that owned the 572 acres
at issue, meanwhile, were interested developing the land in the future,
and had successfully lobbied the Colorado legislature for a statute of
general applicability that would block Telluride's ability to acquire the
Valley Floor via eminent domain. 60 The court's inquiry into whether
Telluride exceeded its powers under Colorado's home rule doctrine was
ultimately no more nor less than a choice between two very different
regulatory policies-would the Valley Floor be developed or would it
remain open space? Home rule disputes, and their resolution, can often
be characterized thusly.
It is important to note, however, that these substantive regulatory
choices are not naked ones. As we discuss in greater detail in the next
section of this Article, courts typically offer more than a fig leaf for the
regulatory preferences of the state and local officials who prevail in
home rule disputes. In addition, the courts are rightly cautious and in-
cremental in their implementation of these substantive regulatory choic-
es. Judgments regarding the character of certain local decisionmaking
and the operationalization of the standard home rule criteria are both
connected to prior decisions involving the same or similar matters. In
sum, the structure of home rule decisions and the criteria employed by
the courts in resolving disputes in difficult cases reveals a reasonably
nuanced approach to regulatory decisionmaking.
58. 185 P.3d 161(Colo. 2008).
59. For example, the Court noted that the citizens of Telluride, "for years have allocated
twenty percent of the town's annual revenue to fund the acquisition of the Valley Floor" for open
space and park purposes. Id. at 164.
60. Id. at 163-64.
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III. THE STRUCTURE OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY
We have discussed what the courts are doing when they do home
rule: they allocate powers between different levels and institutions of
government, and they implement substantive regulatory choices. In this
Part, we explore how the courts make those decisions. That is, we ex-
amine the standards and criteria that the courts apply in these cases, and
the legal doctrine(s) that result.
State courts typically approach home rule questions through a set of
standards that are framed around three core questions:
" Is the activity or regulation at issue a local affair?
" Is it a matter of statewide concern?
" Is it a mixed matter that is of both statewide and local concern?
We begin this Part by examining the doctrines that the state courts
of California, Colorado, and Illinois have crafted around the three core
questions. We discuss the four factors that the courts typically invoke in
resolving state-local conflicts, and give special attention to the two fac-
tors that seem to loom largest in the courts' decisionmaking: the extra-
territorial effects of the local regulation, and the need for statewide un-
iformity in the relevant regulatory area. We then explore the possibility
that the subject matter at issue affects the courts' decisionmaking; that is,
that cases within a given substantive "category" are treated similarly,
while the categories are treated somewhat differently.
A. Imperio Home Rule Doctrine
Study of three courts in imperio home rule states reveals that they
approach the three core questions in a similar. and admittedly ad hoc,
manner. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, begins its inquiry in
a 1990 decision by noting that
We have not developed a particular test which could resolve in every
case the issue of whether a particular matter is "local," "state," or
"mixed." Instead, we have made these determinations on an ad hoc
basis, taking into consideration the facts of each case.... We have
considered the relative interests of the state and the home rule muni-
cipality in regulating the matter at issue in a particular case.6'
In a later decision, the Colorado Court elaborated:
"There is no litmus-like indicator for resolving whether a matter is of
local, statewide, or mixed concern." ... Courts should take the to-
tality of the circumstances into account in reaching this legal conclu-
sion. ... As part of the totality of the circumstances, this court has
61. City & County of Denver v. State of Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767-68 (Colo. 1990).
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considered a number of issues, all directed toward weighing the re-
spective state and local interests implicated by the law.
62
The Illinois Supreme Court has articulated similar views:
Whether a particular problem is of statewide rather than local dimen-
sion must be decided not on the basis of a specific formula or listing
set forth in the Constitution but with regard [to various factors].63
And the California Supreme Court has taken a comparable approach:
'No exact definition of the terms "municipal affairs" can be formu-
lated and the courts have made no attempt to do so, but instead have
indicated that judicial interpretation is necessary to give it meaning in
each controverted case."'.. . At the same time, however, we noted
that "our decisions have also strived to confine the element of judi-
cial interpretation by hedging it with a judicial rocedure intended to
bring a measure of certainty to the process ....
The "judicial procedure" mentioned by the California Court begins
with a presumption that local ordinances are of "local concern" (and
therefore presumptively valid), thereby putting the burden of proof on
those contending that the local ordinance must yield to a conflicting state
law:
If... the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one
of statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related [and
'narrowly tailored'] to its resolution, then the conflicting charter city
measure ceases to be a 'municipal affair' pro tanto and the Legisla-
ture is not prohibited by [the Constitution's home rule provision]
from addressing the statewide dimension by its own tailored enact-
ments.65
The Colorado court starts from a somewhat different point, stating
that if "the matter is one of mixed local and statewide concern," and if
the action of the home rule city conflicts with the state legislature's ac-
tion, then "the state statute supersedes the home rule authority."66 The
court adds that "[e]ven if a home rule city has considerable local interests
at stake, a particular issue may be characterized as 'mixed' if sufficient
state interests are also implicated. 67 Lest this be interpreted as a strong
presumption in favor of the state in close cases, an earlier opinion of the
court suggests otherwise: "even though the state may be able to suggest
a plausible interest in regulating a matter to the exclusion of a home rule
62. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
63. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 274 (111. 1984).
64. Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990,995-96 (Cal. 1992).
65. Id at 996.
66. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 37.
67. Id. at 37.
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municipality, such an interest may be insufficient to characterize the mat-
ter as being even of 'mixed' state and local concern." 68
The Illinois court in Kalodimos, meanwhile, staked out a starting
point somewhere between those of the California and Colorado courts.
The Illinois court contrasts imperio home rule to "a free-wheeling
preemption rule" that "a subject is preempted whenever it is of signifi-
cant concern to the State .... ,, 69 "Home rule," the court clarifies,
is predicated on the assumption that problems in which local gov-
ernments have a legitimate and substantial interest should be open to
local solution and reasonable experimentation to meet local needs,
free from veto by voters and elected representatives of other parts of
the State who might disagree with the particular approach advanced
by the representatives of the locality involved or fail to appreciate the
local perception of the problem.
70
This seemingly strong presumption in favor of local autonomy is
importantly tempered by the Illinois Court's subsequent observation that
the local diversity intentionally fostered by home rule is subject to the
proviso "that the legislature has taken no affirmative steps to circum-
scribe the measures that may be taken and that the measures taken [by
the locality] are reasonable. 71
Nothwithstanding these somewhat different starting points, each of
the courts goes on to identify some variant of the following factors as
being at the core of its analysis:
9 the need for statewide uniformity of regulation;
*the impact of the measure on individuals living outside the
municipality;
ehistorical considerations concerning whether the subject matter
is one traditionally governed by state or local governments; and
* whether the state Constitution specifically commits the particu-
lar matter to state or local regulation.72
Each of the courts makes clear that the multi-factor analysis is not a
formula but rather a kind of balancing test: "All of these factors are in-
tended to assist the court in measuring the importance of the state inter-
68. City & County of Denver v. State of Colorado, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990).
69. Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266,274 (fll. 1984).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 275-76.
72. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 37; see also City & County of Denver, 788 P.2d at 768
(discussing same four factors); Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 274 (identifying as the relevant factors
"the nature and extent of the problem, the units of government which have the most vital interest in
its solution, and the role traditionally played by local and statewide authorities in dealing with it");
Johnson, 841 P.2d at 996, 1001 (identifying as central to the home rule analysis a focus on "extra-
municipal concerns" and an interest in statewide uniformity).
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ests against the importance of the local interests in order to make the ad
hoc decision as to which law should prevail.",
73
Although at least some of the factors just described are mentioned
in nearly every home rule case, a close examination of constitutional
home rule cases over the years discloses that some of these factors play a
more significant role than others. Especially important in home rule
analysis are the questions of how much weight to give the state's interest
in uniformity and how to view local regulations which arguably have
extraterritorial effects. Not surprisingly, the need for statewide uniformi-
ty and concerns about extraterritorial effects of local decisions loom
large as factors in home rule analyses. 
74
At a basic level, the inquiries into uniformity and extraterritoriality
raise the common question of comparative institutional competence, to
wit: Would states or localities be better decisionmakers with regard to a
particular issue? For example, in Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four
Venture, L.L. C.,75 the Colorado Supreme Court decided that the citizens
of Colorado have an interest in consistent, uniform landlord-tenant regu-
lation.76 "Uniformity in landlord-tenant relations," said the court, "fos-
ters informed and realistic expectations by the parties to a lease, which in
turn increases the quality and reliability of rental housing, promotes fair
treatment of tenants, and could reduce litigation., 77  Embedded in this
judgment is a belief that states would in fact maintain a consistent struc-
ture of landlord-tenant law. To the extent that the law would have gener-
al application statewide, this seems a realistic assumption.
Less clear, however, is the state's willingness and ability to craft a
law that assures "informed and realistic expectations" for the parties.
Forbidding localities from adopting residential rent control, for example,
does not assure uniformity in rents across localities; indeed it may well
facilitate the opposite. And there is little reason to believe that there is
consistency across a given state's localities in the supply of, and demand
for, different types of real estate. Uniformity in this context simply
73. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 37; see also id. at 39 ("On the whole, we cannot con-
clude that this matter is so discretely local that all state interests are superseded" and acknowledging
"the legitimacy of both the state interests and [the municipality's] interests"); City & County of
Denver, 788 P.2d at 768 ("We have considered the relative interests of the state and the home rule
municipality in regulating the matter at issue in a particular case"); id. at 770 (comparing "the as-
serted state interests" with "the asserted local interests"); Kalodimos, 470 N.E.2d at 274 ("Whether a
particular problem is of statewide rather than local dimension must be decided not on the basis of a
specific formula... but with regard for [various factors]."); Johnson, 841 P.2d at 997 ("the hinge of
the [home rule] decision is the identification of a convincing basis for legislative action originating
in extramural concerns..." and "the sweep of the state's protective measures may be no broader
than its interest").
74. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Colo. Lodge #27 v. City & County of Denver, 926
P.2d 582, 588-90 (Colo. 1996); City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 768-69 (Colo.
1990).
75. 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
76. Id. at 38.
77. Id.
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means that municipalities cannot pursue their own localized judgments
about whether and to what extent rents ought to be capped-judgments
that presumably can be readily known by both residential landlords and
their prospective tenants and thus in no way preclude "informed and rea-
listic expectations by the parties to a lease."
Thus, the court's true concern in Lot Thirty-Four Venture appears to
be a simple distrust that localities will craft and carry out their own real
estate policies with sufficient concern for safeguarding the policies that
the state deems essential for all lease parties within the state. This is, at
base, a judgment about substantive policy preferences and the compara-
tive competence of different levels of government rather than a funda-
mental interest in statewide uniformity.
A similar consideration is at work in home rule decisions in which
local policies arguably raise concerns about extraterritorial effects. In
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. City & County of Denver,
for example, the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated under its constitu-
tional home rule doctrine a local law that provided for the construction of
a viaduct on the ground that this law would generate a potential ripple
effect outside the municipality.79 The local law did not, by its own
terms, have an extraterritorial reach. But the court viewed it as creating
externalities, as effecting an extraterritorial impact, and therefore impli-
cating a matter of statewide concern. Interestingly, the Colorado court in
the 2008 Telluride decision considered a challenge to a local ordinance
that, by design, had an extraterritorial impact.80 Yet the court approved
this assertion of extraterritorial local power in the face of a conflicting
state statute.81
Extraterritorial impact has considerable traction and appeal as a
home rule criterion; it is difficult to see municipal legislation as dealing
with purely local concerns when it explicitly or predictably affects indi-
viduals outside the municipality.82 However, the juxtaposition of clearly
and intentionally extraterritorial legislation (as in Telluride v. San Mi-
guel)83 and facially local legislation that ultimately also impacts individ-
uals outside the jurisdiction suggests that the criterion is not, and cannot
be, applied mechanically. Rather, the principal consideration at work
here, as in the case of concerns about a need for statewide uniformity, is
78. This is reinforced by Chief Justice Mullarkey's dissenting opinion in which she insists
that the Telluride ordinance "is fundamentally a land use regulation," and therefore is properly local.
Id. at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Mullarkey argues that the majority goes wrong
by narrowing the scope of what is a land use decision. "Land use policy," she says, "is not limited to
the mere definition of permissible uses; rather, land use policy encompasses conditions implemented
within the rubric of zoning and planning decisions." I
79. 673 P.2d 354, 362 (Colo. 1983).
80. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161,163-64 (Colo. 2008).
81. Id. at171.
82. See Briffault, Extraterritoriality and Local Autonomy, supra note 4, at 1324-25.
83. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d at 163-64.
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how best to view the relative competence of localities and the state. Un-
der what circumstances, if at all, can localities reasonably be expected to
enact legislation whose effects are restricted to the locality's boundaries?
Can and will states do a better job than individual localities at balancing
the local and external effects of particular policy preferences?
The central insight of most academic treatments of externalities,
collective action problems, and races to the bottom that view them
through a political economy lens is that some central mechanism is ne-
cessary to regulate intergovernmental competition.84 Yet home rule doc-
trine pushes back against this insight. Protecting a sphere of local sove-
reignty requires the courts to roll up their sleeves and analyze state/local
conflicts with a richer vocabulary and greater nuance than political econ-
omy would provide. The criteria of statewide uniformity and extraterri-
torial effects invite consideration of the comparative institutional compe-
tence of state and local governments: What are the best institutions to
implement intrastate public policy? The answer, of course, is "some-
times the state, sometimes local governments." The courts' ad hoc home
rule inquiries, guided by principles and illuminated by precedent, may in
fact be the best and most reliable route to the right answer when disputes
arise.
One cannot overlook the fact, however, that assessing the compara-
tive institutional competence of state and local governments requires
some baseline. For example, what do we mean by "competence"? The
prevailing conception of local governments and their functions has
shifted considerably over time; what might have been seen as a compe-
tent regime of local governance in, say, the early twentieth century may
not seem so today. To a significant degree, local governments were his-
torically viewed as mechanisms for implementing state goals. State leg-
islatures had plenary powers including the police power; municipalities
were viewed as little more than the instruments for ensuring that the
states' policy choices were realized. The home rule movement of the
early twentieth century (and also as it evolved later) reconfigured this
idea; local governments were, to be sure, implementation mechanisms,
but they were also increasingly viewed as institutions that possessed a
police power in their own right. Indeed, home rule made concrete, and
legally salient, the notion that many basic police power functions-
including the protection of health, safety, and general welfare-were
well within the competence of, and even perhaps best effectuated by,
municipal governments.8 5 Courts reliably sustained local authority to
regulate private conduct in order to protect social aims and to ensure the
84. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENY. U. L. REV. 1241, 1249-50
(2009).
85. The "good government" movement of the Progressive era, described ably in Barron, supra
note 5, at 2291, was the administrative-political analogue of the home rule doctrine of this early
period.
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welfare of their citizens. And, strikingly, the courts did so notwithstand-
ing influential doctrines such as Dillon's Rule that would have otherwise
narrowed greatly the scope of local power.86
This changing conception of local governments will necessarily im-
pact what one means by competent local governance. Likewise, the
changing dynamic of state/local relations will affect what one means or
does not mean by competent state governance. Any comparison of these
competencies requires agreement on a baseline; we need to frame the
issue of state and local competence around ideas and ideals of state and
local governance in operation. While state courts typically, and properly,
elide identifying a theoretical baseline and implementing a judgment
about comparative institutional competence, the most analytically sophis-
ticated home rule cases do bear down on the question of how effectively
state and local institutions each fulfill the regulatory objective(s) at issue.
B. Home Rule and Regulatory Categories
Notwithstanding the self-professed "ad hoc" nature of the courts'
home rule decisions, the factors on which their inquiries are based can be
expected to yield patterns and consistencies in the eventual decisions. In
addition, both the nature of the factors and of the most frequent areas of
regulatory conflict between localities and the states suggest that one
might expect to find that cases within a given substantive "category" are
treated similarly, while the various categories are treated somewhat diffe-
rently. To be clear, we make no claim that the courts are deciding home
rule cases exclusively, or even especially, with reference to the regulato-
ry categories at issue. As mentioned above, the essential structure of
analysis is organized around multi-faceted inquiries into state and local
competence and, to some degree, historical exegesis. Yet, when one
looks at a large body of home rule cases covering the terrain of regulato-
ry policymaking, one sees that the regulatory categories matter, and in
ways that previous analyses of constitutional home rule insufficiently
credit. Therefore, in this section, we preliminarily explore the possibility
that the regulatory categories explain some of the pattern of home rule
decisions. We make no attempt to offer a comprehensive picture; rather,
we look closely at a few cases in some key substantive areas.
86. Dillon's Rule is a canon of statutory construction that calls for the narrow interpretation of
local government authority. See BAKER & Gal=ErrE, supra note 14, at 244 (setting out Dillon's
Rule); See also, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 314-17 (describing inception of
Dillon's Rule); David J. Barron, supra note 17, at 506-09 (explaining Dillon's Rule and its applica-
tion); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 83, 88-90 (1986) (discussing Cooley's
theory of inherent local sovereignty).
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1. Health, safety, and welfare cases
In many cases, courts are called upon to resolve disputes between
state and local governments in which localities assert authority to regu-
late pursuant to their police power, the scope of which is ordinarily
spelled out in their municipal charter. These cases have involved a range
of issues, such as health codes, quarantines, curfews, and the batch of
issues that arose with the growing urbanization of the U.S. These cases
have seldom implicated the "immunity" function of home rule; after all,
states have been generally receptive to localities' efforts to promote
health, safety, and welfare. In the few cases in which localities have
gone many steps further than what the state deemed acceptable, the
courts have worked hard to reconcile state and local authority. Where no
reconciliation was possible, the courts have frequently upheld municipal
police power regulations in the face of state efforts at control 7 In this
way, courts across a range of constitutional home rule states have made
clear that regulating the "health, safety, and welfare" of a locality is
squarely within the scope of local affairs.
Given the well-established plenary powers of state legislatures and
the correlative police powers vested in the state (as opposed to the na-
tional) government, it is by no means obvious that localities possess any-
thing like these police powers. Yet, the state courts have long affirmed
the police powers of home rule local governments to promote health,
safety, and welfare, sometimes on the grounds set out by Justice Lehman
in the early home rule case of Adler v. Deegan:
88
It cannot be gainsaid that in this section of the Constitution cities re-
ceive not from the Legislature but from the sovereign people of the
State, authority to exercise some part of the police power of the State
and the exercise of that authority is made the function not of a desig-
nated local legislative body or city officer but of the city itself. Its
exercise does not rest upon delegation of power by the Legislature.
Within its limited scope it is derived from the same fundamental law,
from which the Legislature derives its own general power. The state
... has not surrendered its police power but it has to some extent di-
vided it between the Legislature and the cities and clearly the exer-
cise of the function bestowed on cities is a matter of city govern-
ment.
89
To be sure, Justice Lehman's observation does little to resolve situa-
tions of state and local conflict. To say that local governments have
some measure of police power and can thereby undertake to protect
87. See, e.g., Porter v. City of Santa Barbara, 35 P.2d 207, 207-08 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934);
Er parte Hitchcock, 166 P. 849, 849-51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917); see also William Carey Jones,
"Municipal Affairs" in the California Constitution, 1 CAL. L. REv. 132, 144 (1913); Sato, supra
note 6, at 1094-98.
88. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929).
89. Id. at 715 (Lehman, J., dissenting).
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health, safety, and welfare in their communities is a far cry from viewing
the resulting regulations as addressing solely matters of local concern.
Some state courts, however, have built upon this acknowledgement of
local police power authority a case for some local prerogative in certain
instances.
Consider, for example, the 1984 case of Kalodimos v. Village of
Morton Grove, in which the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether a
local handgun regulation was properly within the scope of local affairs.90
The court was strongly inclined to protect the local regulations from any
claimed state interest in displacing local prerogative in the area of gun
control. The court's analysis took as its starting point the notion just
described, that matters of health and safety are properly viewed as local.
However, the Illinois court stopped short of proclaiming that local gun
control can be completely shielded from state intervention. The justices
ended their opinion with the qualification that local handgun laws are
within the scope of municipal home rule "provided that the legislature
has taken no affirmative steps to circumscribe the measures that may be
taken . ,,91
2. Land use/zoning
Zoning power, post-Village of Euclid,92 was quickly and aggressive-
ly asserted by local governments to be a matter within their prerogative.
To a great extent, states sat back and let municipalities make these deci-
sions about how best to regulate local (and especially urban) space. Lo-
cal authority to regulate land uses was, predictably, challenged by indi-
viduals and businesses adversely affected by these regulations. Home
rule localities typically responded that zoning was a quintessentially lo-
cal affair. To a great extent, courts agreed. Since the 1970s, however,
the issue has become more complicated due to two (at least) major de-
velopments: (1) the rise of environmental protection efforts at the state
level which implicated local initiatives. The problem here, usually, was
with the absence of zoning laws at the local level; and, relatedly, (2) the
anti-sprawl movement. 94
Although the issue has become messier in recent decades, the courts
still generally side with local governments in zoning disputes, in part no
doubt because the core idea of local control over land use has become a
deeply embedded norm. Classic zoning cases illustrate well the reluc-
90. Kalodimos v. Viii. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 269 (111. 1984).
91. Id. at 276.
92. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
93. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the
Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 1193, 1266-68 (2008); Richard
Briffault, Our Localism Part ll-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLuM. L. REV. 346, 366 (1990);
Charles M. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154, 1154-56
(1955).
94. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 5, at 2259-63.
20091 1357
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tance of state courts to displace local decisionmaking in land use con-
texts.95 Local zoning power is generally upheld against state interven-
96tion.
Colorado cases over the course of the last 100 years reveal the
courts' grappling with the problem of how to reconcile a broad local
power in regulating land use with a variety of legitimate statewide inter-
ests including the state's interest in uniformity across localities. This
issue was at the heart of two recent Colorado Supreme Court cases in-
volving the town of Telluride. First, in Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-
Four Venture, L.L.C.,97 the court in 2000 considered whether a local or-
dinance seeking to ensure the availability of affordable housing could be
shielded from a general legislative prohibition against rent control.98 The
state legislature made its intentions clear in the statute: "The general
assembly finds and declares that the imposition of rent control on private
residential housing units is a matter of statewide concern. '99 Although it
recognized that land use policy is "an area traditionally regulated by lo-
cal government[,]" 1 the court concluded that rent control has both local
and statewide implications. °1 As such, the state legislature was within
its prerogative, consistent with Colorado's constitutional home rule pro-
vision, to displace Telluride's ordinance with its conflicting state law.
For Chief Justice Mullarkey in dissent, the principal flaw in the Lot
Thirty-Four Venture majority's reasoning was its re-characterization of
the local law as being not strictly a land use regulation because "the or-
dinance does not dictate permissible uses of real property."10 2 Tacit in
Chief Justice Mullarkey's dissent is the view that if the local ordinance
were properly viewed as a land use regulation, then the state's interests
would be required to give way to the interests of the municipality.0 3
Although Chief Justice Mullarkey's position did not prevail in the
2000 Telluride case, the basic structure of her argument won the day in
the more recent Telluride case of San Miguel Valley Corp. 104 Here, as
was discussed above, the issue was the municipality's exercise of emi-
nent domain authority for open space/park purposes.10 5 There could be
little dispute that the regulation at issue was a "land use policy." Given
95. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
96. See Barron, supra note 5, at 2378-79; Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 39-58.
97. 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
98. Id. at 32.
99. CoL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-301 (West 2000).
100. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 39 n.9.
101. Id. at 39.
102. Id. at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
103. See id.
104. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
105. Id. at 163.
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the Colorado court's earlier decision in Lot Thirty-Four Venture, one
might have anticipated, nonetheless, that the court would proceed to con-
sider whether this local land use policy conflicted with matters of state-
wide concern and therefore whether this was a case of mixed local and
statewide interests. Not so. The court, incredibly, held the local gov-
ernment's land use policies to be shielded from state control whether or
not statewide interests were implicated. 1°6 Justice Rice declared:
[N]o analysis of competing state and local interests is necessary
where a statute purports to take away home rule powers granted by
the constitution....
[Therefore] we decline here to evaluate the statewide interests impli-
cated by the extraterritorial condemnation of property by home rule
municipalities for open space and parks. The legislature cannot pro-
hibit the exercise of constitutional home rule powers, regardless of
the state interests which may be implicated by the exercise of those
107powers.
As these two cases illustrate, the force of the "land use is local"
principle is a strong one.108 At the same time, the structure of the Colo-
rado Supreme Court's reasoning pivots on what exactly is meant by a
"land use policy." In a general sense, most local regulations dealing in
some way with real property can be characterized as land use regula-
tions; by this logic (conspicuous in Chief Justice Mullarkey's dissent in
the 2000 case'019 and in the majority's opinion in the 2008 Telluride
case'10), the states are quite limited in their ability to displace local regu-
lations dealing with land. In a more specific sense, however, courts fre-
quently look at what issues are implicated at the statewide level by a
particular local regulation of land. The issues of extraterritorial effects
and of the state interests in uniformity are central to this inquiry. Indeed,
as was noted in Part m.A above, these two interests are two of the four
criteria against which the Colorado Supreme Court evaluates constitu-
tional home rule "immunity" claims. It is by no means clear, after the
2008 Telluride decision, whether the Colorado courts have decisively
cordoned off from state interference local laws dealing with land. In-
deed, given the wide swath of issues implicated by local land use regula-
tion, one might expect that controversies will continue to arise in this
area under Colorado law.
106. Id. at 170.
107. Id. at 169-70.
108. See, e.g., id. at 167 (emphasis added): "Ulpon review of pertinent Colorado law, and
considering our state tradition of conducting land planning at the local level, we conclude that
condemnation for open space and parks is in fact a lawful, public, local, and municipal purpose
within the scope of article XX."
109. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, 3 P.3d at 45 (Mullarkey, C.J., dissenting).
110. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d at 171.
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Despite this longstanding preference for local prerogative in the
area of zoning, there are some signs that the balance may ultimately shift
in the direction of the state, in Colorado and elsewhere. Most notable in
this regard are the expansion of state interests in environmental protec-
tion in recent decades, and the post-Kelo" 1 property rights movement,
which, at the state level, undertakes to limit significantly the discretion of
local governments to engage in redevelopment takings." 2 Both of these
movements have the potential to reshape considerably the legal relation-
ship between state and local governments in the area of land use regula-
tion without necessarily requiring any change in the courts' core view of
land use regulation as a local affair. Time will tell whether and to what
extent the courts ultimately reconstitute the relationship between state
and local governments in the area of land use.
3. Employer/employee relations
Courts typically assert that employer/employee relations implicate
matters of statewide concern, and require localities to defer to state legis-
lative judgments in this area. 1 3 This tendency is a bit surprising in light
of the fact that the extraterritorial impact of, and the state interest in un-
iformity in, local employer/employee relations are not apparent.' 4  The
state government's interest in this area is really an anti-interest, that is, an
interest in resisting local experimentation. Local decisionmakers, to be
sure, maintain a strong prerogative to set terms and hours of work and of
wages in the first instance; yet, where state law intervenes, courts almost
111. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (5-4 decision holding that city's exer-
cise of eminent domain power to further an economic development plan satisfies the "public use"
requirement of the Fifth Amendment).
112. See Marci A. Hamilton, Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 32 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 113, 120-21 (2009) (discussing response to Kelo, including fact that 13 states in-
cluded takings initiatives on their ballots in 2006); Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEo.
L.J. 1987, 1988-89 (2008) (observing that Kelo "resulted in legal backlash in many states in the form
of new legislation increasing restrictions on the use of eminent domain for private economic devel-
opment and in judicial rulings interpreting state legal limits on the use of eminent domain more
stringently than Kelo's reading of the federal Constitution").
113. See, e.g., Healy v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 258 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1953); Wilson v. Walters,
119 P.2d 340, 344 (Cal. 1941); City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 10 P.2d 745, 748, 750 (Cal. 1932);
Shewbridge v. Police Comm'n of S.F., 149 P.2d 429, 431 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944); People ex rel.
Drake v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 493, 495-96 (1865); Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New
York, 405 N.E.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. 1980); City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd.,
530 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Ohio 1988). But see Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of
Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1979) ("[B]oth the language of the Constitution and prior authority
support the proposition ... that the determination of the wages paid to employees of charter cities as
well as charter counties is a matter of local rather than state-wide concern."); Prof'l Fire Fighters,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 384 P.2d 158, 166-69 (Cal. 1963); Popper v. Broderick, 56 P. 53, 55
(Cal. 1899) ("We are of opinion that the pay of firemen and policemen clearly falls within the term
'municipal affairs."'). See generally MCBAIN, supra note 7, at 255 n.4; Briffault, Our Localism,
supra note 4, at 16 n.53.
114. See New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1163-64 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2005).
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always rule that local interests give way to state interests in a general
labor law.' 
1 5
A recent case in California presents an interesting and relatively
rare counter-example. In County of Riverside v. Superior Court,"6 the
California Supreme Court sought to balance the state's interest in uni-
form employment laws with the prerogative of home rule counties to set
salaries for county employees. At issue was whether a state statute
which required stalled labor negotiations to be submitted by a locality to
binding arbitration violated the county's prerogative to set Sheriffs' sala-
ries."l 7 The court answered "yes" and, in upholding local home rule au-
thority in this area, reaffirmed that categorizing and balancing statewide
concerns and local affairs in the area of labor and employment law is the
province of the courts" 18 Notwithstanding County of Riverside, the cate-
gorical preference for statewide labor relations law seems as robust and
well embedded in the strong home rule state of California as elsewhere
nationally. 119
Finally, at least one court has taken care to sort out employment
matters from matters which, while nominally about employment, im-
pinge significantly on the core political structure and organization of
municipalities. 20 In a 1978 case involving certain Oregon cities' chal-
lenge to a state law requiring police and firemen employed by any city to
be members of the state's Public Employees Retirement System, the
Oregon Supreme Court in City of La Grande v. Public Employees Re-
tirement Board upheld the state law.' 2' The court distinguished between
permissible state laws "addressed primarily to substantive social, eco-
nomic, or other regulatory objectives of the state," and more troublesome
state laws addressing "the structure and procedures of local agencies.''
22
The court concluded that:
While the statewide retirement and insurance plans do displace other
plans that local agencies have made, or might make, for these objec-
tives, they are not irreconcilable with the freedom to charter their
own governmental structures that are reserved to the citizens of Asto-
ria and LaGrande by [the state constitution's home rule provision]. 1
23
115. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 390-91 (noting that although some
state courts "have been particularly protective of local control over the local employment relation-
ship," that "in most states, state law continues to play a major role in regulating the terms of munici-
pal employment").
116. 66 P.3d 718 (Cal. 2003).
117. Id. at 721.
118. Id. at 721, 728.
119. See the cases cited in Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 4, at 17 n.54.
120. City of La Grande v. Pub. Employees Ret. Rd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1215 (Or. 1978).
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4. Civil rights laws
The issues with respect to local efforts to protect civil rights in the
face of state laws that seek hegemony over such decisions are difficult
ones that, by and large, have not been settled in the state courts under
constitutional home rule. True, local anti-discrimination ordinances have
frequently been held to be consistent with municipal home rule.' 24 But
the more difficult question of constitutional construction is whether these
laws are immune from displacement by the state. In many of the modem
home rule cases, the state courts manage to reconcile state and local law,
and thereby uphold local civil rights laws, without needing to consider
the question of whether the matter is one of purely local concern.
The most conspicuous and contentious context in which these issues
have arisen is in the context of gay rights. Several state courts have
upheld domestic partner ordinances under home rule, despite the shadow
cast by the state's traditional regulation of marriage and divorce.1 25 More
direct interference by localities with traditional marriage, however, has
not been well received by the courts. In Lockyer v. City & County of San
Francisco,126 for example, the California Supreme Court struck down the
effort of San Francisco's mayor, Gavin Newsom, to issue marriage li-
censes to same-sex couples despite a clearly conflicting state law that
authorized the granting of marriage licenses only to couples comprised of
one man and one woman. 127 The court considered and rejected the pos-
sibility that the issuance of marriage licenses by local officials was a
local affair that fell within the scope of California's broad home rule
provision.
[T]he Legislature has enacted a comprehensive scheme regulating
marriage in California, establishing the substantive standards for eli-
gibility for marriage and setting forth in detail the procedures to be
followed and the public officials who are entrusted with carrying out
these procedures. In light of both the historical understanding reflect-
ed in this statutory scheme and the statutes' repeated emphasis on the
importance of having uniform rules and procedures apply throughout
the state to the subject of marriage, there can be no question but that
marriage is a matter of "statewide concern" rather than a "municipal
124. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 14, at 353 (observing that "[s]ome state courts
have upheld local antidiscrimination ordinances that are more expansive than state antidiscrimina-
tion laws" and surveying cases); id. at 354-56 (observing that "[m]ost courts that have considered
[domestic partnership and other measures protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination] have
found that a state's constitutional or statutory grant of home rule power provides local governments
with the authority to adopt them" and surveying cases).
125. See id. at 348-57 (surveying cases); see also Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitution-
al Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 167-77 (2005).
126. 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004).
127. l at472.
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affair" ... and that state statutes dealing with marriage prevail over
any conflicting local charter provision, ordinance, or practice.
12s
Viewed broadly, conflicts over local civil rights protection and state
regulation are resolved by state courts on a theory of home rule that ap-
pears to privilege local creativity and initiative but, importantly, regards
states as the principal in delineating and shaping civil rights protections.
Ordinarily, states will not endeavor to displace local initiatives by declar-
ing that certain groups are not protected-although there are noteworthy
contrary examples, including the Colorado constitutional initiative struck
down in Romer v. Evans129 in 1996, and California's Proposition 187130
concerning illegal immigration. Rather, states will appeal to a general
law that, they argue, is in conflict with specific local laws. Where the
conflict is unavoidable, states typically win; where the conflict can be
ameliorated with certain judicial constructions, the courts usually find
that local law can rest alongside state law. As local governments contin-
ue to experiment with civil rights protections, we can expect more diffi-
cult home rule cases to come to center stage.
5. Taxing authority
Many conflicts between state and local governments arise in the
area of revenue generation through taxation, and much of the early home
rule caselaw, therefore, concerns such conflicts. 131 Broadly speaking, the
tendency of the courts in this area has been to defer to local judgments.
The basic theory is that two bites at the economic apple are generally
fine. So long as local governments do not make life more difficult for
those who impose and collect state taxes, the courts are inclined to ac-
cord deference to local efforts to generate a revenue base.
A key taxation case is California Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.
City of Los Angeles132 in which the City of Los Angeles imposed a busi-
ness license tax on all corporations, including commercial banks, doing
business in the jurisdiction. 133 This municipal tax arguably conflicted
with the state's scheme of taxation for financial institutions. In striking
down the local tax, the court deemed the taxation of financial institutions
to be a matter of statewide concern and, therefore, pro tanto, not a mu-
nicipal affair. 34 The principal basis for this holding was that the Cali-
fornia legislature had revealed an interest in imposing a similar, state-
128. See id. at 471.
129. 517 U.S. 620,625 (1996).
130. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997).
131. See, e.g., Weekes v. City of Oakland, 579 P.2d 449, 573 (Cal. 1978); Ex Parte Braun, 74
P. 780, 780-81, 783-84 (Cal. 1903); Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. Rptr.
166, 167-70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 329 P.2d 441,442-43 (Colo.
1958); Angell v. City of Toledo, 91 N.E.2d 250, 251-52 (Ohio 1950).
132. 812 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1991).
133. Id. at 917-18.
134. See id. at 925.
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wide tax, and that Los Angeles's efforts to independently tap this reve-
nue source would undermine the state's program. 135
One troubling aspect of the court's decision is that it presupposes
that claiming goodies for itself and, correspondingly, leaving municipali-
ties out in the cold, is a worthy state interest.1 36 By this logic, state laws
which undermine local fiscal authority more broadly and decisively
would pass muster more easily under the home rule analysis than less
invasive laws. Given the state's obvious incentive in expanding its own
fiscal powers and in disabling competing intrastate institutions, the Cali-
fornia Federal Savings & Loan analysis skews the result squarely in fa-
vor of the state and against the locality.
IV. ASSESSING THE COURTS' HOME RULE DECISIONMAKING
We have seen in Part m the various ways that the state courts have
drawn lines between the state and local spheres of authority. In this Part
we consider whether and to what extent that project has been a success.
Such an assessment, we believe, has implications not only for state con-
stitutionalism and home rule, but also for the appropriate role of the
courts in demarcating and enforcing federal constitutional boundaries of
state regulatory immunity.
The long and rich history of state courts crafting doctrines and
working through, case by case, the adjudicatory problems posed by home
rule provisions in the state constitution stands in stark contrast to the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority1 37 that the courts could not usefully, and should not, play a role
in disputes under the Tenth Amendment 138 concerning the boundaries of
state immunity from federal regulation. The fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court has declared impossible 39 a task that lesser state courts regularly
undertake underscores the importance and value of critically evaluating
the state courts' work. If the state courts are in fact doing a good job, it
would suggest that the task is far from impossible and, indeed, that the
U.S. Supreme Court might do well to follow the state courts' lead. If,
135. See id. at 926-27,
136. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Supremacy, Local Sovereignty: Reconstructing State/Local
Relations under the California Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA 401,408-
09 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995).
137. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
138. U.S. Const. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.").
139. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (observing that eight years of experience "persuades us
that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional govern-
mental function' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of fede-
ralism .... ); id. at 546-47 (rejecting "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of
state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular
governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional"'); Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
880 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that the "essential-function test" is "conceptually
unworkable").
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instead, a close examination causes one to question the quality or feasi-
bility of the state courts' work, then those courts might do well to adopt
the Garcia Court's approach and abandon this particular line-drawing
project.
In order to evaluate the state courts' home rule doctrines and deci-
sions, one must first agree upon a metric or baseline against which to
measure them. This fact is surprisingly often overlooked by commenta-
tors and appellate courts when they engage in such critiques. 4  In addi-
tion, it is important to note that there are two possible focuses of any
evaluation of the work of the courts: the judicially crafted doctrine or
test, and the court's application of that doctrine or test to the facts of in-
dividual cases.
By what standard should one evaluate the state courts' tests for dis-
tinguishing between "local affairs" and "matters of state-wide con-
cern"?141  Should one ask, for example, whether such a test, in the ab-
stract, is coherent? Draws distinctions that are logical? Treats like cases
alike? 142 Is likely to yield predictable results? Or appears to be an effi-
cient means toward a proclaimed policy goal? Similarly, one might ask
by what standard one should judge a state court's application of its home
rule doctrine to the facts of individual cases: Are like cases treated
alike? Are the results predictable? Are plausible justifications given for
the distinctions that are drawn?
We do not propose to resolve these important questions involving
the baselines that should be used in evaluating either aspect of the courts'
work. We raise them largely to underscore the fact that one cannot prop-
erly assess the quality or success of a legal doctrine or judicial decision
140. See, e.g., KRANE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 12 (terming the effort of the courts to sort out
state and local interests "a quixotic quest," but applying no articulated standard when evaluating the
cases). Similarly, George Vaubel has simply concluded, without elaboration, that the cases are
"unpredictable" and "arbitrary":
Many observers lament the need for judicial decision as the greatest weakness of home
rule. Forced to work with vague constitutional language supported only by an imprecise
concept of "local matters," courts rest their decisions upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. The results are unpredictable, if not, at times, arbitrary. Courts, involved in
this impossible, or at least daunting task, equivocate.
George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise of Municipal Power in
Home Rule, 20 STETSON L. REv. 5, 39 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
Perhaps the best known example of a court contending that a doctrine is "unworkable" or
inadequate, without articulating a useful baseline against which to measure the cases is the U.S.
Supreme Court in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530 (contending that Nat'l League of Cities doctrine is unac-
ceptable because although the Court "supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental func-
tions,' it did not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished
from a 'nontraditional' one"); id. at 539 (contending that "this Court has made little headway in
defining the scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under Nat'l League of Cities").
141. See supra Parts III (Introduction) and mlI.A.
142. For a defense of the intriguing proposition that like cases need not be treated alike and that
"[t]he principle 'treat like cases alike' has no independent moral force," see David A. Strauss, Must
Like Cases Be Treated Alike? 2 (Chicago Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 24, May
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=312180.
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in a vacuum or against an unspecified ideal. In the absence of an appro-
priate, agreed-upon metric, we will nonetheless in the remainder of this
Part attempt to evaluate the work of the state courts by closely examining
several criticisms that logically might be levied against the imperio home
rule doctrines that the courts have devised. These criticisms, not surpri-
singly, echo those discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the context of
its efforts, pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, to protect traditional state
functions, 43 "the functions essential to separate and independent exis-
tence" of the states,"' 44 from federal regulation.
First, one might contend that the doctrines that the courts have
crafted pursuant to the imperio home rule provisions of their states' con-
stitutions are unworkable. The claim is that one cannot distinguish be-
tween matters of "local" or "municipal" concern versus matters of
"statewide" concern with sufficient consistency nor define these terms
with sufficient coherence. 145 This claim must be further parsed, howev-
er. The project of distinguishing between local/municipal and statewide
matters of concern is mandated by the text of many state constitutions'
home rule provisions.146 The Colorado Constitution, for example, autho-
rizes any home rule city to make the laws governing "all its local and
municipal matters," and further stipulates that such local laws "shall su-
persede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or
town any law of the state in conflict therewith."'147 Thus, any perceived
problems with the coherence or "workability" of the larger project, in-
cluding the defining or identifying of such "local and municipal matters,"
are the fault of the drafters and ratifiers of the constitution's home rule
provision rather than of the courts.
If the claim, rather, is that the doctrines that the courts have crafted
to explicate the distinction between local and statewide concerns and to
guide the ensuing line-drawing are not capable of coherent or consistent
143. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851 (referring to services "which the States
have traditionally afforded their citizens"); id. at 849 ("traditional aspects of state sovereignty"); id.
at 852 (invoking "States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmen-
tal functions"); id. at 854 ("'activities in which the states have traditionally engaged"') (quoting
Unites States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936)).
144. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1868) quoted in Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S.
at 845; see also Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 581 (1911); Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
851; id. at 855 (referring to the states "choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of
integral governmental functions are to be made").
145. Cf Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530 (contending that Nat'l League of Cities doctrine is unaccepta-
ble because although the Court "supplied some examples of 'traditional governmental functions,' it
did not offer a general explanation of how a 'traditional' function is to be distinguished from a
'nontraditional' one"); id. at 539 (contending that "this Court has made little headway in defining the
scope of the governmental functions deemed protected under Nat'l League of Cities"); id. at 545 ("A
nonhistorical standard for selecting immune governmental functions is likely to be just as unworka-
ble as is a historical standard."); id. at 546-47 (rejecting "as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether
a particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional').
146. See state constitutional provisions cited supra note 12.
147. COLO. CONSr. art. XX, § 6.
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application, then several other questions arise: Against what baseline is
"coherence" or "consistency" in this context usefully measured? How is
a coherent or consistent application of any doctrine to be identified?
What is an example of a judicial doctrine that is capable of the requisite
level of coherence and consistency in its application? In this area, as in
all others in which courts engage in constitutional interpretation, there is
substantial, beneficial doctrinal path dependence that mitigates against
large, abrupt, unexpected changes as a doctrine evolves. Can one ask
more of a system of case-by-case adjudication than that it produce a
roughly consistent and sensible pattern of cases that carry out the larger
objectives of a defensible public policy?
In this regard, it should be noted that no less an authority than New
York's Chief Justice Cardozo affirmed some 80 years ago that drawing
these lines was surely possible, although he did not answer any of the
preceding questions in reaching that conclusion:
[T]he fundamental question to be determined is the line of division
between city and state concerns. In every case, "it is necessary to in-
quire whether a proposed subject of legislation is a matter of State
concern or of local concern." . . . There are some affairs intimately
connected with the exercise by the city of its corporate functions,
which are city affairs only. Illustrations of these I have given, the
laying out of parks, the building of recreations piers, the institution of
public concerts. Many more could be enumerated. Most important
of all, perhaps is the control of the locality over payments from the
local purse .... There are other affairs exclusively those of the state,
such as the law of domestic relations, of wills, of inheritance, of con-
tracts, of crimes not essentially local (for example, larceny or for-
gery), the organization of courts, the procedure therein. None of
these things can be said to touch the affairs that a city is organized to
regulate, whether we have reference to history or to tradition or to the
existing forms of charters.
... A zone, however, exists where state and city concerns overlap
and intermingle....
How great must be the infusion of local interest before fetters are im-
posed [on the power of the Legislature]? ...
Considerations of "more or less" will lead us in such a case, and in
many others, into a morass of indecision. The test is rather this:
That, if the subject be in a substantial degree a matter of state con-
cern, the Legislature may act, though intermingled with it are con-
cerns of the locality.... I assume that, if the affair is partly state and
partly local, the city is free to act until the state has intervened. 
148
148. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713-14 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, CJ., concurring) (citations
omitted).
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One need not simply defer, however, to Chief Justice Cardozo's
implicit assessment that the courts are quite capable of drawing appropri-
ate and principled lines between matters of state and local concern. The
claim that the courts' imperio home rule doctrines are not capable of
coherent or consistent application is problematic in several independent
respects. First, in the absence of an agreed baseline against which vari-
ous doctrines might be measured and compared, there is no reason to
think that judicial linedrawing in this area is any less coherent or consis-
tent than in other doctrinal areas. Second, one implication of concerns
about the coherence or consistency of these doctrines is that the courts
should play no role at all unless they can do so with some (unspecified)
level of jurisprudential purity. The further implication is that judicial
abstinence in this context is preferable to arguably imperfect judicial
review.
Is there support for such a claim? Perhaps judicial review in this
context is not in fact necessary or preferable. What if the state legislature
were simply left to make its own determinations of what matters are of
statewide versus local concern, without judicial oversight or interfe-
rence? In enacting laws, the legislature in an imperio home rule state
could be understood to have made a determination, implicitly or explicit-
ly, that the matter at issue is of statewide concern. If the role of the
courts under imperio home rule provisions is to correct any errors in
these determinations by the legislature, such judicial review would argu-
ably be unnecessary if either there were no legislative errors for the
courts to correct or if the likelihood of subsequent judicial errors were at
least as great as the likelihood of an initial legislative error. We take up
each of these possibilities in turn.
Can the state legislature reasonably be expected not to encroach into
areas of local concern? The argument, analogous to that set out by the
Garcia majority in the federalism context, 149 would be that to the extent
that localities and municipalities are represented in the state legislature,
the state lawmaking process will inevitably and naturally protect their
interests. In fact, however, representation in state legislatures does not
respect the geographic boundaries of municipalities, let alone provide
municipalities any analogue to the representation of states in the U.S.
Senate. Thus, for example, the city of Austin is represented by two
members of the Texas Senate, each of whom represents a portion of the
city, and each of whom also represents various neighboring cities." 0 The
149. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57; see also Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 876-77
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Texas Senate District 14 includes 84% of the city of Austin, as well as twenty-four other
municipalities in Travis County. Texas Senate District 25 includes the remaining 16% of Austin, as
well as six other municipalities in Travis County and all of the municipalities in each of three neigh-
boring counties (Guadalupe, Hays, and Kendall). See TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CrTY AND
CENsus DESIGNATED PLACES (CDPs) REPORT BY DISTRICT, SENATE DIsTRICT 14, SENATE
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city of Austin has six Representatives in the Texas House, each of whom
represents a different part of the city, and all but one of whom also
represents some or all of several neighboring municipalities. 151  This
structure of representation can offer no reassurance to those who contend
that municipalities could protect themselves adequately within a state's
political process, in the absence of any judicial review, if each municipal-
ity were represented within that process as a whole and separate munici-
pality. That is, if one's concern, as embodied in imperio home rule pro-
visions of state constitutions, is to ensure that home rule jurisdictions
have a realm of autonomy from state regulation, the existing allocation of
representation gives one no reason to think that the members of the state
legislature will be especially keen to abstain from regulating in areas of
"local concern."
It must be noted, however, that the absence of an analogue to the
U.S. Senate within state legislatures may nonetheless protect localities
from legislative encroachments on their autonomy in a different way.
Since at least 1964, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Reynolds v.
Sims' 52 that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that both houses of a
state legislature be apportioned on a population basis,' 53 representation
in each house of every state's legislature has been allocated among dis-
tricts of equal population. This means that small and large municipalities
receive equivalent representation, relative to their shares of the state's
population. And this further means that the gains from any legislation
that the state legislature passes are highly likely to be distributed across
municipalities in proportion to their relative shares of the state's popula-
tion.154
This state of affairs differs markedly from that surrounding the U.S.
Senate, which affords large and small states equal representation, without
regard to population. As one of us has demonstrated in previous work,
the disproportionately great representation that the Senate affords small
DISTRICT 25-PLAN 01188S, http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/Info.aspx?rpts=reports (searchable
database requiring input of search terms for specific district).
151. Texas House District 46 includes 18% of the city of Austin, part of one neighboring
municipality, and all of another. House District 47 includes 13% of the city of Austin and all of ten
neighboring municipalities. House District 48 includes 15% of the city of Austin, part of one neigh-
boring municipality, and all of five others. House District 49 includes 21% of the city of Austin.
House District 50 includes 13% of the city of Austin, part of five neighboring municipalities, and all
of two others. House District 51 includes 19% of the city of Austin, part of one neighboring munici-
pality, and all of two others. See TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COuNCIL, CrrY AND CENSUS DESIGNATED
PLACES (CDPs) REPORT BY DISTRICT, HOUSE DISTRICT 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51-PLAN 01368H,
http://www.fyi.legis.state.tx.us/Info.aspx?rpts=reports (searchable database requiring input of search
terms for specific district).
152. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
153. Id. at 583.
154. See Lynn A. Baker & Samuel H. Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time Has
Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21, 37 (1997); see also Baker, Spending Power, supra note 49, at 203-04;
Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending Power, 103
NW. U.L. REv. 495, 525 (2009) [hereinafter Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities].
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population states, relative to their shares of the nation's population, re-
sults in small population states wielding disproportionately great power
in Congress as a whole. 55 This in turn can be shown, both theoretically
and empirically, to result in small states receiving a disproportionately
large slice, and large states a disproportionately small slice, of the federal
"pie.' ' 56 This systematic redistribution of wealth from the larger states to
the smaller ones cannot be explained by systematically greater poverty in
the smaller states, nor can it be justified by any moral or economic
theory.157 In sum, the equal representation afforded states by the Senate
systematically encroaches on the autonomy of the larger population
states, to the benefit of the smaller states.
The thoroughly proportional structure of representation in state leg-
islatures, combined with the absence of municipality-based representa-
tion, means that a subset of cities within a state are unlikely to be able
systematically to harness the state lawmaking power to infringe on the
autonomy of other cities.158 At the same time, however, the absence of
municipality-based representation may give the state legislature no par-
ticular reason to respect, and to refrain from legislating in, areas of "local
concern." In sum, the structure of representation within the state legisla-
ture, taken alone, does not provide a persuasive argument that the state
legislature can reasonably be expected not to encroach into areas of local
concern.
If state legislatures cannot be presumed consistently to "get right"
the divide between matters of local versus statewide concern, the ques-
tion then becomes whether the addition of judicial review will reduce or
increase the rate of errors in this area. In essence, the question is one of
comparative institutional competence between state courts and state leg-
islatures in the area of ensuring constitutionally mandated local autono-
my.
At one level, this inquiry simply returns us to a variant of the ques-
tions with which we began: by what baseline or metric should one
measure the competence of the court in this area? And what is the pur-
pose of constitutional home rule provisions? If one looks beyond these
questions to potentially relevant differences between courts and legisla-
tures, however, it seems likely that judicial review will reduce rather than
increase the rate of errors in identifying areas of local concern. Judicial
155. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 155, at 26-29; Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities, supra
note 165, at 528-29.
156. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 155, at 36-41; Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities, supra
note 165, at 525-36; Baker, Spending Power, supra note 49, at 203-12.
157. See Baker & Dinkin, supra note 155, at 41-42; Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities, supra
note 165, at 535; Baker, Spending Power, supra note 48, at 211.
158. Other provisions of state constitutions, most notably prohibitions on special legislation,
may prevent this as well. See, e.g., BAKER & GI.LETrE, supra note 14, at 224-43 (discussing and
presenting cases involving prohibitions on "special" and "local" legislation).
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norms can be expected to cause the courts to strive for continuity over
time in deciding what is or is not a matter of local concern. Although
this respect for precedent might be construed as resulting in "regressive"
or "backward looking" decisions, it means that there is likely to be a pre-
dictability to those decisions. Appellate courts, especially, are likely to
be attentive to the temporal "big picture" in a particular doctrinal area.
The legislature, by contrast, operates under very different norms. The
preferences of current interest groups and constituencies are likely to
substantially affect legislative outcomes. In sum, as compared to the
legislature, the courts seem to have relatively little incentive to be biased
in their decisionmaking in favor of any particular interest group or con-
stituency, and to be relatively more likely to be impartially concerned
with the larger, theoretical question of what is a matter of local concern.
Finally, without regard to the persuasiveness of the above, some
might contend that there is no reason for the courts to review legislation
under the state constitution's home rule provision because the courts are
also reviewing legislation under a variety of other constitutional provi-
sions designed to reign in plenary legislative power. Such provisions
include prohibitions against special and local legislation, prohibitions on
special commissions, and "public purpose" requirements for the issuance
of debt and the spending of public funds. 159 Although the effect of some
of these provisions in particular instances may be to prevent legislative
encroachments on local autonomy, none of these other provisions has
that as its focus. Consistent with that fact, at the time of their adoption,
imperio home rule provisions were quite obviously not considered to be
redundant with concurrently adopted or pre-existing constitutional con-
straints on plenary legislative power.
160
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have undertaken a preliminary critical examina-
tion of the role of the courts under imperio home rule provisions of state
constitutions. We have set out a framework for understanding what it is
159. See, e.g., BAKER & GILLErrE, supra note 14, at 222-43 (discussing and presenting cases
involving prohibitions on special and local legislation); id. at 213-22 (discussing and presenting
cases involving prohibitions on special commissions); id. at 393-448 (discussing and presenting
cases involving constitutional requirements for the issuance of debt and the spending of public
funds).
160. The first state to adopt imperio home rule was Missouri in its 1875 Constitution. The
home rule provision granted only the city of St. Louis a power of initiative, which was required to be
exercised "in harmony with and subject to the Constitution and laws" of Missouri. Mo. CONST. art.
IV, §§ 20-22 (1875). Importantly, however, the 1875 Constitution also included a prohibition on
special and local laws. Id. art. IX, §§ 20-25. See also Libonati, supra note 22, at 109-24. In 1851,
Indiana was the first state to include in its constitution a provision prohibiting local or special legis-
lation. Id. at 122-23. And in 1872, Pennsylvania adopted a "ripper clause" constitutional provision
limiting the power of the legislature to delegate municipal functions to a "special commission." Id.
at 123. Many states went on to adopt both of these types of provisions, as well as imperio home
rule. See, e.g., id. at 114; KRANE ET AL., supra note 7, at 10-12; REYNOLDS, JR., supra note 14, at
90-114.
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that state courts are doing when they review legislation that is challenged
under these provisions, and have discussed in detail the courts' handling
of a number of home rule disputes. We have then undertaken to assess
the extent to which the attempts of the state courts to draw lines between
the state and local spheres of authority has been a success. Our tentative
conclusion is that the state courts do have a significant role to play in
ensuring the local autonomy mandated by constitutional home rule, and
that there is no compelling reason to declare this doctrinal project a fail-
ure, let alone one requiring judicial abdication.
In future work, we intend to investigate more elaborately, and with
greater attention to political and structural considerations, the relation-
ship between constitutional design, constitutional law, and the respective
roles of the federal and state judiciaries. In particular, we hope to com-
pare and contrast more fully the role of the state courts under imperio
home rule and the role of the federal courts when considering federalism
claims under the Tenth Amendment. Such a thoroughgoing positive
analysis, we believe, has important implications for both the federal and
state courts.
To the extent that the results of the preliminary analysis in this Ar-
ticle are borne out in future work, it may provide reassurance to the state
courts that their attempts to police the boundaries between cities and
states in home rule jurisdictions are important and should continue, not-
withstanding the contrary jurisprudential claims of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Garcia.161 And, to the extent that the Court's decisions in New
York, 162 Lopez, 163 and Printz'64 suggest that it has begun a retreat from its
declaration of nonjusticiability in Garcia,65 our work may offer reason
161. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
162. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-77 (1992) (invalidating a federal
environmental regulation deemed to 'commandeer' state governments into the service of federal
regulatory purposes" and therefore to be "inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority
between federal and state goverments"); id. at 201-07 (White, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
majority's decision in New York could be reconciled with Garcia).
163. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (identifying family law, criminal
law enforcement, and education as areas "where States historically have been sovereign"); id. at 624
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Commerce Clause does not permit the federal government
"to regulate 'marriage, divorce, and child custody,' or to regulate any and all aspects of education").
164. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (holding Brady Act unconsti-
tutional on grounds that "the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory programs"); cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding under Eleventh
Amendment that Congress lacks authority to empower private citizens to sue states for damages in
state court without the states' consent).
165. Cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding under Eleventh Amendment that Con-
gress lacks authority to empower private citizens to sue states for damages in state court without the
states' consent). Scholars disagree about the extent to which Garcia is still good law, though all
agree that the Court has retreated from its position in Garcia that the courts have no role to play in
delimiting or enforcing the federal-state divide. Compare, e.g., John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safe-
guards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311,1311-12 (1997) (contending that Garcia is no longer
"good law" nor "the controlling theory concerning judicial review of federalism questions"), and id.
at 1334-35 (acknowledging that "the Court has yet to explicitly override Garcia," but contending
that both the then-current majority on the Court as well as the dissenters "have acquiesced in the
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for optimism that the federal courts can and should play a useful role in
policing the federal/state divide.
overruling of Garcia" in cases beginning with Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)), with Jay
S. Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading the Constitution in Plato's Cave,
23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 551, 561 (2000) (describing New York, Printz, and Alden as "cases that
chip away at," rather than overrule, Garcia). See also Thomas H. Odom, Foreword: An Introduction
to the Symposium on the Federalism Decisions of the Supreme Court's 1999 Term, 25 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REv. 783, 810-11 (2000) (observing that New York and Printz may be understood either "to
effectively overrule Garcia" or "to create an 'anti-commandeering' exception to Garcia").
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HoME RULE PROVISIONS IN THE STATES IN 2009
State Type of Citation Home Rule Provision
Home Rule
I Alabama
2 Alaska Legislative Alaska Const. Section 11. Home Rule Powers
art. X, § 11
(2009) A home rule borough or city may exercise all
legislative powers not prohibited by law or by
charter.
3 Arizona Legislative Ariz. Const. § 2. Charter; preparation and proposal by board of
art. XIII, §§ 2 freeholders; ratification and approval; amendment
& 3 (2008).
Section 2. Any city containing, now or hereafter, a
population of more than three thousand five hun-
dred may frame a charter for its own government
consistent with, and subject to, the Constitution and
the laws of the State, in the following manner: A
board of freeholders composed of fourteen quali-
fied electors of said city may be elected at large by
the qualified electors thereof, at a general or special
election, whose duty it shall be, within ninety days
after such election, to prepare and propose a charter
for such city. Such proposed charter shall be signed
in duplicate by the members of such board, or a
majority of them, and filed, one copy of said
proposed charter with the chief executive officer of
such city and the other with the county recorder of
the county in which said city shall be situated. Such
proposed charter shall then be published in one or
more newspapers published, and of general circula-
tion, within said city for at least twenty-one days if
in a daily paper, or in three consecutive issues if in
a weekly paper, and the first publication shall be
made within twenty days after the completion of
the proposed charter. Within thirty days, and not
earlier than twenty days, after such publication,
said proposed charter shall be submitted to the vote
of the qualified electors of said city at a general or
special election. If a majority of such qualified
electors voting thereon shall ratify such proposed
charter, it shall thereupon be submitted to the
Governor for his approval, and the Governor shall
approve it if it shall not be in conflict with this
Constitution or with the laws of the State. Upon
such approval said charter shall become the organic
law of such city and supersede any charter then
existing (and all amendments thereto), and all
ordinances inconsistent with said new charter. A
copy of such charter, certified by the chief execu-
tive officer, and authenticated by the seal, of such
_ city, together with a statement similarly certified
* The authors are grateful to George Hinchey, Univ. of Texas School of Law Class of 2009,
who did the bulk of the research necessary for preparing this appendix.
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and authenticated setting forth the submission of
such charter to the electors and its ratification by
them, shall, after the approval of such charter by
the Governor, be made in duplicate and filed, one
copy in the office of the Secretary of State and the
other in the archives of the city after being recorded
in the office of said County Recorder. Thereafter all
courts shall take judicial notice of said charter.
The charter so ratified may be amended by amend-
ments proposed and submitted by the legislative
authority of the city to the qualified electors thereof
(or by petition as hereinafter provided), at a general
or special election, and ratified by a majority of the
qualified electors voting thereon and approved by
the Governor as herein provided for the approval of
the charter.
§ 3. Election of board of freeholders
Section 3. An election of such board of freeholders
may be called at any time by the legislative author-
ity of any such city. Such election shall be called by
the chief executive officer of any such city within
ten days after there shall have been filed with him a
petition demanding such election, signed by a
number of qualified electors residing within such
city equal to twenty-five per centum of the total
number of votes cast at the next preceding general
municipal election. Such election shall be held not
later than thirty days after the call therefore. At
such election a vote shall be taken upon the ques-
tion whether further proceedings toward adopting a
charter shall be had in pursuance to the call, and
unless a majority of the qualified electors voting
thereon shall vote to proceed further, no further
proceedings shall be had, and all proceedings up to
the time of said election shall be of no effect.
4 Arkansas Imperio A.C.A. § 14- 14-42-307. Powers of municipalities.
42-307 (2008) (a) (1) Each municipality operating under a charter
A.C.A. § 14- shall have the authority to exercise all powers
43-602 (2008) relating to municipal affairs.
(2) This grant of authority shall not be deemed to
limit or restrict the powers of the General Assembly
in matters of state affairs, nor shall this subchapter
be construed as increasing or diminishing the
powers of the state to regulate utilities not munici-
pally owned or fix the rates thereof.
(b) The following shall be deemed to be a part of
the powers conferred upon the municipalities by
this subchapter:
(1) To levy, assess, and collect taxes within the
limits prescribed in the charter adopted by the
municipality and the limits prescribed in the Arkan-
sas Constitution;
(2) To furnish all local public services; to acquire
property therefor by condemnation or otherwise,
within or without the corporate limits, subject,
however, to the provisions of the general laws of
the State of Arkansas, including any law requiring
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that the acquisition of a utility plant be approved by
a municipal election. However, no property can be
acquired under this subchapter by the issuance of
bonds, notes, or other evidence of indebtedness
unless the bonds, notes, or evidence of indebted-
ness is secured by the credit of the city and all the
property therein;
(3) To exercise all powers conferred by the state
constitution and the General Assembly generally
upon municipalities not contrary to this subchapter.
(c) No municipality shall pass any laws contrary to
the criminal laws of the State of Arkansas.
14-43-602. Authority generally.
Any city of the frst class is authorized to perform
any function and exercise full legislative power in
any and all matters of whatsoever nature pertaining
to its municipal affairs including, but not limited to,
the power to tax.
5 California Imperio Cal Const, § 3. County and city charters
Art. x§§
3(a), 4(g), 5 & (a) For its own government, a county or city may
6(2008). adopt a charter by majority vote of its electors
voting on the question. The charter is effective
when filed with the Secretary of State. A charter
may be amended, revised, or repealed in the same
manner. A charter, amendment, revision, or repeal
thereof shall be published in the official state
statutes. County charters adopted pursuant to this
section shall supersede any existing charter and all
laws inconsistent therewith. The provisions of a
charter are the law of the State and have the force
and effect of legislative enactments.
§ 4. County charter provisions
County charters shall provide for:
(g) Whenever any county has framed and adopted a
charter, and the same shall have been approved by
the Legislature as herein provided, the general laws
adopted by the Legislature in pursuance of Section
1 (b) of this article, shall, as to such county, be
superseded by said charter as to matters for which,
under this section it is competent to make provision
in such charter, and for which provision is made
therein, except as herein otherwise expressly
provided.
§ 5. City charter provisions
(a) It shall be competent in any city charter to
provide that the city governed thereunder may
make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in
respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restric-
tions and limitations provided in their several
charters and in respect to other matters they shall be
subject to general laws. City charters adopted
pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any
existing charter, and with respect to municipal
affairs shall supersede all laws inconsistent
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therewith.
(b) It shall be competent in all city charters to
provide, in addition to those provisions allowable
by this Constitution, and by the laws of the State
for: (1) the constitution, regulation, and government
of the city police force (2) subgovemment in all or
part of a city (3) conduct of city elections and (4)
plenary authority is hereby granted, subject only to
the restrictions of this article, to provide therein or
by amendment thereto, the manner in which, the
method by which, the times at which, and the terms
for which the several municipal officers and em-
ployees whose compensation is paid by the city
shall be elected or appointed, and for their removal,
and for their compensation, and for the number of
deputies, clerks and other employees that each shall
have, and for the compensation, method of ap-
pointment, qualifications, tenure of office and
removal of such deputies, clerks and other employ-
ees.
§ 6. Consolidation as charter city and county
(a) A county and all cities within it may consolidate
as a charter city and county as provided by statute.
(b) A charter city and county is a charter city and a
charter county. Its charter city powers supersede
conflicting charter county powers.
6 Colorado Imperio Colo. Const. Section 6. Home rule for cities and towns
Art. XX, § 6
(2008). The people of each city or town of this state,
having a population of two thousand inhabitants as
determined by the last preceding census taken
under the authority of the United States, the state of
Colorado or said city or town, are hereby vested
with, and they shall always have, power to make,
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or
town, which shall be its organic law and extend to
all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant
thereto in such matters shall supersede within the
territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city
or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
Proposals for charter conventions shall be submit-
ted by the city council or board of trustees, or other
body in which the legislative powers of the city or
town shall then be vested, at special elections, or at
general, state or municipal elections, upon petition
filed by qualified electors, all in reasonable con-
formity with section 5 of this article, and all pro-
ceedings thereon or thereafter shall be in reasonable
conformity with sections 4 and 5 of this article.
From and after the certifying to and filing with the
secretary of state of a charter framed and approved
in reasonable conformity with the provisions of this
article, such city or town, and the citizens thereof,
shall have the powers set out in sections 1, 4 and 5
of this article, and all other powers necessary,
requisite or proper for the government and admini-
stration of its local and municipal matters, includ-
ing power to legislate upon, provide, regulate.
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conduct and control:
a. The creation and terms of municipal officers,
agencies and employments; the definition, regula-
tion and alteration of the powers, duties, qualifica-
tions and terms or tenure of all municipal officers,
agents and employees;
b. The creation of police courts; the definition and
regulation of the jurisdiction, powers and duties
thereof, and the election or appointment of police
magistrates therefor;
c. The creation of municipal courts; the definition
and regulation of the jurisdiction, powers and duties
thereof, and the election or appointment of the
officers thereof;
d. All matters pertaining to municipal elections in
such city or town, and to electoral votes therein on
measures submitted under the charter or ordinances
thereof, including the calling or notice and the date
of such election or vote, the registration of voters,
nominations, nomination and election systems,
judges and clerks of election, the form of ballots,
balloting, challenging, canvassing, certifying the
result, securing the purity of elections, guarding
against abuses of the elective franchise, and tending
to make such elections or electoral votes non-
partisan in character;
e. The issuance, refunding and liquidation of all
kinds of municipal obligations, including bonds and
other obligations of park, water and local improve-
ment districts;
f. The consolidation and management of park or
water districts in such cities or towns or within the
jurisdiction thereof; but no such consolidation shall
be effective until approved by the vote of a major-
ity, in each district to be consolidated, of the
qualified electors voting therein upon the question;
g. The assessment of property in such city or town
for municipal taxation and the levy and collection
of taxes thereon for municipal purposes and special
assessments for local improvements; such assess-
ments, levy and collection of taxes and special
assessments to be made by municipal officials or by
the county or state officials as may be provided by
the charter;
h. The imposition, enforcement and collection of
fines and penalties for the violation of any of the
provisions of the charter, or of any ordinance
adopted in pursuance of the charter.
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm
to the people of all municipalities coming within its
provisions the full right of self-government in both
local and municipal matters and the enumeration
herein of certain powers shall not be construed to
deny such cities and towns, and to the people
thereof, any right or power essential or proper to
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the full exercise of such right.
The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as
applicable, shall continue to apply to such cities
and towns, except insofar as superseded by the
charters of such cities and towns or by ordinance
passed pursuant to such charters.
All provisions of the charters of the city and county
of Denver and the cities of Pueblo, Colorado
Springs and Grand Junction, as heretofore certified
to and filed with the secretary of state, and of the
charter of any other city heretofore approved by a
majority of those voting thereon and certified to
and filed with the secretary of state, which provi-
sions are not in conflict with this article, and all
elections and electoral votes heretofore had under
and pursuant thereto, are hereby ratified, affirmed
and validated as of their date.
Any act in violation of the provisions of such
charter or of any ordinance thereunder shall be
criminal and punishable as such when so provided
by any statute now or hereafter in force.
The provisions of this section 6 shall apply to the
city and county of Denver.
This article shall be in all respects self-executing.
7 Connecticut Imperio Conn. Gen. Sec. 7-148. Scope of municipal powers
Stat. § 7-148
(2008). (a) Definitions. Whenever used in this section,
"municipality" means any town, city or borough,
consolidated town and city or consolidated town
and borough.
(b) Ordinances. Powers granted to any municipality
under the general statutes or by any charter or
special act, unless the charter or special act pro-
vides to the contrary, shall be exercised by ordi-
nance when the exercise of such powers has the
effect of:
(1) Establishing rules or regulations of general
municipal application, the violation of which may
result in the imposition of a fine or other penalty
including community service for not more than
twenty hours; or
(2) Creating a permanent local law of general
applicability.
(c) Powers. Any municipality shall have the power
to do any of the following, in addition to all powers
granted to municipalities under the Constitution and
general statutes:
(1) Corporate powers. (A) Contract and be con-
tracted with, sue and be sued, and institute, prose-
cute, maintain and defend any action or proceeding
in any court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) Provide for the authentication, execution and
delivery of deeds, contracts, grants, and releases of
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municipal property and for the issuance of evi-
dences of indebtedness of the municipality;
(2) Finances and appropriations. (A) Establish and
maintain a budget system;
(B) Assess, levy and collect taxes for general or
special purposes on all property, subjects or objects
which may be lawfully taxed, and regulate the
mode of assessment and collection of taxes and
assessments not otherwise provided for, including
establishment of a procedure for the withholding of
approval of building application when taxes or
water or sewer rates, charges or assessments
imposed by the municipality are delinquent for the
property for which an application was made;
(C) Make appropriations for the support of the
municipality and pay its debts;
(D) Make appropriations for the purpose of meeting
a public emergency threatening the lives, health or
property of citizens, provided such appropriations
shall require a favorable vote of at least two-thirds
of the entire membership of the legislative body or,
when the legislative body is the town meeting, at
least two-thirds of those present and voting;
(E) Make appropriations to military organizations,
hospitals, health care facilities, public health
nursing organizations, nonprofit museums and
libraries, organizations providing drug abuse and
dependency programs and any other private organi-
zation performing a public function;
(F) Provide for the manner in which contracts
involving unusual expenditures shall be made;
(G) When not specifically prescribed by general
statute or by charter, prescribe the form of proceed-
ings and mode of assessing benefits and appraising
damages in taking land for public use, or in making
public improvements to be paid for, in whole or in
part, by special assessments, and prescribe the
manner in which all benefits assessed shall be
collected;
(H) Provide for the bonding of municipal officials
or employees by requiring the furnishing of such
bond, conditioned upon honesty or faithful per-
formance of duty and determine the amount, form,
and sufficiency of the sureties thereof;
(1) Regulate the method of borrowing money for
any purpose for which taxes may be levied and
borrow on the faith and credit of the municipality
for such general or special purposes and to such
extent as is authorized by general statute;
(J) Provide for the temporary borrowing of money;
(K) Create a sinking fund or funds or a trust fund or
funds or other special funds, including funds which
do not lapse at the end of the municipal fiscal year,
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(L) Provide for the assignment of municipal tax
liens on real property to the extent authorized by
general statute;
(3) Property. (A) Take or acquire by gift, purchase,
grant, including any grant from the United States or
the state, bequest or devise and hold, condemn,
lease, sell, manage, transfer, release and convey
such real and personal property or interest therein
absolutely or in trust as the purposes of the munici-
pality or any public use or purpose, including that
of education, art, ornament, health, charity or
amusement, cemeteries, parks or gardens, or the
erection or maintenance of statues, monuments,
buildings or other structures, require. Any lease of
real or personal property or any interest therein,
either as lessee or lessor, may be for such term or
any extensions thereof and upon such other terms
and conditions as have been approved by the
municipality, including without limitation the
power to bind itself to appropriate funds as neces-
sary to meet rent and other obligations as provided
in any such lease;
(B) Provide for the proper administration of gifts,
grants, bequests and devises and meet such terms or
conditions as are prescribed by the grantor or donor
and accepted by the municipality;
(4) Public services. (A) Provide for police protec-
tion, regulate and prescribe the duties of the per-
sons providing police protection with respect to
criminal matters within the limits of the municipal-
ity and maintain and regulate a suitable place of
detention within the limits of the municipality for
the safekeeping of all persons arrested and awaiting
trial and do all other things necessary or desirable
for the policing of the municipality;
(B) Provide for fire protection, organize, maintain
and regulate the persons providing fire protection,
provide the necessary apparatus for extinguishing
fires and do all other things necessary or desirable
for the protection of the municipality from fire;
(C) Provide for entertainment, amusements, con-
certs, celebrations and cultural activities, including
the direct or indirect purchase, ownership and
operation of the assets of one or more sports
franchises;
(D) Provide for ambulance service by the munici-
pality or any person, firm or corporation;
(E) Provide for the employment of nurses;
(F) Provide for lighting the streets, highways and
other public places of the municipality and for the
care and preservation of public lamps, lamp posts
and fixtures;
(G) Provide for the furnishing of water, by contract
or otherwise;
(H) Provide for or regulate the collection and
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disposal of garbage, trash, rubbish, waste material
and ashes by contract or otherwise, including
prohibiting the throwing or placing of such materi-
als on the highways;
(1) Provide for the financing, construction, rehabili-
tation, repair, improvement or subsidization of
housing for low and moderate income persons and
families;
(5) Personnel. (A) Provide for and establish pension
systems for the officers and employees of the
municipality and for the active members of any
volunteer fire department or any volunteer ambu-
lance association of the municipality, and establish
a system of qualification for the tenure in office of
such officers and employees, provided the rights or
benefits granted to any individual under any mu-
nicipal retirement or pension system shall not be
diminished or eliminated;
(B) Establish a merit system or civil service system
for the selection and promotion of public officials
and employees. Nothing in this subparagraph shall
be construed to validate any merit system or civil
service system established prior to May 24, 1972;
(C) Provide for the employment of and prescribe
the salaries, compensation and hours of employ-
ment of all officers and employees of the munici-
pality and the duties of such officers and employees
not expressly defined by the Constitution of the
state, the general statutes, charter or special act;
(D) Provide for the appointment of a municipal
historian;
(6) Public works, sewers, highways. (A) Public
facilities. (i) Establish, lay out, construct, recon-
struct, alter, maintain, repair, control and operate
cemeteries, public burial grounds, hospitals, clinics,
institutions for children and aged, infirm and
chronically ill persons, bus terminals and airports
and their accessories, docks, wharves, school
houses, libraries, parks, playgrounds, playfields,
fieldhouses, baths, bathhouses, swimming pools,
gymnasiums, comfort stations, recreation places,
public beaches, beach facilities, public gardens,
markets, garbage and refuse disposal facilities,
parking lots and other off-street parking facilities,
and any and all buildings or facilities necessary or
convenient for carrying on the government of the
municipality;
(ii) Create, provide for, construct, regulate and
maintain all things in the nature of public works
and improvements;
(iii) Enter into or upon any land for the purpose of
making necessary surveys or mapping in connec-
tion with any public improvement, and take by
eminent domain any lands, rights, easements,
privileges, franchises or structures which are
necessary for the purpose of establishing, construct-
ing or maintaining any public work, or for any
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municipal purpose, in the manner prescribed by the
general statutes;
(iv) Regulate and protect from injury or defacement
all public buildings, public monuments, trees and
ornaments in public places and other public prop-
erty in the municipality;
(v) Provide for the planting, rearing and preserving
of shade and ornamental trees on the streets and
public grounds;
(vi) Provide for improvement of waterfronts by a
board, commission or otherwise;
(B) Sewers, drainage and public utilities. (i) Lay
out, construct, reconstruct, repair, maintain, oper-
ate, alter, extend and discontinue sewer and drain-
age systems and sewage disposal plants;
(ii) Enter into or upon any land for the purpose of
correcting the flow of surface water through water-
courses which prevent, or may tend to prevent, the
free discharge of municipal highway surface water
through said courses;
(iii) Regulate the laying, location and maintenance
of gas pipes, water pipes, drains, sewers, poles,
wires, conduits and other structures in the streets
and public places of the municipality;
(iv) Prohibit and regulate the discharge of drains
from roofs of buildings over or upon the sidewalks,
streets or other public places of the municipality or
into sanitary sewers;
(C) Highways and sidewalks. (i) Lay out, construct,
reconstruct, alter, maintain, repair, control, operate,
and assign numbers to streets, alleys, highways,
boulevards, bridges, underpasses, sidewalks, curbs,
gutters, public walks and parkways;
(ii) Keep open and safe for public use and travel
and free from encroachment or obstruction the
streets, sidewalks and public places in the munici-
pality;
(iii) Control the excavation of highways and streets;
(iv) Regulate and prohibit the excavation, altering
or opening of sidewalks, public places and grounds
for public and private purposes and the location of
any work or things thereon, whether temporary or
permanent, upon or under the surface thereof;
(v) Require owners or occupants of land adjacent to
any sidewalk or public work to remove snow, ice,
sleet, debris or any other obstruction therefrom,
provide penalties upon their failure to do so, and
cause such snow, ice, sleet, debris or other obstruc-
tion to be removed and make the cost of such
removal a lien on such property;
(vi) Grant to abutting property owners a limited
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property or leasehold interest in abutting streets and
sidewalks for the purpose of encouraging and
supporting private commercial development;
(7) Regulatory and police powers. (A) Buildings.
(i) Make rules relating to the maintenance of safe
and sanitary housing;
(ii) Regulate the mode of using any buildings when
such regulations seem expedient for the purpose of
promoting the safety, health, morals and general
welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality;
(iii) Regulate and prohibit the moving of buildings
upon or through the streets or other public places of
the municipality, and cause the removal and demo-
lition of unsafe buildings and structures;
(iv) Regulate and provide for the licensing of
parked trailers when located off the public high-
ways, and trailer parks or mobile manufactured
home parks, except as otherwise provided by
special act and except where there exists a local
zoning commission so empowered;
(v) Establish lines beyond which no buildings,
steps, stoop, veranda, billboard, advertising sign or
device or other structure or obstruction may be
erected;
(vi) Regulate and prohibit the placing, erecting or
keeping of signs, awnings or other things upon or
over the sidewalks, streets and other public places
of the municipality;
(vii) Regulate plumbing and house drainage;
(viii) Prohibit or regulate the construction of
dwellings, apartments, boarding houses, hotels,
commercial buildings, youth camps or commercial
camps and commercial camping facilities in such
municipality unless the sewerage facilities have
been approved by the authorized officials of the
municipality;
(B) Traffic. (i) Regulate and prohibit, in a manner
not inconsistent with the general statutes, traffic,
the operation of vehicles on streets and highways,
off-street parking and on-street residential
neighborhood parking areas in which on-street
parking is limited to residents of a given neighbor-
hood, as determined by the municipality;
(ii) Regulate the speed of vehicles, subject to the
provisions of the general statutes relating to the
regulation of the speed of motor vehicles and of
animals, and the driving or leading of animals
through the streets;
(C) Building adjuncts. Regulate and prohibit the
construction or use, and require the removal of
sinks, cesspools, drains, sewers, privies, barns,
outhouses and poultry pens and houses;
(D) Animals. (i) Regulate and prohibit the going at
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large of dogs and other animals in the streets and
public places of the municipality and prevent
cruelty to animals and all inhuman sports;
(ii) Regulate and prohibit the keeping of wild or
domestic animals, including reptiles, within the
municipal limits or portions thereof;
(E) Nuisance. Define, prohibit and abate within the
municipality all nuisances and causes thereof, and
all things detrimental to the health, morals, safety,
convenience and welfare of its inhabitants and
cause the abatement of any nuisance at the expense
of the owner or owners of the premises on which
such nuisance exists;
(F) Loitering and trespassing. (i) Keep streets,
sidewalks and public places free from undue noise
and nuisances, and prohibit loitering thereon;
(ii) Regulate loitering on private property with the
permission of the owner thereof;
(iii) Prohibit the loitering in the nighttime of minors
on the streets, alleys or public places within its
limits;
(iv) Prevent trespassing on public and private lands
and in buildings in the municipality;
(G) Vice. Prevent vice and suppress gambling
houses, houses of ill-fame and disorderly houses;
(H) Public health and safety. (i) Secure the safety of
persons in or passing through the municipality by
regulation of shows, processions, parades and
music;
(ii) Regulate and prohibit the carrying on within the
municipality of any trade, manufacture, business or
profession which is, or may be, so carried on as to
become prejudicial to public health, conducive to
fraud and cheating, or dangerous to, or constituting
an unreasonable annoyance to, those living or
owning property in the vicinity;
(iii) Regulate auctions and garage and tag sales;
(iv) Prohibit, restrain, license and regulate the
business of peddlers, auctioneers and junk dealers
in a manner not inconsistent with the general
statutes;
(v) Regulate and prohibit swimming or bathing in
the public or exposed places within the municipal-
ity;
(vi) Regulate and license the operation of amuse-
ment parks and amusement arcades including, but
not limited to, the regulation of mechanical rides
and the establishment of the hours of operation;
(vii) Prohibit, restrain, license and regulate all
sports, exhibitions, public amusements and per-
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formances and all places where games may be
played;
(viii) Preserve the public peace and good order,
prevent and quell riots and disorderly assemblages
and prevent disturbing noises;
(ix) Establish a system to obtain a more accurate
registration of births, marriages and deaths than the
system provided by the general statutes in a manner
not inconsistent with the general statutes;
(x) Control insect pests or plant diseases in any
manner deemed appropriate;
(xi) Provide for the health of the inhabitants of the
municipality and do all things necessary or desir-
able to secure and promote the public health;
(xii) Regulate the use of streets, sidewalks, high-
ways, public places and grounds for public and
private purposes;
(xiii) Make and enforce police, sanitary or other
similar regulations and protect or promote the
peace, safety, good government and welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants;
(xiv) Regulate, in addition to the requirements
under section 7-282b, the installation, maintenance
and operation of any device or equipment in a
residence or place of business which is capable of
automatically calling and relaying recorded emer-
gency messages to any state police or municipal
police or fire department telephone number or
which is capable of automatically calling and
relaying recorded emergency messages or other
forms of emergency signals to an intermediate third
party which shall thereafter call and relay such
emergency messages to a state police or municipal
police or fire department telephone number. Such
regulations may provide for penalties for the
transmittal of false alarms by such devices or
equipment;
(xv) Make and enforce regulations preventing
housing blight, including regulations reducing
assessments, provided such regulations define
housing blight, and including regulations establish-
ing a duty to maintain property and specifying
standards to determine if there is neglect; prescribe
fines for the violation of such regulations of not
less than ten or more than one hundred dollars for
each day that a violation continues and, if such
fines are prescribed, such municipality shall adopt a
citation hearing procedure in accordance with
section 7-152c;
(8) The environmenL (A) Provide for the protection
and improvement of the environment including, but
not limited to, coastal areas, wetlands and areas
adjacent to waterways in a manner not inconsistent
with the general statutes;
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(B) Regulate the location and removal of any
offensive manure or other substance or dead
animals through the streets of the municipality and
provide for the disposal of same;
(C) Except where there exists a local zoning com-
mission, regulate the filling of, or removal of, soil,
loam, sand or gravel from land not in public use in
the whole, or in specified districts of, the munici-
pality, and provide for the reestablishment of
ground level and protection of the area by suitable
cover;
(D) Regulate the emission of smoke from any
chimney, smokestack or other source within the
limits of the municipality, and provide for proper
heating of buildings within the municipality;
(9) Human rights. (A) Provide for fair housing;
(B) Adopt a code of prohibited discriminatory
practices;
(10) Miscellaneous. (A) Make all lawful regula-
tions and ordinances in furtherance of any general
powers as enumerated in this section, and prescribe
penalties for the violation of the same not to exceed
two hundred fifty dollars, unless otherwise specifi-
cally provided by the general statutes. Such regula-
tions and ordinances may be enforced by citations
issued by designated municipal officers or employ-
ees, provided the regulations and ordinances have
been designated specifically by the municipality for
enforcement by citation in the same manner in
which they were adopted and the designated
municipal officers or employees issue a written
warning providing notice of the specific violation
before issuing the citation;
(B) Adopt a code of ethical conduct;
(C) Establish and maintain free legal aid bureaus;
(D) Perform data processing and related administra-
tive computer services for a fee for another munici-
pality;
(E) Adopt the model ordinance concerning a
municipal freedom of information advisory board
created under subsection (0 of section 1-205 and
establish a municipal freedom of information
advisory board as provided by said ordinance and
said section.
8 Delaware Legislative 22 Del. C. § § 802. Applicability of chapter; grant of power
802 (2008).
Every municipal corporation in this State contain-
ing a population of at least 1,000 persons as shown
by the last official federal decennial census may
proceed as set forth in this chapter to amend its
municipal charter and may, subject to the condi-
tions and limitations imposed by this chapter,
amend its charter so as to have and assume all
powers which, under the Constitution of this State,
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it would be competent for the General Assembly to
grant by specific enumeration and which are not
denied by statute. This grant of power does not
include the power to enact private or civil law
governing civil relationships except as an incident
to an exercise of an independent municipal power,
nor does it include power to define and provide for
the punishment of a felony.
9 Florida Imperio Fla. Stat. § § 166.02. Powers
166.021
(2009). (1) As provided in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State
Constitution, municipalities shall have the govern-
mental, corporate, and proprietary powers to enable
them to conduct municipal government, perform
municipal functions, and render municipal services,
and may exercise any power for municipal pur-
poses, except when expressly prohibited by law.
(2) "Municipal purpose" means any activity or
power which may be exercised by the state or its
political subdivisions.
(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the
grant of power set forth in s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the
State Constitution, the legislative body of each
municipality has the power to enact legislation
concerning any subject matter upon which the state
Legislature may act, except:
(a) The subjects of annexation, merger, and
exercise of extraterritorial power, which require
general or special law pursuant to s. 2(c), Art. VIII
of the State Constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the
constitution;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or
county government by the constitution or by
general law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant
to a county charter adopted under the authority of
ss. I(g), 3, and 6(e), Art. VIII of the State Constitu-
tion.
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so
construed as to secure for municipalities the broad
exercise of home rule powers granted by the
constitution. It is the further intent of the Legisla-
ture to extend to municipalities the exercise of
powers for municipal governmental, corporate, or
proprietary purposes not expressly prohibited by
the constitution, general or special law, or county
charter and to remove any limitations, judicially
imposed or otherwise, on the exercise of home rule
powers other than those so expressly prohibited.
However, nothing in this act shall be construed to
permit any changes in a special law or municipal
charter which affect the exercise of extraterritorial
powers or which affect an area which includes
lands within and without a municipality or any
changes in a special law or municipal charter which
affect the creation or existence of a municipality,
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the terms of elected officers and the manner of their
election except for the selection of election dates
and qualifying periods for candidates and for
changes in terms of office necessitated by such
changes in election dates, the distribution of powers
among elected officers, matters prescribed by the
charter relating to appointive boards, any change in
the form of government, or any rights of municipal
employees, without approval by referendum of the
electors as provided in s. 166.031. Any other
limitation of power upon any municipality con-
tained in any municipal charter enacted or adopted
prior to July 1, 1973, is hereby nullified and re-
pealed.
(5) All existing special acts pertaining exclusively
to the power or jurisdiction of a particular munici-
pality except as otherwise provided in subsection
(4) shall become an ordinance of that municipality
on the effective date of this act, subject to modifica-
tion or repeal as other ordinances.
(6) The governing body of a municipality may
require that any person within the municipality
demonstrate the existence of some arrangement or
contract by which such person will dispose of solid
waste in a manner consistent with the ordinances of
the county or municipality or state or federal law.
For any person who will produce special wastes or
biomedical waste, as the same may be defined by
state or federal law or county or city ordinance, the
municipality may require satisfactory proof of a
contract or similar arrangement by which special or
biomedical wastes will be collected by a qualified
and duly licensed collector and disposed of in
accordance with the laws of Florida or the Federal
Government.
(7) Notwithstanding the prohibition against extra
compensation set forth in s. 215.425, the governing
body of a municipality may provide for an extra
compensation program, including a lump-sum
bonus payment program, to reward outstanding
employees whose performance exceeds standards,
if the program provides that a bonus payment may
not be included in an employee's regular base rate
of pay and may not be carried forward in subse-
quent years.
(8) Entities that are funded wholly or in part by the
municipality, at the discretion of the municipality,
may be required by the municipality to conduct a
performance audit paid for by the municipality. An
entity shall not be considered as funded by the
municipality by virtue of the fact that such entity
utilizes the municipality to collect taxes, assess-
ments, fees, or other revenue. If an independent
special district receives municipal funds pursuant to
a contract or interlocal agreement for the purposes
of funding, in whole or in part, a discrete program
of the district, only that program may be required
by the municipality to undergo a performance audit.
(9) (a) The Legislature finds and declares that this
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state faces increasing competition from other states
and other countries for the location and retention of
private enterprises within its borders. Furthermore,
the Legislature finds that there is a need to enhance
and expand economic activity in the municipalities
of this state by attracting and retaining manufactur-
ing development, business enterprise management,
and other activities conducive to economic promo-
tion, in order to provide a stronger, more balanced,
and stable economy in the state, to enhance and
preserve purchasing power and employment
opportunities for the residents of this state, and to
improve the welfare and competitive position of the
state. The Legislature declares that it is necessary
and in the public interest to facilitate the growth
and creation of business enterprises in the munici-
palities of the state.
(b) The governing body of a municipality may
expend public funds to attract and retain business
enterprises, and the use of public funds toward the
achievement of such economic development goals
constitutes a public purpose. The provisions of this
chapter which confer powers and duties on the
governing body of a municipality, including any
powers not specifically prohibited by law which
can be exercised by the governing body of a mu-
nicipality, shall be liberally construed in order to
effectively carry out the purposes of this subsec-
tion.
(c) For the purposes of this subsection, it consti-
tutes a public purpose to expend public funds for
economic development activities, including, but not
limited to, developing or improving local infra-
structure, issuing bonds to finance or refinance the
cost of capital projects for industrial or manufactur-
ing plants, leasing or conveying real property, and
making grants to private enterprises for the expan-
sion of businesses existing in the community or the
attraction of new businesses to the community.
(d) Nothing contained in this subsection shall be
construed as a limitation on the home role powers
granted by the State Constitution for municipalities.
(10) (a) As used in this subsection, the term:
1. "Authorized person" means a person:
a. Other than an officer or employee, as
defined in this paragraph, whether elected or
commissioned or not, who is authorized by a
municipality or agency thereof to incur travel
expenses in the performance of official duties;
b. Who is called upon by a municipality or
agency thereof to contribute time and services as
consultant or advisor; or
c. Who is a candidate for an executive or
professional position with a municipality or agency
thereof.
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2. "Employee" means an individual, whether
commissioned or not, other than an officer or
authorized person as defined in this paragraph, who
is filling a regular or full-time authorized position
and is responsible to a municipality or agency
thereof.
3. "Officer" means an individual who, in the
performance of his or her official duties, is vested
by law with sovereign powers of government and
who is either elected by the people, or commis-
sioned by the Governor and who has jurisdiction
extending throughout the municipality, or any
person lawfully serving instead of either of the
foregoing two classes of individuals as initial
designee or successor.
4. "Traveler" means an officer, employee, or
authorized person, when performing travel author-
ized by a municipality or agency thereof.
(b) Notwithstanding s. 112.061, the governing
body of a municipality or an agency thereof may
provide for a per diem and travel expense policy for
its travelers which varies from the provisions of s.
112.061. Any such policy provided by a municipal-
ity or an agency thereof on January 1, 2003, shall
be valid and in effect for that municipality or
agency thereof until otherwise amended. A munici-
pality or agency thereof that provides any per diem
and travel expense policy pursuant to this subsec-
tion shall be deemed to be exempt from all provi-
sions of s. 112.061. A municipality or agency
thereof that does not provide a per diem and travel
expense policy pursuant to this subsection remains
subject to all provisions of s. 112.061.
(c) Travel claims submitted by a traveler in a
municipality or agency thereof which is exempted
from the provisions of s. 112.061, pursuant to
paragraph (b), shall not be required to be sworn to
before a notary public or other officer authorized to
administer oaths, but any claim authorized or
required to be made under any per diem and travel
expense policy of a municipality or agency thereof
must contain a statement that the expenses were
actually incurred by the traveler as necessary travel
expenses in the performance of official duties and
shall be verified by a written declaration that it is
true and correct as to every material matter, and
any person who willfully makes and subscribes any
such claim that he or she does not believe to be true
and correct as to every material matter, or who
willfully aids or assists in, or procures, counsels, or
advises the preparation or presentation of such a
claim that is fraudulent or is false as to any material
matter, whether or not such falsity or fraud is with
the knowledge or consent of the person authorized
or required to present such claim, commits a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Whoever
receives an allowance or reimbursement by means
of a false claim is civilly liable in the amount of the
overpayment for the reimbursement of the public
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fund from which the claim was paid.
10 Georgia Imperio Ga. Const. PARAGRAPH II. Home rule for municipalities
Art. IX, § II,
Para. II
(2008) The General Assembly may provide by law for the
self-government of municipalities and to that end is
expressly given the authority to delegate its power
so that matters pertaining to municipalities may be
dealt with without the necessity of action by the
General Assembly.
11 Hawaii Imperio - HRS Const. Section 2. LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT;
no munici- Art. VIII, § 2 CHARTER.
palities - (2008).
Home Rule Each political subdivision shall have the power to
only for frame and adopt a charter for its own self-
counties government within such limits and under such
procedures as may be provided by general law.
Such procedures, however, shall not require the
approval of a charter by a legislative body.
Charter provisions with respect to a political
subdivision's executive, legislative and administra-
tive structure and organization shall be superior to
statutory provisions, subject to the authority of the
legislature to enact general laws allocating and
reallocating powers and functions.
A law may qualify as a general law even though it
is inapplicable to one or more counties by reason of
the provisions of this section.
12 Idaho Imperio Idaho Const. § 2. Local police regulations authorized
Art. Yl, § 2
(2008) Any county or incorporated city or town may make
and enforce, within its limits, all such local police,
sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict
with its charter or with the general laws.
13 Ilinois Legislative 65 ILCS 5/1- Sec. 1-1-5. The corporate authorities of each
1-5 (2009) municipality may exercise jointly, with one or more
other municipal corporations or governmental
65 ILCS 5/1- subdivisions or districts, all of the powers set forth
1-7 (2009) in this Code unless expressly provided otherwise.
In this section "municipal corporations or govern-
mental subdivisions or districts" includes, but is not
limited to, municipalities, townships, counties,
school districts, park districts, sanitary districts, and
fire protection districts.
§ 65 ILCS 5/1-1-7. Power of municipality to
contract with school boards, hospitals, commercial
and industrial facilities, and owners of shopping
centers or apartment complexes. The corporate
authorities of any municipality shall have the power
to contract with school boards, hospitals, commer-
cial and industrial facilities, and owners of shop-
ping centers or apartment complexes within and
without the municipal limits in such manner as is
provided by Section 11-209 of "The Illinois Vehi-
cle Code', approved September 29, 1969, as
amended [625 ILCS 5/11-209], and as provided
under Section 2 of "An Act in relation to the
regulation of motor vehicle traffic and the promo-
tion of safety on public highways in counties',
approved August 9, 1951, as amended.
14 Indiana Legislative Bums Ind. 36-1-34. Presumption that unit has powers neces-
Code Ann. § sary to conduct affairs. (a) The rule of law that a








15 Iowa Imperio Iowa Const., Sec. 38A. Municipal home rule.
Art. lI § 38A
(2008) Municipal corporations are granted home rule
power and authority, not inconsistent with the laws
of the general assembly, to determine their local
affairs and government, except that they shall not
have power to levy any tax unless expressly author-
ized by the general assembly.
The rule or proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise only those
powers granted in express words is not a part of the
law of this state.
16 Kansas Imperio Kan. Const. 5. Cities' powers of home rule.
Art. 12,§5
(2007) (a) The legislature shall provide by general law,
applicable to all cities, for the incorporation of
cities and the methods by which city boundaries
K.S.A. § 12- may be altered, cities may be merged or consoli-
101 (2007) dated and cities may be dissolved: Provided, That
existing laws on such subjects not applicable to all
2009]
unit has only:
(1) Powers expressly granted by statute;
(2) Powers necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to powers expressly granted; and
(3) Powers indispensable to the declared purposes
of the unit;
is abrogated.
(b) A unit has:
(1) All powers granted it by statute; and
(2) All other powers necessary or desirable in the
conduct of its affairs, even though not granted by
statute.
(c) The powers that units have under subsection
(b)(1) are listed in various statutes. However, these
statutes do not list the powers that units have under
subsection (b)(2); therefore, the omission of a
power from such a list does not imply that units
lack that power.
36-1-3-5. Limitations on exercise of powers by
statute or constitution.
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a unit
may exercise any power it has to the extent that the
power:
(1) Is not expressly denied by the Indiana Consti-
tution or by statute; and
(2) Is not expressly granted to another entity.
(b) A township may not exercise power the town-
ship has if another unit in which all or part of the
township is located exercises that same power.
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cities on the effective date of this amendment shall
remain in effect until superseded by general law
and such existing laws shall not be subject to
charter ordinance.
(b) Cities are hereby empowered to determine their
local affairs and government including the levying
of taxes, excises, fees, charges and other exactions
except when and as the levying of any tax, excise,
fee, charge or other exaction is limited or prohib-
ited by enactment of the legislature applicable
uniformly to all cities of the same class: Provided,
That the legislature may establish not to exceed
four classes of cities for the purpose of imposing all
such limitations or prohibitions. Cities shall exer-
cise such determination by ordinance passed by the
governing body with referendums only in such
cases as prescribed by the legislature, subject only
to enactments of the legislature of statewide con-
cer applicable uniformly to all cities, to other
enactments of the legislature applicable uniformly
to all cities, to enactments of the legislature appli-
cable uniformly to all cities of the same class
limiting or prohibiting the levying of any tax,
excise, fee, charge or other exaction and to enact-
ments of the legislature prescribing limits of
indebtedness. All enactments relating to cities now
in effect or hereafter enacted and as later amended
and until repealed shall govern cities except as
cities shall exempt themselves by charter ordi-
nances as herein provided for in subsection (c).
(c) (1) Any city may by charter ordinance elect in
the manner prescribed in this section that the whole
or any part of any enactment of the legislature
applying to such city, other than enactments of
statewide concern applicable uniformly to all cities,
other enactments applicable uniformly to all cities,
and enactments prescribing limits of indebtedness,
shall not apply to such city.
(2) A charter ordinance is an ordinance which
exempts a city from the whole or any part of any
enactment of the legislature as refeired to in this
section and which may provide substitute and
additional provisions on the same subject. Such
charter ordinance shall be so titled, shall designate
specifically the enactment of the legislature or part
thereof made inapplicable to such city by the
adoption of such ordinance and contain the substi-
tute and additional provisions, if any, and shall
require a two-thirds vote of the members-elect of
the governing body of such city. Every charter
ordinance shall be published once each week for
two consecutive weeks in the official city newspa-
per or, if there is none, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city.
(3) No charter ordinance shall take effect until sixty
days after its final publication. If within sixty days
of its final publication a petition signed by a num-
ber of electors of the city equal to not less than ten
percent of the number of electors who voted at the
last preceding regular city election shall be filed in
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the office of the clerk of such city demanding that
such ordinance be submitted to a vote of the elec-
tors, it shall not take effect until submitted to a
referendum and approved by a majority of the
electors voting thereon. An election, if called, shall
be called within thirty days and held within ninety
days after the filing of the petition. The governing
body shall pass an ordinance calling the election
and fixing the date, which ordinance shall be
published once each week for three consecutive
weeks in the official city newspaper or, if there be
none, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
city, and the election shall be conducted as elec-
tions for officers and by the officers handling such
elections. The proposition shall be: "Shall charter
ordinance No., entitled (title of ordinance) take
effect" The governing body may submit any charter
ordinance to a referendum without petition by the
same publication of the charter ordinance and the
same publication of the ordinance calling the
election as for ordinances upon petition and such
charter ordinance shall then become effective when
approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon. Each charter ordinance becoming effective
shall be recorded by the clerk in a book maintained
for that purpose with a statement of the manner of
adoption and a certified copy shall be filed with the
secretary of state, who shall keep an index of the
same.
(4) Each charter ordinance enacted shall control
and prevail over any prior or subsequent act of the
governing body of the city and may be repealed or
amended only by charter ordinance or by enact-
ments of the legislature applicable to all cities.
(d) Powers and authority granted cities pursuant to
this section shall be liberally construed for the
purpose of giving to cities the largest measure of
self-government.
(e) This amendment shall be effective on and after
July 1, 1961.
12-101. Corporate powers; home rule of local
affairs and government.
Article 12, section 5 of the constitution of Kansas
empowers cities to determine their local affairs and
government by ordinance and enables the legisla-
ture to enact laws governing cities. Each city being
a body corporate and politic, may among other
powers --
First. Sue and be sued.
Second. Purchase or receive, by bequest or gift,
and hold, real and personal property for the use of
the city.
Third. Sell and convey any real or personal estate
owned by the city, and make such order respecting
the same as may be deemed conducive to the
I I _ interests of the city, and to provide for the im-
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provement, regulation and government of the same.
Fourth. Make all contracts and do all other acts in
relation to the property and concerns of the city
necessary to the exercise of its corporate or admin-
istrative powers.
Fifth. Have and use a corporate seal, and alter the
same at pleasure.
Sixth. Exercise such other and further powers as
may be conferred by the constitution or statutes of
this state.
17 Kentucky Legislative KRS § 82.082 82.082. Power for public purpose only and not in
(2009) conflict with Constitution or statutes.
(1) A city may exercise any power and perform any
function within its boundaries, including the power
of eminent domain in accordance with the provi-
sions of the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, that
is in furtherance of a public purpose of the city and
not in conflict with a constitutional provision or
statute.
(2) A power or function is in conflict with a statute
if it is expressly prohibited by a statute or there is a
comprehensive scheme of legislation on the same
general subject embodied in the Kentucky Revised
Statutes including, but not limited to, the provisions
of KRS Chapters 95 and 96.
Imperio La. Const.
Art. VI, § 5
(2008).
§ 5. Home rule charter
A. Authority to Adopt; Commission.. Subject to
and not inconsistent with this constitution, any local
governmental subdivision may draft, adopt, or
amend a home rule charter in accordance with this
Section. The governing authority of a local gov-
ernmental subdivision may appoint a commission
to prepare and propose a charter or an alternate
charter, or it may call an election to elect such a
commission.
B. Petition to Elect Commission.. The governing
authority shall call an election to elect such a
commission when presented with a petition signed
by not less than ten percent of the electors or ten
thousand electors, whichever is fewer, who live
within the boundaries of the affected subdivision,
as certified by the registrar of voters.
C. Adoption; Amendment; Repeal.. A home rule
charter shall be adopted, amended, or repealed
when approved by a majority of the electors voting
thereon at an election held for that purpose.
D. Adoption by Two or More Local Governmental
Subdivisions.. Two or more local governmental
subdivisions within the boundaries of one parish
may adopt a home rule charter under this Section if
approved by a majority of the electors in each
affected local governmental subdivision voting
thereon in an election held for that purpose. The
leislature shall crovide by law the method of
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appointment or election of a commission to prepare
and propose a charter consistent with Paragraph (A)
of this Section and the method by which the elec-
tors may petition for an election consistent with
Paragraph (B) of this Section. However, at least one
member of the commission shall be elected or
appointed from each affected local governmental
subdivision.
E. Structure and Organization; Powers; Func-
tions.. A home rule charter adopted under this
Section shall provide the structure and organiza-
tion, powers, and functions of the government of
the local governmental subdivision, which may
include the exercise of any power and performance
of any function necessary, requisite, or proper for
the management of its affairs, not denied by general
law or inconsistent with this constitution.
F. Additional Powers and Functions.. Except as
prohibited by its charter, a local governmental
subdivision adopting a home rule charter under this
Section shall have the additional powers and
functions granted to local governmental subdivi-
sions by other provisions of this constitution.
G. Parish Officials and School Boards Not Af-
fected.. No home rule charter or plan of government
shall contain any provision affecting a school board
or the offices of district attorney, sheriff, assessor,
clerk of a district court, or coroner, which is incon-
sistent with this constitution or law.
19 Maine Imperio Me. Const. § 1. Power of municipalities to amend their char-
Art. VII, Pt. ters
2, § 1 (2008)
Section 1. The inhabitants of any municipality shall
have the power to alter and amend their charters on
all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or
general law, which are local and municipal in
character. The Legislature shall prescribe the
procedure by which the municipality may so act.
20 Maryland Imperio Md. Const. Section 3. Home rule
art. XI-E, § 3
(2008) Any such municipal corporation, now existing or
hereafter created, shall have the power and author-
ity, (a) to amend or repeal an existing charter or
local laws relating to the incorporation, organiza-
tion, government, or affairs of said municipal
corporation heretofore enacted by the General
Assembly of Maryland, and (b) to adopt a new
charter, and to amend or repeal any charter adopted
under the provisions of this Article.
21 Massachusetts Legislative ALM GL ch. § 13. Powers Exercisable by Cities and Towns;
43B, § 13 Limitations and Exceptions.
(2009)
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment
or repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, exercise
any power or function which the general court has
power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent
with the constitution or laws enacted by the general
court in conformity with powers reserved to the
general court by Section 8 of Article LXXXIX of
the Amendments to the Constitution and which is
not denied, either expressly or by clear implication,
to the city or town by its charter. Whenever appro-
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priations, appointments, orders, regulations or other
legislative or executive actions within the scope of
any such ordinance or by-law are necessary in the
exercise of any power or function authorized by
such ordinance or by-law, any such actions which
are to be taken by a city council or town meeting
may be taken by ordinance, by-law, resolution,
order or vote, and any such actions which are to be
taken by executive officers may be taken in any
appropriate manner, subject, however, as to both
such categories, to all provisions of the ordinance
or by-law in question, the city or town charter, and
other applicable law. Any requirement that an
ordinance or by-law be entitled as such, or that it
contain the word "ordained," "enacted" or words of
similar import shall not affect the validity of any
action which is required to be taken by ordinance or
by-law. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to permit any city or town, by ordinance or by-law,
to exercise any power or function which is incon-
sistent with any general law enacted by the general
court before November eighth, nineteen hundred
and sixty-six which applies alike to all cities, or to
all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of
not fewer than two. No exercise of a power or
function denied to the city or town, expressly or by
clear implication, by special laws having the force
of a charter under section nine of said Article, and
no change in the composition, mode of election or
appointment, or terms of office of the legislative
body, the mayor or city manager or the board of
selectmen or town manager, may be accomplished
by by-law or ordinance. Such special laws may be
made inapplicable, and such changes may be
accomplished, only under procedures for the
adoption, revision or amendment of a charter under
this chapter.
22 Michigan Imperio MCLS Const. § 22. Charters, resolutions, ordinances; enumera-
Art. VII, § 22 tion of powers.
(2009)
Sec. 22. Under general laws the electors of each
city and village shall have the power and authority
to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend
an existing charter of the city or village heretofore
granted or enacted by the legislature for the gov-
ernment of the city or village. Each such city and
village shall have power to adopt resolutions and
ordinances relating to its municipal concerns,
property and government, subject to the constitu-
tion and law. No enumeration of powers granted to
cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or
restrict the general grant of authority conferred by
this section.
23 Minnesota Legislative Minn. Const., Sec. 4. Home rule charter
Art. X19, § 4
(2008) Any local government unit when authorized by law
may adopt a home rule charter for its government.
A charter shall become effective if approved by
such majority of the voters of the local government
unit as the legislature prescribes by general law. If a
charter provides for the consolidation or separation
of a city and a county, in whole or in part, it shall
not be effective without approval of the voters both
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in the city and in the remainder of the county by the
majority required by law.
24 Mississippi Imperio Miss. Code § 21-17-1. General grant of powers
Ann. § 21-17-
1 (2008) (1) Every municipality of this state shall be a
municipal corporation and shall have power to sue
and be sued; to purchase and hold real estate, either
within or without the corporate limits, for all proper
municipal purposes, including parks, cemeteries,
hospitals, schoolhouses, houses of correction,
waterworks, electric lights, sewers and other proper
municipal purposes; to purchase and hold personal
property for all proper municipal purposes; to
acquire equipment and machinery by lease-
purchase agreement and to pay interest thereon, if
contracted, when needed for proper municipal
purposes; to sell and convey any real and personal
property owned by it, and make such order respect-
ing the same as may be deemed conducive to the
best interest of the municipality, and exercise
jurisdiction over the same.
(2) (a) In case any of the real property belonging to
a municipality shall cease to be used for municipal
purposes, the governing authority of the municipal-
ity may sell, convey or lease the same on such
terms as the municipal authority may elect. In case
of a sale on a credit, the municipality shall charge
appropriate interest as contracted and shall have a
lien on the same for the purchase money, as against
all persons, until paid and may enforce the lien as
in such cases provided by law. The deed of convey-
ance in such cases shall be executed in the name of
the municipality by the governing authority of the
municipality pursuant to an order entered on the
minutes. In any sale or conveyance of real property,
the municipality shall retain all mineral rights that it
owns, together with the right of ingress and egress
to remove same. Except as otherwise provided in
this section, before any such lease, deed or convey-
ance is executed, the governing authority of the
municipality shall publish at least once each week
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a public news-
paper of the municipality in which the real property
is located, or if no newspaper be published as such,
then in a newspaper having general circulation
therein, the intention to lease or sell, as the case
may be, the municipally owned real property and to
accept sealed competitive bids for the leasing or
sale. The governing authority of the municipality
shall thereafter accept bids for the lease or sale and
shall award the lease or sale to the highest bidder in
the manner provided by law. However, whenever
the governing authority of the municipality shall
find and determine, by resolution duly and lawfully
adopted and spread upon its minutes (i) that any
municipally owned real property is no longer
needed for municipal or related purposes and is not
to be used in the operation of the municipality, (ii)
that the sale of such property in the manner other-
wise provided by law is not necessary or desirable
for the financial welfare of the municipality, and
(iii) that the use of such property for the purpose for
which it is to be sold, conveyed or leased will
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promote and foster the development and improve-
ment of the community in which it is located and
the civic, social, educational, cultural, moral,
economic or industrial welfare thereof, the govern-
ing authority of the municipality shall be authorized
and empowered, in its discretion, to sell, convey or
lease same for any of the purposes set forth herein
without having to advertise for and accept competi-
tive bids.
(b) In any case in which a municipality proposes
to sell, convey or lease real property under the
provisions of this subsection (2) without advertising
for and accepting competitive bids, the governing
authority may sell, convey or lease the property as
follows:
(i) Consideration for the purchase, conveyance
or lease of the property shall be not less than the
average of the fair market price for such property as
determined by three (3) professional property
appraisers selected by the municipality and ap-
proved by the purchaser or lessee. Appraisal fees
shall be shared equally by the municipality and the
purchaser or lessee; or
(ii) The governing authority of a municipality
may contract for the professional services of a
Mississippi licensed real estate broker to assist the
municipality in the marketing and sale or lease of
the property, and may provide the broker reason-
able compensation for services rendered to be paid
from the sale or lease proceeds. The reasonable
compensation shall not exceed the usual and
customary compensation for similar services within
the municipality.
(3) Whenever the governing authority of the
municipality shall find and determine by resolution
duly and lawfully adopted and spread upon the
minutes that municipally owned real property is not
used for municipal purposes and therefore surplus
as set forth in subsection (2) of this section:
(a) The governing authority may donate such
lands to a bona fide not-for-profit civic or dee-
mosynary corporation organized and existing under
the laws of the State of Mississippi and granted tax
exempt status by the Internal Revenue Service and
may donate such lands and necessary funds related
thereto to the public school district in which the
land is situated for the purposes set forth herein.
Any deed or conveyance executed pursuant hereto
shall contain a clause of reverter providing that the
bona fide not-for-profit corporation or public
school district may hold title to such lands only so
long as they are continued to be used for the civic,
social, educational, cultural, moral, economic or
industrial welfare of the community, and that title
shall revert to the municipality in the event of the
cessation of such use for a period of two (2) years.
In any such deed or conveyance, the municipality
shall retain all mineral rights that it owns, together
with the right of ingress and egress to remove
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same;
(b) (i) The governing authority may donate such
lands to a bona fide not-for-profit corporation (such
as Habitat for Humanity) which is primarily en-
gaged in the construction of housing for persons
who otherwise can afford to live only in substan-
dard housing. In any such deed or conveyance, the
municipality shall retain all mineral rights that it
owns, together with the right of ingress and egress
to remove same;
(ii) In the event the governing authority does
not wish to donate title to such lands to the bona
fide not-for-profit civic or eleemosynary corpora-
tion, but wishes to retain title to the lands, the
governing authority may lease the lands to a bona
fide not-for-profit corporation described in para-
graph (a) or (b) for less than fair market value;
(c) The governing authority may donate any
municipally owned lot measuring twenty-five (25)
feet or less along the frontage line as follows: the
governing authority may cause the lot to be divided
in half along a line running generally perpendicular
to the frontage line and may convey each one-half (
1/2) of that lot to the owners of the parcels laterally
adjoining the municipally owned lot. All costs
associated with a conveyance under this paragraph
(c) shall be paid by the person or entity to whom
the conveyance is made. In any such deed or
instrument of conveyance, the municipality shall
retain all mineral rights that it owns, together with
the right of ingress and egress to remove same.
(d) Nothing contained in this subsection (3) shall
be construed to prohibit, restrict or to prescribe
conditions with regard to the authority granted
under Section 17-25-3.
(4) Every municipality shall also be authorized and
empowered to loan to private persons or entities,
whether organized for profit or nonprofit, funds
received from the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under an
urban development action grant or a community
development block grant under the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974 (Public Law
93-383), as amended, and to charge interest thereon
if contracted, provided that no such loan shall
include any funds from any revenues other than the
funds from the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development; to make all contracts
and do all other acts in relation to the property and
affairs of the municipality necessary to the exercise
of its governmental, corporate and administrative
powers; and to exercise such other or further
powers as are otherwise conferred by law.
(5) (a) The governing authority of any municipality
may establish an employer-assisted housing pro-
gram to provide funds to eligible employees to be
used toward the purchase of a home. This assis-
tance may be applied toward the down payment,
closing costs or any other fees or costs associated
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with the purchase of a home. The housing assis-
tance may be in the form of a grant, forgivable loan
or repayable loan. The governing authority of a
municipality may contract with one or more public
or private entities to provide assistance in imple-
menting and administering the program and shall
adopt rules and regulations regarding the eligibility
of a municipality for the program and for the
implementation and administration of the program.
However, no general funds of a municipality may
be used for a grant or loan under the program.
(b) Participation in the program established under
this subsection (5) shall be available to any eligible
municipal employee as determined by the govern-
ing authority of the municipality. Any person who
receives financial assistance under the program
must purchase a house and reside within certain
geographic boundaries as determined by the gov-
erning authority of the municipality.
(c) If the assistance authorized under this subsec-
tion (5) is structured as a forgivable loan, the
participating employee must remain as an employee
of the municipality for an agreed upon period of
time, as determined by the rules and regulations
adopted by the governing authority of the munici-
pality, in order to have the loan forgiven. The
forgiveness structure, amount of assistance and
repayment terms shall be determined by the gov-
eming authority of the municipality,
(6) The governing authority of any municipality
may contract with a private attorney or private
collection agent or agency to collect any type of
delinquent payment owed to the municipality,
including, but not limited to, past due fees and
fines. Any such contract debt may provide for
payment contingent upon successful collection
efforts or payment based upon a percentage of the
delinquent amount collected; however, the entire
amount of all delinquent payments collected shall
be remitted to the municipality and shall not be
reduced by any collection costs or fees. Any private
attorney or private collection agent or agency
contracting with the municipality under the provi-
sions of this subsection shall give bond or other
surety payable to the municipality in such amount
as the governing authority of the municipality
deems sufficient. Any private attorney with whom
the municipality contracts under the provisions of
this subsection must be a member in good standing
of The Mississippi Bar. Any private collection
agent or agency with whom the municipality
contracts under the provisions of this subsection
must meet all licensing requirements for doing
business in the State of Mississippi. Neither the
municipality nor any officer or employee of the
municipality shall be liable, civilly or criminally,
for any wrongful or unlawful act or omission of any
person or business with whom the municipality has
contracted under the provisions of this subsection.
The Mississippi Department of Audit shall establish
rules and regulations for use by municipalities in
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contracting with persons or businesses under the
provisions of this subsection. If a municipality uses
its own employees to collect any type of delinquent
payment owed to the municipality, then from and
after July 1, 2000, the municipality may charge an
additional fee for collection of the delinquent
payment provided the payment has been delinquent
for ninety (90) days. The collection fee may not
exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the delinquent
payment if the collection is made within this state
and may not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of
the delinquent payment if the collection is made
outside this state. In conducting collection of
delinquent payments, the municipality may utilize
credit cards or electronic fund transfers. The
municipality may pay any service fees for the use
of such methods of collection from the collection
fee, but not from the delinquent payment. There
shall be due to the municipality from any person
whose delinquent payment is collected under a
contract executed as provided in this subsection an
amount, in addition to the delinquent payment, of
not to exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the
delinquent payment for collections made within this
state, and not to exceed fifty percent (50%) of the
delinquent payment for collections made outside of
this state.
(7) In addition to such authority as is otherwise
granted under this section, the governing authority
of any municipality may expend funds necessary to
maintain and repair, and to purchase liability
insurance, tags and decals for, any personal prop-
erty acquired under the Federal Excess Personal
Property Program that is used by the local volunteer
fire department.
(8) The governing authority of any municipality
may, in its discretion, donate personal property or
funds to the public school district or districts
located in the municipality fur the promotion of
educational programs of the district or districts
within the municipality.
(9) In addition to the authority to expend matching
funds under Section 21-19-65, the governing
authority of any municipality, in its discretion, may
expend municipal funds to match any state, federal
or private funding for any program administered by
the State of Mississippi, the United States govern-
ment or any nonprofit organization that is exempt
under 26 USCS Section 501(c) (3) from paying
federal income tax.
(10) The governing authority of any municipality
that owns and operates a gas distribution system, as
defined in Section 21-27-11(b), and the governing
authority of any public natural gas district are
authorized to contract for the purchase of the
supply of natural gas for a term of up to ten (10)
years with any public nonprofit corporation which
is organized under the laws of this state or any
other state.
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(11) The governing authority of any municipality
may perform and exercise any duty, responsibility
or function, may enter into agreements and con-
tracts, may provide and deliver any services or
assistance, and may receive, expend and administer
any grants, gifts, matching funds, loans or other
monies, in accordance with and as may be author-
ized by any federal law, rule or regulation creating,
establishing or providing for any program, activity
or service. The provisions of this subsection shall
not be construed as authorizing any municipality or
the governing authority of such municipality to
perform any function or activity that is specifically
prohibited under the laws of this state or as granting
any authority in addition to or in conflict with the
provisions of any federal law, rule or regulation.
(12) (a) In addition to such authority as is otherwise
granted under this section, the governing authority
of a municipality, in its discretion, may sell, lease,
donate or otherwise convey property to any person
or legal entity without public notice, without having
to advertise for and accept competitive bids and
without appraisal, with or without consideration,
and on such terms and conditions as the parties may
agree if the governing authority finds and deter-
mines, by resolution duly and lawfully adopted and
spread upon its official minutes:
(i) The subject property is real property ac-
quired by the municipality:
I. By reason of a tax sale;
2. Because the property was abandoned or
blighted; or
3. In a proceeding to satisfy a municipal lien
against the property;
(ii) The subject property is blighted and is
located in a blighted area;
(iii) The subject property is not needed for
governmental or related purposes and is not to be
used in the operation of the municipality;
(iv) That the sale of the property in the manner
otherwise provided by law is not necessary or
desirable for the financial welfare of the municipal-
ity; and
(v) That the use of the property for the purpose
for which it is to be conveyed will promote and
foster the development and improvement of the
community in which it is located or the civic,
social, educational, cultural, moral, economic or
industrial welfare thereof; the purpose for which
the property is conveyed shall be stated.
(b) All costs associated with a conveyance under
this subsection shall be paid by the person or entity
to whom the conveyance is made.
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(c) Any deed or instrument of conveyance exe-
cuted pursuant to the authority granted under this
subsection shall contain a clause of reverter provid-
ing that title to the property wil revert to the
municipality if the person or entity to whom the
property is conveyed does not fulfill the purpose for
which the property was conveyed and satisfy all
conditions imposed on the conveyance within two
(2) years of the date of the conveyance.
(d) In any such deed or instrument of conveyance,
the municipality shall retain all mineral rights that it
owns, together with the right of ingress and egress
to remove same.
(13) The powers conferred by this section shall be
in addition and supplemental to the powers con-
ferred by any other law, and nothing contained in
this section shall be construed to prohibit, or to
prescribe conditions concerning, any practice or
practices authorized under any other law.
25 Misuri Legislative Mo. Const. § 19(a). Power of charter cities, how limited
Art. VI, §
19(a) (2009) Any city which adopts or has adopted a charter
for its own government, shall have all powers
which the general assembly of the state of Missouri
has authority to confer upon any city, provided
such powers are consistent with the constitution of
this state and are not limited or denied either by the
charter so adopted or by statute. Such a city shall,
in addition to its home rule powers, have all powers
conferred by law.
26 Montana Legislative Mont. Const., Section 5. Self-government charters.
Art. XI §§ 5,6
(2007). (1) The legislature shall provide procedures
permitting a local government unit or combination
of units to frame, adopt, amend, revise, or abandon
a self-government charter with the approval of a
majority of those voting on the question. The
procedures shall not require approval of a charter
by a legislative body.
(2) If the legislature does not provide such proce-
dures by July 1, 1975, they may be established by
election either:
(a) Initiated by petition in the local government
unit or combination of units; or
(b) Called by the governing body of the local
government unit or combination of units.
(3) Charter provisions establishing executive,
legislative, and administrative structure and organi-
zation are superior to statutory provisions.
Section 6. Self-government powers.
A local government unit adopting a self-
government charter may exercise any power not
prohibited by this constitution, law, or charter. This
grant of self-government powers may be extended
to other local government units through optional
forms of government provided for in section 3.
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27 Nebraska Legislative Ne. Const. § 2. City of 5,000 may frame charter, procedure.
Art. X, §§ 2,
5(2009). Any city having a population of more than five
thousand (5000) inhabitants may frame a charter
for its own government, consistent with and subject
to the constitution and laws of this state, by causing
a convention of fifteen freeholders, who shall have
been for at least five years qualified electors
thereof, to be elected by the qualified voters of said
city at any general or special election, whose duty it
shall be within four months after such election, to
prepare and propose a charter for such city, which
charter, when completed, with a prefatory synopsis,
shall be signed by the officers and members of the
convention, or a majority thereof, and delivered to
the clerk of said city, who shall publish the same in
full, with his official certification, in the official
paper of said city, if there be one, and if there be no
official paper, then in at least one newspaper
published and in general circulation in said city,
three times, and a week apart, and within not less
than thirty days after such publication it shall be
submitted to the qualified electors of said city at a
general or special election, and if a majority of such
qualified voters, voting thereon, shall ratify the
same, it shall at the end of sixty days thereafter,
become the charter of said city, and supersede any
existing charter and all amendments thereof. A
duplicate certificate shall be made, setting forth the
charter proposed and its ratification (together with
the vote for and against) and duly certified by the
City Clerk, and authenticated by the corporate seal
of said city and one copy thereof shall be filed with
the Secretary of State and the other deposited
among the archives of the city, and shall thereupon
become and be the charter of said city, and all
amendments of such charter, shall be authenticated
in the same manner, and filed with the secretary of
state and deposited in the archives of the city.
§ 5. Charter of city of 100,000; home rule charter
authorized.
The charter of any city having a population of more
than one hundred thousand inhabitants may be
adopted as the home rule charter of such city by a
majority vote of the qualified electors of such city
voting upon the question, and when so adopted may
thereafter be changed or amended as provided in
Section 4 of this article, subject to the Constitution
and laws of the state.
28 Nevada
29 New Legislative RSA49-B:I 49-B:1 Purpose and Intent.
Hampshire (2009)
It is the purpose of this chapter to implement the
N.H. Const. home rule powers recognized by article 39, part
Pt. FIRST, first, of the constitution of the state of New Hamp-
Art. 39. shire. To that end, the general court hereby pro-
(2009) vides a vehicle whereby a municipality may adopt a
form of government that best addresses local needs.
At the same time, however, the general court
recognizes a need to require uniform procedures
and practices when there is a corresponding state
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interest. Therefore, this chapter is intended only to
provide a procedural framework by which a city or
town may amend its actual form of government.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to create
any power in, or confer any power upon, any city or
town beyond that necessary to carry out the amend-
ment of a charter or form of government as set forth
in this chapter. The general laws of this state shall
remain in full force and effect, and they shall be
construed to be consistent with this chapter to the
greatest extent possible in the effectuation of this
chapter's stated purpose. Accordingly, this chapter
shall be strictly interpreted to allow towns and
cities to adopt, amend, or revise a municipal charter
relative to their form of government so long as the
resulting charter is neither in conflict with nor
inconsistent with the general laws or the constitu-
tion of this state.
Art. 39. [Changes in Town and City Charters,
Referendum Required.]
No law changing the charter or form of govern-
ment of a particular city or town shall be enacted by
the legislature except to become effective upon the
approval of the voters of such city or town upon a
referendum to be provided for in said law.
The legislature may by general law authorize cities
and towns to adopt or amend their charters or forms
of government in any way which is not in conflict
with general law, provided that such charters or
amendments shall become effective only upon the
approval of the voters of each such city or town on
a referendum.
30 New Jersey Legislative N.J. Stat. § § 40:20-1.2. Grant of powers
40:20-1.2
(2009) The grant of powers under this amendatory and
supplementary act is intended to be as broad as is
consistent with the Constitution of the State of New
Jersey and with general law relating to local gov-
ernment. The grant of powers shall be construed as
liberally as possible in regard to the county's right
to reorganize its structure and to alter or abolish its
agencies, subject to the general mandate of per-
forming services, whether they be performed by the
agency previously established or by a new agency
or another department of county government. All
county offices, boards, commissions, and authori-
ties authorized or established by statute, other than
those boards and offices which are subject to the
provisions of subsection b. of section 4 of this
amendatory and supplementary act, and other than
educational institutions authorized or established
pursuant to Title 18A of the New Jersey Statutes,
shall be considered to be county agencies for the
purposes of this section.
31 New Mexico Legislative N.M. Const. § 6. Municipal elections; charters; legislative
art. X, § 6 powers and taxation
(2008) D. A municipality which adopts a charter may
exercise all legislative powers and perform all
functions not expressly denied by general law or
charter. This grant of powers shall not include the
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power to enact private or civil laws governing civil
relationships except as incident to the exercise of an
independent municipal power, nor shall it include
the power to provide for a penalty greater than the
penalty provided for a petty misdemeanor. No tax
imposed by the governing body of a charter mu-
nicipality, except a tax authorized by general law,
shall become effective until approved by a majority
vote in the charter municipality.
E. The purpose of this section is to provide for
maximum local self-government. A liberal con-
struction shall be given to the powers of munici-
palities. (As added November 3, 1970.)
32 New York Imperio NY CLS § 2. Powers and duties of legislature; home rule
Const Art IX, powers of local governments; statute of local
§ 2 (2009) governments
(a) The legislature shall provide for the creation and
organization of local governments in such manner
as shall secure to them the rights, powers, privi-
leges and immunities granted to them by this
constitution.
(b) Subject to the bill of rights of local governments
and other applicable provisions of this constitution,
the legislature:
(1) Shall enact, and may from time to time
amend, a statute of local governments granting to
local governments powers including but not limited
to those of local legislation and administration in
addition to the powers vested in them by this
article. A power granted in such statute may be
repealed, diminished, impaired or suspended only
by enactment of a statute by the legislature with the
approval of the governor at its regular session in
one calendar year and the re-enactment and ap-
proval of such statute in the following calendar
year.
(2) Shall have the power to act in relation to the
property, affairs or government of any local gov-
erment only by general law, or by special law only
(a) on request of two-thirds of the total membership
of its legislative body or on request of its chief
executive officer concurred in by a majority of such
membership, or (b), except in the case of the city of
New York, on certificate of necessity from the
governor reciting facts which in [fig I] the judg-
ment of the governor constitute an emergency
requiring enactment of such law and, in such latter
case, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members elected to each house of the legislature.
(3) Shall have the power to confer on local
governments powers not relating to their property,
affairs or government including but not limited to
those of local legislation and administration, in
addition to those otherwise granted by or pursuant
to this article, and to withdraw or restrict such
additional powers.
(c) In addition to powers granted in the statute of
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local governments or any other law, (i) every local
government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of
this constitution or any general law relating to its
property, affairs or government and, (ii) every local
government shall have power to adopt and amend
local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of
this constitution or any general law relating to the
following subjects, whether or not they relate to the
property, affairs or government of such local
government, except to the extent that the legislature
shall restrict the adoption of such a local law
relating to other than the property, affairs or gov-
ernment of such local government:
(1) The powers, duties, qualifications, number,
mode of selection and removal, terms of office,
compensation, hours of work, protection, welfare
and safety of its officers and employees, except that
cities and towns shall not have such power with
respect to members of the legislative body of the
county in their capacities as county officers.
(2) In the case of a city, town or village, the
membership and composition of its legislative
body.
(3) The transaction of its business.
(4) The incurring of its obligations, except that
local laws relating to financing by the issuance of
evidences of indebtedness by such local govern-
ment shall be consistent with laws enacted by the
legislature.
(5) The presentation, ascertainment and discharge
of claims against it.
(6) The acquisition, care, management and use of
its highways, roads, streets, avenues and property.
(7) The acquisition of its transit facilities and the
ownership and operation thereof.
(8) The levy, collection and administration of
local taxes authorized by the legislature and of
assessments for local improvements, consistent
with laws enacted by the legislature.
(9) The wages or salaries, the hours of work or
labor, and the protection, welfare and safety of
persons employed by any contractor or sub-
contractor performing work, labor or services for it.
(10) The government, protection, order, conduct,
safety, health and well-being of persons or property
therein.
(d) Except in the case of a transfer of functions
under an alternative form of county government, a
local government shall not have power to adopt
local laws which impair the powers of any other
local government.
1410 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:4
(e) The rights and powers of local governments
specified in this section insofar as applicable to any




34 North Dakota Imperio N.D. Cent. 40-05.1-06. Powers.
Code, § 40-
05.1-06 From and after the filing with the secretary of
(2009) state of a charter framed and approved in reason-
able conformity with the provisions of this chapter,
such city, and the citizens thereof, shall, if included
in the charter and implemented through ordinances,
have the following powers set out in this chapter:
I. To acquire, hold, operate, and dispose of
property within or without the corporate limits, and,
subject to chapter 32-15, exercise the right of
eminent domain for such purposes.
2. To control its finances and fiscal affairs; to
appropriate money for its purposes, and make
payment of its debts and expenses; to levy and
collect taxes, excises, fees, charges, and special
assessments for benefits conferred, for its public
and proprietary functions, activities, operations,
undertakings, and improvements; to contract debts,
borrow money, issue bonds, warrants, and other
evidences of indebtedness; to establish charges for
any city or other services, and to establish debt and
mill levy limitations, provided that all real and
personal property in order to be subject to the
assessment provisions of this subsection shall be
assessed in a uniform manner as prescribed by the
state board of equalization and the state supervisor
of assessments. The authority to levy taxes under
this subsection does not include authority to impose
income taxes.
3. To fix the fees, number, terms, conditions,
duration, and manner of issuing and revoking
licenses in the exercise of its governmental police
powers.
4. To provide for city officers, agencies, and
employees, their selection, terms, powers, duties,
qualifications, and compensation. To provide for
change, selection, or creation of its form and
structure of government, including its governing
body, executive officer, and city officers.
5. To provide for city courts, their jurisdiction
and powers over ordinance violations, duties,
administration, and the selection, qualifications,
and compensation of their officers; however, the
right of appeal from judgment of such courts shall
not be in any way affected.
6. To provide for all matters pertaining to city
elections, except as to qualifications of electors.
7. To provide for the adoption, amendment, and
repeal of ordinances, resolutions, and regulations to
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carry out its governmental and proprietary powers
and to provide for public health, safety, morals, and
welfare, and penalties for a violation thereof.
8. To lay out or vacate streets, alleys, and public
grounds, and to provide for the use, operation, and
regulation thereof.
9. To define offenses against private persons and
property and the public health, safety, morals, and
welfare, and provide penalties for violations
thereof.
10. To engage in any utility, business, or enter-
prise permitted by the constitution or not prohibited
by statute or to grant and regulate franchises
therefor to a private person, firm, corporation, or
limited liability company.
11. To provide for zoning, planning, and subdivi-
sion of public or private property within the city
limits. To provide for such zoning, planning, and
subdivision of public or private property outside the
city limits as may be permitted by state law.
12. To levy and collect franchise and license
taxes for revenue purposes.
13. To exercise in the conduct of its affairs all
powers usually exercised by a corporation.
14. To fix the boundary limits of said city and the
annexation and deannexation of territory adjacent
to said city except that such power shall be subject
to, and shall conform with the state law made and
provided.
15. To contract with and receive grants from any
other governmental entity or agency, with respect
to any local, state, or federal program, project, or
works.
16. To impose registration fees on motor vehicles,
farm machinery gross receipts taxes, alcoholic
beverage gross receipts taxes, or sales and use taxes
in addition to any other taxes imposed by law. After
December 31, 2005, sales and use taxes and gross
receipts taxes levied under this chapter:
a. Must conform in all respects with regard to
the taxable or exempt status of items under chapters
57-39.2, 57-39.5, 57-39.6, and 57-40.2 and may not
be imposed at multiple rates with the exception of
sales of electricity, piped natural or artificial gas, or
other heating fuels delivered by the seller or the
retail sale or transfer of motor vehicles, aircraft,
watercraft, modular homes, manufactured homes,
or mobile homes.
b. May not be newly imposed or changed
except to be effective on the first day of a calendar
quarterly period after a minimum of ninety days'
notice to the tax commissioner or, for purchases
from printed catalogs, on the first day of a calendar
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quarter after a minimum of one hundred twenty
days' notice to the seller.
c. May not be limited to apply to less than the
full value of the transaction or item as determined
for state sales and use tax purposes, except for farm
machinery gross receipts tax.
d. Must be subject to collection by the tax
commissioner under an agreement under section
57-01-02.1 and must be administered by the tax
commissioner in accordance with the relevant
provisions of chapter 57-39.2, including reporting
and paying requirements, correction of errors,
payment of refunds, and application of penalty and
interest.
It is the intention of this chapter to grant and
confirm to the people of all cities coming within its
provisions the full right of self-government in both
local and city matters within the powers enumer-
ated herein. The statutes of the state of North
Dakota, so far as applicable, shall continue to apply
to home rule cities, except insofar as superseded by
the charters of such cities or by ordinance passed
pursuant to such charters.
After December 31, 2005, any portion of a charter
or any portion of an ordinance passed pursuant to a
charter which does not conform to the requirements
of subsection 16 is invalid to the extent that it does
not conform.
The invalidity of a portion of a charter or ordinance
because it does not conform to subsection 16 does
not affect the validity of any other portion of the
charter or ordinance or the eligibility for a refund
under section 57-01-02.1. Any taxes imposed under
this chapter on farm machinery, farm irrigation
equipment, and farm machinery repair parts used
exclusively for agricultural purposes, or on alco-
holic beverages, which were in effect on December
31, 2005, become gross receipts taxes after Decem-
ber31, 2005.
35 Ohio Imperio Oh. Const. § 7. Municipal charter
Art. XVIII, § 7
(2009) Any municipality may frame and adopt or amend a
charter for its government and may, subject to the
provisions of section 3 of this article, exercise
thereunder all powers of local self-government.
36 Oklahoma Legislative Okl. Const. § 3(a). Framing and adoption of charter--Approval
Art. XVII, § by Governor--Effect--Record--Amendment
3(a) (2008)
Any city containing a population of more than
two thousand inhabitants may frame a charter for
its own government, consistent with and subject to
the Constitution and laws of this State, by causing a
board of freeholders, composed of two from each
ward, who shall be qualified electors of said city, to
be elected by the qualified electors of said city, at
any general or special election, whose duty it shall
be, within ninety days after such election, to pre-
pare and propose a charter for such city, which
shall be signed in duplicate by the members of such
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board or a majority of them, and returned, one copy
of said charter to the chief executive officer of such
city, and the other to the Register of Deeds of the
county in which said city shall be situated. Such
proposed charter shall then be published in one or
more newspapers published and of general circula-
tion within said city, for at least twenty-one days, if
in a daily paper, or in three consecutive issues, if in
a weekly paper, and the first publication shall be
made within twenty days after the completion of
the charter, and within thirty days, and not earlier
than twenty days after such publication, it shall be
submitted to the qualified electors of said city at a
general or special election, and if a majority of such
qualified electors voting thereon shall ratify the
same, it shall thereafter be submitted to the Gover-
nor for his approval, and the Governor shall ap-
prove the same if it shall not be in conflict with the
Constitution and laws of this State. Upon such
approval it shall become the organic law of such
city and supersede any existing charter and all
amendments thereof and all ordinances inconsistent
with it. A copy of such charter, certified by the
chief executive officer, and authenticated by the
seal of such city, setting forth the submission of
such charter to the electors and its ratification by
them shall, after the approval of such charter by the
Governor, be made in duplicate and deposited, one
in the office of the Secretary of State, and the other,
after being recorded in the office of said Register of
Deeds, shall be deposited in the archives of the city;
and thereafter all courts shall take judicial notice of
said charter. The charter so ratified may be
amended by proposals therefor, submitted by the
legislative authority of the city to the qualified
electors thereof (or by petition as hereinafter
provided) at a general or special election, and
ratified by a majority of the qualified electors
voting thereon, and approved by the Governor as
herein provided for the approval of the charter.
37 Oregon Legislative Ore. Const. Section 2. Formation of corporations; municipal
Art. XI, §§ 2, charters; intoxicating liquor regulation.
2a (2007).
Corporations may be formed under general laws,
but shall not be created by the Legislative Assem-
bly by special laws. The Legislative Assembly shall
not enact, amend or repeal any charter or act of
incorporation for any municipality, city or town.
The legal voters of every city and town are hereby
granted power to enact and amend their municipal
charter, subject to the Constitution and criminal
laws of the State of Oregon, and the exclusive
power to license, regulate, control, or to suppress or
prohibit, the sale of intoxicating liquors therein is
vested in such municipality; but such municipality
shall within its limits be subject to the provisions of
the local option law of the State of Oregon.
Section 2a. Merger of adjoining municipalities;
county-city consolidation.
(1) The Legislative Assembly, or the people by
the Initiative, may enact a general law providing a
method whereby an incorporated city or town or
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municipal corporation may surrender its charter and
be merged into an adjoining city or town, provided
a majority of the electors of each of the incorpo-
rated cities or towns or municipal corporations
affected authorize the surrender or merger, as the
case may be.
(2) In all counties having a city therein containing
over 300,000 inhabitants, the county and city
government thereof may be consolidated in such
manner as may be provided by law with one set of
officers. The consolidated county and city may be
incorporated under general laws providing for
incorporation for municipal purposes. The provi-
sions of this Constitution applicable to cities, and
also those applicable to counties, so far as not
inconsistent or prohibited to cities, shall be applica-
ble to such consolidated government.
38 Pennsylvania Legislative Pa. Const. Art. § 2. Home rule
9, § 2 (2008)
Municipalities shall have the right and power to
frame and adopt home rule charters. Adoption,
amendment or repeal of a home rule charter shall
be by referendum. The General Assembly shall
provide the procedure by which a home rule charter
may be framed and its adoption, amendment or
repeal presented to the electors. If the General
Assembly does not so provide, a home rule charter
or a procedure for framing and presenting a home
rule charter may be presented to the electors by
initiative or by the governing body of the munici-
pality. A municipality which has a home rule
charter may exercise any power or perform any
function not denied by this Constitution, by its
home rule charter or by the General Assembly at
any time.
39 Rhode Island Imperio RI. Const. § 2. Local legislative powers
Art. XIII, § 2
(2009) Every city and town shall have the power at any
time to adopt a charter, amend its charter, enact and
amend local laws relating to its property, affairs
and government not inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion and laws enacted by the general assembly in
conformity with the powers reserved to the general
assembly.
40 South Caro- Imperio S.C. Code § 5-7-30. Powers conferred upon municipalities;
lina Ann. § 5-7-30 surtax for parking spaces.
(2007)
Each municipality of the State, in addition to the
powers conferred to its specific form of govern-
ment, may enact regulations, resolutions, and
ordinances, not inconsistent with the Constitution
and general law of this State, including the exercise
of powers in relation to roads, streets, markets, law
enforcement, health, and order in the municipality
or respecting any subject which appears to it
necessary and proper for the security, general
welfare, and convenience of the municipality or for
preserving health, peace, order, and good govern-
ment in it, including the authority to levy and
collect taxes on real and personal property and as
otherwise authorized in this section, make assess-
ments, and establish uniform service charges
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relating to them; the authority to abate nuisances;
the authority to provide police protection in con-
tiguous municipalities and in unincorporated areas
located not more than three miles from the munici-
pal limits upon the request and agreement of the
governing body of such contiguous municipality or
the county, including agreement as to the bounda-
ries of such police jurisdictional areas, in which
case the municipal law enforcement officers shall
have the full jurisdiction, authority, rights, privi-
leges, and immunities, including coverage under
the workers' compensation law, which they have in
the municipality, including the authority to make
arrests, and to execute criminal process within the
extended jurisdictional area; provided, however,
that this shall not extend the effect of the laws of
the municipality beyond its corporate boundaries;
grant franchises for the use of public streets and
make charges for them; grant franchises and make
charges for the use of public beaches; engage in the
recreation function; levy a business license tax on
gross income, but a wholesaler delivering goods to
retailers in a municipality is not subject to the
business license tax unless he maintains within the
corporate limits of the municipality a warehouse or
mercantile establishment for the distribution of
wholesale goods; and a business engaged in making
loans secured by real estate is not subject to the
business license tax unless it has premises located
within the corporate limits of the municipality and
no entity which is exempt from the license tax
under another law nor a subsidiary or affiliate of an
exempt entity is subject to the business license tax;
borrow in anticipation of taxes; and pledge reve-
nues to be collected and the full faith and credit of
the municipality against its note and conduct
advisory referenda. The municipal governing body
may fix fines and penalties for the violation of
municipal ordinances and regulations not exceeding
five hundred dollars or imprisonment not exceeding
thirty days, or both.
For the purpose of providing and maintaining
parking for the benefit of a downtown commercial
area, a municipality may levy a surtax upon the
business license of a person doing business in a
designated area in an amount not to exceed fifty
percent of the current yearly business license tax
upon terms and conditions fixed by ordinance of
the municipal council. The area must be designated
by council only after a petition is submitted by not
less than two-thirds of the persons paying a busi-
ness license tax in the area and who paid not less
than one-half of the total business license tax
collected for the preceding calendar year requesting
the designation of the area. The business within the
designated area which is providing twenty-five or
more parking spaces for customer use is required to
pay not more than twenty-five percent of a surtax
levied pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph.
41 South Dakota Legislative S.D. Const. § 2.
Article IX, § 2
(2008) Any county or city or combinations thereof may
provide for the adoption or amendment of a charter.
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Such charter shall be adopted or amended if ap-
proved at an election by a majority of the votes cast
thereon. Not less than ten per cent of those voting
in the last preceding gubernatorial election in the
affected jurisdiction may by petition initiate the
question of whether to adopt or amend a charter.
A chartered governmental unit may exercise any
legislative power or perform any function not
denied by its charter, the Constitution or the general
laws of the state. The charter may provide for any
form of executive, legislative and administrative
structure which shall be of superior authority to
statute, provided that the legislative body so estab-
lished be chosen by popular election and that the
administrative proceedings be subject to judicial
review.
Powers and functions of home rule units shall be
construed liberally.
42 Tennessee Legislative Tenn. Const. Sec. 9. Power over local affairs - Home rule for
Art. XI, § 9 cities and counties -- Consolidation of functions.
(2009)
The Legislature shall have the right to vest such
powers in the Courts of Justice, with regard to
private and local affairs, as may be expedient.
The General Assembly shall have no power to pass
a special, local or private act having the effect of
removing the incumbent from any municipal or
county office or abridging the term or altering the
salary prior to the end of the term for which such
public officer was selected, and any act of the
General Assembly private or local in form or effect
applicable to a particular county or municipality
either in its governmental or its proprietary capacity
shall be void and of no effect unless the act by its
terms either requires the approval by a two-thirds
vote of the local legislative body of the municipal-
ity or county, or requires approval in an election by
a majority of those voting in said election in the
municipality or county affected.
Any municipality may by ordinance submit to its
qualified voters in a general or special election the
question: "Shall this municipality adopt home
rule?"
In the event of an affirmative vote by a majority of
the qualified voters voting thereon, and until the
repeal thereof by the same procedure, such munici-
pality shall be a home rule municipality, and the
General Assembly shall act with respect to such
home rule municipality only by laws which are
general in terms and effect.
Any municipality after adopting home rule may
continue to operate under its existing charter, or
amend the same, or adopt and thereafter amend a
new charter to provide for its governmental and
proprietary powers, duties and functions, and for
the form, structure, personnel and organization of
its government, provided that no charter provision
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except with respect to compensation of municipal
personnel shall be effective if inconsistent with any
general act of the General Assembly and provided
further that the power of taxation of such munici-
pality shall not be enlarged or increased except by
general act of the General Assembly. The General
Assembly shall by general law provide the exclu-
sive methods by which municipalities may be
created, merged, consolidated and dissolved and by
which municipal boundaries may be altered.
A charter or amendment may be proposed by
ordinance of any home rule municipality, by a
charter commission provided for by act of the
General Assembly and elected by the qualified
voters of a home rule municipality voting thereon
or, in the absence of such act of the General As-
sembly, by a charter commission of seven (7)
members, chosen at large not more often than once
in two (2) years, in a municipal election pursuant to
petition for such election signed by qualified voters
of a home rule municipality not less in number than
ten (10%) percent of those voting in the then most
recent general municipal election.
It shall be the duty of the legislative body of such
municipality to publish any proposal so made and
to submit the same to its qualified voters at the first
general state election which shall be held at least
sixty (60) days after such publication and such
proposal shall become effective sixty (60) days
after approval by a majority of the qualified voters
voting thereon.
The General Assembly shall not authorize any
municipality to tax incomes, estates, or inheri-
tances, or to impose any other tax not authorized by
Sections 28 or 29 of Article II of this Constitution.
Nothing herein shall be construed as invalidating
the provisions of any municipal charter in existence
at the time of the adoption of this amendment.
The General Assembly may provide for the con-
solidation of any or all of the governmental and
corporate functions now or hereafter vested in
municipal corporations with the governmental and
corporate functions now or hereafter vested in the
counties in which such municipal corporations are
located; provided, such consolidations shall not
become effective until submitted to the qualified
voters residing within the municipal corporation
and in the county outside thereof, and approved by
a majority of those voting within the municipal
corporation and by a majority of those voting in the
county outside the municipal corporation.
43 Texas Legislative Tex. Const. § 5. Cities of More Than 5,000 Population; Adop-
Art. XI, § 5 tion or Amendment of Charters; Taxes; Debt
(2009) Restrictions
Cities having more than five thousand (5000)
inhabitants may, by a majority vote of the qualified
voters of said city, at an election held for that
purpose, adopt or amend their charters. If the
number of inhabitants of cities that have adopted or
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amended their charters under this section is reduced
to five thousand (5000) or fewer, the cities still may
amend their charters by a majority vote of the
qualified voters of said city at an election held for
that purpose. The adoption or amendment of
charters is subject to such limitations as may be
prescribed by the Legislature, and no charter or any
ordinance passed under said charter shall contain
any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of
the State, or of the general laws enacted by the
Legislature of this State. Said cities may levy,
assess and collect such taxes as may be authorized
by law or by their charters; but no tax for any
purpose shall ever be lawful for any one year,
which shall exceed two and one-half per cent of the
taxable property of such city, and no debt shall ever
be created by any city, unless at the same time
provision be made to assess and collect annually a
sufficient sum to pay the interest thereon and
creating a sinking fund of at least two per cent
thereon. Furthermore, no city charter shall be
altered, amended or repealed oftener than every two
years.
44 Utah Imperio Utah Const. § 5. [Cities and towns not to be created by special
Art. Xl, § 5 laws - Legislature to provide for the incorporation,
(2008) organization, dissolution, and classification of cities
and towns -- Charter cities.]
The Legislature may not create cities or towns by
special laws.
The Legislature by statute shall provide for the
incorporation, organization and dissolution of cities
and towns and for their classification in proportion
to population. Any incorporated city or town may
frame and adopt a charter for its own government
in the following manner:
The legislative authority of the city may, by two-
thirds vote of its members, and upon petition of
qualified electors to the number of fifteen per cent
of all votes cast at the next preceding election for
the office of the mayor, shall forthwith provide by
ordinance for the submission to the electors of the
question: "Shall a commission be chosen to frame a
charter?" The ordinance shall require that the
question be submitted to the electors at the next
regular municipal election. The ballot containing
such question shall also contain the names of
candidates for members of the proposed commis-
sion, but without party designation. Such candi-
dates shall be nominated in the same manner as
required by law for nomination of city officers. If a
majority of the electors voting on the question of
choosing a commission shall vote in the affirma-
five, then the fifteen candidates receiving a majority
of the votes cast at such election, shall constitute
the charter commission, and shall proceed to frame
a charter.
Any charter so framed shall be submitted to the
qualified electors of the city at an election to be
held at a time to be determined by the charter
commission, which shall be not less than sixty days
subsequent to its completion and distribution
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among the electors and not more than one year
from such date. Alternative provisions may also be
submitted to be voted upon separately. The com-
mission shall make provisions for the distribution
of copies of the proposed charter and of any alter-
native provisions to the qualified electors of the
city, not less than sixty days before the election at
which it is voted upon. Such proposed charter and
such alternative provisions as are approved by a
majority of the electors voting thereon, shall
become an organic law of such city at such time as
may be fixed therein, and shall supersede any
existing charter and all laws affecting the organiza-
tion and government of such city which are now in
conflict therewith. Within thirty days after its
approval a copy of such charter as adopted, certi-
fied by the mayor and city recorder and authenti-
cated by the seal of such city, shall be made in
duplicate and deposited, one in the office of the
secretary of State and the other in the office of the
city recorder, and thereafter all courts shall take
judicial notice of such charter.
Amendments to any such charter may be framed
and submitted by a charter commission in the same
manner as provided for making of charters, or may
be proposed by the legislative authority of the city
upon a two-thirds vote thereof, or by petition of
qualified electors to a number equal to fifteen per
cent of the total votes cast for mayor on the next
preceding election, and any such amendment may
be submitted at the next regular municipal election,
and having been approved by the majority of the
electors voting thereon, shall become part of the
charter at the time fixed in such amendment and
shall be certified and filed as provided in case of
charters.
Each city forming its charter under this section
shall have, and is hereby granted, the authority to
exercise all powers relating to municipal affairs,
and to adopt and enforce within its limits, local
police, sanitary and similar regulations not in
conflict with the general law, and no enumeration
of powers in this constitution or any law shall be
deemed to limit or restrict the general grant of
authority hereby conferred; but this grant of author-
ity shall not include the power to regulate public
utilities, not municipally owned, if any such regula-
tion of public utilities is provided for by general
law, nor be deemed to limit or restrict the power of
the legislature in matters relating to State affairs, to
enact general laws applicable alike to all cities of
the State.
The power to be conferred upon the cities by this
section shall include the following:
(a) To levy, assess and collect taxes and borrow
money, within the limits prescribed by general law,
and to levy and collect special assessments for
benefits conferred.
(b) To furnish all local public services, to pur-
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chase, hire, construct, own, maintain and operate,
or lease, public utilities local in extent and use; to
acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, within or
without the corporate limits, property necessary for
any such purposes, subject to restrictions imposed
by general law for the protection of other communi-
ties; and to grant local public utility franchises and
within its powers regulate the exercise thereof.
(c) To make local public improvements and to
acquire by condemnation, or otherwise, property
within its corporate limits necessary for such
improvements; and also to acquire an excess over
than [that] needed for any such improvement and to
sell or lease such excess property with restrictions,
in order to protect and preserve the improvement.
(d) To issue and sell bonds on the security of any
such excess property, or of any public utility owned
by the city, or of the revenues thereof, or both,
including, in the case of public utility, a franchise
stating the terms upon which, in case of foreclo-
sure, the purchaser may operate such utility.
45 Vermont
46 Virginia Imperio Va. Code § 15.2-1102. General grant of power; enumeration
Ann. § 15.2- of powers not exclusive; limitations on exercise of
1102 (2009) power
A municipal corporation shall have and may
exercise all powers which it now has or which may
hereafter be conferred upon or delegated to it under
the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth
and all other powers pertinent to the conduct of the
affairs and functions of the municipal government,
the exercise of which is not expressly prohibited by
the Constitution and the general laws of the Com-
monwealth, and which are necessary or desirable to
secure and promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the municipality and the safety,
health, peace, good order, comfort, convenience,
morals, trade, commerce and industry of the mu-
nicipality and the inhabitants thereof, and the
enumeration of specific powers shall not be con-
strued or held to be exclusive or as a limitation
upon any general grant of power, but shall be
construed and held to be in addition to any general
grant of power. The exercise of the powers con-
ferred under this section is specifically limited to
the area within the corporate limits of the munici-
pality, unless otherwise conferred in the applicable
sections of the Constitution and general laws, as
amended, of the Commonwealth.
47 Washington Legislative Wash. Const. § 10. Incorporation of municipalities
Art. XI,§ 10
(2009) Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be
created by special laws; but the legislature, by
general laws, shall provide for the incorporation,
organization and classification in proportion to
population, of cities and towns, which laws may be
altered, amended or repealed. Cities and towns
heretofore organized, or incorporated may become
organized under such general laws whenever a
majority of the electors voting at a general election,
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shall so determine, and shall organize in conformity
therewith; and cities or towns heretofore or hereaf-
ter organized, and all charters thereof framed or
adopted by authority of this Constitution shall be
subject to and controlled by general laws. Any city
containing a population of ten thousand inhabitants,
or more, shall be permitted to frame a charter for its
own government, consistent with and subject to the
Constitution and laws of this state, and for such
purpose the legislative authority of such city may
cause an election to be had at which election there
shall be chosen by the qualified electors of said
city, fifteen freeholders thereof, who shall have
been residents of said city for a period of at least
two years preceding their election and qualified
electors, whose duty it shall be to convene within
ten days after their election, and prepare and
propose a charter for such city. Such proposed
charter shall be submitted to the qualified electors
of said city, and if a majority of such qualified
electors voting thereon ratify the same, it shall
become the charter of said city, and shall become
the organic law thereof, and supersede any existing
charter including amendments thereto, and all
special laws inconsistent with such charter. Said
proposed charter shall be published in the daily
newspaper of largest general circulation published
in the area to be incorporated as a first class city
under the charter or, if no daily newspaper is
published therein, then in the newspaper having the
largest general circulation within such area at least
once each week for four weeks next preceding the
day of submitting the same to the electors for their
approval, as above provided. All elections in this
section authorized shall only be had upon notice,
which notice shall specify the object of calling such
election, and shall be given as required by law. Said
elections may be general or special elections, and
except as herein provided shall be governed by the
law regulating and controlling general or special
elections in said city. Such charter may be amended
by proposals therefor submitted by the legislative
authority of such city to the electors thereof at any
general election after notice of said submission
published as above specified, and ratified by a
majority of the qualified electors voting thereon. In
submitting any such charter, or amendment thereto,
any alternate article or proposition may be pre-
sented for the choice of the voters, and may be
voted on separately without prejudice to others.
48 West Virginia Imperio W. Va. Const. § 39(a). Home Rule for Municipalities
Art. VI, § 39a
(2008) No local or special law shall hereafter be passed
incorporating cities, towns or villages, or amending
their charters. The legislature shall provide by
general laws for the incorporation and government
of cities, towns and villages and shall classify such
municipal corporations, upon the basis of popula-
tion, into not less than two nor more than five
classes. Such general laws shall restrict the powers
of such cities, towns and villages to borrow money
and contract debts, and shall limit the rate of taxes
for municipal purposes, in accordance with section
one, article ten of the Constitution of the State of
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West Virginia. Under such general laws, the
electors of each municipal corporation, wherein the
population exceeds two thousand, shall have power
and authority to frame, adopt and amend the charter
of such corporation, or to amend an existing charter
thereof, and through its legally constituted author-
ity, may pass all laws and ordinances relating to its
municipal affairs: Provided, that any such charter or
amendment thereto, and any such law or ordinance
so adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent
or in conflict with this Constitution or the general
laws of the State then in effect, or thereafter, from
time to time enacted.
49 Wisconsin Imperio Wis. Const. Section 3. Municipal home rule; debt limit; tax to
Art. XI, § 3 pay debt.
(2008)
[As amended Nov. 1874, Nov. 1912, Nov. 1924,
See Bleck v. Nov. 1932, April 1951, April 1955, Nov. 1960,
Monona April 1961, April 1963, April 1966 and April 1981]
Village, 148
N.W.2d 708 (1) Cities and villages organized pursuant to state
(1967) (deter- law may determine their local affairs and govern-
mining that ment, subject only to this constitution and to such
home rule enactments of the legislature of statewide concern
applies to as with uniformity shall affect every city or every
local govern- village. The method of such determination shall be
ments only prescribed by the legislature.
when they
have first been (2) No county, city, town, village, school district,
validly organ- sewerage district or other municipal corporation
ized pursuant may become indebted in an amount that exceeds an
to state law). allowable percentage of the taxable property
located therein equalized for state purposes as
provided by the legislature. In all cases the allow-
able percentage shall be 5 percent except as speci-
fied in pars. (a) and (b):
(a) For any city authorized to issue bonds for
school purposes, an additional 10 percent shall be
permitted for school purposes only, and in such
cases the territory attached to the city for school
purposes shall be included in the total taxable
property supporting the bonds issued for school
purposes.
(b) For any school district which offers no less than
grades one to 12 and which at the time of incurring
such debt is eligible for the highest level of school
aids, 10 percent shall be permitted.
(3) Any county, city, town, village, school district,
sewerage district or other municipal corporation
incun-ing any indebtedness under sub. (2) shall,
before or at the time of doing so, provide for the
collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay
the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to
pay and discharge the principal thereof within 20
years from the time of contracting the same.
(4) When indebtedness under sub. (2) is incurred in
the acquisition of lands by cities, or by counties or
sewerage districts having a population of 150,000
or over, for public, municipal purposes, or for the
permanent improvement thereof, or to purchase,
acquire, construct, extend, add to or improve a
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sewage collection or treatment system which
services all or a part of such city or county, the city,
county or sewerage district incurring the indebted-
ness shall, before or at the time of so doing, provide
for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to
pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also
to pay and discharge the principal thereof within a
period not exceeding 50 years from the time of
contracting the same.
(5) An indebtedness created for the purpose of
purchasing, acquiring, leasing, constructing, ex-
tending, adding to, improving, conducting, control-
ling, operating or managing a public utility of a
town, village, city or special district, and secured
solely by the property or income of such public
utility, and whereby no municipal liability is
created, shall not be considered an indebtedness of
such town, village, city or special district, and shall
not be included in arriving at the debt limitation
under sub. (2).
50 Wyoming lmperio Wyo. Const. § 1. Incorporation; alteration of boundaries;
Art. 13, § I merger, consolidation; dissolution; determination of
(2008) local affairs; classification; referendum; liberal
construction
(a) The legislature shall provide by general law,
applicable to all cities and towns,
(i) For the incorporation of cities,
(ii) For the methods by which city and town
boundaries may be altered, and
(iii) For the procedures by which cities and towns
may be merged, consolidated or dissolved; pro-
vided that existing laws on such subjects and laws
pertaining to civil service, retirement, collective
bargaining, the levying of taxes, excises, fees, or
any other charges, whether or not applicable to all
cities and towns on the effective date of this
amendment, shall remain in effect until superseded
by general law and such existing laws shall not be
subject to charter ordinance.
(b) All cities and towns are hereby empowered to
determine their local affairs and government as
established by ordinance passed by the governing
body, subject to referendum when prescribed by the
legislature, and further subject only to statutes
uniformly applicable to all cities and towns, and to
statutes prescribing limits of indebtedness. The
levying of taxes, excises, fees, or any other charges
shall be prescribed by the legislature. The legisla-
ture may not establish more than four (4) classes of
cities and towns. Each city and town shall be
governed by all other statutes, except as it may
exempt itself by charter ordinance as hereinafter
provided.
(c) Each city or town may elect that the whole or
any part of any statute, other than statutes uni-
formly applicable to all cities and towns and
statutes prescribing limits of indebtedness, may not
apply to such city or town. This exemption shall be
by charter ordinance passed by a two-thirds (2/3)
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vote of all members elected to the governing body
of the city or town. Each such charter ordinance
shall be titled and may provide that the whole or
any part of any statute, which would otherwise
apply to such city or town as specifically desig-
nated in the ordinance shall not apply to such city
or town. Such ordinance may provide other provi-
sions on the same subject. Every charter ordinance
shall be published once each week for two consecu-
tive weeks in the official city or town newspaper, if
any, otherwise in a newspaper of general circula-
tion in the city or town. No charter ordinance shall
take effect until the sixtieth (60th) day after its final
publication. If prior thereto, a petition, signed by a
number of qualified electors of the city or town,
equaling at least ten per cent (10%) of the number
of votes cast at the last general municipal election,
shall be filed in the office of the clerk of such city
or town, demanding that such ordinance be submit-
ted to referendum, then the ordinance shall not take
effect unless approved by a majority of the electors
voting thereon. Such referendum election shall be
called within thirty (30) days and held within ninety
(90) days after the petition is filed. An ordinance
establishing procedures, and fixing the date of such
election shall be passed by the governing body and
published once each week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in the official city or town newspaper, if any,
otherwise in a newspaper of general circulation in
the city or town. The question on the ballot shall
be: "Shall Charter Ordinance No.... Entitled
(stating the title of the ordinance) take effect?". The
governing body may submit, without a petition, any
charter ordinance to referendum election under the
procedures as previously set out. The charter
ordinance shall take effect if approved by a major-
ity of the electors voting thereon. An approved
charter ordinance, after becoming effective, shall be
recorded by the clerk in a book maintained for that
purpose with a certificate of the procedures of
adoption. A certified copy of the ordinance shall be
filed with the secretary of state, who shall keep an
index of such ordinances. Each charter ordinance
enacted shall prevail over any prior act of the
governing body of the city or town, and may be
repealed or amended only by subsequent charter
ordinance, or by enactments of the legislature
applicable to all cities and towns.
(d) The powers and authority granted to cities and
towns, pursuant to this section, shall be liberally
construed for the purpose of giving the largest
measure of self-government to cities and towns.
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VERTICAL LEARNING: ON BAKER AND RODRIGUEZ'S
"CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE AND JUDICIAL SCRUTINY"
NESTOR M. DAVIDSONt
INTRODUCTION
In Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny,' Lynn Baker
and Daniel Rodriguez start an important conversation about an interest-
ing and understudied puzzle.2 In one view of vertical federalism, the
federal government is understood as constrained to enumerated powers,
states retain plenary police power, and local governments are traditional-
ly creatures of the state. This view yields something of structural consti-
tutional bell curve that situates the heart of sovereignty at the state level,
leaving the federal government and local governments with forms of
limited authority on either end. Despite this seemingly privileged state
position, however, federal courts seem unwilling in the main to protect
states from federal power in direct conflicts arising under the Tenth
Amendment. Local governments asserting arguably equivalent home
rule constitutional provisions as a shield against those same states more
often get their day in state court.
To Baker and Rodriguez, this conundrum can be understood largely
as a question of differing self-conceptions of judicial competence at the
federal and state level. State courts are comfortable with routinely decid-
ing whether a matter is "local" or of "statewide concern" in interpreting
constitutional home rule provisions. The U.S. Supreme Court, by con-
trast, has declared that divining a line between proper federal and state
authority-at least in the context of state regulatory immunity under the
Tenth Amendment-is functionally "unworkable.",
3
Baker and Rodriguez's tentative conclusion from this juxtaposition
is that the federal courts-and it would seem, by extension, critics of
resurgent state-centered federalism jurisprudence-should look to the
state example and stop worrying so much about the difficulty of develop-
ing an elegant theory of governance scale that would, ex ante, provide
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
1. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny,
86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337 (2009).
2. Baker and Rodriguez's article is the first part of a larger project that will examine in depth
the parallels between federalism and localism as a case study in comparative domestic constitutional
law. See id. at 1372.
3. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) ("Mhe attempt to draw
the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not
only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism."); see Baker &
Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1364-65 (discussing Garcia).
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clear theoretical lines between levels of governments. State courts, they
argue, have proven adept at developing a constitutional common law in
this area and the federal courts should learn from this example. As Baker
and Rodriguez put it, "if the state courts are in fact doing a good job"
developing a jurisprudence to police the state-local boundary under con-
stitutional home rule, "it would suggest that the task is far from impossi-
ble and, indeed, that the U.S. Supreme Court might do well to follow the
state courts' lead."4
This is a compelling argument in many respects, but worthy of
some caution. In this brief comment, I want to suggest ways in which
Baker and Rodriguez may be overly dismissive of the pragmatics of fed-
eral-court review of federal-state conflicts and conversely overly san-
guine about the efficacy of state-court supervision of the state-local di-
vide. Ultimately, the question should be not whether state courts are
forging a path that federal courts have mistakenly abjured, but rather
under what circumstances any court reviewing vertical constitutional
conflicts should displace the political process that has created the conflict
in the first place.
There are no easy answers here, and Rodriguez and Baker have per-
suasively framed a parallelism that deserves serious attention. It is worth
asking, however, when it is justified to displace normative debates about
specific policy disputes into the realm of judicial review of governmental
scale, rather than as a practical matter to leave those debates, as federal
courts often do, to the give and take of intergovernmental collaboration
and conflict. It may be that in answering this question, it is state courts
that have lessons to learn from their federal counterparts, rather than the
other way around.
I. A (PARTIALLY) UNIFIED DISCOURSE OF VERTICAL CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUCTURE
In reflecting on Baker and Rodriguez's project, it is useful to start
with a little taxonomical brush clearing. It is well rehearsed that vertical
intergovernmental conflicts-federal versus state as well as state versus
local-involve a handful of recurring patterns. In one pattern, the ques-
tion is whether the relevant government has the power to act-in .local
government parlance, the power of initiation. 5 The second pattern in-
volves questions of preemption and immunity, where power to act runs
4. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1365.
5. See Daniel Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 637-42 (2001)
(discussing local legal power to act and local legal immunity). Questions of baseline authority to act
and intrinsic limitations on that authority are not limited to local government. The same issue arises
at the federal level, see, for example, United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (determining the
scope of Congress' powers under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment), and the state level,
see, for example, Mun. City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind. 2003) (striking down a
state statute as violating a state constitutional prohibition on special legislation).
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into the (potentially) disabling authority of another level of government.
6
And in the interstices of these conflicts, courts must grapple with com-
plications that relate to whether the source of asserted authority or im-
munity is constitutional or legislative.7
I mention these basics to point out that from the panoply of poten-
tial vertical conflicts, Baker and Rodriguez draw their lessons about
state-court jurisprudence from a relatively narrow subset. In particular,
Baker and Rodriguez highlight (granted, not exclusively) the parallelism
between state court review of local immunity under constitutional, impe-
rio in imperium, home rule8 and federal court review of state immunity
under the Tenth Amendment. 9
This is an intriguing ground of unification between federal-state and
state-local conflicts, but it is not the only parallelism between these two
arenas. Federal courts, for example, have proven perfectly capable of
wading into vertical constitutional conflicts in the context, for example,
of federal preemption. t Similarly, federal courts have adjudicated fed-
eral-state conflicts over the Commerce Clause outside Tenth-
Amendment constraints,"' the Spending Clause,1 2 and other sources of
federal power.
Taking these types of cases as a whole, it is worth remembering that
federal courts have developed a jurisprudence of federal-state allocation
of power through the very kind of case-by-case, common-law-like adju-
dicative accretion that Baker and Rodriguez rightly identify with the
work of state courts interpreting home rule provisions.' 3 This is not to
say that this federal jurisprudence is necessarily internally coherent or
normatively defensible in any given instance. Nor is this to argue that in
these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal courts are con-
fronting the nature of reserved state sovereignty as directly or explicitly
as the Court did in Garcia and the case it overturned, National League of
6. As with questions of the authority to act, there is consistency about disputes over immuni-
ty and preemption at varying levels of intergovernmental conflict. This question arises whenever a
federal statute potentially displaces state authority, see, for example, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (2009), and arises in very similar terms whenever a state statute potentially displaces local
authority, see, for example, City of Davenport v. Seymore, 755 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa 2008).
7. On this score, again, there is parallelism, although its texture may be more nuanced. In
many federal-state conflicts, there is both a statutory question (can the federal regime coexist with
the state regime?) and a constitutional question (if not, does the federal government prevail as a
matter of the Supremacy Clause, or is there some protection, from the Tenth Amendment or other-
wise, that immunizes the state?). Likewise, state courts grappling with state-local conflicts often
have to resolve both a predicate statutory and then a subsequent constitutional question.
8. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1349-64.
9. Id. at 1364-65.
10. See, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187.
11. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
12. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
13. For a thoughtful discussion of the accretive, common-law-like approach to federalism
disputes evident at the federal level, see Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity,
Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L REV. 1733 (2005).
2009]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Cities v. Usery.14 Nonetheless, although the question confronting the
Court in these cases is less the abstract meaning of the spheres of "na-
tional" and "state" authority or even the direct question of the scope of
state sovereignty, federalism cases are rife with such concerns nonethe-
less. In divining the lessons that federal courts might learn from their
state-court counterparts, we should thus not underestimate the breadth of
the role that federal courts play in policing federal-state conflicts, even if
in many situations the outcome is some form of vindication of federal
supremacy.
H. IS VERTICAL STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REALLY A
QUESTION OF JUDICIAL COMPETENCE?
What, then, of Baker and Rodriguez's paradigm comparison-
Tenth Amendment timidity at the federal level versus a work-a-day con-
stitutional home rule jurisprudence at the state level? If Baker and Ro-
driguez's central argument is about judicial competence to decide ques-
tions of intergovernmental power conflicts, then it is worth pausing to
think about how courts approach that task.
We might think of three modes of analysis here, although they over-
lap significantly in practice (and this is hardly an exhaustive list). First,
there are formalist approaches to dividing vertical power. As Baker and
Rodriguez note, courts look to the relevant constitutional text, historical
practice, and seemingly fixed categories to discern binding principles to
follow.
Next, there is a basic pragmatist reasoning that informs many fede-
ralism and localism decisions. Here, courts are trying to discern whether
a given division of labor between levels of government produces "better"
outcomes. These outcomes can be argued on any number of grounds-
experimentalism yields diversity in policy approaches; local or state or
federal officials have the resources/political incentives/relevant exper-
tise/fill-in-the-blank advantage to solve this particular problem; situating
authority at this or that level provides more accountability; and so forth.
These are all practical judgments about collective welfare that courts try
to get at by using rough proxies in vertical constitutional structure and
comparative institutionalism.
Finally, there are various normative screens that courts apply to re-
solve vertical conflicts. These normative screens can relate to values we
associate with federalism or localism, or they might perhaps more impli-
citly relate to whatever the underlying regulation addresses. Thus, while
a court that might not rely on a testable hypothesis that subsidiary yields
more efficient or distributionally just outcomes, the court may nonethe-
less decide that a system that devolves power and responsibility to the
14. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
1428 [Vol. 86:4
VERTICAL LEARNING
smallest practical unit of government is preferable given (small d) demo-
cratic values. But a court might also decide that-for reasons that have
nothing to do with values associated with vertical structure-validating
or invalidating civil rights, property rights, the rights of gun owners and
the like is best served by locating power at any given level of govern-
ment.
In assessing what courts are "essentially doing when they review
state/local conflicts" and the insights that this analysis yields for "larger
matters of judicial capability and doctrinal efficiency," 5 Baker and Ro-
driguez highlight the line between pragmatism and normativity un-
moored by the actual values of federalism or localism, however indeter-
minate. It is at this juncture that I think we need to pause.
To begin, Baker and Rodriguez seem to acknowledge that formal-
ism is not doing much real work here. At the federal level, the text of the
Tenth Amendment is famously opaque16 and there was good reason for
the Court to throw up its hands in Garcia over the quest for defensible
indicia of historical tradition embedded in that text. 17 At the state/local
level, there is perhaps more text and tradition on which to rely, but is
"local" or "municipal" or "statewide concern" as an intrinsic guide any
less tautological?'
8
Turning then to the other two approaches, Baker and Rodriguez find
in the state court experience pragmatic, if not perfect, judgments about
comparative institutional competence between local and state govern-
ments. As they put it, courts in constitutional home rule cases are really
making judgments about the "best institutions to implement intrastate
public policy,"'19 which is essentially an assessment of appropriate go-
vernance structure.
This is certainly a more promising ground for defending the courts'
work in vertical constitutional conflicts than plain formalism, but here is
where the line between pragmatic and normative judgment gets tricky.
There is a good argument that, in run-of-the-mill vertical conflicts,
pragmatism is as functionally indeterminate as formalism. For every
15. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1339.
16. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (Tenth Amendment "re-
strains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment
itself, which,. . . is essentially a tautology"); see also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending
After Lopez, 95 CoLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1924 n. 47 (1995) (discussing the source of Tenth Amend-
ment protection for states).
17. Cf. Young, supra note 13, at 1736 ("[flt seems fair to say that although those sources of
law have been highly relevant to the Court's enterprise, neither text nor history has dictated many of
the resulting doctrines.").
18. Baker and Rodriguez cite to various categorical distinctions state courts have made in
home rule cases, such as "health, safety, and welfare," land use, employee relations, civil rights, and
taxing. Each of these categories, however, represents more of a starting point for analysis that hard-
ly determines the conclusion and their own analysis underscores the internal contradictions evident
within the categories. See Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1356-64.
19. Id. at 1354.
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claim about Brandeis's laboratories of democracy, one can make an
equally compelling counter-argument about economies of scale or the
benefits of uniformity.
The Telluride decision, 20 which Baker and Rodriguez cite, illu-
strates this well. By what pragmatic metric can a court really say that
"rent control" is a matter of local, state, or mixed concern, if the question
is about comparative governance capabilities? Obviously, the Colorado
Supreme Court got there, finding the matter to have both local and state-
wide implications. 21 The court's discussion of extraterritorial impact and
the value of uniformity could as easily have been replaced with debates
about the instrumental value of local control of housing markets and the
interests of vulnerable renters. I could make similar arguments about the
regulation of firearms, civil rights, competition over tax revenues, and
the other staples of home rule jurisprudence that Baker and Rodriguez
discuss.
This is not to say that such debates are irresolvable, but rather that
the tools available to courts-state and federal-to make fine-grained
assessments about comparative institutional competence and the appro-
priate scale of governance have significant limitations. If the empirical
ground for preferring one level of government to another is contestable,
it leaves the sinking suspicion that what is really driving decisions are
normative judgments about what Baker and Rodriguez called "substan-
tive regulatory choices."
22
Baker and Rodriguez acknowledge that how they assess structural
doctrine "is bound up with" their views about underlying substance,
2 3
which is perfectly legitimate (indeed, perhaps inevitable) from a scholar-
ly perspective. The problem arises when courts engage in the same
melding between judgments about structure and substance, with norma-
tive judgments about substantive policy being decided through proxies
about government scale that are imperfect at best. I think much of what
gives pause to critics of federalism decisions that purport to discern a
clear line between spheres of state and federal authority, under the Tenth
Amendment and in other areas, has to do with a certain discomfort with
how elusive it is in practice to disaggregate these two strands of value
judgment.
All of this suggests that state courts, no less than their federal coun-
terparts, should be as transparent as possible about their grounds of deci-
20. Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30 (Colo. 2000).
21. The court also invokes a categorical view, asking whether the issue is one "traditionally
regulated at the state or local level." Id. at 39. Land use is about as paradigmatically local as an
issue gets, but the Court gave this tradition almost no weight, finding instead that "rent control" is an
issue that states have taken interest in.
22. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1345.
23. Id. at 1348.
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sion in refereeing state-local disputes. Discerning some inherent mean-
ing in concepts like "local" and "statewide" can prove a tempting ground
on which to make proxy judgments about the merits of whatever it is the
state and local governments are fighting over in the first place.
III. LEARNING FROM GARCIA: Is THERE ANYTHING TO THE POLITICAL
SAFEGUARDS OF LOCALISM?
If there are intrinsic reasons for being cautious about the "judicial
capability and doctrinal efficacy" 24 of dividing state from local, might
that intuition be bolstered by importing a state-local version of the well-
worn move at the federal level of giving weight to structural political
protections? 25 In other words, can we have any faith in the "political
safeguards of localism"? 26
Baker and Rodriguez say no, arguing that localities are even more
underrepresented in state structure than the states are in the U.S. Senate,
primarily because representation in state legislatures does not "respect
the geographic boundaries of municipalities. 27 This is true, but it ig-
nores the incentives that state representatives have to be sensitive to local
constituencies nonetheless. It also underplays the ability that local gov-
ernments or groups of local governments have to promote their collective
self-interest in local autonomy, even if they may not have a stake in any
one particular state-local conflict.
I do not profess to know whether, empirically, these safeguards are
sufficient in all instances to protect local governments from the state
legislature (or, conversely, adequate to protect statewide interests when
localities prevail). At this juncture, however, I think that there is enough
of an argument to suggest caution about any theory of less-than-
deferential judicial review predicated on the assumption of the inherent
political vulnerability of local governments.
It is certainly true that courts are limited in their ability to probe ex-
plicitly whether local governments and the citizens they represent can
adequately protect themselves in the state political process. That is an
important question nonetheless to attempt to answer before stepping too
eagerly into the business of overriding that very political process. Trust-
ing the judiciary to make hard substantive calls (in the name of govern-
mental scale, no less) risks obscuring the real choices facing the political
system.
24. Id. at 1339.
25. For all the well-aimed bricks that have been thrown at its edifice, see, for example, Baker,
supra note 16, at 1939-47, Herbert Wechsler's The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954), remains an influential articulation of the rationale for limited judicial oversight of federal-
state conflicts.
26. Rodriguez, supra note 5, at 630 n. 16.
27. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 1368.
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CONCLUSION
What comparative lessons do state court decisions on constitutional
home rule hold for those evaluating the jurisprudence of federalism? In
asking this question, Baker and Rodriguez-both in Constitutional Home
Rule and Judicial Scrutiny and in the larger project it presages-are min-
ing a valuable and underappreciated vein of experience. That state courts
have managed to forge workable approaches to divining the line between
local and state, however, does not necessarily mean that the U.S. Su-
preme Court is wrong to tread carefully when faced with clashes between
states and the federal government. This is particularly so in the heartland
of cases on which Baker and Rodriguez focus, in the Tenth Amendment
context, where the horizontal comparative institutional question is most
stark because the moorings provided to the Court are hardest to grasp.
The U.S. Supreme Court cannot avoid the task any more than state courts
can avoid deciding constitutional home rule cases, but there is something
to be said for the reticence with which the Court approaches the task.
TELLURIDE'S TALE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, HOME RULE,
AND RETROACTiVITY
RICHARD B. COLLINS t
Telluride is an upscale ski town located at the closed end of a box
canyon in southwestern Colorado. In 2000, the town began to set aside
twenty percent of annual revenue in a fund to acquire private land be-
tween the town boundary and the canyon's mouth, the area known as the
Valley Floor.' The landowner was determined to develop the property
commercially; town residents were equally determined to acquire it for
parks, recreation, and open space. The principal landowner was the San
Miguel Valley Corporation.2 Its main owner is billionaire Neal Blue,
CEO of General Atomics Corporation of San Diego, a major defense
contractor. 3 Blue is a Denver native whose parents were successful in-
vestors and financiers. His mother, a state treasurer and University of
Colorado Regent, is honored in a stained glass window in the State Capi-
tol.4  Neal Blue bought the Valley Floor in 1983 for a reported six to
seven million dollars.5 General Atomics is best known as maker of the
Predator drone aircraft.6 A Fortune magazine article about Blue said that
his take-no-prisoners style in business gave him the personal nickname
of "The Predator.",
7
In 2002, town voters by popular initiative adopted Ordinance No.
1174 to condemn 572 acres of the Valley Floor next to the town owned
by San Miguel Valley Corporation.8 A Notice of Intent to Acquire was
t Professor, University of Colorado. Thanks to faculty colleagues who made useful sugges-
tions at a faculty workshop on a draft of this paper. Ben Schler and Brad Watts, both University of
Colorado class of 2010, provided valuable research assistance.
1. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2008).
2. Bruce V. Bigelow, A Rockies Saga, SAN DIEGO UNION TRiB., Mar. 25, 2007, at Fl, avail-
able at http://www.signonsandiego.comluniontrib/20070325/news-tz I b25bigelow.html.
3. See id.
4. See Matt Potter, General Atomics: Color it Blue, SAN DIEGO WKLY. READER, July 12,
2001, available at http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2001/jul1Y2/general-aton-ics-color-it-blue;
Colo. State Archives, Colorado State Capitol Virtual Tour, http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/ arc-
hives /cap/blue.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
5. See Bigelow, supra note 2, at Fl.
6. See Potter, supra note 4.
7. See Barney Gimbel, The Predator, FORTuNE, Nov. 10, 2008, at 122, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/28/magazines/fortune/predator--gimbel.fortune/index.htm.
8. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2008). The
parcel taken was reported to be "almost two-thirds" of Blue's holdings in the valley. Bruce V.
Bigelow, Setback for S.D. Industrialist, SAN DIEGO UNION TRW., May 10, 2007, at CI, available at
http:lwww.signonsandiego.comluniontrib/200705 10/news_lblOblue.html. The trial record showed
that the corporation retained 233 acres and related water rights. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 3
n.2, Telluride, 185 P.3d 161 (No. 07SA101), 2007 WL 4312700; see also Telluride Town Council
Res. No. 1, ex.a (2006) (on file with author) (describing the larger holding involved in the proposed
settlement of the dispute).
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served on the landowner the following July, followed by on offer to pur-
chase that the landowner rejected. The town filed its condemnation ac-
tion on March 26, 2004.9 Shortly before that, the landowner procured an
amendment to a pending bill in the legislature on regulating eminent
domain in urban renewal.10 The amendment became law the following
June. It forbids extraterritorial eminent domain by Colorado municipali-
ties for purposes of parks, recreation, and open space." This provision
was expressly retroactive to January 1 of that year and was popularly
called the Telluride Amendment. 12 The landowner moved to dismiss the
condemnation action based on the statute, but the district court held the
statute invalid under the Colorado Home Rule Amendment and denied
the motion.13 As discussed below, this ruling was reasonably faithful to
Colorado precedents.
The district court ordered mediation, and negotiations were held for
over a year under guidance of a retired judge.' 4 In December 2005, town
officials reached a tentative compromise with the landowner, which
would have provided for annexation of all of respondent's Valley Floor
land, allowed development of about nine percent of it, and preserved the
rest. 1 5  But the condemnation ordinance had been adopted by popular
vote, so the proposed compromise had to go back to the voters. After a
vigorous public debate, they turned it down.' 
6
I. VENUE AND JURORS FOR EMINENT DOMAIN TRIALS
The next phase of the eminent domain action was valuation. The
landowner demanded a jury, all members of which by Colorado statute
9. Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Telluride, 185 P.3d 161 (No. 07SA101), 2007 WL
2813743.
10. See COLO. H. JOURNAL, Feb. 25, 2004, 649-53 (describing the proposed amendment).
11. H.B. 04-1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. sec. 6, 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1747,
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4) (West 2009)). The statute provides
that land cannot be condemned for these purposes without the landowner's consent, which is another
way to say that it is forbidden.
12. See Pat Healy, In VF Appeal, These Are the Deciders, TELLURIDE DAILY PLANET, Aug.
15, 2007, available at http://www.telluridegateway.com/articles/2007/08/16/news/newsOl.txt.
13. See Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 2-4. The Home Rule Amendment appears
in article XX of the Colorado Constitution. The landowner's motion in the alternative asked for a
change of venue for the valuation trial. The court denied this motion but later granted a second
request. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 2-3 (San Miguel Dist.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondent's renewed motion to change
venue).
14. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 2-3 (San Miguel Dist.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondents' renewed motion to change
venue); Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 2, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. CL Mar. 14, 2006). Authority to order mediation is
conferred by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311 (West 2009).
15. See Telluride Town Council Res. No. 1, ex. a (2006) (on file with author); see also Tellu-
ride Town Council Res. No. 2, ex. a(2006) (on file with author).
16. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 8 n.3, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.,
185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008) (No. 07SA101), 2007 WL 2813743.
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had to be freeholders. 17 It also filed a renewed motion for change of ve-
nue.18 This could have raised a constitutional issue. The statute guaran-
teeing landowners a jury of freeholders also requires that they be resi-
dents of the county where the petition is filed, which usually must be
where the land is located, and the town argued that the statute precluded
changing venue. 19 The landowner claimed that the vote against the com-
promise, although confined to the town, showed that it could not get a
fair jury in San Miguel County.20 It argued that obeying the statute
would therefore be unconstitutional as applied, and it invoked the general
Colorado court rule governing changes of venue in civil cases, which
allows changes for jury bias.2'
The district court agreed with the landowner on the fair trial claim
and granted its motion, but not on constitutional grounds. Instead, the
court invoked a 1925 decision not cited by the parties. Denver had filed
an action to condemn land in Jefferson County to use for a park based on
a statute that required the eminent domain petition to be filed in Den-
ver.22 The Colorado Supreme Court ordered venue moved to Jefferson
County based on the general venue statue then in force, noting that the
17. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-106 (West 2009) (requiring at least six freeholders); see
also COLO. CONST. art. 1I, § 15 (requiring valuation in eminent domain by a commission of three
freeholders or by a jury). Five other states provide for valuation by commissions of three (in some
cases three or more) freeholders, two by constitution, three by statute. MO. CONST. art. I, § 26;
OKLA. CONST. art. IL § 24; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 213.3 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §
76-706 (LexisNexis 2009); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014 (Vernon 2007). Only one other state-
West Virginia-limits eminent domain juries to landowners. W. VA. CONST. art. 1I, § 9. Umiting
voting and jury service to landowners (and to men) was once common everywhere, but politics
gradually broadened juror qualifications. See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional
Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 432-34, (1996). More recently, Supreme Court
constitutional decisions eliminated most other laws restricting voting and jury service to property
owners. See id. at 462-69. The eminent domain rules appear to be the only remaining instance of
blue-ribbon juries. It is conceivable that the Constitution forbids limiting eminent domain juries to
freeholders. Cf Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106-09 (1989) (invalidating restriction of state board
to freeholders). However, challenges to the practice are unlikely for political reasons.
18. Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 1, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Mar. 14,2006).
19. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-106 (West 2009) (requiring "a jury of freeholders residing
in the county in which the petition is filed"). The basic provision for a taking requires the condem-
nor to file in the county in which the property or part if it is located. Id. § 38-1-102.
20. Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 2, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Mar. 14,2006).
21. COLO. R. Civ. P. 98(g).
22. People ex rel. Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. Dist. Court, 242 P. 997, 997-98 (Colo. 1925); see
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 9-10 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Nov. 2,
2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondents' renewed motion to change venue).
The statute Denver relied on in Bear Creek Dev. Corp. for power to condemn was the Act of June 3,
1911, ch. 129, 1911 Colo. Sess. Laws 373-82. The Act gave cities explicit extraterritorial power to
condemn for "boulevard, parkway, or park purposes." Id at 377, § 10 (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-110 (West 2009)). The section was amended in 1983 to limit extra-
territorial power to land within five miles of city boundaries subject to stated exceptions, one of
which is condemnation with county consent. In 1959, § 1 of the 1911 statute was amended to state
that extraterritorial eminent domain is forbidden unless "specifically authorized by law." Act of
May 18, 1959, ch. 118, 1959 Colo. Sess. Laws 423 (1959) (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38-6-101 (West 2009)).
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eminent domain statute relied on by Denver did not forbid changing ve-
nue. 23 The statute requiring that jurors reside in the county in which the
petition is filed was then in force, though not mentioned in the court's
24opinion. The general venue statute of 1925 is the direct ancestor of
today's Colorado court rule governing civil case venue;25 hence the 1925
decision, by implication, supported the Telluride court's decision that the
court rule on venue prevailed over the eminent domain jury statute. De-
cisions to change venue are often made only after jury selection fails to
seat a suitably unbiased jury, but the district judge in Telluride declined
to make the attempt.26
Whether there is a constitutional right to change venue in an emi-
nent domain action based on potential jury bias was thus avoided. It
would be an interesting question. Criminal defendants often seek
changes of venue for potential jury bias, and volumes of reported appel-
late decisions and academic commentaries parse the issue.27 By contrast,
reported cases on requests to move civil cases for jury bias are rare.
28
When the issue arises, courts usually apply the same kind of reasoning as
in criminal cases. However, constitutional rights to juries in criminal
prosecutions are separate from those for civil actions and more strictly
applied. The Sixth Amendment jury right of criminal defendants is fully
applicable against the states, while the Seventh Amendment right to a
civil jury is not.29 Thus civil jury rights depend on state law. Lacking
much in the way of jury trial precedents to rely on, the Telluride lan-
downer argued that the federal and state constitutional right to just com-
pensation for takings requires the right to be heard by an impartial jury.3°
There is no direct federal support for this claim. The landowner cited
several decisions from other states, but all were based on statutes or court
rules rather than constitutional grounds.
23. Bear Creek Dev. Corp., 242 P. at 998.
24. See COMP. LAW. CoLO. § 6317 (1921) (current version at CoLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1-106 (West 2009)).
25. See Cow. R. Civ. P. 98(g), in COLO. STAT. ANN. vol. 1 (1935 & Supp. 1941). The 1925
Bear Creek Dev. Corp. decision is the only reported case in which a Colorado appellate court or-
dered a change of venue in a civil case.
26. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 3-9 (San Miguel Dist.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondents' renewed motion to change
venue).
27. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1993).
28. For example, among hundreds of annotations to the federal civil venue statute in 28
U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West 2009), none reported granting a change of venue for jury bias. Colorado has
only the 1925 decision relied on by the Telluride district court. See supra note 22, 25. The lan-
downer in Telluride cited Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Four Mile Railway Co., 66 P. 902 (Colo.
1901), where a change of venue was unsuccessfully sought based on alleged bias of the judge.
29. WILLAM COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONsTIUTIoNAL LAW 511-
12 (12th ed. 2005).
30. See Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 24, Town of Telluride v. San
Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Mar. 14,2006).
31. See id. at 25.
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Unlike most states, the Colorado Constitution has no general guar-
antee of a civil jury.32 There is a specific guarantee for eminent domain
actions, which provides for valuation by three commissioners who must
be freeholders or by a jury, although it does not require that jurors be
freeholders or residents of the local county. 33 As noted above, the statute
does require that jurors be both freeholders and residents. Therefore, the
landowner in Telluride wanted a ruling that the statute's requirement that
jurors be residents was inapplicable or unconstitutional as applied but
fully severable from the requirement that they be freeholders. The
court's ruling granted exactly that but without analyzing these points.
The district court moved the valuation trial to neighboring Delta
County, a more favorable venue for the landowner as the ensuing verdict
reflected. 34 The town's last offer before the jury's verdict was $26 mil-
lion; the landowner claimed a value of almost $51 million. The jury's
verdict was for $50 million.35 After the verdict, the town had three
months to raise the extra funds.36 Many thought this would end the
town's quest for the Valley Floor, but Telluride is home or second home
to many wealthy (and celebrated) citizens, including Tom Cruise, Chris-
tie Brinkley, Daryl Hannah, and Oprah Winfrey.3 7 The town not only
raised the money, it did so eleven days early.38 Furthermore, because
Colorado requires a condemning town to reimburse attorneys fees when
32. Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 580-81 (Colo.
2004).
33. COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 15.
34. Delta County is in the same judicial district as San Miguel County, and the district judge
who heard the Telluride case normally sits there, so it was a natural choice for him. See Seventh
Judicial District, http://www.7thjudicialdistrictco.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). How-
ever, Delta is considered one of Colorado's most politically conservative counties, much more so
than San Miguel. For example, 2009 voter registrations for the two counties included 9,397 Repub-
licans and 4,513 Democrats in Delta County, compared to 1,108 Republicans and 2,719 Democrats
in San Miguel County. See COLO. SEC'Y OF STATE, TOTAL REGISTERED VOTERS BY PARTY
AFFILIATION AND STATUS (2009), http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/2009%20Voter
%20Registration%20Numbers/January/by-party.pdf. On the relevance of party affiliation to emi-
nent domain, see infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
35. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2008); cf City
of Black Hawk v. Ficke, No. 06CA1302, 2008 WL 732043, at *1 (Colo. App. Mar. 20, 2008) ("Fol-
lowing a valuation trial, the jury detennined that $637,500 was just compensation for the taking,
which was over six times higher than the City appraiser's opinion of value, and $100,000 more than
the valuation opinion of respondents' appraiser."). The city abandoned the condemnation, and the
court upheld the abandonment but awarded respondents their attorneys' fees. Id.
36. The jury's verdict was entered on February 20, 2007. This was followed by a hearing on
the amount of time the town had for raising the funds to satisfy the verdict because there was no
explicit Colorado rule setting a deadline. The landowner argued for 44 days, until April 5. The
town argued for no deadline or in the alternative for 90 days, until May 21. The district court
adopted the May 21 deadline.
37. Wikipedia, Telluride, Colorado, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telluride,_Colorado (last
visited April 17, 2009) (listing notable residents).
38. See Bigelow, supra note 2, at Fl.
2009] 1437
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
an eminent domain verdict is 130% or more of the town's last offer, Tel-
luride had to pay almost $2.8 million more for fees and costs.
39
The eminent domain action at last had a final judgment that could
be appealed, and the landowner did so, seeking to enforce the 2004 Tel-
luride Amendment. The town did not challenge the venue decision.
Under Colorado law, a trial court judgment holding a state statute to be
unconstitutional is reviewed directly by the Colorado Supreme Court.n°
In June 2008, that court affirmed the judgment, holding the statute to be
41an unconstitutional interference with Telluride's home rule powers.
The validity of the statute depended entirely on the Home Rule Amend-
ment because the town declined to argue that the statute was invalid as
applied retroactively to the condemnation action.42 However, both ques-
tions are interesting issues of state constitutional law.
II. TELLURIDE'S HOME RULE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Constitutional home rule began in Colorado with adoption of the
1902 amendment to the Colorado Constitution that made Denver a con-
solidated city and county, gave it home rule powers, and offered like
powers to other municipalities.43 The original amendment included the
power at issue in the Telluride case. It provides that a home rule city or
town "shall have the power, within or without its territorial limits, to
construct, condemn and purchase ... water works, light plants, power
plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any other public utili-
ties or works or ways local in use and extent ... for public use by right
of eminent domain .... 4" Of course, to take advantage of this provi-
sion, a municipal charter must claim the power, but Telluride's charter,
adopted in 1978, does so.
45
A. The Precedent
The landowner's counsel built their legal strategy around avoidance
of the Colorado Supreme Court's 1978 decision in City of Thornton v.
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.46 In 1973, Thornton filed an ac-
39. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 197 P.3d 261, 262 (Colo. App. 2008)
(applying COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-122(1.5) (2007)). The statute applies only if the award is at
least $10,000. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-122(1.5) (West 2009). After unsuccessful appeal of
denial of its motion to dismiss, the landowner sought attorneys fees for that proceeding as well, but
the court denied the claim. Telluride, 197 P.3d at 262.
40. The Colorado Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is provided in the Colorado Consti-
tution. COLO. CONST. art. VL § 2(1). When a district or county court has declared a state law to be
unconstitutional, intermediate jurisdiction of the Colorado Court of Appeals is barred. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §13-4-102(1)(b) (West 2009).
41. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163 (Colo. 2008).
42. Cf infra Part m.
43. COLO. CONST. art. XX.
44. id. art. XX, § 1.
45. HOME RULE CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF TELLURIDE art. XIV, § 14.1 (1978), available at
http:lwww.telluride-co.gov/docs00_charter-final-telluride-s-lrevclc.pdf.
46. 575 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1978).
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tion to condemn a large part of the water rights owned by the company.
The rights in question were sited in a lake outside the city, so the con-
demnation was extraterritorial. The action was filed based on existing
statutes that allowed Thornton to decide on necessity for the taking and
provided for valuation to be done in the same manner as in most other
eminent domain actions.47 Nineteen months later the legislature passed a
new statute that would have made Thornton's acquisition much more
difficult. It applied only to condemnation of water rights and required
convening a special commission to determine whether condemnation was
necessary and if so to determine just compensation. s The statute also
limited condemnation to water needed within a horizon of fifteen years.49
Defendants moved to dismiss based on Thornton's failure to comply with
the new statute, and the district court granted the motion.50
The supreme court reversed. Oddly, its opinion never discussed
whether the new statute was intended to apply retroactively to Thorn-
ton's pending case. The terms of the statute, unlike those of the Tellu-
ride Amendment, were not expressly retroactive, and the usual rule pre-
sumes a new statute to be prospective in operation. 51 It is likely that the
statute would never have been applied to a completed condemnation ac-
tion, but Thornton's was in mid-stream.
Instead, the court held the statute's two main features-commitment
of decision to a special commission and limiting future needs to a fifteen-
year period-to be unconstitutional as applied to Thornton based on the
Home Rule Amendment. The court concluded:
By the adoption of Article XX [Section 1], ... the people of Colo-
rado intended to, and in effect did, delegate to home rule municipali-
ties full power to exercise the right of eminent domain in the effectu-
ation of any lawful, public and municipal purpose, including particu-
larly the acquisition of water rights.
... We fully recognize that, generally, the legislative powers of a
home rule municipality are superior with respect to local and munici-
pal matters; and that, in cases of conflict between a statute and the
ordinance of a home rule city relating to a matter of statewide con-
cern, the statute must govern. Here, however, there is involved a
specific constitutional power granted to home rule municipalities
and, even though the matter may be of statewide concern, the Gener-
47. Id. at 386.
48. See id. at 386 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to -216 (1973 & Supp. 1976)).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-202(2) (West 2009); Thornton, 575 P.2d at 390.
50. Thornton, 575 P.2d at 386.
51. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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al Assembly has no power to enact any law that denies a right specif-
ically granted by the Colorado Constitution.
52
The court's opinion appeared to recognize that Thornton was sub-
ject to other state statutes governing eminent domain, but none of these
would have placed the condemnation in jeopardy, and Thornton did not
oppose them.53 However, application of these statutes created doubt
about the scope of the decision. A 1989 decision clarified the issue to
some extent, holding that a state statute known as the Land Use Act
"gives Grand County and Eagle County the power to regulate, but not to
prohibit, Denver's operation of extraterritorial waterworks projects."'
B. How to Deal with It?
The Thornton decision was a major obstacle for the landowner in
Telluride. The case upheld extraterritorial eminent domain in apparent
conflict with a governing state statute, the very power claimed by Tellu-
ride. The usual options were to distinguish the case or to ask the court to
overrule or limit it. If the decision were to be distinguished, how should
it be done? The landowner's counsel based its case mostly on distin-
guishing different objects of extraterritorial condemnation, between
Thornton's water rights and Telluride's proposed parks, open space, and
recreational uses. The core basis for this claim was the text of article
XX, section 1, which explicitly gives eminent domain power for a list of
public utilities purposes or other "works or ways local in use and ex-
tent. '55 The Thornton opinion held that water rights came within the
specific power to condemn for "water works. 56 Telluride's condemna-
tion was unrelated to any of the specific subjects in section 1.
The landowner's plea to read article XX strictly was supported by
the argument that eminent domain power is distinctive and disfavored, so
it should be implied to have a more restricted scope than others. This
claim had force in the abstract, as the Colorado Supreme Court has often
said that legislative grants of the power must be clearly expressed or nec-
essarily impliedY. The difficulty was that the court's prior decisions had
52. Thronton, 575 P.2d at 389 (citations omitted).
53. See id at 386.
54. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d 753, 762 (Colo. 1989); see
also Land Use Act, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (West 2009).
55. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1.
56. Thornton, 575 P.2d at 535-36; see also Toll v. City & County of Denver, 340 P.2d 862,
865 (Colo. 1959) (sustaining extraterritorial eminent domain to take flowage easements and channel
improvement rights based on the "water works" power in the Colorado Constitution); Town of
Glendale v. City & County of Denver, 322 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Colo. 1958) (same issue for sewer
right of way).
57. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938, 941-42 (Colo. 2004). Several early
decisions applied this rule to invalidate attempts at extraterritorial eminent domain by statutory
municipalities. See, e.g., Mack v. Town of Craig, 191 P. 101, 101 (Colo. 1920) (sewage outlet);
Healy v. City of Delta., 147 P. 662, 662 (Colo. 1915) (sewage outlet); Warner v. Town of Gunnison,
31 P. 238, 239 (Colo. App. 1892) (right-of-way for water supply ditch). In reaction to Mack and
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found article XX, section 1 explicit enough to sustain other unenume-
rated powers of eminent domain. 8 Thus, there was no reasonable basis
to distinguish parks, recreation, and open space. Another way to articu-
late the issue is to ask at what level the requirement for explicit legisla-
tive action applies. The Colorado court rulings that interpreted article
XX broadly had the effect of locating the requirement for an explicit
legislative act within home rule municipalities unless the state legislature
has power to override them.
1. The Claim That Municipal Eminent Domain Power is Limited to
Utilities Purposes
The landowner first argued that article XX, section 1 restricts mu-
nicipal powers of eminent domain to the itemized list and analogous pub-
lic utilities uses and does not extend to parks, recreation, and open
space.59 This claim faced difficulties. The constitutional text bundles all
active powers of a municipality with eminent domain powers. To restrict
a town to the specified powers even within its borders would limit home
rule to far fewer powers than Denver had exercised before 1902 as a sta-
tutory city. For this reason, the Colorado Supreme Court's first opinion
on the subject rejected a claim that Denver could not build a municipal
auditorium. The court stated:
[W]e do not agree... that the stinted grant of power contained in
section 1 and other parts of the article is the only power possessed by
Denver. It seems very clear that the statement contained in the first
section was not intended to be an enumeration of powers conferred,
but simply the expression of a few of the more prominent powers
which municipal corporations are frequently granted. The purpose of
the twentieth article was to grant home rule to Denver and the other
municipalities of the state, and it was intended to enlarge the powers
beyond those usually granted by the legislature .... 60
Six years later, the court applied similar reasoning to sustain Denver's
power to condemn land for parks.6'
Notwithstanding these decisions in Denver's favor, in other early
cases the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted home rule powers narrow-
ly. 62 In reaction, voters used the new power of initiative in 1912 to re-
place 1902's article XX, section 6 with a broader text that grants home
Healy, the legislature passed a statute to authorize extraterritorial eminent domain for specified
utilities purposes. 1921 Colo. Sess. Laws 773 (codified at CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-122
(West 2009)).
58. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
59. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163 (Colo. 2008).
60. City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 83 P. 1066, 1068 (Colo. 1905).
61. Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 119 P. 156, 158-59 (Colo. 1911). The condemna-
tions at issue in Londoner were within Denver. Id. at 158.
62. See DALE A. OEsTERLE & RIcHARD B. CoutNs, THE COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION
390 (2002).
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rule municipalities all powers set out in the original sections of article
XX, as well as "all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the
government and administration of its local and municipal matters." This
section was the focus of a 1971 decision in which challengers argued that
Denver lacked urban renewal powers because they were not itemized in
article XX, section 1.63 The court responded: "The enumerated purposes
of § 1 were superseded by the general § 6 standard of 'local and munici-
pal matters.' 64
2. The Claim That Municipalities Have No Extraterritorial Power
to Condemn for Parks and Open Space
The landowner next argued that constitutional power outside munic-
ipal boundaries should be restricted to the itemized list and similar utili-
ties purposes, or at least should exclude power to condemn land for parks
and open space. In addressing this claim, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated that extraterritorial condemnation for parks and open space was a
question of first impression that depended on whether this was "a lawful,
public, local, and municipal purpose within the scope of article XX.
65
This claim again conflicted with the constitutional text that equates
internal with external powers and eminent domain with all other powers.
The landowner answered this point by invoking a clause in article XX,
section 6, added in 1912, which differentiates between internal and ex-
ternal powers:
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such mat-
ters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction
of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
66
This provision is relevant to validity of the 2004 Telluride Amend-
ment, as discussed below. As a basis to claim that Telluride lacked ex-
ternal power of eminent domain in the absence of a conflicting state sta-
tute, it was weak. By its terms, the provision takes in the "other jurisdic-
tion" of the municipality. 67 On parks in particular, section 6 grants ex-
plicit power over park districts "in such cities or towns or within the ju-
risdiction thereof., 68  And the part of section 6 quoted above made it
clear that the section was intended to add to, not subtract from, the home
rule powers granted in 1902. The supreme court made these points in
rejecting the claim.69
63. Karsh v. City & County of Denver, 490 P.2d 936, 937 (Colo. 1971).
64. Id. at 939.
65. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 167 (Colo. 2008).
66. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 166.
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The court went on to sustain the power, based again on the 1905
Hallett decision quoted above. 70  That decision interpreted section 1 to
confer all powers that the legislature could have delegated to municipali-
ties. The Hallett court cited several statutes that had delegated extraterri-
torial powers of eminent domain for various purposes, including parks
and open space, to municipal governments.
71
Both of the landowner's claims based on pre-2004 law had been re-
jected in at least two previous decisions of the supreme court that sus-
tained extraterritorial condemnations for purposes not enumerated in
article, XX section 1.72 Moreover, there was a long-established legisla-
tive practice of granting eminent domain powers to private companies for
many purposes73 and of granting extraterritorial powers to statutory mu-
nicipalities; 74 thus, municipal boundaries had not previously been an
important criterion. In rejecting a 1926 attack on a statutory city's extra-
territorial condemnation, the supreme court minimized the point by stat-
ing: "The condemnation statutes do not limit the rights of the city to take
property only within its municipal borders. 75
Both of these claims faced yet another obstacle that was argued to
the court but not mentioned in its opinion. The Colorado Constitution
was amended in 1998 to create the City and County of Broomfield.76
The amendment includes an updated version of the list of powers, includ-
ing the eminent domain power, in the original Home Rule Amendment.
The Broomfield provision expressly allows condemnation of land "with-
in and without its territorial limits" to establish "parks, recreation facili-
ties, [and] open space lands. 77 Because the Broomfield amendment was
intended to imitate, not add to, home rule status of other municipalities,
this provision implies the view that these uses were within the general
70. Id. at 168 (citing City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 83 P. 1066, 1068 (1905)).
71. Id. It could also have referred to the decision relied on by the district court to order
change of venue, which involved extraterritorial eminent domain for park purposes. See supra note
22 and accompanying text.
72. City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 156 P.2d 101, 108-09 (Colo. 1945)
(airport); Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 108 P.2d 236, 242 (Colo. 1940) (military use).
Moreover, the decisions sustaining extraterritorial powers arguably within those enumerated in
article XX, section 1 articulated the power in broad terms. In addition to Thornton, see Toll v. City
& County of Denver, 340 P.2d 862, 865-66 (Colo. 1959) (flowage easements); Town of Glendale v.
City & County of Denver, 322 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Colo. 1958) (utilities easement). The Colorado
Court of Appeals made a yet more explicit ruling in Town of Parker v. Norton, sustaining extraterri-
torial eminent domain by a home-rule town for a recreational trail. 939 P.2d 535, 536-37 (Colo.
App. 1997), cert. denied, Norton v. Town of Parker, No. 97SC567, 1997 Colo. LEXIS 1112 (Colo.
Dec. 22, 1997).
73. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-202(2) (West 2009).
74. The Telluride court relied on two such statutes. See 185 P.3d at 168 (citing COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-25-201(1) (2007) (park or recreational purposes, parkways, open space, conservation
easements), § 38-6-110 (2007) (boulevard, parkway, and park purposes)). Both statutes remain on
the books though partially repealed by inconsistency with the Telluride Amendment. See id. §§ 31-
25-201(1), 38-6-110.
75. Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Loveland, 245 P. 493, 499 (Colo. 1926).
76. COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 10-13.
77. Id. § 10.
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power of other home rule governments. 78  Of course, the opposite infe-
rence is possible, though much less likely.
3. The Claim that the 2004 Telluride Amendment Repealed Extra-
territorial Power to Condemn for Parks and Open Space
The landowner's last claim, oddly deferred to the end of its opening
brief, was its strongest: even if extraterritorial eminent domain for parks
and open space had been valid, the 2004 statute took away the power.
The statute, which the court called the landowner's "proposed amend-" " " r,,79
ment" for which it had "lobbied the state legislature, was based on the
same strategy as the arguments discussed above. It preserved extraterri-
torial eminent domain for the purposes itemized in article XX, section 1
and related public utilities uses and forbade it for all other purposes. For
good measure, it explicitly prohibited the power for parks, open space,
and recreation. It also disallowed use of municipal funds for that pur-
pose by any other entity, an apparent attempt to head off creation of a
special district to achieve Telluride's purpose.
The Telluride Amendment was tacked onto a statute to restrict use
of eminent domain for urban renewal that had been introduced at the
beginning of the legislative session.82 This was a year before the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London83 generated a
national reaction against that subject. 84 In Colorado, the urban renewal
change was provoked by a controversial proposal to condemn a lake as a
site for Wal-Mart. 5 Ironically, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
proposed taking to be illegal about the same time as Telluride filed its
eminent domain action.8 6 In any case, the decision against Wal-Mart did
not derail the anti-urban renewal statute.
78. The 1998 "blue book" informing voters about ballot measures stated nothing relevant to
this question. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF 1998 BALLOT
PROPOSALS (1998), http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/ballot/analy-c.htm. Nor do the
published records of passage of the measure through the legislature. See Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1998
Senate Resolutions and Memorials, http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg_dir/house/sres98.htm (last
visited Apr. 17, 2009) (reporting on S. Con. Res. 98-013, 61st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
1998)). Nor do any of the newspaper accounts of the measure. Therefore, the statement in the text
is the author's opinion. Of course, in light of the result in the Telluride case, the powers of other
home-rule municipalities are comparable to those of Broomfield.
79. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 164.
80. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4)(b) (West 2009).
81. See id.; see also id. § 38-1-202(1)(f)(Vl) (eminent domain power of park and recreation
districts).
82. See H.B. 04-1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004) (codified as amended at
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-25-105.5, 38-1-101(4) (West 2009)).
83. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
84. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Taking Property for Development, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/politics/24scotus.html?
emc=etal; Jonathan V. Last, The Kelo Backlash: What the Supreme Court Touched off With Its
Eminent Domain Decision, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2006, at 14.
85. See Arvada Urban Renewal Auth. v. Columbine Prof I Plaza Ass'n, 85 P.3d 1066, 1067-
68 (Colo. 2004).
86. Id. at 1073.
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The Telluride Amendment's hasty consideration was illustrated by
the fact that it left unamended a conflicting statute that expressly allowed
municipalities to condemn land within five miles outside their bounda-
ries for park and open space purposes.8 7 It also made no attempt to har-
monize its requirements with the state's general Land Use Act, which
had been applied to limit home rule powers. 88 Moreover, the text of the
Telluride Amendment appears to give counties a veto power over agreed
settlements of eminent domain cases where a municipality seeks land for
parks, open space, or recreation outside its boundaries.8 9 If this reading
is correct, it made the landowner's attempted compromise with Telluride
contingent on the consent of San Miguel County.90
For its claim based on the Telluride Amendment, the landowner
tried to work around the Thornton case in two ways. One was an appli-
cation of its utilities theory of section 1, asking the court to decide that
even if the itemized list in section 1 were not a closed set when no state
law tried to override municipal power, it should be so held for extraterri-
torial eminent domain in conflict with a state statute. In other words, the
state could override the town for all purposes save those specified. Be-
cause Thornton involved one of those powers, it was distinguishable.
Second, Thornton was decided at a time when the Colorado Su-
preme Court's home rule jurisprudence had not yet crystallized into a
coherent scheme. 91 The court subsequently adopted a doctrine that allo-
cates claims of municipal power into three categories: purely local, pure-
ly statewide, and mixed. Under this doctrine, only purely local claims
are immune from override by the state legislature. 92 The landowner ar-
gued that extraterritorial eminent domain should be categorized as mixed
and thus subject to legislative override.93
The court rejected the latter argument based on the Thornton
precedent. It held that the local-mixed-statewide form of analysis did not
apply, relying on reasoning lifted from the Thornton opinion:
Where the constitution specifically authorizes a municipal action
which potentially implicates statewide concerns, the municipality's
exercise of that prerogative is not outside the bounds of its authority.
... We therefore conclude that the extraterritorial condemnation of
87. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-201(1) (West 2009); see also supra note 22 (outlining
history of Colorado statutes allowing extraterritorial eminent domain by municipalities).
88. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
89. See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4)(b)(l1) (West 2009).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (discussing the proposed compromise).
91. One can trace the modem doctrine to Woolverton v. City & County of Denver. 361 P.2d
982, 984 (Colo. 1961), overruled in part by Vela v. People, 484 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Colo. 1971). But
the court did not articulate a consistent formal test until City & County of Denver v. State. 788 P.2d
764, 768 (Colo. 1990).
92. See City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 767.
93. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 167; Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 18-19, 34-40.
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property need not be pursuant to a purpose that is purely local and
municipal.9
To reject the first claim the court again refused to read the itemized
list in article XX, section 1 to create distinctively stronger powers. It
invoked the many prior decisions that had treated the list as merely illu-
strative of broader powers. In particular, it invoked decisions that had
sustained extraterritorial condemnations of land for an army base95 and
for airport use.9 Therefore, the Thornton case could not be distin-
guished, and the court ruled for Telluride based on that precedent.9 The
landowner did not ask the court to overrule or limit Thornton, so the
court did not address that subject.
4. The Dissent
Justice Eid was the sole dissenter. The basis for her dissent is not
entirely clear. Her opinion embraced the landowner's proffered distinc-
tion between the enumerated powers in article XX, section 1 and powers
to acquire land for parks and open space.98 Some passages appeared to
argue from that premise that home rule towns have never had constitu-
tional power of extraterritorial eminent domain for purposes other than
those enumerated-the landowner's second claim discussed above.9
Other parts of her opinion appeared to assume that the power exists ab-
sent a conflicting statute, but concluded that the 2004 Telluride Amend-
ment validly overrode it. She distinguished the Thornton precedent as an
exercise of an itemized power.'0°
C. How Broad Was the Ruling? Was It Correct?
The press reported that the Telluride decision gave Colorado's
home-rule municipalities unlimited power to condemn land anywhere in
the state for any purpose, a power the press strongly criticized.10' Jour-
nalists noted a prior situation where the City of Golden had threatened to
use its power of eminent domain to block installation of a digital broad-
casting tower outside the city. 0 2  Golden was thwarted by federal
94. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 167 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 166 (citing Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 108 P.2d 236, 241 (Colo. 1940)).
96. Id. (citing City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 156 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo. 1945)).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 172-73 (Eid, J., dissenting).
99. See supra Part ILB.2.
100. See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 173 (Eid, J., dissenting).
101. See Vincent Carroll, Editorial, Unleashing Mischief, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWs,
June 6, 2008, at 39; Editorial, A Ruling Too Far: Supreme Court Gives Home-Rule Cities Alarming
Power, DENVER ROCKY MoUNTAIN NEws, June 5, 2008, at 38; Editorial, Wrong Course on Eminent
Domain, DENVER POST, June 4, 2008, at B 12.
102. Michael Roberts, Golden Showers: A City's Plans Rain on Local TV Powerhouses,




preemption, and the facility was built; it mostly serves persons residing
outside of Golden. 0 3
The journalists surely overstated the case. Three limits can be
found in the opinion, although all are quite uncertain in scope. The most
basic point is the court's embrace of the phrase "local and municipal
matters" to define the "plenary power" of municipalities that the legisla-
ture cannot override' °4 The court can declare any future action by a city
or town to fall outside that definition. But of course the phrase is vague,
and uncertainty is increased by its use to mean quite different things.
When Article XX was adopted in 1902 and amended in 1912, drafters of
the texts did not address the question of whether and when a home rule
city can act unless a state statute lawfully overrides the city, the category
the supreme court later dubbed mixed. The text of section 6 defines mu-
nicipal jurisdiction generally as "local and municipal matters" and adds a
list of specific powers and other terms that appear to define municipal
powers very broadly. 105 It then states that laws passed by a home-rule
city within the scope of its powers "supersede" a conflicting state law.' 6
The text led some supreme court justices to conceive of municipal and
state powers as two exclusive kinds with no overlap, a viewpoint not
expressly rejected until 1961107
Thereafter, doctrine evolved into the current system of local, mixed,
and statewide powers. Under this system, a home-rule city's powers
absent a conflicting state statute are a very broad swath of actions cover-
ing both local and mixed powers. The supreme court now often uses the
phrase "local and municipal matters" to define only those local powers
that trump conflicting state laws. 0 8 This usage is consistent with the
"supersedes" clause of article XX, section 6, but not with the section's
definition of the full range of municipal powers. The practice is not con-
sistent because the court often quotes the phrase from section 6 when the
context means to refer to all local powers, including those subject to
override by the legislature. °9 The more precise term in current use is
103. See Ann Schrader & Anne Mulkern, Congress OKs TV Tower, DENVER POST, Dec. 10,
2006, at C 1.
104. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 166.
105. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
106. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
107. See Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 361 P.2d 982, 990 (Colo. 1961), overruled
in part by Vela v. People, 484 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Colo. 1971). As is well known, the same question
plagued the federal Constitution for many years. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (discussing the distinction between the "essentially exclusive" police power of the
states and the "also exclusive" power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
108. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990). City &
County of Denver is the court's leading case on point.
109. Indeed, this is true of the Telluride opinion itself. The first uses of the phrase appeared to
describe the full range of local powers. See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 165. Later, the opinion rejected a
claim by the landowner that Telluride's external eminent domain power was not "purely local and
municipal." Id. at 167. Later yet, the phrase was repeatedly used with both its broad and restricted
meanings.
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"matters of local concern" to define local power to oust the state, in con-
trast to matters of "mixed local and state concern" to define powers that
municipalities can exercise subject to state override." 0 However, be-
cause the Telluride court rejected application of the local-mixed-
statewide test, these more exact terms only appeared in the opinion's
reasoning for not applying the test.'
The second potential limit in the opinion is found in footnote 8 and
elaborated in the concurring opinion of Justice Coats." 2 The footnote
states in part:
Our past cases indicate that, although the legislature may not prohibit
the exercise of article XX powers, it may regulate the exercise of
those powers in areas of statewide or mixed state and local concern.
Therefore, the analysis of competing state and local interests would
be appropriate in a case involving a statute which merely regulates
home rule municipalities' exercise of their constitutional powers....
However, this line of cases does not compel us to analyze competing
state and local concerns in the case at hand, where the legislature
purports to abrogate, not regulate, home rule powers granted by the
constitution. 
13
A similar point arises from the court's strong reliance on the Thornton
precedent because that opinion applied some state statutes to Thornton's
condemnation action even as it held others unconstitutional.' 
14
These points clearly approve of procedural laws that do not forbid
an action; this describes the statutes specifically sustained in the Thorn-
ton opinion." 5 In the Telluride case itself, the town obeyed state statutes
defining the procedures for eminent domain, including the laws allowing
the court to order mediation, allowing change of venue, limiting the jury
to freeholders, and paying the landowner's attorneys' fees.
But the focus of criticism is the substantive reach of the decision.
Its limits appear to depend on defining the section 6 phrase "local and
municipal matters." On this point, the court's opinion created confusion
and uncertainty by rejecting application of the local-mixed-statewide
powers test that it uses to define local powers in most other situations."
6
The court appeared to do this because it assumed that any extraterritorial
action by a municipality must ipso facto involve statewide interest, be-
110. See City & County of Denver, 788 P.2d at 767.
111. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 169.
112. Id. at 170 n.8; id. at 171-72 (Coats, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 170 n.8 (majority opinion).
114. City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382, 387-88, 392 (Colo.
1978).
115. Id. at 392 (upholding CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-1-101 to -120, 38-6-101 to -122 (1973),
38-6-201 to -216 (1973 & Supp. 1976)).
116. See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 167.
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long in the mixed interest category, and be subject to state control. It
therefore rejected application of this scheme in favor of the view it had
taken in Thornton and other prior decisions, that extraterritorial eminent
domain is a specific power that is exempt from any balancing of state-
wide interests unless a statute regulates-but does not prohibit-an ac-
tion.1 17 This in turn gave rise to the inference that the power is unlimited,
despite the vague denial in footnote 8.
The court's precedents did not compel that analysis. As noted
above, the text of article XX, section 6 appears to give home rule gov-
ernments exclusive power within their boundaries "and other jurisdic-
tion." '  Yet the court has often allowed the state to override municipal
actions inside corporate boundaries, 19 and in the precedents reviewed in
the Telluride decision, it found extraterritorial actions to be immune from
state authority. 120 Any action by a municipal government has some ef-
fect outside its borders, so deciding on a constitutional line between local
and mixed powers requires a judgment about each situation that comes
down to a determination whether the statewide interest is important
enough to classify a power as mixed. In cases arising within municipal
borders, the court's precedents said as much, applied a four-part test to
make the determination, and opined that each case depends on its
facts.121
In Telluride, the crucial factor that negated use of this analysis was
the assumption that any action outside municipal boundaries was ipso
facto of statewide concern. 122 That would be correct in many circums-
tances, perhaps most, but on the Telluride record, ownership and use of
the Valley Floor land did not fairly present any issue of statewide con-
cern. The land abuts the town and surrounds its highway access. The
one reasonable claim for statewide concern was to protect the interest of
San Miguel County, the territorial local government for the Valley Floor,
but the county sided with Telluride, declaring that the issue was local to
117. Seeid. at 171.
118. See discussion supra Part.II.B.2.
119. See e.g., City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1284 (Colo. 2002) (regarding
photo radar and red light cameras); Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30,
39 (Colo. 2000) (regarding rent control).
120. See supra note 72; see also Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845, 849 (Colo. 2004)
(regarding powers of a municipal court).
121. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 768-72 (Colo. 1990).
122. The text of the Telluride Amendment asserts: "The acquisition by condemnation by a
home rule or statutory municipality of property outside of its territorial boundaries involves matters
of both statewide and local concern because such acquisition by condemnation may interfere with
the plans and operations of other local governments and of the state." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1-101(4)(a)(1) (West 2009). However, if the legislature can override home-rule towns by including
such a finding in a statute, constitutional home rule is at an end. See Richard B. Collins, The Colo-
rado Constitution in the New Century, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 1265, 1334 (2007).
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Telluride. 23 The Valley Floor is a uniquely isolated piece of land that
affects few outsiders.
Legislative motivation for the Telluride Amendment was either
ideological opposition to any use of eminent domain to acquire land for
parks and open space, an attempt to accommodate the wishes of a weal-
thy landowner and potential campaign contributor, or some mix of both.
Neither has any particular relation to the question whether Telluride's
action should be characterized as involving a statewide concern; land
inside Telluride's borders would present the same question. If the state
had made its decision pursuant to a general plan for land use statewide,
such as the Land Use Act, there might have been a reasonable claim of
statewide interest, even for the Valley Floor.124 Instead, the Telluride
Amendment was an ad hoc measure adopted in great haste.
It is difficult to imagine a set of facts less favorable to state override
of local preferences. Strong views of those who live next to the land
were opposed by the ego of a nonresident billionaire owner who had
never lived there or had any ancestral tie to it. The jury awarded him his
full claimed value and attorneys' fees. The basis for the decision sug-
gested here would have allowed many other cases to be decided the other
way, such as Golden's plan to condemn the broadcasting site. Had the
local-mixed-statewide doctrine been applied in Telluride without an au-
tomatic assumption that extraterritorial action cannot be local, the result
should have been the same, but the implications of the decision for other
situations far less sweeping. In a future case, the court might hold the
Telluride Amendment to be severable and sustain its requirement for
consent of the county, which was not at issue in the case.
1 25
Even if the modified analysis of the last four paragraphs were used,
the court's broad opinion raised a number of concerns. Telluride is one
of the most far-reaching decisions in favor of exclusive local power re-
ported for any state. Moreover, a per se rule that extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is always subject to explicit state override (including home rule mu-
nicipal laws) would furnish a bright-line rule that would avoid ad hoc
adjudication. Many extraterritorial actions will conflict with local terri-
torial governments and with local majority opinion. Some municipal
actions are elitist and exclusionary, and thus in need of tempering.
126
These concerns show that the legal issues in Telluride were something of
a sideshow because extraterritorial actions in pursuit of the itemized utili-
123. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 169 & n.6 (Colo. 2008).
124. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
125. See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4)(b)(I1) (West 2008).
126. Criticism of cities on this account has focused on such issues as exclusionary zoning,
racial segregation, and tax resources of public schools. See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism
Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regional-
ism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanisra, Progressivism, and Race, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 665 (1998) (book review).
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ties purposes in article XX, section 1 are not inherently more worthy than
others. This is implicitly conceded by the terms of the first legislative
bill introduced to try to undo the decision by making extraterritorial con-
demnations impossibly expensive-it would apply to takings for any
purpose. 127
Il. WAS THE TELLURIDE AMENDMENT'S RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
INVALID?
[A] retroactive law is truly a monstrosity. Law has to do with the
governance of human conduct by rules. To speak of governing or di-
recting conduct today by rules that will be enacted tomorrow is to
talk in blank prose. 128
All laws should be therefore made to commence infuturo, and be no-
tified before their commencement; which is implied in the term "pre-
scribed."'
129
Retroactive criminal laws are forbidden absolutely by the Ex Post
Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses that were imposed by the original
Constitution on all American governments, state and federal. 30 The
clause that forbids state laws impairing the obligation of contracts out-
laws one kind of retroactive civil laws. 131 Another is restricted by the
requirements of the Takings Clause.1 32 Laws that attempt to overturn
final judgments of courts violate separation of powers. 133 Beyond these,
the only constitutional limit on retroactive civil laws in most jurisdictions
is the Due Process Clause.134 However, every jurisdiction recognizes
Professor Fuller's concern, quoted above, by erecting a strong presump-
tion that all new legislation is intended to be applied only prospective-
ly.
135
During the Twentieth Century, the problem of retroactivity became
a concern regarding some judicial decisions. Traditional law had treated
all judicial decisions as inherently retroactive on the theory that courts
127. H.B. 09-1258, 67th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009). The bill's lead sponsor,
Senator Shawn Mitchell, was also a lead sponsor of the Telluride Amendment. See COLO. H.
JOURNAL, Feb. 25, 2004,649-53.
128. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (rev. ed. 1969).
129. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46.
130. U.S. CONST. art. L § 9, cl. 3 & § 10 el. 1.
131. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
132. Id. amend. V.
133. E.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225-26 (1995).
134. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486 (7th ed. 2004).
135. For Colorado, see City of Colorado Springs v. Powell. 156 P.3d 461, 464-65 (Colo.
2007); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-202 (West 2009) ("A statute is presumed to be pros-
pective in its operation."). For Federal statutes, see United States v. Security Industrial Bank. 459
U.S. 70, 79 (1982) ("Ibe principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions
operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student."); see also 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 245
(2008).
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merely declare the law and do not create new laws. 136 But when a court
overrules a prior decision, this theory is at least sorely strained. Some
other rulings are so novel as to raise like concerns. Publication of The
Nature of the Judicial Process, Judge Cardozo's celebrated work, pro-
vided the catalyst for courts to begin to issue rulings applying decisions
only prospectively. 137 After undertaking detailed enforcement of the bill
of rights in state criminal trials, the Supreme Court adopted prospective
overruling for many of its decisions that added to the rights of accused
persons. The Court's decisions in this field have generated volumes of
scholarship. 138 All of these rulings were made in the name of some no-
tion of due process or fundamental fairness.
Colorado is one of seven states that add further constitutional bar-
riers to retroactive civil laws:
[No law] retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable
grant of special privileges, franchises or immunities, shall be passed
by the general assembly. 139
The general assembly shall pass no law for the benefit of a railroad or
other corporation, or any individual or association of individuals, re-
trospective in its operation, or which imposes on the people of any
county or municipal subdivision of the state, a new liability in respect
to transactions or considerations already past.14
0
The first provision was copied verbatim by Colorado's 1876 consti-
tutional convention from the 1875 Missouri Constitution. 141 Its ancestor
was probably the New Hampshire Constitution, which uses somewhat
stronger words.142  Four other states have similar provisions. 143  The
second quoted provision was also copied from the 1875 Missouri Consti-
tution and was later adopted in Montana, but it was subsequently re-
136. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
137. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-49 (1921); see
also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1932). See generally
Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 631 (1967).
138. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1642 (2005).
139. COLO. CONST. art. lI, § 11.
140. Id. art XV, § 12; see also id. art. XV, § 8 (preserving the power of eminent domain over
the property of corporations).
141. See MO. CONsT. of 1875 art. 11, § 15.
142. See N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 23 ("Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and
unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the pu-
nishment of offenses.").
143. Tennessee forbids "retrospective" laws. TENN. CONST. art. L § 20. Three states forbid
"retroactive" laws. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 X; OHO CONST. art. II, § 28; TEx. CONST. art. L § 16.
The Montana Constitution forbids any "retrospective law" that imposes a "new liability" on past
events. MONT. CONST. art. XII § 1(3). The Alabama Constitution requires the title of a law to
indicate any intended retroactive effect. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 45, construed in Ala. Educ. Ass'n v.
Grayson, 382 So. 2d 501, 505 (Ala. 1980).
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pealed in both states.144 Nothing in the Colorado Convention records
explained or elaborated the meaning of either clause.
145
The Colorado Supreme Court's first application of the article H
clause arose when a wrongful death judgment against a railroad was
based on a statute that was repealed during the railroad's appeal. The
court rejected the railroad's claim that this absolved it of liability retroac-
tively, invoking both the barrier of article H, section 11, and the pre-
sumed legislative intent that a new statute operate prospectively.' 46 The-
reafter, the court chose a verbal device to apply these sections, which
declared a retroactive law valid unless retrospective. 147 Because the two
words are dictionary synonyms, this simply attaches the retrospective
label to laws found to be invalid. The main substantive rule the court has
applied forbids retroactive laws that impair vested rights or impose new
obligations on past transactions. 48 Interpretations of other states' clauses
are similar.1 49 This formulation traces to an 1814 opinion of Justice Sto-
ry on Circuit that is also followed in determining due process attacks on
retroactive laws. 50  On the other side of the ledger, the courts say that
retroactive laws that are remedial or procedural in character are valid.'
5'
The Colorado court's most recent application of the article II clause
showed willingness to broaden its reach. In 1998-99, Golden made five
agreements with developers that included incentives to invest in the city
in the form of tax rebates and subsidies that were reviewable each
year.152  A 2001 city law (adopted by citizens' initiative) revoked this
commitment. Its purported retroactive application was marginal: elimi-
144. MO. CONST. of 1875, art. XII, § 19. The former Montana Constitution was worded simi-
larly to Colorado's article XV provision. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XV, § 13, construed in
State ex rel. Souders v. Dist. Court, 12 P.2d 852, 855 (1932). The same text was proposed in Cali-
fornia in 1878 but was not adopted. CAL. CONST. proposed amend. 298, § 8 (1878), available at
http:llwww.sos.ca.gov/archives/1879/archive/F3956-11 .pdf.
145. See TIMOTHY O'CONNOR, SEC'Y OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION HELD IN DENVER, DECEMBER 20,1875 TO FRAME A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF
COLORADO at 90, 143, 204, 487 (1907) (reciting the text of both sections repeatedly without inter-
preting or explaining either of them). However, the convention delegates' intent to restrict the
power of corporations was manifest. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 62, at 6-7, 313-16;
Donald Wayne Hensel, A History of the Colorado Constitution in the Nineteenth Century, 134-55
(1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado) (on file with the Wise Law Library,
University of Colorado, Boulder).
146. Denver, South Park & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162, 168-69 (1878).
147. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 62, at 44-45.
148. See id.
149. See, e.g., Goldrush n v. City of Marietta, 482 S.E.2d 347, 358 (Ga. 1997); Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Villa Capri Homes, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 327, 332-33 (Mo. 1985); Wallace v. Mont. Dep't of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 889 P.2d 817, 819-22 (Mont. 1995); Socha v. City of Manchester, 490 A.2d
794, 795 (N.H. 1985); Vogel v. Wells, 566 N.E.2d 154, 161-62 (Ohio 1991); Dark Tobacco Grow-
ers' Coop. Ass'n v. Dunn, 266 S.W. 308, 312 (Tenn. 1924); McCain v. Yost, 284 S.W.2d 898, 900
(Tex. 1955). There does not appear to be a decision under any of these provisions that departs from
the "vested rights" formulation.
150. Soc'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767-69 (Cir. Ct.
D.N.H. 1814); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268-69 (1994).
151. See, e.g., Cont'l Title Co. v. Dist. Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo. 1982).
152. City of Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285, 288 (Colo. 2006).
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nation of future subsidies and rebates to developers who had invested
previously in expectation of continued annual consideration of rebates
and subsidies. The 2001 law did not impair any vested rights in the tra-
ditional sense; the repudiated commitment was not to give rebates and
subsidies, only to consider giving them each year. The court neverthe-
less invalidated application of the 2001 law to pre-2001 investors on the
theory that they had a vested right to annual consideration of rebates and
subsidies. 153
The 2004 Telluride Amendment did not impair vested rights, not
even in the attenuated sense of the Golden case. Nor did it impose new
obligations on a completed past transaction because the condemnation
action had been filed shortly before the enactment. It did overturn ex-
pectations of Telluride residents that they could preserve the Valley
Floor, but that is a public expectation, and past decisions have protected
only private rights. m On the other hand, the Amendment was in no
sense remedial or procedural in character. Therefore, an attack on its
retroactive application would have presented a novel issue.
A further problem for Telluride might have been the traditional rule
that denies local governments standing or capacity to claim rights against
their states on the theory that they are but arms of the state, unless the
state gives express permission. 155 However, constitutional home rule is
often held to allow municipalities to sue their states to challenge invasion
of home-rule powers.156  Colorado decisions appear to assume this,
though no explicit ruling has been reported.
157
Telluride's case for invalidation would focus not on the kind of in-
jury caused, but on the claim that the statute's retroactive application was
a special accommodation to a single, powerful party. Many state consti-
153. Id. at 296. The annual consideration ritual was necessary to comply with Colorado's
constitutional debt restriction. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(b); see also Golden, 138 P.2d at
291-92.
154. See OEsTRIE & COLLINS, supra note 62, at 44-45.
155. See Harold A. Olsen, Note, Procedural Barriers to Suits Against the State by Local Gov-
ernment, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 431, 437 (1996). In Colorado, see Board of County Commissioners v.
Vail Associates. 19 P.3d 1263, 1270 (Colo. 2001). Colorado law gives counties that are sued au-
thority to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute as a defense to the action, but there is no
general authority to initiate a constitutional challenge. See COLD. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-105.1
(West 2009).
The Colorado authorities use the term "standing" to describe the authority at issue. Olsen
explains that "capacity" is a more accurate term. See Olsen, supra, at 437-40. A similar rule forbids
unauthorized suits by officers to challenge the constitutionality of laws defining their duties. See,
e.g., Lamm v. Barber, 565 P.2d 538, 544 (Colo. 1977), questioned on other grounds in Bd. of Coun-
ty Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 599 P.2d 887, 890-91 (Colo. 1979).
156. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 155, at 447.
157. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990) (allowing suit
against the state to enforce home rule with no discussion of city's standing or capacity). No chal-
lenge was made in Telluride to the town's capacity or standing to challenge the constitutional validi-
ty of the Telluride Amendment as a defense. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.,
185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
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tutions include a provision forbidding "local or special laws."' 58 These
provisions achieved their procedural goal of forcing legislatures to act by
general and uniform laws, but any substantive aim to prevent unfair favo-
ritism has not succeeded because there is no good way to define which
laws should be overturned. 5 9  All laws require majority support, and
achieving that support is the essence of democracy. All laws are in some
sense special, and many perfectly good laws are local in some sense or
another. But retroactivity is an important additional factor. Making a
new law just retroactive enough to benefit a single wealthy interest that
procured the law can be walled off as a distortion of democracy. Colora-
do's article 11 ban on retrospective laws condemns "special privileges."
Article XV's unique ban expressly forbids retrospective laws that benefit
a single corporation. It also seems to give municipalities standing to
invoke the provision.
When applied to complex statutory schemes with broad social im-
pact, such as tax and welfare laws, retroactivity can raise complex issues
of intertemporal equity that have generated sophisticated academic ana-
lyses. 16° However, the sort of retroactivity involved in the Telluride case
raised no such concern. A shift in policy to forbid use of eminent do-
main to create parks and open space is exactly the sort of change that can
and ought to be prospective only. The legislature implicitly recognized
this in the bill on urban renewal to which the Telluride Amendment was
attached: the rest of the bill was entirely prospective in operation.
161
IV. LITIGATION, LEGISLATION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The Telluride eminent domain case is a dramatic illustration of the
distortions litigation can create for orderly public policy. The case was
quite unusual. The decision to condemn the land was made by Tellu-
ride's citizens rather than its government officials. Indeed, the officials
reached a compromise with the owner that the citizens rejected. Ques-
tions about possible above-market values of a resident owner who is sub-
jected to condemnation were largely inverted because the absentee lan-
158. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 25; see also Thomas F. Green, Jr., A Malapropian Pro-
vision of State Constitutions, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 359 & n.2 (1939) (stating that half the states
had such provisions at that time).
159. This statement is illustrated by any published discussion of the workings of these provi-
sions; all show their limited effects. See, e.g., OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAw 96-103 (2d ed. 2001); Green, supra note 158, at 362-66. A sophisticated pro-
posal to define this limit in terms of good and bad logrolling concluded that the determination would
be very difficult. The key part of such a rule would be whether logrolls producing allegedly special
or local laws should be presumed valid or invalid. The proposal concluded that they should be
presumed valid. See Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and Local
Government Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 625, 642-57 (1994).
160. See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 43-52 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity
and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1056-58 (1997).
161. See H.B. 04-1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004).
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downer had never lived on the land, 162 while local residents passed
through it often. Instead of an orderly review of the subject of extraterri-
torial eminent domain, an amendment was hastily tacked onto a bill
about urban renewal. 163 The amendment's legal theory was the same as
the litigation strategy of the eminent domain defendants, a theory with
little relation to the policies at stake. The amendment may have har-
dened Telluride's voters against a compromise with the landowner. As
discussed above, there was no significant statewide interest in the con-
demnation, contrary to most such cases.164 The Colorado Supreme Court
reached a defensible result on the facts of this unusual case but generated
uncertainty and criticism by its vague and overbroad opinion.
The Telluride Amendment was inspired by loosely aligned groups
known to supporters and opponents alike as the property rights move-
ment.165 The movement places a high priority on restricting use of emi-
nent domain, a goal pursued both politically and in litigation. 166 The
movement's principal opponents are organizations often described as the
environmental movement. 167 The major political parties claim to support
both property rights and the environment, but when environmental poli-
cies conflict with landowners' interests, there are rather clear differences
between them. Republicans typically side with landowners against envi-
ronmental preservation, while Democrats favor the environment. 68  A
concrete example is current battles over the Endangered Species Act.' 69
162. The San Miguel Valley Corporation owns a handsome house inside Telluride that is
occasionally used by members of the Blue family. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. Geiger, Tellu-
ride Town Attorney (Feb. 9, 2009). However, very few people have resided on the condemned land
since abandonment of the early mining settlement of San Miguel City. See Telluride and Mountain
Village Official Visitor Guide, The Valley Floor Legacy,
http://www.telluridevisitorguide.com/townsValleyFloor.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
On the valuation issue, see generally Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent
Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker
Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 713, 739-42 (2008); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Re-
medies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1542-53 (1998) (arguing for
higher eminent domain valuations based on the so-called endowment effect when owner-occupiers
are displaced by takings). A recent study argued that claims of undercompensation resulting from
non-monetary values of residents displaced by eminent domain may be overstated. See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006).
163. See supra notes 10- 12 and accompanying text.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 116-25.
165. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, POL'Y ANALYSIS,
Dec. 15, 2005, at 3, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa558.pdf.
166. See id. at 25-34.
167. See MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AT THE DAWN OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 284-85 (3d ed. 2002).
168. Party platforms try to straddle these issues, but the differences stated in the text are there.
Compare COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2008 REPUBLICAN NAT'L CONVENTION, 2008
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 36, 54, available at http://platform.gop.com/2008Platform.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009), with 2008 DEMOCRATIC NAT'L CONVENTION COMM., THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL PLATFORM 42 (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/apache.3cdn.net/
8a738445026dId5fDf_bcm6b5l7a.pdf.




Another is the Telluride Amendment, passed when Republicans con-
trolled all three political branches of Colorado government.
170
A second policy that may have driven the Telluride Amendment
was economic development. The stormy debate about the Kelo case de-
scried use of eminent domain for urban renewal, an anti-development
view. 171  Nevertheless, historical uses of eminent domain have mostly
been pro-development, public or private. Land was taken to intensify its
use or to supply services to other developments. Takings for parks were
a limited exception, but only in recent years has the power been used to
preserve open space and other ambient resources.172  For some policy
makers, that is a negative use that they wish to limit or forbid. 73 This is
another important question of public policy that was poorly served by
chasing a pending lawsuit of peripheral relevance.
170. See Julia C. Martinez, Governor Owens Cheers on GOP, Says Economy a Priority,
DENVER POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at E3.
171. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Political opposition to Kelo has been very
broad, from Ralph Nader to Rush Limbaugh. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/constitutionallaw/PostKeloReform.pdf"
172. See Joseph L. Sax, Why American Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
513, 514-16 (2005). Older treatises on eminent domain made no mention of its use for open space
other than parks. See, e.g., I JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES 405-95 (2d ed. 1900). By contrast, current treatises prominently discuss the subject,
relying entirely on recent authorities. See, e.g., 8 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § GI4D (2008).
173. A frequent issue in debates about takings law and policy is whether government regula-
tion that limits private development should be valid without just compensation. The property rights
movement strongly seeks to restrict governments' power to impose such regulations. See, e.g.,
Eagle, supra note 165, at 14-15.
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MINORITY INTERESTS, MAJORITY POLITICS: A COMMENT
ON RICHARD COLLINS' "TELLURIDE'S TALE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN, HOME RULE, AND RETROACTIViTY"
ASHIRA PELMAN OSTROW'
In his article, Telluride's Tale of Eminent Domain, Home Rule, and
Retroactivity,' Professor Richard Collins skillfully parses many of the
unique legal issues that confronted the Colorado Supreme Court in Town
of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.2 In particular, Professor Collins
explores the constitutional right to a change of venue based on jury bias
in an eminent domain action,3 the scope of Telluride's home rule power
of eminent domain,4 and the extent to which a state statute purporting to
limit such power could be retroactively applied.5
As Professor Collins notes, the Telluride case was unusual in sever-
al ways:
The decision to condemn the land was made by Telluride's citizens
rather than its government officials. Indeed, the officials reached a
compromise with the owner that the citizens rejected. Questions
about possible above-market values of a resident owner who is sub-
jected to condemnation were largely inverted because the absentee
landowner had never lived on the land, while local residents passed
through it often. Instead of an orderly review of the subject of extra-
territorial eminent domain, an amendment was hastily tacked onto a
bill about urban renewal .... The amendment may have hardened
Telluride's voters against a compromise with the landowner ....
[T]here was no significant statewide interest in the condemnation,
contrary to most such cases.6
In this Comment, I would like to expand on Professor Collins' ob-
servations, first, by framing Telluride's tale of extraterritorial eminent
domain through the lens of public choice theory, and, second, by arguing
that extraterritorial condemnation, wherein a local government condemns
land outside of its own geographic boundaries, necessarily implicates
t Associate Professor, Hofstra Law School. Thank you to Richard Briffault, Richard Col-
lins, Nestor Davidson, Laurie Reynolds and Christopher Serkin for helpful comments and sugges-
tions. Thank you also to Noah Patterson and Kevin Shelton for excellent research assistance. As
always, a special thank you to Dr. Adinah Pelman.
1. Richard Collins, Telluride's Tale of Eminent Domain, Home Rule, and Retroactivity, 86
DENv. U. L. REv. 1433 (2009).
2. 185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
3. Collins, supra note 1, at 1434-38.
4. Id. at 1438-51.
5. Id. at 1451-55.
6. Id. at 1455-56 (footnotes omitted).
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extra-local concerns. I therefore suggest that a state perspective, though
subject to its own political process failures, is better able to balance the
inter-local and statewide interests at stake in cases of extraterritorial emi-
nent domain.
Part I describes the events leading up to the Colorado Supreme
Court's decision in Town of Telluride and contrasts Town of Telluride
with the more familiar tale of eminent domain told most recently by the
United States Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London.7 Part II
borrows from public choice theory to compare the relative advantages of
special interest groups at the state and local level. In particular, this Part
argues that some of the peculiarities in Town of Telluride, including Tel-
luride residents' rejection of a negotiated compromise with the landown-
er and the hasty passage of a state statute intended to circumvent Tellu-
ride's condemnation action, can be explained through an analysis of the
relative political advantage of each party. The Telluride case, thus, dra-
matically illustrates that in the land use context developers have an ad-
vantage in influencing politics at the state level, while homeowners tend
to dominate at the local level.
Part III then argues that a state-wide perspective is needed to fully
account for the impact of a locality's decision to condemn land outside of
its own geographic borders. Extraterritorial condemnation impacts resi-
dents or potential residents who are excluded from the political process
of the condemning locality. The ability of a local community, particular-
ly an elite and wealthy community, to use its land use regulatory power
to stymie development that would benefit individuals who are not
represented in the condemning locality's political process gives rise to a
significant state-wide interest in regulating extraterritorial condemnation.
I. TELLURIDE'S TALE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
The Supreme Court's highly publicized decision in Kelo v. City of
New London brought much attention (mostly negative) to the use of emi-
nent domain for economic redevelopment.8 In Kelo, an economically
depressed local government sought to revitalize its community by attract-
ing private development. Jessica Corry, Director of the Indeppndence
Institute's Property Rights Project, described a similar Colorado con-
demnation case as follows:
7. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
8. Ilya Somin, The Limits of the Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo 7-11
(George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 07-14), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract--976298 (describing negative public response to Kelo); Adam Karlin, A Backlash on Seizure
of Property, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 6, 2005, at 1, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0706/pOlsO3-uspo.html (describing massive anti-Kelo backlash).
Forty-three states have enacted eminent domain reforms since Kelo was decided. Castle Coalition,
50 State Report Card, http://www.castlecoalition.org/publications/report_card/index.htm (last vi-
sited June 8, 2009).
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Sheridan residents face a situation typical of what is occurring in
many struggling Colorado towns and cities. A decline in sales tax
revenue due to a major retailer's departure in 1997 led to the loss of
the city's municipal building, and in response, city leaders created the
Sheridan Redevelopment Agency, aggressively sought redevelop-
ment opportunities to generate additional tax revenue, and turned to
condemnation of existing businesses to make way for a private rede-
velopment project perceived to have the ability to generate greater
tax revenue.
9
In Kelo the Supreme Court held that economic redevelopment constitutes
a permitted "public use"'0 under the Takings Clause." Unfortunately, in
some cases, the property owner, forced from her home or business, is
nonetheless injured if she is not adequately compensated for the non-
monetary value of her property.
As Professor Collins observes, however, Telluride presents a far dif-
ferent dynamic. Instead of a local home or business owner, the property
owner in Telluride was Neal Blue, a San Diego-based defense contractor,
who purchased several hundred acres of land at the entrance to the Tellu-
ride Valley through his company, the San Miguel Valley Corporation
(SMVC). Thus, in this case, the "above-market values of a resident
landowner who is subjected to condemnation were largely inverted be-
cause the absentee landowner had never lived on the land, while local
residents passed through it often."'"
One could scarcely think of a better foil for Blue than the Town of
Telluride. Once a mining town, Telluride is now famous for its scenic
views, snow capped peaks and anti-development stance. In the words of
Seth Cagin, publisher of the Telluride Watch, "What you have in Tellu-
ride is a large constituency of people who moved here because they are
of the mind that the Earth is imperiled... to them it's important to draw
the line and take a stand-and just say no."'
4
Early on the battle lines were drawn between Neal Blue, "easily ca-
ricatured as a ruthless capitalist, for whom the Valley Floor was a sym-
9. JESSICA PECK CORRY, INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTE PROPERTY RIGHTS PROJECT, AT THE
CROSSROAD OF CONDEMNATION: THE DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR PRIVATE
DEVELOPMENT AND OPEN SPACE 9 (2006), available at http://www.i2i.org/articlesl
IP_ l_2006_b.pdf (footnote omitted).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
11. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478-81, 483-84. See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)
(holding that private structures which are not themselves blighted may be condemned as part of a
larger program designed to prevent the spread of blight and that transfer of a condemned property to
a private entity for redevelopment qualifies as public use).
12. Bruce V. Bigelow, Setback for S.D. industrialist, S.D. UNION-TRM., May 10, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20070510/news-lblOblue.html.
13. Collins, supra note 1, 1455-56.
14. Richard Bernstein, A clash of values, Rockies resort-style letter from America, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Feb. 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 3703058.
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bol of private property" and the citizens of Telluride, "equally easy to
caricature-from Blue's perspective-as idealistic hippies, or leftists,
who did not respect private property rights."' 5 The conflict came to a
head in 2002, when Telluride residents voted to use the town's power of
extraterritorial eminent domain to forcibly acquire almost two-thirds of
Blue's parcel for public open space, parkland and recreation use. The
town filed its condemnation petition in San Miguel County on March 26,
2004.16
Here again, the Telluride tale diverges from other eminent domain
stories. Most property owners are powerless to resist an official con-
demnation order.1 7 Once a government has made the decision to exercise
its power of eminent domain, the fight turns to the valuation of the con-
demned property.
But Neal Blue is not an ordinary landowner. Blue took his fight to
the state legislature and succeeded in tacking an amendment, known as
the Telluride Amendment, onto a more general bill reforming eminent
domain law.18 The Telluride Amendment explicitly prohibited extraterri-
torial condemnation for public open space, parkland and recreation use.
It applied retroactively to January 1, 2004, neatly capturing Telluride's
March 2004 condemnation order.
The Telluride Amendment, at best, fit awkwardly into the larger
property rights bill onto which it was tacked. 19 House Bill 1203 was
passed in response to public outcry over alleged abuse of the Colorado
Urban Renewal Law, which permitted local agencies to transfer property
ownership in designated blighted areas to private developers for the pur-
pose of urban renewal.20 Enacted one year prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Kelo, House Bill 1203 narrowed the public use requirement
by excluding from the definition of public use "the taking of private
15. Seth Cagin, Field of Dreams, TELLURIDE WATCH, Feb. 28, 2009, available at
http://tinyurl.com/djnmu8. Adding fuel to the fire, Telluride residents, already opposed to any
development of the Valley Floor, grew even more distrustful of Blue when an internal memo was
leaked to the press recommending that Blue gain community support by buying a local newspaper
and using a seemingly fictitious agricultural scheme to drain wetlands. Bernstein, supra note 14.
16. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163-64 (Colo. 2008).
17. Posting of Ilya Somin to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1235208323.
shtml (Feb. 21, 2009, 3:25 PST) (reviewing Little Pink House by Jeff Benedict and noting Bene-
dict's description of the great difficulty of resisting eminent domain when those targeted are relative-
ly lacking in political influence).
18. 2004 Colo. Legis. Serv. 367 (West) (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-1-101(4)(b)
(West 2009)).
19. Collins, supra note 1, at 1444 (noting that the Amendment's hasty consideration was
illustrated by the fact that it left unamended a conflicting statute that expressly allowed municipali-
ties to condemn land within five miles outside their boundaries for park and open space purposes).
20. CORRY, supra note 9, at 4.
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property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic de-
velopment or enhancement of tax revenue.',
2 1
The Telluride Amendment, in contrast, prohibited the use of emi-
nent domain for public open space, park and recreation purposes. Open
space condemnation is unlikely to be used by urban renewal agencies
22seeking to attract new development projects. Moreover, condemnation
of private land for public open space and parkland, though perhaps ob-
jectionable on other grounds, 23 falls squarely within the narrow meaning
of public use as "use by the public." Thus, House Bill 1203 prevents
communities from privileging private commercial development, while
the Telluride Amendment prevents communities from excluding private
commercial development.
While it is possible that the Telluride Amendment was legitimately
inspired by the property rights movement and would have passed even
without Blue's lobbying,25 the fact that the Amendment was just retroac-
tive enough to capture the Telluride condemnation makes that theoretical
possibility unlikely.26 In the words of a local blogger writing at the time
the Amendment was being considered by the state legislature:
This open space amendment clearly still represents special interest
legislation; the amendment was brought up at the request of lobbyists
(4 of them, this time) from the law firm representing one landowner:
SMVC, owner of Telluride's Valley Floor. This amendment was
clearly and indisputably written with the express purpose of thwart-
ing Telluride's rights of self-determination. There have been no oth-
21. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-101(l)(b)(I) (2009) (."[Public use' shall not include the taking
of private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic development or en-
hancement of tax revenue."). See also NCSL.org, State Legislative Response to Kelo,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/annualmtgupdateO6.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (describing
post-Kelo legislative efforts including reforms which prohibit the use of eminent domain for eco-
nomic development purposes, to generate tax revenue, or to transfer private property to another
private entity and reforms which define "public use" as the possession, occupation or enjoyment of
the property by the public at large, public agencies or public utilities).
22. Cf. Collins, supra note 1, at 1457 (noting that "historical uses of eminent domain have
mostly been pro-development, public or private. Land was taken to intensify its use or to supply
services to other developments. Takings for parks were a limited exception .... ).
23. See discussion infra pp. 1470-71 (analogizing extraterritorial condemnation for open
space to other forms of exclusionary zoning).
24. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479 (2005) (describing narrow view of public
use requirement as use by the public).
25. Collins, supra note 1, at 1450 ("Legislative motivation for the Telluride Amendment was
either ideological opposition to any use of eminent domain to acquire land for parks and open space,
an attempt to accommodate the wishes of a wealthy landowner and potential campaign contributor,
or some mix of both.").
26. As noted above, the Telluride Amendment was retroactive to January 1, 2004. See COLO.
REv. STAT. § 38-1-101(4)(b)(I-U) (2009). The Town of Telluride filed its condemnation action on
March 26, 2004. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163-64 (Colo. 2008).
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er examples of cases that this amendment would effect [sic] or bene-
fits of this legislation outside of benefits to SMVC.
27
Professor Collins similarly concludes that "making a new law just re-
troactive enough to benefit a single wealthy interest that procured the law
can be walled off as a distortion of democracy. 28 Indeed, as I will dis-
cuss more fully below, 29 passage of the Telluride Amendment likely illu-
strates the capacity of a special interest to capture the democratic process
at the state level.
Ultimately, the District Court invalidated the Telluride Amendment
under Colorado's constitutional Home Rule provision.30  The District
Court also ordered the parties to enter into mediation.3' In December
2005, Telluride town officials reached a tentative compromise with Blue.
The agreement would have allowed Blue to build 22 houses on 64 acres
of land.32  In exchange, Blue would build 15 units of affordable housing
for Telluride's working-class people, donate land for a new hospital and
school, and place the remaining 91% of the land under a conservation
easement.33
Despite the seemingly beneficial terms of the compromise and the
endorsement of the Telluride Town Council and San Miguel County
Commission, Telluride's residents voted to reject the compromise. 34 In
rejecting the compromise, residents took an absolute stance against de-
velopment.35
With the Telluride Amendment invalidated and the compromise
agreement rejected, all that was left for the condemnation to be complete
was a trial to set compensation. At the time of the trial, Telluride ap-
praised the land at $26 million, which the town itself had raised, mostly
27. Progress Now Colorado, http://www.progressnowcolorado.org/pagetcommunity/post/
jbholston/CLWc (Mar. 26, 2004, 02:00 EST). In his post, blogger JB Holston further notes:
According to a Colorado Municipal League release, SMVC attorney Tom Ragonetti testi-
fied before the House committee that heard this bill that this amendment is not special in-
terest, but failed to site examples outside of his client's Valley Floor land. Ragonetti's
firm has since hired at least four of the state's hardest hitting lobbyists to fight for this
amendment. Some of these lobbyists are from state home-builders associations, a power-
ful lobby group, fighting for property rights and development rights.
Id. Bigelow, supra note 12 (citing Telluride Mayor, John Pryor, as saying that Blue's company
lobbied for the passage of the Telluride Amendment).
28. Collins, supra note 1, at 1455.
29. See infra Part I.
30. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 2-4, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No.
07SAI01 (Colo. Aug. 15,2007).
31. Collins supra note 1, at 1434.
32. Patrick O'Driscoll, Land Fight in Telluride, Colo., Enters Ilth Hour, USA TODAY, May
8, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-05-07-tellurideN.htm; Bernstein,
supra note 14 (describing the terms of the mediated compromise).
33. O'Driscoll, supra note 32.
34. According to Art Goodtimes, one of the county commissioners who recommended the
proposal, "It was hard to say no to that (compromise), because it offered so much for so little." Id.
35. In the words of one Telluride resident, the compromise was rejected because "A little
development on the valley floor is like being a little bit pregnant." Bernstein, supra note 14.
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by incurring bond debt. In contrast, Blue appraised the land at closer to
$50 million. A panel of jurors agreed with Blue, leaving the town with
only three months to raise the $24 million shortfall.3 6
For most local governments, a $24 million shortfall would have
created an insurmountable obstacle to the condemnation action. But
Telluride is not an ordinary local government. In 2002 the median home
price in the United States was $156,200, 37 while the median home price
in the incorporated area surrounding the Telluride Ski Resort was over
$2 million.3' Telluride is also "home or second home to many wealthy
(and celebrated) citizens, including Tom Cruise, Christie Brinkley, Daryl
Hannah, and Oprah Winfrey, '' 39 as well as diplomat Richard Holbrooke,
former eBay CEO Meg Whitman, and Hollywood movie mogul Tom
Shadyac, who alone contributed $2 million in the days before the dead-
line expired.4n The Telluride community, therefore, was able to raise the
funds necessary to complete the condemnation. a
II. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AT THE STATE AND LOCAL
LEVEL
As Part I explains, Telluride's tale of condemnation turns the more
notorious eminent domain saga on its head. Instead of a politically vul-
nerable landowner, such as Suzette Kelo, being forced from her lifelong
home or business, this case involved a commercial landowner so politi-
cally powerful that he was able to persuade the state legislature to pass a
law specifically designed to preserve his property. And instead of a lo-
cality motivated by a desire to rejuvenate its declining community by
36. Id.; see also Collins, supra note 1, at 1437 ("The town's last offer before the jury's verdict
was $26 million; the landowner claimed a value of almost $51 million. The jury's verdict was for
$50 million."). In addition, Professor Collins explains:
The jury's verdict was entered on Feb. 20, 2007. This was followed by a hearing on the
amount of time the town had for raising the funds to satisfy the verdict because there was
no explicit Colorado role setting a deadline. The landowner argued for 44 days, until
April 5. The town argued for no deadline or in the alternative for 90 days, until May 21.
The District Court adopted the May 21 deadline.
Id. at 1437 n.36.
37. RealEstateABC.com, Median Sales Prices of Existing Homes Since 1968,
http://www.realestateabc.com/graphs/natlmedian.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009).
38. Bernstein, supra note 14.
39. Collins, supra note 1, at 1437.
40. O'Driscoll, supra note 32; Bigelow, supra note 12.
41. See O'Driscoll, supra note 32 (stating that the town needs to raise the money by May 9,
the deadline date); Bigelow, supra note 12 (describing fund raising efforts, including a $2 million
donation from a Hollywood producer and other large contributions that enabled the town to raise $24
million in less than 3 months). See also Joanne Kelley, Telluride Passes Hat, Collects $50 Million,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 10, 2007, available at http://tinyurl.com/co5zfy.
In fact, the total amount raised was actually higher than $24 million because, as Professor
Collins notes, "because Colorado requires a condemning town to reimburse attorneys fees when an
eminent domain verdict is 130% or more of the town's last offer, Telluride had to pay almost $2.8
million more for fees and costs." See Coffins, supra note 1, at 1437-38 & n.39 (citing Town of
Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 197 P.3d 261, 262 (Colo. App. 2008) (applying COLO. REV.
STAT. § 38-1-122 (1.5) (2008)).
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attracting private development, it involved a town so wealthy it was able
to pay $50 million to prevent development outside its borders.
Although the case presents some unique issues, this Part demon-
strates that the actions of both the landowner and the residents of Tellu-
ride can be explained through an analysis of the relative political advan-
tage of each party at the state and local levels of government. More spe-
cifically, the Telluride case dramatically illustrates the general observa-
tion that in the land use context, developers have an advantage in in-
fluencing politics at the state level, while homeowners tend to dominate
at the local level.42
Political scientists have long recognized that small groups enjoy an
advantage in the political process.43 Indeed, a central insight of public
choice theory is that a motivated minority group can exert more political
influence than an unorganized or apathetic majority. Neal Komesar ex-
plains that:
Interest groups with small numbers but high per capita stakes have
sizeable advantages in political action over interest groups with larg-
er numbers and smaller per capita stakes, because higher per capita
stakes mean that the members of the interest group will have greater
incentive to expend the effort necessary to recognize and understand
the issues."
In addition, smaller groups can more easily overcome free-rider prob-
lems, transaction and information costs and other organizational hurdles
that can plague larger groups. Moreover, special interest group influence
increases in proportion to the size of the government because the larger
the government, the more difficult it is for majorities to organize effec-
tively.
45
In contrast, small governments are more easily captured by domi-
nant majorities.46 The notion that small polities are vulnerable to majori-
42. Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the
Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1624, 1664 (2006).
43. Id. at 1638 ("In contemporary politics, their relative advantage can explain special interest
groups' frequent ability to capture legislatures, regardless of the preferences of the majority of vot-
ers.").
44. NElL K KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMrrS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF
RIGHTS 61 (2001).
45. Serkin, supra note 42, at 1662-64. Serkin notes, however, that:
there may be a size cutoff above which the marginal cost of organizing the majority does
not substantially change, at which point other factors, like the quality of the decisionmak-
ers, become increasingly important. In other words, this comparison may work better be-
tween small, local governments on the one hand, and state and federal governments on
the other, than between states and the federal government.
See id. at 1663 n.149.
46. Of course, rule by majority is a central tenet of democracy and is not, in and of itself,
harmful. The danger in small localities arises because "logrolling by competing constituencies is
less likely to ensure that every group will get its say. Instead, a dominant majority can effectively
shut out competing voices and systemically have its way." See Serkin, supra note 42, at 1647.
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tarianism, or faction, can be traced directly back to James Madison and
the Federalist Papers. Madison worried that in a small society, "a com-
mon passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole.., and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice
the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. 47
In particular, small local governments are often responsive to their
largest and most motivated constituency, namely homeowners.48 As a
result, in towns like Telluride, developers must negotiate with the com-
munity, through exactions and other compromises, in order to gain local
approval for their projects. 9
For over two decades, Neal Blue, a Denver native whose mother, "a
state treasurer and University of Colorado Regent, is honored in a stained
glass window in the State Capitol,, 50 and whose take-no-prisoner's style
of business earned him the personal nickname "The Predator, 5 l nego-
tiated unsuccessfully with the local community to gain approval for his
development plans. Having failed to woo the local majority, Blue, not
surprisingly, turned to the state legislature to defeat Telluride's condem-
nation motion.
That Blue was unable to persuade the local government to approve
his development plans is also not surprising. The homeowner majority is
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 81 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
48. William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on
Robert Nelson's Privatizing the Neighborhood, 7 GEo. MASON L. REv. 881, 891 (1999)
("[C]onvincing econometric evidence supports the supposition that in small towns, the preferences
of the median voter-usually a homeowner-prevail in local political decisions"); Serkin, supra
note 42, at 1648 (supporting Fischel's hypothesis that local politics are dominated by homeowners
who have both the incentive and the means to exert political influence locally); Winter King, Smart
Growth Meets the Neighbors, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1349, 1357-58 (2007) ("A local government's
responsiveness to the desires of landowners within its jurisdiction is unsurprising given the repre-
sentative nature of local government. City councils (and often planning commissions) are elected
bodies, and are therefore unlikely to approve a project, much less a significant change in policy, in
the face of significant opposition from the electorate."). Not all scholars agree with the characteriza-
tion of local governments as majoritarian. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age
of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1243, 1273 (1997) ("Theoretical constructs aside, however,
there seems to be a slim empirical basis for concluding that small locality politics are generally rife
with majoritarian abuse of power."); Vicki Been, The Perils of Paradoxes-Comment on William A.
Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property?,
67 Cin.-KENT L. REV. 913, 920 (1991) ("iThere is enormous room for debate about whether all or
even most local governments fit [the majoritarian] model."); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism,
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131-32 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)) (criticizing the majoritarian model of local
politics as an example of "localism bashing").
49. Serkin, supra note 42, at 1652 (noting that in small local governments special interest
groups may be better viewed as petitioners for homeowner approval).
50. Collins, supra note 1, at 1433 & n.4 (citing Colorado State Capitol,
http:llwww.colorado.gov/dpaldoit/archiveslcaptblue.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009)); Matt Potter,
General Atomics: Color It Blue, S.D. WEEKLY READER, July 12, 2001, available at
http:llwww.sandiegoreader.com/news/2001/jul/l12general-atomics-color-it-blue.
51. Collins, supra note 1, at 1433 & n.7 (citing Barney Gimble, The Predator, FORTUNE
MAGAZINE, Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/28/magazines/fortunel
predator.gimbel.fortune/index.htm).
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primarily motivated by a common desire to maintain property values
within the community.52 In economically depressed communities this
desire may translate into a concerted effort to attract new development to
the community. In wealthy communities such as Telluride, however,
homeowners are likely to oppose development within and adjacent to the
locality out of "fear that greater density will adversely affect local road
congestion, neighborhood character, crime, taxes and public services." 3
Moreover, as Christopher Serkin argues, homeowners are motivated
by a desire to maintain not only the objective market value of their
homes, but also the subjective use value of their homes and communities.
According to Serkin:
Homes embody more than a substantial financial investment; they in-
corporate aspects of their owners' lives and identities. An account
that focuses exclusively on market values or risk aversion misses im-
portant interests like the commitment members of a community may
have to preserving its character, independent of any effect on proper-
ty values.
54
Factoring in the subjective use value of property can account for
homeowners' desire to exclude minorities or other groups of neighbors
considered to be undesirable, even where the economic benefit of ex-
cluding these groups from the community is unclear.55 It can also ac-
count for Telluride's stubborn refusal-over the course of two decades-
to approve Blue's development plans and its refusal to accept even the
negotiated compromise, which would have provided the Town with af-
fordable housing, a school and a hospital.56
Instead, Telluride residents focused on maintaining the subjective
use value of their elite community, set literally and figuratively above its
neighbors, which would be diminished by the construction of a nearby
development. As one newspaper reported, "[t]here's a powerful determi-
nation among those lucky or rich enough to live here not only to enjoy
their earthly paradise but also to ensure that it is a responsible paradise.
Telluride-esque means recreation as a way of life combined with a cer-
52. "Homeowner control over local governments means that local governments will seek to
maximize the use value of people's property." Serkin, supra note 42, at 1659.
53. Fischel, supra note 48, at 881. See also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEvOTER
HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOvERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE,
AND LAND-USE PouIcms 229-31 (2001).
54. Serkin, supra note 42, at 1656. See also D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept,
46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 255, 278-83 (2006) (describing psychological value of a home). For a
related explanation of why neighbors oppose even property value enhancing development see King,
supra note 48, at 1362 & n.56 ("Another explanation ... is that owners of older homes do not to
[sic] want to be outdone by new development .... Even if their property values go up due to the
new development, neighbors may still find it distasteful to feel like poor relations to the new resi-
dents.").
55. Serkin, supra note 42, at 1657.
56. See Bernstein, supra note 14 (describing terms of the negotiated compromise between
Town officials and Neal Blue).
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tain high-minded utopianism, where the morally and physically polluting
elements of the outside world should and can be kept at bay. ' 57 Seth
Cagin characterized the condemnation more critically, noting that "the
$50 million ... could have been spent to save rainforest in the Amazon,
to build a wind farm, or any other number of things. To spend it on the
Valley Floor when we could have had 91 percent of the same land for
free is one thing only: conspicuous consumption. ' 8
In the end, it is difficult to determine who "won" the Telluride case.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court invalidated the Telluride
Amendment, thereby permitting the condemnation, a jury forced Tellu-
ride to pay Blue $50 million-almost exactly the amount Blue had ap-
praised the property to be worth and nearly double the Town's appraisal.
At least from an economic perspective, the outcome was efficient
because Telluride residents were forced to internalize the full cost of
their condemnation action. Indeed, the Telluride case serves as a striking
illustration of how the Takings Clause works in small local governments:
"Given any government proposal that requires compensating burdened
property owners, the local government will have to decide-under the
control of local homeowners-whether the proposal will cost more in
property taxes than it will generate in gain through increased property
values."59 In this case, Telluride residents agreed that preserving the
Valley Floor was worth the $50 million price tag.60
HI. IDENTIFYING THE EXTRA-LOCAL INTEREST
Although Telluride's condemnation of the Valley Floor may have
been economically efficient, there are still reasons to question whether it
achieved the optimal result, particularly since, as Part II explains, it was
motivated not only by environmentalism but also by a less lofty desire to
preserve Telluride's character as an elite resort community. As Seth
Cagin admonished in the aftermath of the community's rejection of the
negotiated compromise with Blue:
And so, we have become what we are: Beverly Hills in the moun-
tains; Aspen south. We are now a community of very wealthy
second homeowners, a few very wealthy families who can afford to
live here full-time, a dwindling and aging population of others who
got in before prices hit the stratosphere and a small, static population
of workers in subsidized housing .... What has passed for environ-
57. Bernstein, supra note 14.
58. See Allan Best, Telluride Open Space Won't Be Cheap, ASPEN TIMEs, Feb. 23, 2007,
available at http://www.aspentimes.comarticle/20070223/NEWs/7O223006.
59. Serkin, supra note 42, at 1661.
60. Perhaps not surprisingly, the court's decision in Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Devel-
opment Corp. represents both an end and a beginning. It is the end of the decades' long battle
against Neal Blue, but it is also the start of a new battle between town residents who are bitterly
divided over how the 572 acres of condemned land should be used. Cagin, supra note 15.
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mentalism in Telluride ... is not environmentalism at all. It is elit-
ism, pure and simple.
6 1
Exclusionary zoning is not new,62 and Telluride's use of its land use
regulatory authority to maintain its elite status and exclude newcomers is
63hardly unique. Exclusionary zoning is the natural consequence of a
decision-making process in which the interests of potential residents are
not represented by the locality enacting the exclusionary policies.64 As
William Fischel has noted, "the political market's failure in NIM-
BYism65 is that those who would benefit from the project are either ab-
sent from the jurisdiction, or present in such small numbers that they are
politically ineffective."
66
Extraterritorial condemnation often exhibits the same political mar-
ket failure because residents, or potential residents, of the area to be con-
demned are not represented by the locality exercising the condemnation
power. This market failure was vividly illustrated by the recent attempt
of another Colorado city, ironically named Golden,67 to prevent the con-
struction of a digital broadcasting tower outside its own borders by con-
demning the proposed site for open space. 68  The broadcasting tower
61. Bernstein, supra note 14.
62. Traditionally, exclusionary zoning has been used to describe large-lot, low-density zoning
used by some communities to prevent development. In this Comment, I use the term more broadly
to include other land use controls designed to exclude new development.
63. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 11-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
346, 347-49 (1990) (describing suburbs' use of exclusionary zoning); Jerry Frug, The Geography of
Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1082 (1996) (arguing that zoning is used to keep out "'the
wrong kind of people'-those who have to be excluded in order to make a residential neighborhood
seem desirable."); Stephen David Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Exclusionary
Zoning, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 71 (1992) ("In decisions affecting land use, landlords and
homeowners naturally unite to further their common interests... influence[ing] local governments
to enact zoning policies that effectively deny many individuals their choice of residence. In most
cases, these individuals also are excluded from the political process."); Nestor M. Davidson, Coop-
erative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959,
1025 (2007) (describing use of zoning to reinforce preferences of an artificially created majority).
64. Nestor Davidson articulates this phenomenon by noting that "the confluence of the Civic
Republican ideal of local participation and the Tieboutian rationale for intergovernmental competi-
tion combine in the realm of privileged local communities to foster exclusion and inequality."
Davidson, supra note 63, at 1025 (citing Briffault, supra note 63, at 403-25); see also Galowitz,
supra note 63, at 71.
65. NIMBY, an acronym for Not In My Backyard, describes "nearby homeowners who object
to further development within their community." William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion and the
NIMBY Syndrome, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 881 (1999).
66. Id. at 891.
67. Founded as a mining town in 1859, the City of Golden is actually named for Thomas
Golden, a miner. Britannica Online Encyclopedia, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/237
473/Golden (last visited June 8, 2009).
68. See CORRY, supra note 9, at I 1 ("According to Golden Spokeswoman Sabrina Henderson,
the city wants to acquire the land at a cost of $1.7 million to taxpayers, demolish the existing towers,
and turn the land into open space .... ); id. (noting that Golden City Council members claim their
purpose is to create new open space); Golden's Condemnation, http://www.hdtvcolorado.com/
content~pages/condemnation.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2009); Michael Roberts, Golden Showers: A
City's Plans Rain on Local TV Powerhouses, WESTWORD, Apr. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.westword.com/2006-04-13/news/golden-showers/l; Editorial, Merciful Intervention in
TV Tower Dispute, DENVER POST, Dec. 12, 2006, at B06 (characterizing decision to condemn the
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serves residents of the greater Denver metropolitan area, who, for the
most part, are excluded from Golden's political process. 69
Professor Collins maintains that the Telluride condemnation was
unique, in part because there was no significant statewide interest in the
Telluride condemnation. 70 Professor Collins acknowledges that a state-
wide interest could exist if the county in which the property was located
objected to the condemnation or if the condemnation conflicted with a
statewide land use policy, but concludes that in this case, "ownership
and use of the [Telluride] Valley Floor land did not fairly present any
issue of statewide concern.... San Miguel County, the territorial local
government for the Valley Floor... sided with Telluride, declaring that
the issue was local to Telluride. The Valley Floor is a uniquely isolated
piece of land that affects few outsiders. 71
Collins, therefore, suggests that the breadth of the court's decision
could have been tempered without changing the substantive outcome had
the court applied its traditional state-mixed-local framework to Tellu-
ride's condemnation action. Specifically, if the court had concluded that
the condemnation was purely local, it would have given Telluride the
power to condemn the Valley Floor, while at the same time preserving
the authority of the state to limit the extraterritorial condemnation powers
of home rule localities.72
Even if the particular parcel of land at issue in Telluride was geo-
graphically isolated, however, condemnation of this land by an adjacent
municipality likely implicates broader state interests. Indeed, in light of
the political market failure identified above, I would suggest that any
extraterritorial condemnation for open space necessarily presents an issue
of statewide or mixed state-local concern.73
More generally, the enormous overlap of municipal borders and
functions in our increasingly global economy makes it difficult to identi-
fy any municipal action that is purely local.74 As Richard Briffault has
site as "ludicrous"). See also Mount Laurel Tp. v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., 878 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005), aff'd per curiam, 910 A.2d 617 (2006) (upholding municipal open space con-
demnation designed to prevent residential real estate development), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 26
(2007).
69. See Anne Mulkem & Ann Schrader, Congress OKs TV Tower, DENVER POST, Dec. 10,
2006, at CO. See also Collins, supra note 1, at 1446.
70. Collins, supra note 1, at 1449. Professor Collins nonetheless acknowledges that a state-
wide interest could exist if the county in which the property was located objected to the condemna-
tion or if the condemnation conflicted with a statewide land use policy. k
71. Id. at 1449-50.
72. Id. at 1450 ("Had the local-mixed-statewide doctrine been applied in Telluride without an
automatic assumption that extraterritorial action cannot be local, the result should have been the
same, but the implications of the decision for other situations far less sweeping.").
73. Collins notes that this view was shared by the parties to the Telluride case. Id. at 1448.
74. See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENY. U. L.
REV. 1271, 1272 (2009) ("[M]ore than 80% of our population now lives in what can be defined as
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observed, "With most urban areas composed of dozens, if not hundreds,
of local governments-and few, if any, local governments, fully encom-
passing their economic and social regions-local governments inevitably
have needs which cannot be satisfied entirely within their borders and
inevitably undertake actions which affect people outside their bounda-
ries. '75
Local government decisions, particularly in the area of land use,
impose external effects on neighboring communities.76 Indeed, land use
regulation, once thought to be exclusively within the domain of local
government, has increasingly been viewed as a regional or statewide
concern.77
The Telluride court acknowledged the state's interest in extraterri-
torial condemnation when it noted that the state legislature may regulate
the exercise of extraterritorial eminent domain powers, even if it may not
prohibit it.78 This point was emphasized by Justice Coats' concurrence,
which explicitly recognizes the state's "cognizable interest in regulating
the acquisition of property, beyond their own boundaries, by so many
home rule cities." 7  In cases of extraterritorial eminent domain, both the
condemning locality and the locality in which the land to be condemned
is located have an interest regulating the property. Thus, as Professor
Richard Briffault observes, "surely the state has an interest in protecting
the land use regulatory authority and, more broadly, the policy-making
metropolitan areas, with their multiplicity of local government units and the corresponding overlap-
ping and intersecting boundary lines.").
75. Richard Briffault, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp: Extraterritoriality and
Local Autonomy, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 1311, 1317 & n.35 (2009) (citing Town of Telluride v. San
Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164-69 (2008)).
76. Davidson, supra note 63, at 1024.
77. See Ashira Peman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from
RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 717, 719-20 (2008) (noting a growing recognition that exces-
sive reliance on local governments may have contributed to regional problems such as exclusionary
zoning and environmental degradation). In some instances, local land use has been deemed of
federal concern. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads
of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L REv. 381, 389 (2002) ("The most appropriate role for
the federal government in land use issues is not embodied in a national zoning scheme, but rather in
the facilitation of community planning through guidelines, technical assistance, and funding.");
Shelby D. Green, The Search for a National Land Use Policy: For the Cities' Sake, 26 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 69 (1998) (documenting federal laws and programs that affect state and local land use,
including federal spending on highways, tax benefits and mortgage insurance, inner-city housing,
urban renewal, block grants, and enterprise and empowerment zones). More recently, the federal
government has constrained local discretion in areas where Congress determined that national inter-
ests should outweigh, or at least balance, local majoritarian concerns. See, e.g., Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7) (West 2009) (preempting local zoning process in siting of cell
phone towers); Energy Policy Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C.A. § 717b(e)(l) (West 2009) (preempting local
zoning of liquid natural gas terminals); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (West 2009) (regulating local zoning of religious land use).
78. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 170 n.8 (Colo. 2008).
79. Id. at 172 (Coats, J., concurring).
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autonomy of the local governments in which extraterritorially con-
demned land is located. 80
Professor Collins argues that the Telluride condemnation presented
no issue of statewide concern, in part because San Miguel County, the
locality in which the condemned parcel was located, agreed that the issue
was local to Telluride. County consent in this case, however, does not
negate the broader statewide interest in regulating extraterritorial con-
demnation, particularly since the County may not have fully accounted
for all of the extra-local interests impacted by the condemnation deci-
sion. 1
Instead, the County, a local political body, might have been overly
responsive to the desires of its wealthy Telluride constituency, especially
since the uninhabited parcel presented no opposing constituency. Thus,
the County, though more broadly constituted than a single locality, may
still be too narrow to fully internalize all of the costs associated with
certain local land use decisions. In contrast to a locality and despite its
own political process failures, a state government, at times, may be better
situated to balance extra-local costs.
CONCLUSION
In his article, Professor Collins highlights a number of unusual fa-
cets in Telluride's tale of extraterritorial condemnation. This Comment
demonstrates, first, that many of these twists and turns, including Tellu-
ride's stubborn refusal to accept any development of the Valley Floor
and Blue's subsequent attempt to circumvent the local community by
appeal to the state legislature, can be explained through a public choice
theory analysis of the state and local government political processes.
Moreover, this Comment argues that the ability of a local community,
particularly a wealthy community, to use its land use regulatory power to
stymie development that would benefit individuals who are not
represented in the condemning locality's political process gives rise to a
significant state-wide interest in regulating extraterritorial condemnation.
80. Briffault, supra note 75, at 1325.
81. See also Appellants' Reply Brief at 2, San Miguel Valley Corp. v. Town of Tellurde, No.
07SA101, 2007 WL 4312701 (Colo. Oct. 26, 2007) ("The Town and the amicus briefs denigrate the
state interest in the subject matter of the Statute by focusing upon the particular geographic position
of Telluride. But the state interest is self-evident when the focus shifts to the remainder of the state.
While Telluride may exist in isolation, many home-rule municipalities are part of larger metropolitan
areas. Indeed, the Denver Regional Council of Governments contains 30 home-rule governments.").
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